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

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Reflections on the Quarter

The SPD Election Victory

AFTER twenty years of Christian Democratic rule, the first Socialist Chancellor, Willy Brandt, entered Schaumburg Palace on October 21. Since 1957, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has steadily increased its share of the West German vote to become a serious competitor of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/-CSU). Over the past decade it has succeeded in shaking off its Marxist image and past, and has extended its electoral appeal to middle-class groups. Moreover, the combined vote for the two major parties increased from 82 per cent in 1957, and a low of 81.5 per cent in 1961, to almost 90 per cent of the total vote cast in 1969. Thus, the Federal Republic has experienced a trend toward a two-party political system, which has the advantage of producing a parliamentary majority for the governing party and, therefore, strengthening cabinet government.

Yet the SPD, in order to form a majority government, found it necessary to enter a coalition with the small Free Democratic Party (FDP). This action has postponed, at least for the duration of the coalition, election reforms conceived to eliminate splinter parties and hasten the creation of a truly two-party system. In all likelihood the 1973 elections will be held under the present laws, which combine the majority and the proportional systems of representation.

In Germany half of the 496 deputies to the Bundestag are elected proportionally and the other half in single-member constituencies. An exclusively majority system would have eliminated the FDP from parliamentary representation. It would also have minimized the prospects for the controversial National Democratic Party (NPD), since small parties like these can win seats only by gaining either 5 per cent of the national vote or a plurality in one constituency. The FDP barely exceeded the 5 per cent needed to attain representation, while the NPD fell short of this important threshold by only 220,000 votes. Had the NPD gained the required 5 per cent, it might have been necessary to continue the Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD that ruled the Federal Republic from 1966 until 1969 with a parliamentary majority of 447 seats and an opposition of only 49. Such a development would not have served the cause of representative government in Germany.

The SPD benefited greatly from its partnership with the CDU/-CSU. The Grand Coalition enabled it to demonstrate to middle-class groups, traditionally fearful of Socialist political programs, that the party had the potential to

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govern Germany effectively. When the Grand Coalition was formed in 1966, the German economy had slipped into what was, for German standards, a crisis. It was estimated that the deficit in the federal budget would reach $2 billion annually for a period of five years (the total budget in 1966 was $18.4 billion). After two years of inflation at the rate of 7 per cent, credit was tightened and, in turn, unemployment climbed to a record high of 2.5 per cent.

In close cooperation, Dr. Karl Schiller (SPD), Minister of Economics, and Franz-Josef Strauss (CSU), Minister of Finance, brought Germany out of the recession and succeeded in pushing through parliament legislation for medium-range budgetary planning, a reform of the distribution of taxes between the federal and *Länder* governments, and increased governmental control of the economy. At the same time, the federal and *Länder* governments cooperated successfully in programs for university expansion, regional economic planning, structural reforms in agriculture, and progress in ending the structural crisis of the mining industries.

The social policy of the Grand Coalition provided evidence that "welfare" is not a necessary evil but a socially profitable investment. Without the SPD as his ally, Hans Katzer (CDU), Minister of Labor, could not have conceived the far-reaching legislation that has improved the status of the 11 million blue-collar workers, who now enjoy equal status with 5.6 million white-collar workers.

In foreign affairs, the Grand Coalition policy of an opening to the East had its origins in previous governments. Yet it was during Brandt's tenure as Foreign Minister that ambassadors were exchanged with Rumania and Yugoslavia. And not until the Grand Coalition took office was an active policy pursued to ease tensions between the two Germanys. In the summer of 1967, Chancellor Kiesinger offered high-level negotiations on sixteen subjects. For the first time, the Bonn government encouraged West German business leaders to attend the Leipzig industrial and trade fair. However, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia dampened efforts toward further rapprochement. Talks between Dr. Schiller and Horst Solle, East Germany's Minister of Foreign Trade, were postponed indefinitely.

In the short time the new government has been in office, its impact on foreign affairs has been most noticeable. The Federal Republic has resumed the diplomatic offensive in the East interrupted by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In response, the leaders of the Soviet bloc met in Moscow in early December 1969. This conference may be considered a success for the Brandt government. Although it did not rebuke East Germany for her apparently uncompromising posture vis-à-vis West Germany, it refrained from imposing East Germany's policy position on the other bloc countries. As may be recalled, in 1967, after Rumania and the Federal Republic had agreed on the exchange of ambassadors, East Germany apparently

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succeeded in blocking further initiatives by the Bonn government in Eastern Europe.

In December West Germany announced that she was prepared to enter into negotiations with Poland for the "normalization" of relations. On December 22 Poland accepted the proposal. Bonn offered to sign a pact renouncing the use of force and recognizing the territorial integrity and the inviolability of the borders of the signatories, which would amount to a security guarantee for the still controversial Oder-Neisse frontier.

Although West German overtures to East Germany have produced an exchange of letters between the heads of state, they are not expected to bear fruit in the foreseeable future. While Bonn is interested in easing tensions between the two Germanys, it appears to place greater importance at present on reconciliation with Poland. Since Chancellor Brandt assumed office the West German government has stressed that it considers improved relations with Poland a cornerstone of its Eastern policy comparable to the priority given to reconciliation with France when Dr. Adenauer was Chancellor of the Federal Republic.

The SPD's success at the polls indicates its ability to draw votes from the white-collar middle class. In the election of September 28, all major cities voted Socialist. The SPD won 127 of the 248 constituencies, leaving the CDU/CSU with only 121. For the first time the SPD won more constituencies than the CDU/CSU. Yet, structural changes in the makeup of the SPD may affect its future base of support and hence its prospects for electoral success. The more the party appeals to the middle class, the more it risks alienating old party faithful who remained loyal because it was a workers' party. As workers' "class consciousness" and the SPD hold on labor groups weakens, the party is likely to find itself in greater competition with the CDU/CSU for labor votes. The election of 1969, to the extent that it has furnished evidence of the reduction of old cleavages and the strengthening of a broadly based two-party system, augurs well for representative government in Germany.

Toward Evenhandedness in the Middle East

SPEAKING on December 9, 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers made it clear that U.S. policy toward the Middle East is based on two assumptions: first, continuous conflict and occasional war benefits no one; second, the local antagonists are too suspicous of one another to negotiate a peace settlement.

Although permanent peace depends ultimately on the cooperation of the Arab states and Israel, the development of a "framework" for a settlement and the encouragement of negotiations are proper functions of the United States and other major powers. With this aim, the United States has participated in four-power and two-power discussions on the Middle East for the last eight months. All of these

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conversations, together with Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's special mission, are being carried out in accordance with a UN resolution of November 1967.

In that resolution Secretary Rogers saw four major themes and two important subsidiary themes which have relevance for U.S. policy. The major themes are peace, security, withdrawal and boundaries. The subsidiary themes are refugees and Jerusalem.

According to Rogers, the crux of the Arab-Israeli dispute is the relationship between peace and withdrawal. The Israelis fear that the Arabs mean no peace; the Arabs fear that the Israelis mean no withdrawal. Therefore, U.S. policy must have as its objectives to convince the Arabs to negotiate a viable peace and the Israelis to withdraw from territories occupied in the June 1967 war.

What does "peace" mean? In the U.S. view, peace is a binding commitment to good relations, including an obligation by Arab states to control infiltration of terrorist groups across borders. This corresponds with Clause II in the UN resolution, concerning the end of belligerency and the acknowledgment of sovereignty within "secure and recognized boundaries."

Withdrawal, as defined by the resolution, is "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." To what line of demarcation shall the Israeli armed forces repair? In the context of "peace" as conceived by both the United Nations and Secretary Rogers, they should withdraw behind "secure and recognized boundaries." Since the prewar boundaries were merely armistice lines, the postwar boundaries must be negotiated to guarantee security and recognition. Rogers declared that boundaries shall not "reflect the weight of conquest," but can involve "insubstantial adjustments for mutual security." Other security measures include demilitarized zones. But the practical security arrangements, within the UN framework, are subjects for negotiations among the states of the Middle East.

After Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries and the acceptance by both sides of demilitarized zones and "insubstantial" territorial changes, there will be a "climate" in which the refugees may be given a "positive future" and Jerusalem may be unified and open to Israelis and Arabs.

As an illustration of how the U.S. scheme might operate, Rogers revealed the gist of American discussions with the Soviet Union concerning the two principal parties, the UAR and Israel. Although no agreements had been reached, U.S.-Soviet discussions had produced "greater" understanding. The talks were not intended to split Cairo from other Arab governments; as the most populous and powerful Arab state, the UAR was simply the place to start.

The "four principal elements" of the discussions were: (1) Peace. There must be a binding commitment, including border control. (2) Security. Provisions should be negotiated by means of Ambas-

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sador Jarring's good offices and the only successful precedent in Arab-Israeli exchanges, the Rhodes formula of "indirect" talks. Recognition of Israel was *not* specified. Three security issues are foremost, Sharm el-Sheik controlling the Gulf of Aqaba, demilitarized zones (presumably in the Sinai), and the future of the Gaza Strip. (3) Withdrawal. Israeli forces must leave "Egyptian territory." (4) Secure and recognized boundaries. The pre-1967 "international boundary" is to be guaranteed for fifty years.

Subsequently, similar U.S. proposals for an Israeli-Jordanian settlement were disclosed. The Israelis should withdraw, with "insubstantial" territorial changes worked out in Rhodes-type negotiations. More controversial, however, were the suggestions for refugees and Jerusalem. The refugees would choose between Israeli compensation or repatriation to Israel, with the annual readmission rate subject to negotiations. Jerusalem would be governed jointly by Jordan and Israel.

The Secretary of State acknowledged that these proposals would probably not be well received by either side. He was correct. The semi-official Egyptian press dismissed his speech as a maneuver, pointing out that Cairo had already rejected these ideas in private primarily because they "infringed on the sovereignty of the UAR." The Israeli government proclaimed that Rogers' notions were not in the interest of "peace and security" and resented the neutral position implied by his speech.

The Israelis were especially bitter about the American suggestions for an Israeli-Jordanian settlement. They noted that the West Bank area, originally assigned as the Arab successor state to the Palestinian Mandate, had been conquered by Jordan in 1948 in a war initiated by the Arabs. Now, the refugees from that war, living in the West Bank, were to be given a choice of compensation by Israel or return to Israel proper. The Arabs demanded the return of territory occupied in June 1967 by Israel, while the Israelis called for peace and security, both of which, they alleged, had been jeopardized by the Arabs. Finally, the Soviet government attacked the U.S. proposals as "one-sided," evidencing "undiminished" American military and financial support for Israel.

The U.S. pronouncement has found no local support, except for a rumored Jordanian "interest." It certainly has not appreciably diminished the "one-sided" reputation of the United States in the Arab world. Whether Rogers' speech affected the rancorous Rabat Conference of Arab states is not clear, but the evidence suggests that the conference broke up of its own discord. The major achievement of the U.S. ploy has been to distinguish the American position from that of Israel.

There are several ambiguities in the speech. For instance, although it refers to "binding" commitments to peace, nowhere is the nature of such commitments explained. From the Israeli viewpoint this is a bizarre omission. One can conjec-

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ture that the contemplated demilitarized zones might be kept demilitarized by a UN force, but this is not specified. Moreover, there is that reference to "insubstantial [territorial] adjustments for mutual security." If such adjustments contribute to mutual security, they are unlikely to be "insubstantial."

The difficulty with the U.S. proposal is its insensitivity to opposing positions in the Middle East. To the Arab states Rogers says, in effect, that territory which rightfully belongs to you, since acquisition by conquest is inadmissible, will be returned if you discard your foreign policy since 1948 and recognize Israel's title to her pre-June 1967 borders. At the same time he calls upon Israel to accept her pre-June 1967 boundaries in return for Arab professions of peaceful intentions.

Should the United States and the Soviet Union *guarantee* the territorial status quo as it was before June 1967, including the presence of a United Nations force, then there will be a *de facto* "peace." Undoubtedly, this is the only way the local parties can be brought together, given the mutual suspicions that thus far have prevented direct talks. For this scheme to operate, the United States and the Soviet Union must exert direct influence over the most important local states. In addition, any UN force to patrol the demilitarized zone must be more responsive to the two superpowers than to any other members of the Security Council.

What the Secretary thus proposes is a division of the Middle East, with a possible UN force as a buffer zone between the United States and the Soviet Union. It forces Israel and the Arab states into a permanent embrace with their current big-power benefactors. It grants the Soviet government a full share in the Arab world and may well ensure a Soviet-American confrontation should the scheme fail.

The American plan appears to ignore the Palestine Liberation Movement. The Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese governments are not likely to desire, much less be able, to suppress the political movement whose rights and wrongs are the basis of the entire Arab position. In the pre-1967 situation, it was the commando movement that provoked Israeli military retaliation. Is a UN force in combat with the guerrillas a conceivable outcome? Is it not probable that the commandos will act as they have in the past, with all Arab governments disclaiming responsibility for them? The Soviet Union has had no difficulty supporting national liberation movements of its choice. (Moscow's recent *official* invitation to Al Fatah leaders to come to Moscow is a strong step in this direction.)

In short, if the local states cannot agree among themselves, peace and security must be imposed from outside. Since the commandos and the refugees are Israel's chief internal security problem, what "positive future" can be devised to thwart their proclaimed intention and active campaign to destroy the Israeli state?

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Because there is little in the U.S. plan to induce either the Arabs or Israelis to come to terms, it can work only if the great powers impose an impartial condominium, and this will require a détente, and perhaps even an entente, between Washington and Moscow. But in the Soviet view, "impartiality" means the punishment of the "aggressor" before peace negotiations begin. American neutrality on this issue was foreclosed by the events of 1967; the United States is censured for not having restrained the Israelis; the proof is our continuous support.

The Israelis are alarmed by the trend toward American impartiality. In their opinion, the Arabs will accept Israel's right to exist when they realize that otherwise their territory will not be returned. Yet recognition remains the chief prize the Arabs can deny their enemy, regardless of her military prowess. Israeli policy also rules out recognition of the Palestine Liberation Movement or a future for the refugees. At the same time, Al Fatah's official position that only a military solution can improve the situation eliminates this organization as a possible political spokesman for the refugees in negotiations with Israel.

Many U.S. policymakers, especially in the State Department, have been arguing that the U.S. stance has been driving the Arab states into Soviet hands. They fear that those Arab governments friendly to the United States could soon be pushed hopelessly into radical courses in order to survive in a hostile environment. The more "radical" states, especially Egypt, have been moving ever closer to the Soviet Union. We were reminded of this tendency in September 1968, when Cairo took a position on the Czechoslovakian invasion similar in most respects to that of Moscow. Moreover, the Libyan monarchy has fallen, and Western military bases in Libya are being dismantled. In Saudi Arabia, King Faisal has survived an attempted coup. In Jordan, King Hussein continues to face formidable domestic opposition.

If the Middle Eastern conflict wears out the Israelis over the long run, the Arab states will gain the advantage. If Israel continues to meet every challenge triumphantly, Israel will be preserved. If conflict results in the eradication of U.S. influence in the Arab world, then the Soviet Union will be the beneficiary. Thus, the premise that all parties view conflict as a vain enterprise is false.

Secretary Rogers stressed that mutual suspicions among the local powers make great-power intervention necessary to settle the dispute. Yet all the powers have intervened, by diplomatic device or military supply, before and after the war of June 1967. None can be considered to be impartial: the Arabs condemn the United States for having assisted Israel, and the Israelis are frustrated by continuing Soviet support of the Arabs.

The Egyptian government, the chief target of the U.S. policy of wooing the Arab states through a more "equal" treatment of both sides, conceives of a political solu-

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tion in the framework of the Declaration of Khartoum. That declaration consisted of three nays: no recognition, no negotiation, no compromise on the refugee problem. In the Egyptian view, immediate Israeli withdrawal must occur before any discussion about peace may be entertained; a political solution simply means restoration of the 1967 boundaries by means other than force.

By supporting Cairo's position, the United States might wean the UAR from Moscow and thereby share influence with the Soviet Union in the Arab world. As Israel's foreign mainstay, the United States undoubtedly could reclaim the temporary favor of the Arab states in return for pressuring Israel into an unconditional withdrawal and support of the Khartoum Declaration.

The Egyptians see the United States as the key to a satisfactory political solution, that is, peaceful Israeli withdrawal. Only Washington commands sufficient leverage over Israel to accomplish that. Yet current U.S. proposals do not go far enough to satisfy the minimum Egyptian position. U.S. policy remains the preservation of the State of Israel. This does not bind us to Israel's present policies or boundaries, but by merely affirming the right of Israel to exist, we impose serious constraints on our overtures toward the Arab states. So long as the Arabs maintain a policy of belligerent nonrecognition toward Israel, the United States is perforce aligned against them in their most important foreign and domestic political issue. As the guarantor of Israel's existence, it is the main obstacle to Arab goals. The Soviets have reminded us of the severe limitations on Washington's maneuverability by denouncing Rogers' proposals—despite the fact that they amounted to a virtual invitation to Moscow to share in a settlement at Israel's expense, since the chief supplier of her enemy would become coguarantor of her security. The Soviets apparently believe they can do better in the Middle East without peace.

If the price of Israel's secure existence is unremitting Arab hostility to the United States, together with powerful Soviet influence over the Arab world, then the United States has a simple choice: to pay the price, or to be satisfied with less than Israel's secure existence. Our policy options have been eliminated on the one hand by the Israeli military victory, and on the other by the Declaration of Khartoum. The circumstances of our dilemma spring from the 1967 conflict. If the United States concludes that the war was a precipitate provocation by men who were willing to risk war in order to push Israel to the wall, we are bound to Israel's side and to the prevention of such a situation in the future. If we decide that the war was a deliberate aggression by a muscle-bound Sparta not confident of its rights or tenure, then we are committed to the Arab side, and, in the long run, to a change in the nature of Israel. Current American policy, as enunciated by the Secretary of State, straddles this issue. The Soviets, Arabs and Israelis have cause to be indignant about it.

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The El Salvador-Honduras "Soccer War"

IN June 1969, conflict erupted between El Salvador and Honduras, precipitated by a soccer match. But had there been no World Cup Series between them, Honduras and El Salvador probably would have gone to war eventually. The ingredients for a conflagration existed and awaited only a catalyst. The causes of the conflict are to be found in the political, economic and social situations of the two belligerents.

El Salvador is seriously overpopulated, its citizens are poor, and the government has been unable to meet demands made on it. Approximately 3.1 million people crowd its 8,260 square miles, giving it a population density of 374 per square mile (compared with 50 per square mile in the United States). It also has one of the highest birth rates in the world, 3.5 per cent per year.

Per capita income is miserably low, although in recent years rapid industrialization has contributed to a high economic growth rate for the country, reaching 7 to 8 per cent in the early 1960's. Since then it has leveled off to about 6 per cent, still a relatively high figure. Despite the growth rate, large segments of the society have been frustrated by the inability of the economy to provide sufficient jobs for the growing population.

The growth of industry should not obscure the fact that El Salvador is an agricultural country, whose livelihood depends mainly on exports of coffee and cotton. The *campesino* has not benefited greatly from industrialization and his lot has not been improved by land reform. In El Salvador's unequal land distribution, one per cent of the population owns more than half of the arable land. The large landholders have shown little inclination toward redistribution.

The government has been virtually immobilized by the pressures put on it. President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez is dependent on the politically powerful landowning oligarchy (the "fourteen families"). As a result, he is unable to respond to demands from the rural population, which is becoming increasingly politicized. For several years El Salvador has remained peaceful despite overcrowding, poverty and an increasingly mobilized and frustrated population, simply because the dissatisfied have been able to emigrate, especially to Honduras. By 1969 about 300,000 Salvadorans had emigrated.

Honduras is underpopulated, with 2.5 million people on 43,227 square miles and a population density of 55 per square mile—about one-sixth that of El Salvador. But it is the poorest country in Central America and its economy, almost entirely agrarian, is growing at a lower rate than that of El Salvador, besides which its exports must compete with those of El Salvador on the world market. Although Honduras joined the Central American Common Market with great hopes, the other members consider it the weakest link in the economy of the region.

The President of Honduras, General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, came

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to power in 1963 by military coup. In March 1968 he was elected to office, but the results were so obviously fraudulent and his margin of victory so large that even he was embarrassed. Despite his weak claim to legitimacy, Lopez has embarked on a program of economic improvements, especially in agriculture and industry. In late 1968 the government authorized $15 million for land reform and plans to effect redistribution by granting government plots to *campesinos*. Industrialization is proceeding slowly. Few Hondurans have skills for industry, and unemployment is high.

As Honduras attempts to modernize, the influx of Salvadorans is complicating the process. Many immigrants are living illegally on government land. Those who are semi-skilled are better able than unskilled Hondurans to find employment. Resentment among the native population has become widespread, forcing the government to take several measures to deal with the problem: it has limited the benefits of land reform to Honduran citizens, restricted to 10 per cent the number of foreign employees in an industry, and has begun deporting immigrants who enter illegally. Meanwhile the Salvadoran government's reluctance to readmit citizens who had left, or even to stop the emigration, kept the conflict between the two countries simmering.

The details of the pathetic war sparked by an inconsequential sports match are of little importance. Rioting followed each game in the "best of three" series. El Salvador won the final soccer game, played in neutral Mexico City. This perceived national dishonor led Hondurans to retaliate against the Salvadorans living among them. Terror escalated on both sides of the border. About 15,000 refugees returned to El Salvador telling of atrocities, some of which have been verified. Both sides broke diplomatic ties and began massive propaganda campaigns. Within a month fighting broke out. It lasted five days, during which more than 2,000 people (mostly Hondurans) were killed. By the time the OAS was able to effect a cease-fire, Honduran air attacks had severely damaged El Salvador's industry, and Salvadoran troops were twenty-five miles inside Honduran territory. Both armies (of about 5,000 men each) were in disarray, ammunition and food supplies were unavailable, the air forces (about eight planes on each side originally) were crippled, and the news media had reached a level of hysteria.

Of great importance was the response of the other Central American states, the OAS, and the United States to this breakdown of peace. The first to react were Nicaragua, Guatemala and Costa Rica, concerned because the Central American Common Market was threatened by the rift between two of its members. In addition, war refugees created problems for the Central American republics. Nicaragua, especially, began to receive an influx of Salvadorans fleeing Honduras. The three nations offered to mediate immediately following the severing of diplomatic relations by the two belligerents.

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Their offer was accepted, but events made the attempt irrelevant. When armed conflict broke out, OAS peacekeeping machinery superseded the three-nation effort. During occasional border incidents in early July, the OAS continued to support the Central American mediation; once the war was in progress, the inter-American organization assumed full responsibility.

The Nixon Administration decided to defer to OAS attempts to restore peace. The day the war began, the President announced that the United States supported OAS efforts and would not act unilaterally. The administration, mindful of the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965, wanted to avoid hemispheric criticism of unilateral U.S. action, and it hoped the OAS would be strengthened by successfully mediating the conflict. Consistent with this reasoning, the United States refrained from attempting to influence the OAS effort; the U.S. delegation was unusually docile.

The fact that virtually all the armaments used in the war were U.S.-supplied proved embarrassing. In 1968 the United States had given $800,000 in military assistance to Honduras and $500,000 to El Salvador. The rationale was that both states needed the weapons to deal with communist insurgents and would acquire arms from another source if they could not get them from the United States.

With the outbreak of war, U.S. arms policy was challenged, especially by Senators Fulbright and Javits. Former Ambassador to El Salvador Murat W. Williams stoked the debate when he revealed that in 1963 and 1964 he had urged the United States to phase out its El Salvador mission. At that time, according to Williams, there were more men in the U.S. air mission than there were pilots in the Salvadoran Air Force. The Soccer War underscored the necessity of reviewing arms policies toward the developing world.

The OAS was ultimately responsible for restoring a semblance of peace. Before the fighting began, it had expressed concern and had sent three members of its Human Rights Commission to investigate El Salvador's claim that Honduras was mistreating its nationals. Mainly, however, it supported the mediation efforts of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

Once the war started, the OAS acted quickly, responsibly, and in a unified manner. Galo Plaza, the Secretary-General of the organization and former President of Ecuador, immediately sent a team of diplomats from seven states, including the three Central American republics and the United States, to report on the combat. Dr. Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States, headed the team. As fighting raged along the 860-mile common border, the two sides exchanged insults in an emergency OAS Council session on July 15, at which a unanimous resolution was passed calling for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The immediate goal of the OAS was a cease-fire. From July 15 to 18 the team headed by Sevilla-Sacasa shuttled between the capi-

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tals of the combatants (in a U.S.-supplied plane, the only overt sign of U.S. participation) discussing terms for a cease-fire with government representatives. In Washington Galo Plaza worked informally within the OAS structure. By July 17 both armies and air forces were in such disarray that organized fighting was reduced, although terror increased as deserting soldiers marauded. On July 18, with the background negotiations completed and both military efforts collapsing (Honduras was relatively worse off), the OAS unanimously passed a four-part resolution. A cease-fire was to begin at ten o'clock that night. Troops were to be withdrawn in stages within 96 hours of the cease-fire. The safety of the nationals of each country living in the other was guaranteed. The OAS would send representatives to both countries to insure the observance of the first three parts of the resolution. In addition, a resolution was passed asking the belligerents to restrain their hysterical propaganda attacks.

The resulting cease-fire was short-lived: El Salvador refused to withdraw troops from Honduras, claiming that the safety of its citizens in Honduras could not be guaranteed. The actual reason, however, was that the supporters of President Sanchez Hernandez threatened to dismiss him if he withdrew troops, because they feared the consequences of the return of refugees to El Salvador. There had been no resolution of the root cause of large-scale emigration: the refusal of the ruling class of overpopulated El Salvador to undertake reforms to deal with social and economic problems.

The OAS responded to El Salvador's challenge first with anger and dismay, then with admirable political finesse. Dismay sprang from the knowledge that if the OAS could not settle the conflict there was danger of intervention by neighboring countries, in which case the organization's effectiveness as a mediator would be destroyed. Throughout the crisis there were unverified rumors that the neighbors, particularly Nicaragua, were supplying arms and fuel to Honduras out of fear that the Honduran government was susceptible to a left-wing coup.

On July 23, in an emergency meeting, the OAS cited El Salvador for "noncompliance" and tacitly threatened diplomatic and economic sanctions if troops were not withdrawn by July 26. El Salvador replied with demands for international protection of Salvadorans in Honduras, indemnification of Salvadoran losses, free transit of Salvadorans, and prosecution as war criminals of Hondurans who harmed Salvadorans or their property. These demands received some support later when the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights charged Hondurans with "a wave of acts of aggression and unrestrained violence against Salvadorans residing in that country, and against their property and businesses, reaching excesses of brutality and the commission of very serious crimes." But at the moment many OAS members had only limited sympathy for the demands considering the source of the prob-

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lem, and in any event the organization did not have the resources to meet them.

When El Salvador had not withdrawn troops by the July 26 deadline, the OAS went into a closed-door extended session. Although exactly what happened has not been disclosed, the basic outline is known. In an effort to provide a resolution of the problem mutually acceptable to El Salvador and the OAS, Galo Plaza delivered a conciliatory opening address. El Salvador refused to remove troops and suggested sanctions against Honduras for mistreatment of Salvadoran nationals. This obdurate behavior isolated her from any potential support. As the other delegates pointed out with increasing frequency and emotion, under Article 17 of the OAS Charter even temporary military occupation is intolerable. El Salvador's military presence in Honduras was threatening the OAS; Honduras' treatment of Salvadorans, although deplored, was not. The OAS delegates applied extreme pressure and renewed the threat of diplomatic and economic sanctions.

At first El Salvador seemed prepared to endure the probable sanctions. Then the realities of the situation prevailed: the return of the refugees would be highly disruptive to the political system, but the imposition of economic sanctions would be catastrophic. El Salvador yielded to OAS threats, and the troops were withdrawn. The OAS had succeeded in ending the Soccer War.

What were the results of the war? Certainly neither of the participants benefited from it. The refugees were among the most pathetic in history. There had been more than 2,000 deaths with many more injured and great losses of property. The economies of both states were crippled because trade decreased, the Inter-American Highway was closed, industrial areas were damaged, tourism declined, and new taxes were needed to pay for the war. In addition, social programs designed to cope with long-term problems were diverted to deal with current disruption, and both governments now must meet increased problems and demands. In this situation El Salvador's President has become even more isolated and vulnerable, while Honduras' President seems to have gained popular support, at least for the moment. But most tragic is the fact that the war in no way alleviated the conditions which caused it.

The OAS and the collective security concept on which it is based were strengthened by the crisis. The delegates, and especially Galo Plaza, showed unusual political acumen, and the organization, often accused of being a tool of U.S. policy, performed well in the absence of overt U.S. pressure. Faced with a violation of the Charter, OAS members were determined to apply sanctions on the offender even though such sanctions are costly to all parties. Their threat led the state to change its behavior. Unfortunately for such international organizations, while failure to resolve a crisis can result in severe damage, success does not elicit commensurate rewards.

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The chief victim of the Soccer War may have been the Central American Common Market. Many experts feel that it has been destroyed, and even the most optimistic believe it will take five years to repair the damage. When El Salvador closed the Inter-American Highway and thus disrupted trade, a dangerous precedent was established. Free trade between members is only slowly resuming. The free movement of labor across national borders, a major goal of the CACM, now seems unlikely. Ultimately the effect of the war on the CACM will be determined by the reconciliation of the belligerents. Given the cause of the war—the behavior of Hondurans against Salvadoran immigrants and the large number of refugees — an early reconciliation is doubtful.

The Soccer War is most alarming when viewed as a possible portent of demographic conflicts to come. Overpopulation is a transnational problem, yet in the present system the governmental unit that must cope with the problem is the nation-state. If a state, such as El Salvador, fails to act responsibly to control the growth of its population, it inevitably creates difficulties for its neighbors. Such difficulties may lead to war. There are numerous governments that are remiss in this respect, and there is to date no discernible movement to treat the problem of overpopulation on an international basis. Eventually the Soccer War, despite all the suffering and institutional disruption it produced, may be seen as a minor precursor of major demographic conflict.

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SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

by Foy D. Kohler and Mose L. Harvey

MANY factors have contributed to the downgrading of the Soviet threat that has marked Western appraisals of the international situation over the past several years. Certainly one of the most basic is a recurrence among opinion-makers of an old habit of discounting Soviet as against U.S. capabilities in the sphere of science and technology.

No one has gone so far as to return to the pre-Sputnik appraisal of the USSR as a technologically backward nation. Most observers appear now to agree that the Soviet Union is capable of great achievement in particular fields, especially when related to urgent military needs, through marshaling overwhelming human and material resources on a "costs-be-damned" basis. Most observers also recognize that from the standpoint of overall activity the USSR deserves ranking as a technological superpower. Nevertheless, recent comparative appraisals of the United States and the USSR differ vastly from those of a few years ago. Not only have the extreme alarms of the Sputnik era died out. The USSR is portrayed as lagging seriously behind the United States in most areas of scientific-technological endeavor. And projections show the odds more favorable to a widening than a closing of existing gaps.

American scientists and technologists who have had opportunity to visit the Soviet Union and to view at first hand — and in some cases to participate in — ongoing scientific activities in the areas of their specialties have played a leading role in the reassessment process. Since inauguration of the U.S.-Soviet exchange program in 1958, several thousand American scientists and technologists have journeyed to the USSR for periods ranging from a few days to a year or so, and have returned to relate their observations and experiences. Quite a few have made repeat trips, gaining appreciably in authoritativeness as a result.

Consistently, these American visitors have been impressed by the high qualifications and attainments of some of the individual Russian scientists with whom they have had contact. Many have

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also been impressed by one or another particular line of investigation they have observed. Nearly all have been strong in praise of accomplishments in certain disciplines—notably mathematics, astronomy, branches of theoretical physics, and, within narrow limits, oceanography: the Russians are acknowledged to be among the world leaders in these fields. But as a general matter, the Americans have seen the overall level of research, experimentation and application in the USSR as substantially under that of the United States, and in many instances under that of Western Europe and Japan. All branches of chemistry, experimental physics, earth sciences, meteorology, communication sciences and communication technology, all branches of the life sciences, electronics, cybernetics, reliability engineering, nuclear power, computer-controlled automation, metal alloys, metal substitutes, and even metallurgy, have repeatedly been subjected to critical evaluation. It has not been unusual for observers to speak in terms of a Soviet lag of a number of years behind the United States, as for example "ten years" in the case of chemistry, "ten or more years" for different of the life sciences, and "many, many years" for cybernetics.

Americans have been particularly influenced by the contrast between U.S. and Soviet research facilities and support resources. Almost uniformly they have dwelt upon ill-designed and poorly-housed laboratories, limited equipment, overcrowding, the absence of research tools considered standard in the United States, the lack of trained research assistants and other support personnel, the paucity of research supplies, evident continued dependence on foreign sources for many basic items of equipment, the absence of sophisticated computers and other electronic devices. They have been impressed by the up-to-dateness of some "prestige" facilities and have shown awareness that other advanced facilities were off-limits to them because of military considerations. But this has not altered the seeming consensus: that from the physical standpoint the overall Soviet situation is somewhat primitive in comparison with the United States.[1]

[1]The authors have become acquainted with the reactions of a large proportion of American scientists who have visited the Soviet Union over the past ten years. We have found that while points of emphasis vary according to individual interests and experiences, there is a striking coincidence of views among an overwhelming majority as to the overall situation. We believe Professor John Turkevich reflected a general consensus among American visitors when he wrote in *Foreign Affairs* for April 1966: "Soviet scientific accomplishments have been spotty: outstanding exploits in space; solid engineering and application of nuclear science; brilliant work in mathematics, theoretical physics and astronomy; elegant experiments in certain

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West Europeans, who long were preoccupied with their plight "in between" the technological colossi to the East and West, have in recent years added their voices to the deprecatory appraisals of Soviet capabilities emanating from U.S. scientists and technologists. A main contributing factor has been the failure of the USSR to hold its commanding lead in space — something many European scientists appeared not to have expected — together with evidence that it has not realized the same sort of general forward surge in science and technology in consequence of its space efforts as has the United States. The West Europeans have been especially influenced by complaints of the Russians themselves over their comparative rate of progress, and have used data of Soviet origin to construct a picture of a technological gap between the United States and the USSR comparable to that between the United States and Western Europe.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for example, gave limited circulation in mid-1968 to a 738-page study on "Science Policy in the USSR" that showed, on the basis of Soviet sources, considerable disarray in Soviet efforts in science and technology. *The Economist* of February 8, 1969 used this study as point of departure for an appraisal that appears more or less typical of informed opinion throughout Western Europe:

> Looking at the Russians' achievements in space, one finds it hard to believe that one of their obsessions at home is with the technological gap between themselves and the United States, and the way to close it. The Russians are, after all, training quite a staggering number of scientists and engineers; half the students coming out of the universities are qualified as either the one or the other, making the number of young, technically qualified graduates coming out each year substantially higher than it is in the United States. . . . It is not lack of trained men that explains the gap, nor is it lack of money. The sums spent on science have been increasing annually and very rapidly. . . . The Russians have tried the brute force approach of throwing in masses of men and money on a scale approaching the American — but fail to get the results they were looking for. They are now groping for some more subtle key to technological innovation and this is having a profound effect on the
>
> branches of experimental physics. But in many important areas, Soviet work is either weak or pedestrian. . . . The research base of the Soviet Union is very narrow, confined as it is to academy institutes and four or five major universities. This may be contrasted to the diversity of research institutions in the United States. . . . Physical facilities for carrying out scientific investigations in the Soviet Union are barely adequate except in a small number of prestige laboratories. . . . Scientific equipment is either copied from American models or imported. The Soviet economy has not developed an instrument industry sufficiently alert to scientific discoveries, nor adequate to give logistic support to Russian scientists."

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whole of their economic thinking. For what the Russians appear to have found is that innovation requires first of all an attitude of mind that is not fostered by a normal Marxist economy.[2]

II

Up to a point, the change in view with regard to Soviet scientific and technological attainments represents a healthy development. Few of the false images that have been created from time to time about the Soviet Union have matched in absurdity the exaggerated notions of its overall scientific and technological prowess built up in the wake of Sputnik. Yet there is real danger that in redressing a serious imbalance in one direction we will create an equally serious imbalance in the other. This danger is all the more real since many who currently rate Soviet accomplishments and prospects as substantially below those of the United States appear not to give adequate weight either to recent adverse trends in U.S. policies and purposes or to remedial efforts in the USSR. In practical terms of U.S. national interests and needs, are we justified in the far-reaching inferences we seem to be drawing from what may be a transitory situation? Are we safe in projecting, as we appear intent on doing, a current balance sheet into the indefinite future? This question breaks down into whether we are, on the one hand, underestimating the potential of the Russians, or, on the other, overestimating our own.

III

There has long been a semblance of "roller-coasterism" in our evaluations of the Soviet Union. We tend to ignore or discount for extended periods impressive evidence of great purposefulness and intensive activity toward a given goal or goals. Then a sudden turn of events alerts our attention to what is actually going on and sheer surprise — sometimes consternation — causes an upturn in appreciation that generates its own momentum, sweeping not only up to but far beyond any realistically justified point. There follows a period of revision, born of Soviet failure to measure up to the artificially inflated expectations — or fears — and appraisals turn downward, again gathering their own momentum and passing far beyond a realistically justified point.

During the initial phases of the first Five-Year Plan, few took seriously this highly publicized effort to force the rapid

[2]*The Economist*, February 8-14, 1969, p. 64.

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transformation of the USSR into a first-class industrial power. The consensus was that the Russians were simply too backward, their system too faulty, their resources too limited to realize the goals they had set for themselves. The backdrop of such views was not the Soviet Russia actually existing in 1929, but the feudal, economically primitive Russia that had been conjured up as an aftermath of the Bolshevik takeover. Forgotten was the great industrial progress achieved during the four decades prior to the First World War, progress that had raised the one-time sprawling agricultural country to the rank of fourth among the industrialized nations of the world, with an impressive productive capacity in coal, steel, petroleum and textiles, and with a railway net second only to that in the United States. Forgotten also was the recovery that had been effected during the period of the New Economic Policy. And no one seemed to recognize the potential effectiveness of a single-minded leadership willing to go to extremes of ruthlessness to realize its purposes.

When, in 1932, the Kremlin announced the completion of the Five-Year Plan in four years and produced convincing evidence of striking successes in a number of fields, the news, in combination with the deepening Great Depression in the West, produced a shock wave. In the minds of many, Soviet Russia, for the first time, began to loom "twelve feet tall." Stalin, in reporting to his Central Committee on January 7, 1933, was consequently able to draw on a range of telling "before and after" views from the West.[3]

In subsequent years it became apparent that performance under the first Five-Year Plan had been less solid than had first appeared: Stalin himself once declared that "the picture [of plan fulfillment] is a motley one."[4] Moreover, the rate of growth tended to fall off sharply as the second Five-Year Plan was pushed in the mid-1930's. Meanwhile, the West was emerging from its depression, with Nazi Germany making especially rapid progress. These circumstances combined to produce a downward spiral in estimates regarding the USSR. By the time of the Nazi invasion in June 1941, the image of the Soviet Union had shrunk to that of an industrial pygmy, so lacking in the sinews necessary for modern war that it could have little hope of holding out more than a few weeks against German might. Thus it came as an unending surprise that the USSR was able to absorb the huge territorial and

[3]See Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), pp. 403-405.
[4]*Ibid.*, p. 363.

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material losses and still ultimately match the Germans gun for gun, tank for tank, and plane for plane.

At the end of the war, the outside world recognized that the USSR commanded a formidable war machine, but at the same time assumed the machine was doomed to increasing obsolescence over at least a decade. War devastation and the demands for reconstruction, in combination with the paucity of industrial resources and skilled manpower, were thought to preclude successful efforts to mechanize land forces, develop a nuclear capability, shift to a jet-propelled air force, or build a modern submarine fleet. The error once again was too little allowance for what the Soviets actually had in hand, and too little regard for what could be accomplished by a ruthless dictatorship bent upon massively extending its power base irrespective of either difficulties or costs.

These were the days of great military complacency in the United States, and this despite mounting political tensions and ominous crises around the world: days of the demobilization of the armed forces, an out-of-the-hat ceiling on the U.S. defense budget, smug conviction that our nuclear arsenal with its handful of weapons was adequate to our needs, confident assertions from many sides that we had little reason to go forward and develop a hydrogen bomb. Then came another of the shock waves. It was started by the Soviet explosion of an A-bomb in August 1949[5] — five to ten years ahead of the "schedule" set in the West — and fed by evidence of the swift transition of the Soviet air force to jet basis, the unveiling in 1949-1950 of a new arsenal of Soviet weapons ranging from automatic small arms to massive tanks and self-propelled rocket artillery, and indications that Moscow was concentrating major effort on the rapid development of a long-range rocket capability.

One of the consequences of this shock wave was to galvanize the United States into decisions it had hitherto been unwilling to take, paving the way for the atom bomb on a mass production basis; the green light to develop the hydrogen bomb; serious research and development on rocket missilery; and a start on new air and ground weapons systems. Other consequences, however, were of the overreaction category: Intelligence estimates began to speak of 300 Soviet divisions in place and battle-ready with the most modern arms and equipment, 30,000 combat planes, and a

[5]The explosion was in August. It was detected only some time later and was first announced to the world by President Truman on September 23, 1949.

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full fleet of snorkel submarines capable of operating off the very shores of the United States. In some circles, the USSR was conceded the capability of *simultaneously* overrunning Western Europe, the Near and Middle East, noncommunist Asia, and even the Japanese islands. An absurdly high rate of Soviet economic growth was not only accepted but projected into the indefinite future, with charts showing the gross national product of the United States equaled in the 1960's, surpassed on a per capita basis in the 1970's, and far outdistanced from the 1980's on.

Only with the death of Stalin and the beginning of startling exposures of deep flaws in the Soviet structure did alarms quiet and developments in the Soviet Union come into reasonable perspective. However, the revision process, which once again generated its own dynamics, soon brought the by then standard overcorrection. The new Soviet leadership talked freely about the plight of agriculture, the neglect of light industry and housing, and even of imbalance in the heavy industry sector. Investments had not yielded the returns they were supposed to have yielded. Labor productivity, the all-important key to progress, had mounted at rates far below the levels planned. Education had been neglected, and scientific research warped by arbitrary political decisions. To American ears, all of this bespoke not only a Soviet system in disarray, but a Soviet system with no choice but to effect a change in direction. No longer could Soviet resources and energies be concentrated on expanding the power base. Agriculture, consumer goods, housing, satisfying the aspirations of the Russian masses — these would have to be the priority targets of the future.

We thus admirably conditioned ourselves to be ill-prepared for Sputnik, making virtually inevitable a traumatic reaction to what should have been a predictable event. We need only have given due weight to what the Soviet Union could do and was signaling in many ways it was doing in a wide range of developmental areas.

IV

A circumstance that has influenced Americans as we first recover from the shock of Soviet accomplishments and then steadily downgrade the lasting implications of those accomplishments, is that we find it difficult to reconcile deeply entrenched notions about the Soviets with first-class competence in science and technology. We can accept the USSR as a big and formidable

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country, with a population capable of fortitude and great sacrifices in both war and peace, and a ruling regime given to ruthless effectiveness in manipulation of its people, unscrupulous use of political power on the international scene, and constant efforts to make propaganda and sway or intimidate the weak and unwary to its ends. But it runs against our grain to see the USSR as a modernized great power capable of moving effectively and purposefully on the frontiers of new science and new technology.

The A-bomb story is instructive in this connection. While some few Americans allowed the possibility that the Soviet Union might, with benefit of U.S. experiences,[6] be able to produce an A-bomb in relatively short order, the consensus of informed opinion was far more conservative. General Leslie Groves, organizer of the U.S. atomic effort, told the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy on November 29, 1945 that he believed another nation like the USSR could, "with complete secrecy," produce a bomb in from fifteen to twenty years, "more likely the latter. . . . It may be that instead of this being 20 years it should be 40 or 50. A good many people who know and have been in some of these countries [i.e., the Soviet Union] tell me they don't think they could ever build it. . . ." When Molotov asserted on November 6, 1947 that "the secret of the atom bomb . . . has long ago ceased to exist," he was almost universally discounted. And even when President Truman announced, on September 23, 1949, detection of a Soviet explosion, a surprisingly large number of observers refused to believe that Soviet capabilities had been greater than generally supposed: Soviet espionage and captured German experts, not Soviet science and technology, were alleged to have been the factors responsible for success.

In making such appraisals, no one seemed to give any appreciable weight to long-term, intensive Soviet interest and activity in the nuclear field. As early as the 1920's, Soviet physicists began serious research on the nucleus of the atom. By the mid-1930's research was progressing on a range of nuclear problems. Both fundamental and experimental work was under way at a number of institutes and was already producing important results as well as an increasing number of brilliant nuclear scientists, several of whom were soon to earn international reputations.

[6]Henry D. Smyth's *General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes* (Washington: GPO, 1945) sets forth these experiences in amazingly lucid detail.

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Among other things, the Soviets assumed a leading role in the development of cyclotron technology, and in the use of cyclotrons in nuclear research. The discovery of nuclear fission by the Germans Otto Hahn and F. Strassmann, in January 1939, aroused the same keen interest in the Soviet Union as in the West. Soon thereafter the USSR Academy of Sciences established a "Commission for Isotopes," and later a "Special Committee for the Problem of Uranium." After a brief interruption, the war brought a steady buildup of Soviet interest and activity. Evidently knowledgeable of what the United States was doing, the Soviets had a broad-gauged program under way by 1943, and efforts were increased to large-scale proportions by 1947.

How can disregard of this prolonged and extensive Soviet activity in the atomic field be explained, except in terms of arbitrary disparagement of basic Soviet capabilities in science and technology? Even as we stood awed by the first Sputniks, many refused to believe that anything more than a fluke was involved: the Soviets had lacked the technological capability to develop a sophisticated H-bomb and had to go for an outsized model requiring an outsized booster, which yielded the first earth satellite as a by-product. Later, the reaction was that the Soviets were engaged in easy "spectaculars," involving little more than capitalizing over and over again on their initial booster advantage to get large weights off the ground, while the United States was building highly complex machines, carrying out intricate and sophisticated experiments, and rapidly bringing space to the service of man in communications, weather observations, and the like. One can also detect strong notes of condescension in much of the current discussions of the technological gap. The tendency, it seems, is to concede that the Soviets have accomplished much, but after all "in the United States. . . ."

V

An even more serious danger is that we still have not brought ourselves to recognize the great importance the Soviet regime attaches to maximum development and full utilization of science and technology, or the overriding purposefulness with which it is concentrating human and material resources to these ends. This was one of the main reasons for our failure to foresee the speed with which the USSR would come up with a nuclear capability. Many of the estimates of Soviet prospects allowed the possibility of

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a bomb within a few years (usually five to seven), provided an all-out effort were made. But few saw an all-out effort as a strong likelihood, much less as the virtual certainty it was, given the known characteristics of the Soviet regime. In more recent years, the Soviet will to stay the course in space competition has repeatedly been discounted. Many have convinced themselves that the Kremlin is uninterested in further weapons development unless prodded into it by the United States. Currently skepticism prevails that the USSR will of its own volition leave no stone unturned in its search for an effective anti-ballistic missile capability.

What we need to keep in mind, however, is something more far-reaching than the Soviet willingness and ability to go "all out" to achieve selected goals involving advanced science and advanced technology. Soviet purposefulness extends to *general* preeminence — to world predominance — in the field. One of the most fundamental attributes of the Soviet regime is the ideological and practical conviction that through the forced development of science and technology the USSR can achieve world leadership. For the Soviets, it is an article of faith that their system — with its total power to set priorities, allocate resources and push forward in accord with a fixed purpose and without regard to costs, profitability or other such considerations — gives them an immense advantage over other countries in the maximum utilization of science and technology. Their attitudes and policies have religiously reflected exhortations of Lenin:

> The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically . . . perish or drive full steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history confronts us. . . . Only when the country has been electrified, when industry, agriculture, and transport have been placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, only then will we be fully victorious.[7]

The very fact that the Soviets have become obsessed, as *The Economist* put it, with "the technological gap between themselves and the United States, and the way to close it," is indicative of the overriding priority their leadership attaches to maximizing progress. For almost a decade, they have engaged in self-criticism and searches for improvements for science and technology that are reminiscent in their intensity, frankness and sobriety of the cam-

[7]From J. Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), p. 232.

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paign to improve agriculture in the 1950's. In the context of continued U.S.-Soviet competition on the world scene, we can properly draw reassurance from weaknesses on the science-technology front that the Soviets themselves have revealed. At the same time, however, we need to read their exposures and their thrashing about to overcome shortcomings as alarm signals, since they underscore the unrelenting purposefulness of the regime to achieve the preeminence it so badly wants and on which it is staking so much. It is important to note that, unlike the situation for agriculture, science and technology have been moved to a top place on the leadership's agenda not in response to a crisis but during a period of relatively great advancement.

VI

Bothering the Soviets most, and receiving their main attention, has been their inability to apply the scientific knowledge and technological capabilities that produced their space and other successes to the general requirements of Soviet economic development, that is, to spark a general advance on a broad national front. Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet party boss, pinpointed the matter at the Twenty-third Soviet Party Congress held in March-April 1966:

> Soviet science has won great prestige and has indisputably great accomplishments to its credit. However, mention should be made of the deficiencies that hold up its development. The gravest is its slow introduction of the results of scientific research into production. There is an unjustifiable gap between theoretical research and its technological and design development. Often, years pass before a discovery is applied in production — a fact damaging the national economy and science itself. Poor use of electronic computer techniques is one example of this.[8]

This problem is not peculiar to the USSR. Traditionally, the practical application of new knowledge lags behind its discovery. But it is particularly galling to the Soviet regime, since basic to its reason for being is the concept that "the socialist mode of production" makes possible a rationality in the adoption of new ways which is unattainable for "capitalist systems." As the Party Program formulated by the Twenty-second Party Congress held in October 1961 saw the future:

> In the current decade (1961-1970) the Soviet Union . . . will surpass the strongest and richest capitalist country, the U.S.A., in production per head of population. . . . All in all, capitalism is increasingly impeding the

[8] *23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1966), p. 109.

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development of the contemporary productive forces. Mankind is entering a period of scientific and technical revolution, bound up with the conquest of nuclear energy, space exploration, the development of chemistry, automation and other major achievements of science and engineering. But the relations of production under capitalism are much too narrow for a scientific and technical revolution. Socialism alone is capable of effecting and applying its fruits in the interest of society. . . . The USSR will possess productive forces of unparalleled might; it will pass the technical level of the most developed countries and occupy first place in the world in per capita production.[9]

The Soviet leadership has had to eat crow with respect to these boastful expectations. In the use of space-generated science and technology to effect a general advance it has found itself blocked by one of the most basic features of the Soviet system: compartmentalization. All sorts of obstacles stand in the way of transferring gains in one area to other areas, and in the past this has been responsible for uneven development: While tremendous strides were being made in heavy industry, light industry moved with glacial slowness and agriculture stagnated. Development of a sophisticated capability in electronics had little evident impact on the reliability of such things as telephone systems and elevators. The genius of Soviet design engineers has been anything but paralleled by the skill of mechanics who service automobiles, trucks and tractors. Computers guiding intercontinental ballistic missiles have had no impact on the marketplace, where abacuses hold sway.

Soviet political leaders as well as responsible scientists and technologists have seen their compartmented situation in sharp contrast to American flexibility. The U.S. space program — indeed, the gamut of the United States' major developmental programs, including those related to military needs — is being conducted not in isolation but as an integral activity within the mainstream of the American economy and all elements of the society. In carrying forward its programs,

the U.S. government has worked with industry, the universities and other organizations to buy lead time by underwriting the risk of long-term development and to encourage the formation of capital, the formation of research teams, the flow of information within the constraint of secrecy requirements, and innovation in materials, processes, components, products, and analytical techniques. Taken together, these policies and arrangements constitute an institutional framework within which

[9]Herbert Ritvo, *The New Soviet Society: Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: The New Leader, 1962), pp. 58, 114, 117.

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technology [in the United States] has burgeoned. . . . In nuclear energy, electronics, computers, aircraft, and many other fields . . . accumulation of the results of these "spin-offs" [has] effected a technological revolution for the whole world and helped to give the United States an industrial complex so great that an international conference has been called to study "the technological gap."[10]

A small but illuminating illustration of the "transfer" problem in the USSR is to be found in the experience of an American university professor who visited principal Soviet physics institutes. Although the institutes in question were concerned with research in areas of major emphasis in the USSR (controlled thermonuclear fusion and solid state materials and devices), the American noted no evidence of the use of microelectronics or integrated circuits in any of the electronic equipment in use. Some of the Russian scientists indicated to him that they "believed it was being used in the space program," but they had never seen integrated circuits incorporated in any of the electronic test equipment available to them. Such blunt evidence of the separation of the space program — the most important single area of scientific and technological research and development in the Soviet Union — from the mainstream of Soviet scientific activity took the American observer, who as a professor was intimately acquainted with every phase of the U.S. space program, by startled surprise.

Kirill Mazurov, member of the Politburo and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in commemorating the Bolshevik Revolution last November, reflected Soviet concern over the greater returns the United States was realizing from its investments in research and development:

In our days, the scientific-technological revolution is becoming the most important springboard in the struggle between the two social systems in the world arena. Everything shows that the capitalists are paying much attention to this situation. The U.S. monopolies, spending ever larger sums for scientific research, for perfecting technology, among others through enticing scientists from other capitalist countries, are trying to perpetuate the so-called "technological gap" between the economies of the socialist countries and that of the United States.[11]

Others among Soviet leaders have spoken with even greater frankness and explicitness. Peter L. Kapitsa, Director of the prestigious Institute of Physical Problems of the Soviet Academy

[10]Richard B. Foster and Francis P. Hoeber, "The Technological Feedback from Defense R&D," a paper prepared for the Conference on Atlantic Technological Imbalance and Collaboration, Deauville, France, May 25-28, 1967, pp. 1 and 4.
[11]*Pravda*, November 7, 1968.

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of Sciences and long one of the most influential of academicians in the science-technology area, gave a graphic account of the harsh realities that were so disturbing to the Soviets in his report to the USSR Academy of Sciences on December 13, 1965. Kapitsa's appraisal echoed views that were being widely voiced in scientific and industrial circles throughout the Soviet Union. We believe his report worthy of close examination:

> . . . The basic indicator of the progress of a national economy is the productivity of labor, and the increase in the productivity of labor is achieved in the main by the assimilation of new technology and the attainments of science. When the growth of the productivity of labor slackens, the reasons for this must be sought in the deficiencies of assimilating by industry the achievements of science and technology. . . .
> . . . The assimilation of the achievements of science and technology by industry takes place slowly and with difficulty by us [i.e., in the Soviet Union].
> . . . They [the Americans] now produce about one-third of world science. We produce one-sixth of world science, that is twice less than they. Each of the remaining countries produces less than we. Therefore in scientific production we are the second country in the world. However, if one takes into account . . . [that the numbers of American and Soviet scientists are approximately equal] then it appears that with approximately the same number of scientific workers we produce half of the scientific work which the Americans produce. . . . The productivity of our scientists is approximately two times lower than the productivity of the scientists of the USA.
> . . . We must quickly find a way for overcoming the lag [of Soviet science behind American science]. If in the near future we will not increase the labor productivity of our scientists, will not improve the conditions for assimilating by industry the achievements of science and technology, then the problem of catching up with America, of course, cannot be solved. If we decisively and capably utilize the great advantages our socialist system provides in organizing our science and industry, then this lag in growth will only be a temporary hitch.[12]

VII

To the need for greater effectiveness in organizing science and technology, which Kapitsa so heavily stressed, the Soviet leadership has been diligently addressing itself over the past decade. Back in June 1959 a Plenary Session of the Communist Party Central Committee took up the problem of "the poor coordination of research" and the "dispersal of forces which lowers

[12]Peter L. Kapitsa, *Teoriya, Eksperiment, Praktika* (Moscow: Znaniye, 1966), pp. 7, 13, 14. This 47-page pamphlet containing some of Kapitsa's speeches and articles extending back to 1941 shows that he had repeatedly emphasized similar points.

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the level of research . . . and delays its practical application," and criticized the USSR Academy of Sciences for overextending itself. The Committee approved a new Statute for the Academy which, while leaving the organizational structure largely intact, extensively redefined the scope of its responsibilities. Two years later another step was taken. Authorities had become convinced that the Academy was functioning inadequately in the industrial research area and at the same time was so dissipating its resources as to interfere with its efforts for basic problems, especially in key fields like cybernetics and biology. The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on April 12, 1961 adopted a new decree, entitled "Measures for Improving the Coordination of Scientific Research in the Country and Activities of the USSR Academy of Sciences." The Academy's role in applied research was greatly reduced, and the industrial-oriented and specialized institutions of the Academy were transferred to industrial ministries.

Following this, steps were taken to bring under a single umbrella all scientific and research activities not associated with industrial ministries. On April 11, 1963, a government-party decree "On Measures to Improve the Activity of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Academies of Sciences of the Union Republics" placed on the USSR Academy responsibility for "scientific leadership of research on the most important problems in the natural and social sciences carried out by the Academies of Sciences of the Union Republics, the higher educational institutions, and other scientific research institutions of the country, and coordination of work in these areas of sciences."[13] The USSR Academy's coordinating duties were extended to embrace all non-Academy institutes, and to facilitate this operation some ninety science councils and commissions were attached to it. At the same time, however, the USSR Academy was relieved of responsibility for applied research and development, and technically-oriented research institutions that still remained under its jurisdiction, as well as those of the academies at the republic level, were shifted to ministries.[14]

These several measures evidently made the administration of the rapidly expanding range of scientific activities more orderly. Nevertheless, they did not get at, and may well have accentuated, the key organizational problem: how to end "the isolation of

[13] *Pravda*, May 17, 1963.
[14] *Ibid.*

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theoretical science from life on the one hand and on the other an insufficiently high quality of experimental work," something "that is opposite to what takes place in the United States."[15] Further and more far-reaching innovations were necessary. As Council of Ministers Chairman Kosygin told the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966: "A well-ordered system of balanced organization and stimulation of the speediest and most economical application of the results of research in production must be set up as soon as possible. The development of direct cost-accounting links between research institutes and factories will undoubtedly promote a more rapid application of results of research to production."[16]

VIII

Despite Kosygin's appeal for urgency, two years of head-knocking among vested-interest groups ensued before the Kremlin was ready to act decisively. Its action took the form of a decree — published on October 23, 1968 — entitled "On Measures for Raising the Effectiveness of the Work of Scientific Organizations and Accelerating the Utilization in the National Economy of the Findings of Science and Technology."[17] Although this edict represents the most comprehensive and innovative program of reforms the Soviets have attempted in the scientific-technological sphere, it has received little attention in the West. The decree attests both to the depth of the leadership's dissatisfaction with the existing situation and to the extent of its willingness to break with precedent to dispel the sources of that dissatisfaction, including an attemped application of some American practices. The stated rationale is that

> it is necessary to improve significantly the activities of scientific organizations, to eliminate the obstacles which restrain the utilization of the achievements of science and technology in the national economy.
> . . . the general shortcoming in the work of scientific research, design, design-construction, technological organizations, and the scientific subdivisions of higher educational institutions consists of the fact that their activity is not concentrated to the necessary extent on the solution of the most important scientific-technical problems and especially questions connected with the acceleration of the tempo of growth of labor productivity.

[15]Kapitsa, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.
[16]*23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, op. cit.*, p. 182.
[17]The text of the decree can be found in *Pravda,* October 23, 1968. Quotations in the analysis that follows are from this text.

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Measures encompassed by the decree include (1) new planning procedures, (2) organizational changes, (3) financial changes, (4) incentives and sanctions for organizations and individuals, and (5) the development of "competition in the scientific-technological field and the prevention of monopolies in solving the most important scientific and technical problems." It specifically notes that the "newest achievements" of both foreign and domestic science and technology are to be drawn upon.

The new planning procedures involve the preparation of scientific-technological forecasts for a long period — ten to fifteen and more years — with regard to principal problems in the development of the national economy. These forecasts are to guide "ministries and departments, and the union republic Councils of Ministers" in developing designs for plants and production, machines and equipment. V. A. Kirillin, Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology, had stressed the need for such long-term forecasting in an article in the May 1968 *Economic Gazette*:

> Until recently, insufficient attention was given to planning the development of science and technology in perspective, for 10-20 years ahead and in individual cases for a longer period. There is no need to speak . . . of the imperative need for the perspective working out of the development of science and technology for a long period, at least for the most important trends. This will provide the possibility for determining more correctly the general direction of the development of technology, for utilizing resources more rationally, for avoiding many costly mistakes.

Responsibility for preparation of the forecasts is allotted to the Soviet State Committee on Science and Technology, along with the State Planning Agency (Gosplan), the USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Construction Agency (Gosstroi) and interested ministries and agencies, including union-republic Councils of Ministers. In addition, the decree accords to the State Committee for Science and Technology responsibility for preparing with the USSR Academy of Sciences and interested government agencies the list of basic trends in the development of science and technology and principal scientific-technical problems to be used in establishing the scientific-technical goals for the Five-Year Plan. These new functions for the State Committee represent a reduction in the planning responsibilities which had been accorded to the USSR Academy in 1963.

Among the organizational changes the decree introduces is the "recommendation" that the USSR economic ministries and other

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government agencies establish, where necessary, "composite scientific institutions fulfilling scientific-research, design-construction and technological tasks" and attach scientific-research institutes to large industrial enterprises. These provisions are similar to Kirillin's recommendations in the *Economic Gazette*.[18]

The decree's principal financial changes include an attempt to provide flexibility in allocating funds for scientific research. It permits USSR ministries and departments and the union-republic Councils of Ministers to retain "an undistributed reserve of two per cent of the total budgetary allocations" for scientific research to be used "for strengthening the most important trends in scientific-research work." The State Committee on Science and Technology is granted "the right to redistribute with the agreement of the ministries and departments the total expenditures for scientific-research work, including the wages fund." The decree also establishes a special fund at scientific-research, design-construction and technological institutes for additional capital investments and the purchase of scientific equipment and materials. The source of this fund is to be the income from contract work and intraministerial orders fulfilled by the institutes and the sale of licenses for their inventions.

In introducing a new series of incentives and sanctions for scientific-technical organizations and personnel, the decree instructs USSR and union-republic ministries and departments, and the USSR, union-republic and specialized Academies of Sciences to evaluate at least once every three years the activities of their subordinate scientific-research, design-construction and technological organizations, including the scientific subdivisions of higher educational institutions. Both the quantity and quality of the work performed by the subordinate institutions and its "general economic effect" are to be judged. In accordance with the evaluation, decisions will be taken for the further development of the institutions and "the additional material encouragement of the personnel through the centralized premium funds of the ministries and departments." Institutions and organizations that fail to fulfill their assignments will either be closed or reorganized.

Starting in 1969, the work of individual scientists, with some exceptions, will be evaluated not less than once every three years by

[18]In that article Kirillin said "if the necessary conditions are present, it may be advisable to transfer design-construction and scientific-research organizations to the direct jurisdiction of [industrial] enterprises."

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a commission consisting of "highly qualified scientists, and representatives of Party and trade-union organizations." A *Pravda* editorial of October 24, 1968 indicated that this provision involves a check of not only the professional performance but also the "business-like and political qualities" of the scientists.

To develop competition the decree calls upon governmental agencies, the USSR and other Academies of Sciences "in necessary instances to commission several organizations following different channels with the fulfillment of research investigations and also design-construction and technical projects." For especially important problems the competing research investigations will be permitted to continue until experimental samples are built before final choices are made between them.

The increased responsibilities for scientific research accorded to the Soviet State Committee with the implied reduction in powers of the USSR Academy, plus the incorporation into the decree of proposals identified with officials of the State Committee, suggests the possibility that Soviet bureaucrats will now dominate the scientists and have the opportunity to introduce an approach to scientific matters alien to the latter. However, the top leaders of the State Committee — Kirillin and V. A. Trapeznikov, respectively chairman and first deputy chairman — are not only administrators but are themselves scientists and academicians.

Comment on the decree leaves little doubt of the Soviet leadership's high hopes that it will, at long last, enable the USSR to make, as Brezhnev said at the Twenty-third Party Congress, "increasingly effective use of the socialist mode of production." Whether these hopes will be fulfilled, or whether the Russians will again find, as *The Economist* pointed out in the February 1969 article cited above, "that innovation requires first of all an attitude of mind that is not fostered by a normal Marxist economy," remains to be seen. The critical issue is whether long-established institutional rigidities, which have ruled in the area of science and technology as in other areas in the Soviet Union, can be broken down. That they never have been before may be all important. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership displays a new awareness of the problem and a new determination to act decisively. It may also be, as some Soviet scientists are suggesting,[19] that the sheer magnitude and complexity of the requirements being

[19]See, for example, Andrei D. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), *passim*. Views in keeping with Sakharov's have been widely noted by the authors among Soviet scientists.

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generated by the rapidly accumulating new knowledge and technology in the USSR will give a weight to this reform effort that has hitherto been lacking.

IX

Meanwhile, there appears no likelihood of a let-up in the Soviet practice of pouring ever larger resources into the further development of science and technology. Soviet leaders have never stinted in the supply of money to attain preeminence in this area, even during trying times. They have not debated the matter from year to year, or even on occasions of political change. They have simply gone ahead as a matter of course. Moreover, the rate of increase of expenditures for science and technology has generally been greater than for any other area. For many years the annual growth has been as high as 14 per cent and seldom under 8 per cent. In 1965 two and one-half times as much was spent on science and technology as in 1958, and in 1967 three times as much. Allotments in 1968 totaled some nine billion rubles as against some three billion ten years earlier. Several times as much is spent on science each year as on higher education.

As for the future, the leaders, despite dissatisfaction and complaint over the current productivity of their scientists, profess to remain convinced that investments in science yield greater dividends than other types of investment and evidence an intent to double the present rate of support. Writing in the *Economic Gazette* of July 1968, Trapeznikov asserted:

> . . . a ruble invested in science and the assimilation of its results gives 1.45 rubles of growth in the national income. On the other hand, the growth of national income from the usual capital investments comprises 39 kopeks for the invested ruble. Consequently, expenditures on science and the assimilation of its results are approximately 3.5 times more effective than the usual capital investments. Since investments in science are particularly effective, it is advisable to reduce somewhat the [usual] capital investments and to give the released resources to science and the assimilation of its results. . . . In accordance with our calculations we should increase expenditures on science two times. . . .

X

However inefficient the Soviets may be in comparison with the United States in particular lines of endeavor, investments in science and technology on the scale projected by Trapeznikov can hardly fail to produce significant results, particularly since they

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are being coupled with new and somewhat imaginative approaches by the authorities to get the most out of the monies expended.

What of the United States on its side? What of our own prospects? U.S. investments in science and technology have, over the past decade, more than kept pace with those of the USSR. As a percentage of gross national product they have averaged about the same — somewhat above 3 per cent according to the best available estimates. This means that in terms of dollar amounts the U.S. outlay has almost doubled the Soviet. Should this situation continue, lasting U.S. preeminence would be assured, not only because of the larger base on which the United States is building, but also because of the greater productivity of American scientists and engineers.

Is it likely that the United States will be willing to maintain the current level of support on a sustained basis? Unlike the USSR, it has not accepted public responsibility for promoting research and development as a matter of deliberate policy. It has, because of peculiar circumstances, made an exception in a few selected fields — notably agriculture, waterway engineering, Bureau of Standards work, and more recently aviation, public health and nuclear energy. Otherwise, federal involvement in research and development has been in response to externally generated crises of one sort or another, and then only to take care of the crisis situation. In contrast to most other modern great powers, the United States traditionally has not even carried forward as a matter of course substantial research and development in fields related to military security. Between the two world wars, for example, U.S. expenditures for military R & D were but a fraction of those of Germany, the USSR, Britain, France and Japan.

Truly large-scale government efforts in science and technology were undertaken for the first time in World War II (during World War I we had largely depended on French and British efforts), and once the conflict was over, these dropped off precipitously. Only the sense of peril arising from developments in the Cold War, and particularly the Soviet explosion of an A-bomb, the Korean War, and indications of extensive Soviet activity in the field of rocket missilery, reversed the downward trend. It remained for Sputnik, however, to plunge the federal government into the science and technology field on a large-scale, across-the-board basis.

What has happened since Sputnik, and not our long-term

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stance, is the measure by which we and others appraise the future prospects of U.S. science and technology, both absolutely and in comparison with the Soviet Union. Are we safe in this? Given trends of recent years, the answer would seem to be no. As our anxieties with regard to the Soviets have calmed, resistance has built up to government programs requiring costly R & D. The McNamara years in the Pentagon evoked the concept that we have gone as far as we need to go in weaponology, that further developmental work would in fact be counterproductive because it would incite the Soviets to efforts they otherwise would forgo.

Research and development in the defense area has for some time been drying up. Beginning as early as mid-1963 — and strongly stimulated by allegations that the Soviets were having no part of a "moon race"— need for a space program of the nature and scale we had adopted in 1961 has been increasingly questioned, and budgets have since been substantially under the level required to achieve the broadly-based "preeminence" we had set as our objective in space. Decisions have not been made and monies have not been provided for preparatory work necessary for a large-scale space effort after the Apollo moon-landing project is brought to a conclusion. Unless a new tack is taken, the space program — the greatest single stimulus to research and development activity in recent years — will dwindle to small proportions. Currently there is strong resistance to the varied efforts and activities that almost surely will lead somewhere, sometime to an effective defense against ballistic missiles. Most important, perhaps, the government seems increasingly unwilling to continue, at any substantial level, with one of the most revolutionary of the innovations introduced after Sputnik: direct federal support of the training of persons capable of working on and extending the frontiers of new science and new technology.

The growing inclination of the United States to turn its attention and energies inward to meet urgent social problems, together with a burgeoning neo-isolationism, seems to make unlikely a reversal of these trends, at least for the near term. The prospect, consequently, is for a sharp decline in U.S. inputs into science and technology at the precise time that the USSR will be increasing and accelerating its own.

How serious will the effect be for the United States? Some argue that technological progress in this country is little affected by federal programs, no matter how big. Yet the United States has at-

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tained a leading role in *advanced* science and *advanced* technology only as the government during and after World War II has adopted and carried forward large-scale programs. We have, of course, long led the world in ability to make use of new knowledge and technology. But except for agriculture, the new knowledge and new technology used have largely been the product of others. It is instructive to recall that during the first forty years of the Nobel prizes — that is, from 1901 through 1940 — U.S. nationals, including those trained abroad, received only ten in the sciences as against thirty for Germans, nineteen for Britishers and thirteen for Frenchmen. Since 1940 — during the years of major governmental programs — the U.S. total has exceeded the combined total of all of Europe, including the Soviet Union. Similarly, most of the great discoveries and developments responsible for launching the ongoing technological revolution were of European rather than U.S. origin. The United States has gained the leading role in carrying the revolution forward, but again this has been only after the inauguration of large-scale federal programs.

Federal programs have been the direct or indirect source of more than 80 per cent of total funds devoted to scientific and technological research and development in this country over the past ten years. Federal funds, direct and indirect, account for some three-fourths of the costs of graduate training and research in American universities. Is it conceivable that these funds can be substantially reduced without crippling the capabilities of the nation in science and technology?

The simple fact is that the requirements incident to marshaling, organizing and managing the resources necessary for a continuing advance in science and technology have become so vast and so complex that they can be met only by an effort involving the whole of our society. If the United States is to remain at the forefront of an increasingly technologically-oriented world, this is one of the most basic of the many hard realities it must face. We cannot as a nation rely upon an existing level of superiority — not in view of what is going on in the Soviet Union. It is true that, by their own admissions and objective outside observations, the Soviets are behind the United States in most areas of science and technology. But it seems to us that we have not learned from experiences of the past how to make a sound and dispassionate analysis of the meaning of this for the Soviets' enduring capabilities and purposes in comparison with our own. As we

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ourselves achieve spectacular successes, as for example in the space program, we become inclined by the ensuing euphoria to let our efforts slip, rather than to look objectively at either long-term Soviet trends or our own long-term interests.

From this comparative study of the scientific and technological efforts of the two superpowers we have reached two fundamental conclusions: The United States still needs to learn to make and rely upon a truly objective analysis of the Soviet effort, not going from one extreme to the other; and, similarly, we must objectively establish our own national capabilities, purposes and needs. The immediate question, therefore, is whether we can today fashion a rational program in science and technology for ourselves for the future, or whether we are again to wait until some new spectacular Soviet breakthrough forces us into a crash program not of our own choosing. This leads to an even more sobering question: Can we continue indefinitely to count on being able in such situations to catch up in time?

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: THE RELEVANCE OF ITS PAST TO ITS FUTURE

by Robert H. Johnson

THE Nixon Administration is engaged in "reviving" the National Security Council. The Council is now meeting regularly and is back in our newspapers. The President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, quickly assembled a large staff and took over direction of an interdepartmental committee structure which was previously under the wing of the State Department. The inside-dopesters have been preoccupied with how Dr. Kissinger's activities may be affecting the relative power of Secretary of State William Rogers. For the longer term, the more interesting questions are how the latest developments may affect the basic structure of decision-making in foreign and military affairs and how they relate to prior efforts to make the NSC an effective organization. It is too early to answer such questions with assurance, but a look at past experience with the NSC can provide a backdrop against which it may be possible to offer preliminary assessments of the significance of recent changes.

The need for a National Security Council seems logically inescapable in this age of nuclear weapons, interdependence of foreign and military affairs and deep U.S. international involvements. Yet what logic makes necessary, it does not necessarily make effective. As experience has shown, making the NSC an effective organization is an exceedingly difficult task. We can perhaps best probe the difficulties by looking first at how the role of the Council has reflected the constellation of forces within the four previous administrations and then examining the kinds of functions the Council might perform and has performed.

Any effort to analyze past NSC experience must begin with the realization that there is nothing more complex or difficult to generalize about than the processes by which foreign and defense policies are made. Frequently even insiders do not know precisely when a particular policy decision was made or what discussions or other factors influenced it. An institution like the NSC is, at best, only one channel in a complex policy stream. How NSC consideration of an issue may have been related to, and influenced or

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determined by, the handling of that issue in other policy channels is often obscure.

I

Looking at the NSC in broad perspective, one observes that its first thirteen years under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower was a period of gradual institution-building. This was followed by a sudden de-institutionalization under President Kennedy. While the Johnson Administration groped for institutional substitutes for the NSC, it had not found effective new answers before its term of office ended. Eisenhower is sometimes credited with creating the elaborate NSC system of the 1950's, but the changes his administration introduced were simply the logical extensions of developments that had occurred under Truman. The gradual institutionalization of the NSC reflected the changing interests of the State and Defense Departments and the White House. In this evolution of interests, the USSR's explosion of its first nuclear device and the onset of the Korean War played a crucial role, just as they played a crucial role in determining the substance of U.S. defense and foreign policies in the 1950's. But to understand the impact of these events we must first go back to the origins of the NSC.

Although the idea of creating a cabinet-level committee in the field of foreign and defense policies was pushed by a number of persons in the postwar period, it is identified most clearly with James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, subsequently the first U.S. Secretary of Defense. It was a study committee created by Forrestal and headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt that first proposed the name "National Security Council" and provided a statement of the Council's functions much like that which was subsequently written into the National Security Act of 1947. The idea had an important part of its inspiration in the wartime contact of American military officers and civilian defense officials with British committee practice in the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff and the British Cabinet Committee on Imperial Defense. Another stimulus derived from long-standing Navy Department views as to proper national defense organization.

Thus, the proposal served several purposes. For the Navy, opposed to a strongly unified department of defense, the new body was to provide top-level coordination of the three services (especially in budgetary matters), but without integration. There was also a desire for the protection against error and for the

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coherence of decision-making which was supposedly provided by the British cabinet system of government. Some evidence suggests that some supporters of the concept felt that Harry Truman was a weak successor to Franklin Roosevelt and that the NSC would provide a partial institutional substitute for a more adequate President. While there was formal acceptance of the idea that the Council was advisory to the President, some seemed to expect that the President would become committed in Council and that the NSC would, therefore, have something of the character of a genuine collegial policymaking body.[1]

Defense officials were also concerned with ensuring a continuing military voice in foreign policy. Their concern expressed itself in a desire to coordinate defense policy with foreign policy. The failures of coordination during World War II, which provided one rationale for establishing the NSC, were the consequence of the dominance of military considerations and of the military departments, in decisions with respect to the conduct of the war. But now that the war was over, the problem was how to maintain some continuing military influence on foreign policymaking and how to influence domestic policies relating to future military "mobilization." This is not to say that Pentagon officials sought to dominate foreign policymaking; they were quite sensitive to the danger that they would be charged with such ambitions. But they did see the NSC as essentially *their* instrument in the foreign policy field. Forrestal, according to his diaries, regarded the NSC "as an integral part of the national defense setup."

This perspective of defense officials was reflected in their effort to have the Secretary of Defense preside over NSC meetings in the absence of the President. In this attempt they pointed to the provision of the statute establishing the NSC, that the "Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant of the President in all matters relating to the national security." The effort to maintain military influence also led to an attempt to have the NSC Staff located physically in the Pentagon. (Offices were actually set aside, but never occupied.) These efforts failed. The Secretary of State was designated by President Truman as the second-ranking Council member, and he presided at Council meetings during the first two and a half years of the Council's existence, after which Truman began attending and presiding. The NSC Staff was housed in

[1]Cf. Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), Chapter 8, especially pp. 203-213.

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the Executive Office Building next to the White House, thus symbolizing the Council's role as an arm of the President. However, Secretary Forrestal was a very active member of the Council, and during the NSC's first year the Pentagon originated almost as many Council projects as the State Department.[2]

But the Pentagon could not influence foreign policy if the State Department was unwilling to play the new game. State's cooperation was essential to the effective operation of the Council in peacetime. Accordingly, the first Executive Secretary of the Council, Sidney Souers, a businessman and wartime admiral, went to some lengths to emphasize the primacy of the State Department in the new organization.[3] A senior foreign service officer was designated head of the interdepartmental staff that drafted papers for NSC consideration. State, however, initially played its hand within the NSC cautiously and defensively. It often dragged its feet in response to pressures for Council review of particular foreign policies, and at other times responded by submitting policy statements purely for the "information" of the Council. The typical action taken upon such statements was to "note" them or to "concur" in them.

The interest of the State Department in military policy questions was stimulated by several developments in 1949. The most important included the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance and the initiation of planning for a military assistance program for Europe; the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear device in August 1949; and the completion of the conquest of the Chinese mainland by the communists. Of these developments the Soviet nuclear test probably led most directly to action to improve the integration of foreign policy and defense strategy. This event raised basic questions about the validity of relying on U.S. nuclear

[2]On this point and on many details of the NSC's development through 1960, see James S. Lay, Jr., and Robert H. Johnson, "An Organizational History of the National Security Council," in *Organizing for National Security: Studies and Background Materials* Submitted to the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, by its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Volume Two (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 411-468. Under the National Security Act of 1947 the membership of the NSC included the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the three service secretaries and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board. Subsequent changes eliminated the service secretaries and added the Vice President. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have regularly participated as statutory advisers. Various other officials have been invited by various Presidents to participate regularly in NSC meetings, most notably the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

[3]Cf. Sidney Souers, "Policy Formation and the National Security Council," *The American Political Science Review,* June 1949, p. 536.

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weapons as the principal military deterrent and helped to precipitate the U.S. decision to develop thermonuclear weapons.

The State Department, which had been seeking a review of U.S. strategic policy and military programs, seized the opportunity provided by the Soviet test and the administration's H-bomb decision to obtain Presidential authorization for such a review on January 30, 1950. Significantly, however, it chose to bypass and supersede a similar review initiated within NSC channels scarcely more than a month before.[4] An *ad hoc* committee under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, undertook the policy review. In this case there was a coincidence of interest and viewpoint between the State Department (including Secretary Acheson) and the professional military, who, in effect, joined forces against Secretary of Defense Johnson (and, implicitly, President Truman himself) to break through the ceiling of $13.5 billion on defense expenditures and to question the adequacy of the entire national security effort.

The handling of the report of the *ad hoc* committee reflected the continuing tug of war between the NSC Staff, which wanted such subjects examined within NSC channels, and the State Department, which preferred to bypass the NSC. The report was submitted by the Secretaries of State and Defense directly to the President. Truman, however, apparently acting on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary of the NSC, referred the report to the National Security Council asking that it be costed out. It was placed within NSC covers as NSC 68, probably the most famous of all NSC documents. A new and broader committee, constituted within the NSC framework to do the costing job, was concerned not only with the defense program but also with other national security programs – e.g., foreign aid, stockpiling, mobilization. Before its work had been completed, the North Korean attack upon South Korea created a new situation and a new atmosphere within which it was possible to obtain public and Congressional support for major program increases.[5]

The year following the outbreak of the Korean War was the busiest period for the Council during the Truman Administration. Military and defense mobilization problems played a proportionately greater role in its work, and the development and

[4]Cf. Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 271-378, especially pp. 290-296.

[5]For a much fuller account of the development of NSC 68, see *ibid.*

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costing of major national security programs continued. The atmosphere of the time was characterized by a high sense of urgency. The initiation of the war was seen at first as presaging military attacks elsewhere on the boundary between the communist and noncommunist worlds. In this atmosphere, it served the State Department's interests to make somewhat greater use of the NSC.

The attack in Korea not only resolved the question of expanding U.S. security programs; it also settled an argument over strengthening the Council's interdepartmental staffing mechanism. Soon after the attack the President issued a directive on Council organization, the most important provision of which created an assistant-secretary-level interdepartmental staff group called the Senior Staff. This body supplanted a much looser organization of Consultants to the NSC which had seldom met as a group. A lower-level interdepartmental staff group, which had done much of the actual drafting of NSC papers, was reconstituted and subordinated to the new Senior Staff. For a year or so after the attack these bodies were kept busy. Then, as the Truman Administration found itself caught up in a war it could not finish and became a lame duck administration, both the Council and the Senior Staff gradually drifted into the doldrums along with the rest of the government.

The Senior Staff never gained the acceptance within the government subsequently achieved by the Eisenhower Administration's NSC Planning Board. Especially in the last year or so of the Truman Administration, much interdepartmental planning for the NSC took place within special groups and committees, similar to the committee that prepared NSC 68. But this kind of dispersed operation was difficult to discipline and control, and many committees never completed their assigned tasks.

When the Eisenhower Administration came to office in 1953 the U.S. government was involved at great cost in a variety of "security" programs. The defense budget had grown from $15 billion to $50 billion; foreign aid was now $8 billion; atomic energy programs, $4 billion; and stockpiling of strategic materials consumed $1.6 billion per year. Even if President Eisenhower had not been predisposed by his military experience to utilize the NSC mechanism, these program involvements would probably have ensured a fairly active life for the Council. If U.S. external policies had not been militarized, they had certainly become security-

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oriented. In this situation the overlapping interests of State and Defense were considerable, and agencies like the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget also had a central concern with national security matters. A key problem for an economy-minded administration was how to realign U.S. commitments and U.S. strategy in such a way as to permit cutbacks in security programs. Thus the NSC was projected immediately into a new review of security programs, and soon after into a basic review of strategy. The answers developed in the military sphere were the strategy of "massive retaliation" and the related budgetary strategy of emphasis on nuclear capabilities, colloquially labeled "more bang for a buck."[6]

The power situation within the administration contributed to bringing these issues into the NSC, particularly in the initial period. If some Presidents are their own Secretaries of State, Eisenhower was his own Secretary of Defense. His role was enhanced by the fact that, during much of his administration, his Secretaries of Defense were businessmen of limited capacity on matters of military strategy. The NSC also provided a forum in which a strong Secretary of State (Dulles) with his own views of military strategy, and a powerful Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) with determined opinions about military and other security programs, could express their views in the presence of the President.

Besides the legacy of national security programs, several new factors contributed to the strengthening and increased employment of the National Security Council mechanism. The most obvious was President Eisenhower's predilection, acquired in his military service, for completed staff work. He preferred a policy process which ensured thorough staff review of papers submitted to him for consideration. What is less well appreciated is the fact that his first Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, had a passion for neatness and order which must surely have equaled or surpassed Eisenhower's. Cutler also had the unbounded energy and drive of a bachelor brought up on the "Protestant ethic" of a traditional New England family. It is significant that he entitled his autobiography *No Time for Rest.*

[6]Strictly speaking, the NSC did not enunciate or endorse the doctrine of massive retaliation. That was an extrapolation by Secretary of State Dulles from an NSC policy statement that nuclear weapons should be viewed as "the major deterrent" to communist attack. See Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Schilling, Hammond and Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-524, especially pp. 436-439.

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His two tours of duty as Special Assistant at the beginning of the first and second terms of the Eisenhower Administration had something to do with the motion the NSC machine generated in those periods.

The individuals selected by Eisenhower to be his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs were not, with the single exception of his last appointee, Gordon Gray, experts in foreign affairs or defense policy. They were the President's agents in operating the NSC system, but they were not, by and large, independent sources of power and advice.

There are important reasons why the NSC tended to play a more active role in the initial phase of the Eisenhower Administration than it did later. When a change occurs in party control of government, there is a strong tendency to distrust the career bureaucracy, or, at least, to be uncertain as to what parts of the bureaucracy can be trusted. After twenty years of Democratic Party rule there was a particularly strong tendency to limit consultation to those who were identifiably a part of the new administration and to bypass the bureaucracy in matters of high policy. At the beginning of any administration there is also a greater lack of sureness among cabinet members about their own competence to deal with the problems of their departments and, therefore, a tendency to rely on group counsel. In time, as cabinet members gain confidence in the competence and loyalty of their subordinates and in their own competence, more self-protective tendencies develop and are reflected in efforts to keep out of the Council those matters considered to be within the particular Council member's jurisdiction.

Moreover, the general feeling at the beginning of any administration, that existing policy is defective, or potentially so, and that the international environment is relatively malleable and subject to U.S. influence, opens a large realm of activity for a body concerned in a comprehensive way with foreign and defense policy. But as an administration grows older and is caught up in past commitments, it loses its more sanguine expectations about the possibility of change. Policy change then is viewed as an incremental process; the contribution of a mechanism like the NSC to day-to-day incrementalism is, at best, limited.

The organizational changes introduced by the Eisenhower Administration were, in retrospect, of relatively modest character except for the creation of an Operations Coordinating Board to

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monitor the implementation of NSC policy. The NSC Staff was strengthened to provide a greater independent analytic capability, and the old Senior Staff was rechristened the NSC Planning Board. A somewhat sharper line was drawn between the career staff and the White House. Liaison with the President and the White House Staff was now maintained primarily by the new Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs rather than by the career Executive Secretary. The Special Assistant also chaired the Planning Board and presented its papers to the Council. Much more significant than these organizational changes was the stepped-up level of activity and the increased sense of importance and purpose with which the organization was suffused. Initially the Planning Board met three or more afternoons a week; the Council met at least once a week; and the agendas of both were crowded. Consultant groups were created to review various policies or programs. But after the first two years of intense activity, both the volume and importance of Council business declined considerably. Another burst of activity at the beginning of the second Eisenhower Administration was followed by a further decline.

This is not to say that some vital business was not considered in the NSC during these slower periods, only that the factors tending to increase the value of the NSC at the beginning of an administration and to reduce it later appeared to dominate general trends of activity. One of the most important developments of the Eisenhower period was the creation of what might be called a "national security community," a point to which we shall return when we discuss the functions of the NSC.

The dismantling of the NSC substructure of Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board by the Kennedy Administration and its relative neglect of the NSC itself is usually attributed to President Kennedy's different style of operation.[7] Without question this was the key to explaining the changes that occurred. (Senator Jackson's hearings on the NSC mechanism may have played some role in shaping the President's opinions, though this factor seems marginal except perhaps with respect to abolition of the OCB.) President Kennedy simply did not find the formal processes, large meetings and relative Presidential passivity that had characterized the Eisenhower system compatible with his

[7]On the Kennedy and Johnson periods, see the useful study by Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, *The President and the Management of National Security* (New York: Praeger, for the Institute for Defense Analyses, 1969).

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personal and activist approach to the Presidency. The NSC occasionally provided a kind of policy-legitimating or administration morale-building device, but for the most part it fell into disuse.

There were, however, other factors which provided an uncongenial atmosphere for the use of this kind of mechanism in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. As indicated, one of the more important NSC responsibilities in the Eisenhower days was the review of military strategies and programs. Strategies were generally reviewed through the device of an annual re-examination of Basic National Security Policy, a comprehensive policy document, the heart of which was a statement of politico-military strategy. Military programs, such as missile or continental defense programs, were reviewed by a variety of mechanisms, of which perhaps the most noteworthy were committees of outside consultants such as the Gaither and Killian Committees. The reports of these committees were elaborately reviewed in the Planning Board and Council with fairly concrete results. With a strong Secretary of Defense of the character and caliber of Robert McNamara, such activities were precluded. McNamara resisted all efforts to write a new Basic National Security Policy. Instead he developed military posture statements and related strategic pronouncements in consultation with other officials, but always firmly under his own control. He also developed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense greatly increased capabilities for the analysis of weapons systems, thus weakening the case for outside reviews.

McNamara's dominance in the politico-military area was enhanced by Secretary of State Rusk's excellent relationships with McNamara and by Rusk's disinclination to get into military matters that he considered to be within the Defense Secretary's responsibility. This disinclination had an inhibiting effect upon the willingness of those at lower levels in State to carry military issues to the top. Rusk's preference for giving his advice to the President in private further limited the usefulness of a body like the NSC.

The dismantling of the Eisenhower NSC system led, in effect, to a reversion under Kennedy and Johnson to a more traditional structure with greater reliance on the departments and on *ad hoc* and informal modes of coordination. The Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs became virtuosos sitting before the vast keyboard of the bureaucratic organ. Assisted by the

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Executive Secretary of the Council, they called forth advice and perspectives through a wide variety of formal and informal channels. Occasionally they convened a formal meeting of the NSC to give all a chance to express their views or to place an additional stamp of authority upon a Presidential decision. More often they utilized an active NSC/White House Staff to probe for information and perspectives; convened *ad hoc* groups; or, after some preliminary informal scouting, called more formally upon one or more departments for recommendations with respect to a problem.

The Special Assistants under Kennedy and Johnson — McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow — were foreign affairs experts in their own right. While they served as the Presidents' agents in operating the highly informal system they developed, they were also, to a much greater extent than Eisenhower's Special Assistants, influential advisers to the President. They were supported by active, well-informed staffs.

The principal institutional innovation of the Kennedy Administration was the creation of a Presidential staff for foreign and defense policy. The NSC Staff no longer served the institution, the National Security Council, but served the President directly. Another Kennedy innovation was the creation of a number of interdepartmental task forces with varying mixtures of policy planning and policy implementation functions. These were *ad hoc* committees, intended to function for a relatively brief time. The system had a short life; only the Viet Nam and Berlin Task Forces developed any longevity. Later task forces were generally short-term crisis-management mechanisms.

If anything, President Johnson's approach to national security policymaking was more personal and informal than President Kennedy's. In the Truman or Eisenhower eras problems like those associated with the escalation of the war in Viet Nam in early 1965 might have led to strengthened institutional arrangements for policy coordination. To the extent that Johnson utilized a regular institutional device to deal with war policy issues, it was the highly informal device of his regular Tuesday lunches with Rusk and McNamara. Otherwise, coordination took place at lower levels or by even more informal means.[8]

[8]Working-level coordination was maintained throughout the period of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations by a Viet Nam Task Force headed by a State Department representative. This task force was periodically reconstituted as part of the continuing effort to improve implementation of policy. To the author's knowledge, it was never a vehicle for the development of major policy proposals.

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The effort in March 1966 to hand over responsibility for coordination of overseas activities to the State Department by creating a new Senior Interdepartmental Group chaired by the Under Secretary of State, and Interdepartmental Regional Groups chaired by Assistant Secretaries of State, appears to have enjoyed mixed success. State did not exhibit much initiative in attempting to make the system work, though some of the regional groups played moderately useful roles.

This brief account of the evolution of the NSC system suggests that the usefulness of the Council varies not only with the personal styles of Presidents, but also with the relative power of the President's principal subordinates and with the situation an administration confronts. In situations where security programs are large and security-oriented perspectives prominent, the NSC may play a more substantial role. It is more likely to play a major role at the beginning than at the end of an administration. But the factor that dominates everything else is the President's style of decision-making. Where a President finds an institutionalized Presidency confining rather than reassuring, the NSC is unlikely to be a significant factor in policymaking.

II

Criticisms of the National Security Council have been based on various conceptions of what functions the Council *should* perform. Unfortunately, the functions assigned to it by the National Security Act of 1947 are not easily performed by such a body. Critics have tended to focus upon the NSC's failings in performing its legislatively-prescribed functions of policy coordination and policy advice to the President. Participants and supporters have often pointed to the less obvious but important values of education, communication and community which they have found in the NSC process. In order to provide a reasonably comprehensive view of its strengths and weaknesses, we shall briefly examine eight roles that the Council has, at one time or another, performed: policy coordination, policy advice for the President, policy planning, policy legitimation, crisis decision-making, program guidance, policy education and communication, and the creation of a "national security policy community."

The coordinating role of the NSC was emphasized in the National Security Act of 1947. That act created a partially unified Department of Defense and integrating mechanisms in the field of

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intelligence (CIA), war mobilization planning (the National Security Resources Board; now the Office of Emergency Planning) and national security policy (the NSC). The National Security Council was to integrate domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security and to prepare policy advice for the President in this area.

Many of the difficulties and defects of the Council grew out of the partially contradictory character of these two linked functions of policy coordination and preparation of advice for the President. To the extent that the views of all participants were taken into account, the policy advice offered to the President tended to be blurred. Since much of the coordination occurred below the level of the Council itself, the President—and the other Council members—were not always exposed to the full flavor of policy differences. Many different devices were adopted in the effort to get around this problem in the Truman and Eisenhower days. Some of these will be discussed in connection with our examination of other NSC functions. One device was to play down the coordination function by submitting uncoordinated papers directly to the NSC. Typically, these were discussed in the Senior Staff or the Planning Board prior to Council consideration, in order to "brief" the agencies on the significance of the proposals and to expose any potential differences of view.

The most commonly employed device, however, was the inclusion in proposed policy papers of alternative formulations of policy language, each espoused by one or more agencies represented on the Senior Staff or the Planning Board. These divergent proposals, called "splits," were commonplace in papers that went to the Council in the Eisenhower era. While sometimes the splits were of esoteric-seeming character to those not immediately involved in the process, and at other times posed an issue in rather crude, simplistic form, they did often provide the basis for useful policy debates. (Splits relating to the magnitude of future foreign aid for a particular country were among the most common type.) If the papers emerging from the Council were often bland it was not always because the papers that had been submitted to it were lacking in significant statements of policy issues. Sometimes the Council refused to face a policy issue or, perhaps more frequently, faced the issue, but ended by confirming existing policy. A paper that restates current policy is not likely to seem especially interesting or valuable to those who read it without having been involved in the *process* by which the state-

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ment was prepared. Often the NSC process was more valuable than the identifiable NSC product. When that process worked it at least forced members of the cabinet to justify, in the presence of the President, the continuation of existing policy in the face of arguments that it should be changed. Sometimes, of course, the process did produce changes in policy.

A basic difficulty with the NSC as a policy-advisory mechanism is that such a mechanism, by its character, is not well designed to develop minor proposals for incremental changes in policy. It is geared to large issues and to a fairly high level of abstraction. Yet much of the time the United States is caught up in a web of past commitments and external and internal limitations which permit only incremental changes in policy. Moreover, as many writers have pointed out, the U.S. national style is oriented toward individual cases and toward incremental change. Thus, except at relatively infrequent moments of significant internal or external change, there is a basic incompatibility between practical policy needs and the kind of policy proposals such a mechanism can most readily deliver. One time of potential change is the initial period of a new administration. To some degree, a new administration can escape some of the commitments of the past because there is expectation both at home and abroad that policy change will occur. Even when it cannot escape from the iron jacket of past commitments it generally *believes* that it can.

This last point brings us to a third function of the Council — policy planning. Robert Cutler used to deny that the NSC engaged in policy planning, but strictly speaking this claim was not correct. While the Council mechanism rarely attempted really long-term forecasting, it was often concerned with the short-to-medium-term future. The annual revisions of Basic National Security Policy ordinarily began with an intelligence estimate which attempted to project future political and military trends. The reviews of major military programs, such as those initiated by the Gaither and Killian Committees, were typically based on an effort to project the future strategic environment. In truth, all policymaking depends upon estimates or assumptions regarding the future. Without prediction, policymaking is impossible. Moreover, most policymaking involves planning, i.e., an attempt to take account of the consequences of alternative courses of action and to select those courses best designed to achieve desired future conditions.

The Planning Board and the Council undertook a number of

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different kinds of planning exercises. One general type was the preparation of papers containing statements of major policy alternatives, with arguments for and against each alternative. Thus, early in the Eisenhower Administration, a major effort was mounted to examine principal alternative politico-military strategies. This was the famous "Operation Solarium," named for the place where the idea originated, the White House solarium. Individuals from inside and outside the government were recruited for three teams which were directed to develop, and make the case for adopting, one of three alternative strategies. It is doubtful, however, whether this elaborate exercise had as much impact on administration strategy as the predispositions the President, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, brought with them into the new administration.[9]

One of the chief problems with attempts to lay out major policy alternatives is the strong temptation to load the dice. A typical procedure is to set up a straw-man alternative on either side of a middle course of action which quickly becomes the logical choice over the more "extremist" options. In an interdepartmental body like the Senior Staff or Planning Board it is also difficult to gain acceptance of pro or con arguments that are viewed as "illegitimate" by proponents of one or another policy alternative. Nonetheless, this type of exercise can, with effort, be one of the most valuable the NSC or other planning mechanisms can undertake. It is a particularly useful device at the beginning of an administration when major options are — or seem to be — open to policymakers.

A second type of planning, which tended to dominate the work of the Council in the Eisenhower days, was the integrative planning of country or geographic area policies. This is a form of planning which seems necessary, and so we continue to attempt it; but it is a kind of planning that is exceedingly difficult to do well, so we generally fail in our attempt. Even after the NSC mechanism had been dismantled in the Kennedy-Johnson years, efforts continued within the State Department to perfect country planning. Apparently renewed efforts of this kind are being undertaken by the Nixon Administration. Why have these efforts enjoyed such limited success? Part of the problem is our still limited understanding of other societies; another part, our limited ability

[9]On "Solarium" see Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 406-410.

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to influence other societies; a third part derives from the complexities of decision-making in the U.S. government. The last point deserves brief comment. It is frequently impossible to provide guidance for U.S. country programs that will be effective for as long as six months. Within the government the cycle of program planning and adjustment of aid and other programs is so continuous and complex, and is affected by so many considerations, that efforts to influence programs through one-shot papers are unlikely to remain influential for long. Moreover, anticipation of this complexity leads those concerned with implementing programs to push for maximum flexibility in policy language.

The NSC has also been utilized to prepare contingency plans. These attempt to answer the question "What if. . . .": What if a government is deposed; what if war breaks out between India and Pakistan; and so on. As all who engage in such planning quickly realize, its value is less in the paper produced—which cannot possibly anticipate all of the circumstances surrounding a possible future event — than in the *process* of examining policy options in various contingencies. The thinking embodied in the paper, rather than the proposed policy responses, is likely to be of some utility.

A fourth type of function the Council has sometimes performed is policy legitimation. Although such a function is unlikely to be openly acknowledged, a President occasionally finds it politically useful to have the official blessing of such a prestigious body for controversial policy decisions. One of the clearest examples was the endorsement by the NSC of the St. Lawrence Seaway as being in the security interests of the United States, prior to the initiation of negotiations for the seaway. Another possible example was the use of the NSC to endorse controversial decisions with respect to relaxation of East-West trade controls during the 1950's. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson used the Council in similar fashion. For example, Theodore Sorensen reports that Kennedy's policy on the U.S. response to the Berlin crisis in 1961 was decided "for the record" in an NSC meeting after the decisions had, in fact, already been made.

The Council has sporadically been involved in crisis decision-making — to some degree in most of the major postwar politico-military crises, but, as some critics have noted, not always in a substantial way or in the key phases of some of these crises. It has

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been utilized because it is the obvious forum for consideration of problems like the North Korean attack upon South Korea, the Lebanon crisis of 1958 or the Cuban missile crisis, but its usefulness has not been sufficient to make it the essential forum in such situations. Its staff can provide orderly record-keeping and communication that may be important in the chaos typical of crises, and the convening of the NSC may have public relations or decision-legitimizing advantages for a President. But in a swirling crisis, Senior Staff or Planning Board members are hard put to keep up with their cabinet principals, and it may seem more useful to convene either larger or smaller groups than the NSC itself. When the NSC has played a role it has been more as a top-level forum than as a "system" contributing elaborate staff work.

In the case of the Cuban missile crisis the top-level group that discussed basic strategy with the President was assimilated to the NSC structure by being christened the Executive Committee of the NSC only after the basic decisions had been taken, six days after the group had begun meeting. This *ex post* move appears to have been designed, in part at least, as a legitimating and symbolic action. Similarly, when an NSC meeting was convened in the midst of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the purpose seemed to be primarily symbolic.

Beginning with NSC 68, the National Security Council endeavored to perform a sixth function — to influence budgetary decisions with respect to major defense, foreign affairs or mobilization programs. Sometimes this took the superficial and largely ineffective form of discussing oral presentations of budget projections. At other times elaborate efforts were made to examine major programs with the objective of affecting their magnitude and character. The results were, at best, mixed. In general such reviews, when effective at all, were more successful in influencing the magnitude of particular programs than in achieving a more effective balance within or among programs.

During the first months of the Eisenhower Administration the Council's examination of major programs in a series of sessions apparently did influence the size of those programs.[10] An effort some time in 1955-1956 to prepare multiyear projections of major programs and to raise questions about their future direction was aborted by the objections of certain Council members. A review in the mid-1950's by a committee chaired by an Under Secretary of

[10]On the military program aspects of this review, see *ibid.*, especially pp. 393-399.

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State focused on the question of whether there should be reduced emphasis on military assistance programs and increased emphasis on economic assistance programs. This had little direct effect, primarily because of difficulties in getting behind Joint Chiefs of Staff judgments on the country force levels to be supported by military assistance. The Chiefs were unwilling or unable to provide the committee with the information and reasoning which would relate these force levels to specific U.S. policy objectives. Many techniques for NSC review of programs were tried, but few succeeded. Perhaps those that had the greatest impact were the studies by outside committees of military programs—the studies of the Gaither and Killian groups.

Part of the problem in achieving an impact was timing. Budgetary decisions are made late in the fall under great time pressure and are difficult to influence by exercises mounted much earlier with a different set of parameters. Another obstacle was the resistance of any ongoing program to basic change, and beyond that, the resistance of agency heads to the idea that others should play a major role in determining the size and content of their agencies' programs.

The use of outside groups like the Gaither and Killian Committees involves real dangers even though it may be the most effective way to inject changes. Such committees are unlikely to raise truly fundamental questions about prevailing assumptions, yet they may create public pressures for increases or other changes in programs which seriously limit the President's freedom of action.[11]

One of the most important functions of the NSC was its role as educator and communicator. Especially during its active periods, it provided a regular means by which a large number of officials in the Council and its subordinate mechanisms could be kept informed of basic foreign affairs and defense problems and of how the President and his foreign affairs and military advisers viewed those problems. This function, too, was performed less through the medium of the NSC papers themselves than through the process by which they were prepared and discussed. Such discussion helped to educate the agencies involved in the current point of view of other agencies and top-level officials with respect to a problem or program, and thus to achieve a kind of subtle continuing coordination of policy. From one perspective this use of the

[11]Cf. Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 346.

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NSC was desirable, for it enabled the government to act in concert and speak with one voice. From another perspective, by emphasizing the administration's current "line" it may have inhibited spontaneity and dissent within the government. Such inhibiting effects probably operated more strongly at lower levels and on the fringes of the NSC system than they did upon members of the Senior Staff or Planning Board. These latter bodies always contained some dissenters from the current "line" who had personal relationships with their cabinet-level superiors which protected their positions and gave them considerable scope for deviationism. The official ideology of the NSC system sought to encourage such independence by avoiding a narrowly agency-representational view of the roles of these officials.

Closely related to the education and communications function is the role the NSC system played in creating a "national security community." One of the greatest problems involved in attempting to integrate foreign policy with defense policy is the reluctance of "nonexperts" to meddle in the business of "experts." This problem has an asymmetrical aspect. Almost everyone who reads a newspaper fancies himself an expert on foreign affairs, but few claim to be privy to the seemingly arcane knowledge involved in defense policy. Pentagon officials may be reluctant for bureaucratic jurisdictional reasons to offer suggestions on foreign policy, but they are seldom inhibited simply by fear of their ignorance. State Department officials, on the other hand, have a double inhibition about commenting on defense policy: they are reluctant to become involved in important matters within someone else's jurisdiction and they hesitate to comment because of a sense of their own ignorance of military technology and strategy.

A virtue of the old Senior Staff and Planning Board mechanisms, but particularly the latter, was that they tended to break down these inhibitions on both sides. There were several reasons for this. Perhaps the most important was the fact that the stable, continuing membership of the Board and the more or less constant contact provided by its frequent meetings created an atmosphere of confidence and trust. Members were not reluctant to speak out because they were among friends, or at least well-known antagonists. Moreover, the atmosphere of such meetings tended to encourage the idea that the business before the group was joint business, not that of a single agency. In this atmosphere sharp confrontations between opposing views could take place

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without endangering continued communication. The Council mechanisms also operated to educate participants in the arcana of defense problems. The system would probably not have worked, however, if there had not been some independent-minded noncareer officials serving as agency representatives in Council activities.

From one point of view it can be argued that the creation of a national security community[12] was not an altogether desirable development because it projected the military deeply into foreign policy matters and may have contributed to the "militarization" of foreign policy in the 1950's. It would be foolish to deny that such a danger existed. However, Secretary of State Dulles was the most powerful member of the Council in the 1950's, and the defense-oriented character of policy during much of the period derived less from the influence of the military than from the Cold War itself. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, the Korean War and communist dominance on the China mainland were crucial factors in defining the spirit of the time. A combination of the policies developed in immediate reaction to these events and Dulles' own vision of the world and the character of the communist problem led to military-mindedness. To a certain extent, some of the participants attempted to use the NSC mechanism to restrain these defense-oriented tendencies of foreign policy.

In some respects, the importance of the NSC as a center for a security community is less today than it was in the 1950's. Contact and communication between State and Defense is now maintained by a variety of means, both formal and informal. Moreover, the growth in scholarly literature dealing with military strategy and the gradual familiarization of State Department officers with military questions has created a number of civilian experts on such issues. Nonetheless, so far as this writer could observe, many—though not all—State Department officials in the 1960's remained reluctant to pursue very far their doubts and questions about defense policy matters. This reluctance was, unfortunately, most noticeable among high-level officials who came from an earlier generation of foreign affairs experts with more traditional backgrounds of training and experience.

On the basis of this brief survey, it is evident that the informal

[12]While the security community was most evident in the top-level structures of the Council, hundreds of officials from lower echelons of the Defense Department, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and other government agencies were involved in NSC work on a part-time or full-time basis.

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functions of the Council have, in the past, been at least as important as its formal policy-coordinating and policy-advisory functions, and that the process, more than the formal product, has often been the most valuable aspect of the Council's work — the process of coordinating, planning, discussing, educating, and creating a network of relationships which constituted a national security community. This general judgment is confirmed by the views of others who were involved in the Truman and Eisenhower NSC systems.[13] It also seems broadly true that studies attempting to pose major policy alternatives have been among the most valuable kinds of studies the NSC system has developed.

There have been many inadequacies in the operation of the system. Its products have often been bland; it has great difficulty relating in a specific fashion to the ongoing process of day-by-day policymaking; it is designed for comprehensiveness and large issues, yet meaningful comprehensiveness is difficult to achieve and opportunities for major policy decisions occur but infrequently. The Council has sometimes been employed as a source of reassurance for officials hesitant to decide issues on their own. As Henry Kissinger, the present Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has said: "The committee approach to decision making is often less an organizational device than a spiritual necessity."[14] Moreover, as anyone who has worked with a committee knows, collective wisdom is often not wisdom at all. Communication between the top and lower levels was at times a problem. Frequently Planning Board or NSC Staff members were chagrined by the inability of Council members to grasp the real meaning of a policy issue despite attempts to state the issue clearly and to educate their principals as to its significance.

At its best the NSC system continuously forced policymakers to re-examine policy alternatives, including alternatives previously rejected. It created a community within which education, communication, planning and debate could occur with considerable freedom. At its worst it was a treadmill and a paper mill which led nowhere and bored its participants.

III

It is much too early to offer any kind of informed, precise judgment on the effectiveness of the current effort by the Nixon Administration to recreate an NSC system. Nonetheless, the ex-

[13]See, for example, Clark and Legere, *op. cit.*
[14]Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

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perience of the past does provide a basis for viewing recent changes in perspective and for speculating about the future.

One of the most interesting developments has been the sheer volume of Council activity. The first phase of the Nixon Administration is, in this respect, replicating the first Eisenhower phase, and perhaps for similar reasons. New cabinet members, many of whom lack administrative experience or substantive experience or both within their present fields, are seeking guidance from other officials they can trust. Nixon himself experienced the intense NSC activity that characterized the first year or so of the Eisenhower Administration and that period may be a model for him. Moreover, this is a rare time of great potential change in foreign and defense policies, a time in which an organization best equipped to deal with large issues might play some significant role.

The Nixon NSC system appears to combine the principal features of both the Truman-Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson systems, insofar as those somewhat divergent patterns of organization can be combined. The NSC has taken over the interdepartmental regional committee structure established under State Department leadership in the Johnson Administration and has added to it some new topic-oriented committees (e.g., on foreign aid and politico-military affairs) plus a Review Board. The committee structure thus created to serve the NSC is a good deal more elaborate than the old Truman-Eisenhower structure, but appears to serve similar purposes. The new Review Board is like the old Senior Staff and Planning Board in composition, yet seems designed to perform only one of the functions of those bodies: it reviews and discusses reports before they are considered by the NSC, but does not ordinarily "coordinate" papers by redrafting them before they are presented to the Council. Presumably the regional and topical committees, plus the Review Board, will eventually become the primary funnels for policy papers to be considered by the NSC. Continuation of the Johnson Administration's Senior Interdepartmental Group as the Under Secretary's Committee of the NSC provides a forum for discussion of lesser policy issues below the top level of government. The purpose of this body appears to be rather like that of the old Eisenhower Operations Coordinating Board, but with less emphasis on reporting and follow-up, more on coordinated decision-making.

In addition to establishing this Eisenhower-like NSC structure,

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the Nixon Administration has followed the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in creating a strong, substantively-oriented NSC Staff which serves the President directly under the leadership of a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs who is an expert in foreign and defense policy. This staff is larger in size than, and at least as diversified in its functions as, the NSC Staffs of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations; it is concerned with policy planning, with following the activities of the major national security agencies, and with questions of program development.[15]

So far as one can judge, the staff has divided its activities between serving the President directly and serving him by ensuring that the Council is provided with adequate policy studies. Thus, in the handling of the ABM issue, the White House and NSC Staffs served the President in generally the same manner that such staffs served Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.[16] At the same time, staff members have devoted considerable time to arranging the preparation of major policy studies for consideration by the NSC. News reports indicate that these studies are concerned with a wide range of policy alternatives—nine in the case of Viet Nam and ten in the case of a study of basic military strategy and military programs.[17] There have been papers proposing alternative foreign aid programs, China policies and East-West trade policies. This emphasis on the posing of alternatives seems healthy, and draws upon the best of prior experience with the Council.

A key question for the future is whether the Truman-Eisenhower or the Kennedy-Johnson pattern will be dominant, or whether some kind of balance between the two will be maintained. The determining factor is likely to be the President's style. President Nixon's style appears to differ significantly from that of his three immediate predecessors. While, like Eisenhower, he seems to value a process that ensures elaborate staff work in

[15]The idea of a career NSC Staff—which would survive changes in administration—has proved unrealistic as the staff has become an arm of the President rather than of the NSC as an institution. The career staff idea was pushed strongly by the first two Executive Secretaries of the Council, Sidney Souers and James Lay, and accepted by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. Under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, the membership of the staff has changed with the Presidency, with few holdovers in each case. On Nixon's NSC staffing, see John Osborne, "Nixon's Command Staff," *The New Republic*, February 15, 1969, pp. 13-15.

[16]*New York Times*, March 19, 1969, p. 22.

[17]On the latter, see *ibid.*, May 2, 1969, p. C 15.

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preparation for policy decisions, unlike Eisenhower he does not seem to place a high value on formal coordination of that staff work and prefers to make his decisions in personal isolation from his advisers. He made it clear early in his administration that he would neither make nor announce decisions in committee meetings—something Eisenhower frequently did, or appeared to do.[18] He engages much less than Kennedy and Johnson in a wide-ranging consultation process prior to decisions, and seems to view Presidential decision-making as a more private, contemplative process. He also appears strongly concerned to maintain the autonomy of that process.[19]

These attitudes forecast a continued but fairly limited role for the National Security Council as such. In fact, the evidence suggests that the balance has already tipped toward a system in which the Special Assistant and NSC Staff, rather than the NSC, form the key element. The Special Assistant and his staff seem to be using the NSC and the Review Board mechanisms as fulcrums with which to pry information and policy perspectives from the foreign affairs and defense agencies. The purpose of this effort is the education first of the Special Assistant, then of the President. The means employed are National Security Study Memoranda which levy requests for information and analyses upon the agencies.

The trend toward emphasizing the White House and NSC Staffs over the NSC may be strengthened as the Council runs through its initial agenda of broad foreign and defense policy reviews. Exhaustion of the stock of intellectual capital the new group of officials brought into the government and reversion to a policy process characterized by day-to-day incrementalism is likely to lead to a decline in the frequency and importance of Council meetings. But if the President retains a strong Special Assistant, that official is likely to continue to play an important role in managing the President's foreign and defense policy agenda.

An equally important question for the future is that of the balance of power among the participants in the new NSC system. This is a time when significant changes in U.S. foreign and

[18] *Washington Post,* April 24, 1969, p. A 21.

[19] In connection with the ABM decision, Nixon rejected a proposal by Dr. James Killian of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for a review of U.S. strategic requirements by a private group, reportedly on the grounds that such a review would involve an abdication of executive responsibility. He did agree to an annual review of the need for the ABM by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but this is a body which is not in a position to assess all the factors involved in ABM deployment and is unlikely to conduct a campaign outside the government for its point of view. *New York Times,* March 19, 1969, p. 22.

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defense policies seem essential. We not only need to extricate ourselves from Viet Nam and to ensure that the nuclear arms race does not get out of control; we must also make a fundamental reassessment of our interests in less developed countries, of our policy toward Western and Eastern Europe, and of our options in Asia. We are in deep trouble for a very fundamental reason: the old bases of national interest and the old bases for many of our national security policies have been seriously eroded by developments in civilian and military technology; by a more realistic awareness of our own limited influence and the limited influence of the communists in many areas of the world; by a new awareness of the limitations and dangers of relying upon military force; by the Sino-Soviet split; by the urgency of our domestic problems, and by many other factors.[20]

The balance of forces within the NSC will determine whether it is likely to be an instrument for the basic reshaping of policy. The present situation is not reassuring from this perspective. A conservative Department of Defense faces a cautious State Department which has, moreover, only recently begun to gear itself up to deal with the new situation. The conservatism of Defense is reflected in the leadership of its Office of International Security Affairs—the Pentagon's "Foreign Office" and frequent past ally of State. It is also exhibited in the attitudes of the Secretary of Defense. One such attitude has a vital bearing on the operation of the NSC. Secretary Laird is said to consider that his decisions with respect to defense policy must be based wholly upon present and estimated future Soviet capabilities; that the estimation of intentions is a subject for someone else to worry about.[21] This is the conventional point of view of the typical professional military officer. It may, perhaps, be appropriate for the professional military to base its judgments on military capabilities alone, on the grounds that estimates of intentions involve political judgments which are beyond its competence, but such an attitude is most troublesome in a civilian Secretary of Defense.

[20]Various aspects of these changes are discussed in such sources as Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), especially Part I, and Klaus Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Almost all books now being published on U.S. policy toward less developed countries must grapple with the difficult question of U.S. interests in such countries, but particularly good discussions are contained in John Pincus, *Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), Chapters 1 and 2, and Robert E. Asher, *International Development and the U.S. National Interest* (Washington: National Planning Association, July 1967).

[21]*Washington Post*, May 9, 1969, p. 1.

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All decisions with respect to defense policy and programs involve taking calculated risks because the defense program, no matter how generously funded, can never cover all risks. The calculus of risk must be as explicit and comprehensive as possible if decisions are to be soundly based. To leave out of the calculus the highly important question of the intentions of potential enemies either places a heavy burden of responsibility upon others — mainly the Secretary of State and the President — to reincorporate this element, or it means heavy pressures for increasing defense spending, or both. Neither the Secretary of State nor the President is likely to have the intimate knowledge of military program options possessed by a Secretary of Defense. To demand that they take the sole responsibility for making an integrated judgment of the capabilities and intentions of international antagonists — and, on such a basis, make a different judgment from that of the Secretary of Defense as to military programs—is to create a situation in which the temptation to play it safe will be almost irresistible. The past tendency of the United States to base its policies upon exaggerated estimates of potential Soviet capabilities has added momentum to the upward spiral of the arms race. Our arms decisions have produced self-fulfilling prophecies, for they have often stimulated the very Soviet actions which we feared and upon which we based our decisions.[22]

To some extent this weakness in the Council may be offset by a strong White House/NSC Staff and by constant insistence that issues be presented to the NSC and White House in terms of alternative policies and programs. A bold, informed State Department would also be a major asset.

The State Department has been slow in adapting itself to the new situation, but in early July it announced the organization of a Planning and Coordination Staff which will combine, under a single director, the planning function of the Policy Planning Council with responsibility for coordinating State's contribution to the NSC and other interagency bodies. The move is designed to make planning more realistic and to improve the quality of the Department's inputs into the NSC system.[23] Officials who introduced these changes hope that the policy coordinators will add to the realism of planning by helping to relate it to current issues,

[22]Cf. Carl Kaysen, "Keeping the Strategic Balance," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1968, pp. 665-675, especially pp. 674-675.

[23]On these changes and their rationale, see Department of State *News Letter* for July 1969 and *New York Times,* July 4, 1969, p. 1.

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and that the policy planners will contribute perspective to the handling of NSC business. However, the principal problem of the Policy Planning Council in recent years has been less that it has lacked contact with the Department's current business than that there has been a lack of effective interest in planning at the top of the Department. It seems unlikely that reduction of the bureaucratic status of the planning function, which will be a by-product of this move, will increase the access of planners to either information or top policymakers. Given the State Department's bias toward day-to-day decision-making, the danger is that planning will take second place to coordination and that the new mechanisms will not be utilized to raise basic questions about foreign and defense policies.

The new staff should, nonetheless, improve the quality of State's participation in the NSC system by regularizing the Department's procedures and bringing broader planning perspectives to bear on its contributions.[24] A crucial question still is State's willingness to challenge the judgments of the Pentagon with respect to military programs and policies. The unusual extent to which the Nixon Administration has staffed the higher levels of the State Department with professional foreign service officers is likely to reinforce the Department's normal cautious tendencies in such matters, but ultimately the attitudes of the Secretary and the Under Secretary will be determinant, and on these we have little evidence so far.

The National Security Council rose to prominence on the tide of concern produced by the full nuclearization of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and by the Korean War. Can it be the instrument through which we extricate ourselves from the perspectives and policies then set in motion which are no longer relevant to our current situation? That is the key question for the Council's future. Central to the answer is the role of the President. The NSC is no superagency with superanswers; it is the President's instrument. He can use it in such a way as to amplify the influence of the military and its often conventional wisdom on security problems, or he can use it to contain such influence and to aid him in the search for new kinds of answers.

[24]The new staff arrangements bear some resemblance to those that existed during the Eisenhower Administration. Responsibility for coordination of State Department participation in the NSC system was then lodged in the Policy Planning Staff. But the coordination function was then an appendage to the planning function rather than a coequal or better than coequal function.

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THE NINTH CCP CONGRESS AND THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE: THEIR MEANING FOR ASIA*

by Frank N. Trager, with Robert F. Bordonaro

IN April and June 1969, the rival centers for world communist leadership convened two long-postponed party conferences. The one in Peking was held first. Contrary to previous practice, the Communist Party of China (CCP) did not invite other communist parties and friendly groups. The meeting in Moscow, initiated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), sought to maximize the attendance of communist parties and fraternal elements. Each gathering heard speeches by their respective leaders and adopted resolutions on policy, i.e., a combination of communist ideology (theory) and strategy (practice). The content of these documents with reference to their implications for the noncommunist states of Asia is the subject of this article.

I

On April 1, 1969, the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party opened in Peking with 1,512 delegates in attendance. Though these congresses were originally intended as annual party affairs, seventeen years had elapsed between the Sixth and Seventh Congresses (1928 and 1945, respectively); eleven years were to pass before the Eighth Congress was held in 1956; and nine years of turmoil went by before Chairman Mao Tsetung (new spelling) and his deputy, Defense Minister Lin Piao, opened this congress "with grandeur." Chairman Mao delivered an as yet unpublished speech. The congress' agenda consisted of three items: the "political report" by Vice Chairman Lin Piao on behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP; revision of the party's Constitution; and election of the new CCP Central Committee.[1]

Except for official communiqués, information from within the

*This article has been adapted from a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in New York in September 1969.

[1]*Hsinhua,* Peking, April 1, 1969. The pecking order became clear on the first day of the twenty-four-day congress. Lin Piao was named in Chapter I of the new Constitution as Chairman Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and successor," and together with Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng (in that order) constituted the new Standing Committee of the new twenty-five-member Politburo. The wives of

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congress is sparse. Foreign communist party representatives, spectators and press were largely absent or excluded.[2] There appear to have been only three plenary sessions, each lasting about a half-day and each the subject of a communiqué, on April 1, 14 and 24 respectively. "Group discussions" were employed to study Mao's speech, Lin's Report, and the draft Constitution. This phase of the congress was completed on April 14. The remaining ten days presumably were given over to the election of the new Central Committee.

The present Constitution, amended only slightly from the draft that appeared in Taipei in December 1968, and Lin's Report were "unanimously adopted" by the delegates.[3] The Constitution atypically provides for Lin Piao's succession. It elevates Mao Tsetung's thought (MTT) to an equal place with Marxism and Leninism, thereby creating a new ideological trinity. Henceforth, the CCP takes "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought as the theoretical basis guiding its thinking." Mao is constitutionally described as having "brought it [Marxism-Leninism] to a higher and completely new stage," one "in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory."[4]

Mao and Lin are included in the latter. They are all members of the new 170-member Central Committee. Alternate members totaled 109. Names of the Central Committee were announced on April 25. Fifty-two of the 170 members of the Eighth Party Congress appear on the new list. All twenty-nine provincial-level Committee Chairmen, appointed in the wake of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), are Central Committee members or alternates. People's Liberation Army representatives account for 44 per cent of the total Central Committee membership. For further data and analysis on this point, see Richard Baum, "China: Year of the Mangoes," *Asian Survey*, January 1969, and "Who's Who at the Center of Mao's Communist Party," in *What's Happening on the Chinese Mainland* (a bi-weekly newsletter of facts and analysis published in Taipei), May 18, 1969. The latter contains brief biographies of all twenty-five members of the new Politburo.

[2]At the Eighth National CCP Congress, more than fifty fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties were represented. This time, not even Albania was present, though its party and its leader, Enver Hoxha, alone of all parties and leaders friendly to the CCP, were singled out for mention by Lin Piao in his Report. These facts underscore the extent to which the CCP under the Mao-Lin leadership has isolated its domestic scene from the fraternal parties in recent years, primarily, I believe, because of the unsettled issues created by the GPCR upheaval.

[3]The text of the Ninth CCP Congress communiqué approving the Constitution and Report was distributed in English by *Hsinhua*, April 14, 1969, and reprinted in the *New York Times*, April 15, 1969. The original draft of the new Constitution, translated by the American Consulate-General's office in Hong Kong, was reprinted in the *New York Times*, January 8, 1969.

[4]Excerpts are drawn from Chapter I, "General Programme," of the 1969 Constitution. Note that Mao Tsetung's thought is grammatically given as "Mao Tsetung Thought," conveying the impression of an "ism." In point of fact, Mao's philosophical contributions to Marxism-Leninism have been rather slight, as amply demonstrated by Arthur A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1966).

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The Constitution also stipulates the party's emphasis on "class-struggle," "seizure and consolidation of state power by armed force," and "struggle against both right and 'left' opportunist lines." The CCP "upholds proletarian internationalism . . . and fights to overthrow imperialism headed by the United States, modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its center, and the reactionaries of all countries."[5] State power is defined as "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in which all organs of power — the People's Liberation Army, the Communist Youth League, other revolutionary mass organizations —"must accept the leadership of the Party."[6]

Lin Piao's dull and repetitive eight-part Report — some twenty-two legal-size, single-spaced pages in length — is largely an expansion of the Constitution, a paean to MTT, and a history and justification of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The brief concluding section is an exhortation on unity within the country and among patriotic "Overseas Chinese" in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

Of special significance here is Section VII, "On China's Relations with Foreign Countries." Lin charges that the United States and the Soviet Union are at one and the same time imperialist rivals who, according to Leninist doctrine on imperialist war, are "locked in strife" and who also "collude . . . in opposing China, opposing communism, and opposing the people, in suppressing the national liberation movements and in launching wars of aggression." The Soviet leadership comes in for special condemnation. It is accused of practicing "social-imperialism and social-fascism." It is identified with the Czars, Hitler and Japanese militarism, having imposed a dictatorship on Czechoslovakia under the guise of the "so-called theory of 'limited sovereignty' " and encroached militarily on Chinese boundaries in an attempt to provoke "border incidents" and sabotage and subvert the CCP.

China, according to Lin, "has drawn a clear line between herself on the one hand and U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism on

[5]Chapter I, 1969 Constitution.

[6]Chapter III, "Organizational Principle of the Party," 1969 Constitution. On July 1, 1969, all major official newspapers editorially called for the formation of a "strong core of party leadership" in all levels of the dominant Revolutionary Committees set up in the later stages of the GPCR. The editorial emphasized that the process of rebuilding the party structure must be undertaken "gradually" and according to the "concrete conditions" of the respective Revolutionary Committees. (See the *New York Times,* July 2, 1969.) Obviously, this leaves power in the hands of the military who in fact control these committees.

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the other." The CCP is determined to unite and fight together with all genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations, and with the revolutionary people of all countries against the forces of imperialism, revisionism and reaction. Lin specifically pledges China to "firmly support" revolutionary struggle in Viet Nam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, India, and other countries and regions in Asia. However, his remarks were not confined to the lower end of the strategic spectrum, i.e., revolutionary warfare and insurgency. He also addressed the problem of conventional and nuclear war:

> We must . . . on no account ignore the danger of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism launching a large scale war of aggression. We must make full preparations, preparations against their launching a big war . . . at an early date, preparations against their launching a conventional war and . . . a large-scale nuclear war. In short, we must be prepared. . . . Whether the war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents the war, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism will not last long.[7]

From this review of developments during the Ninth Party Congress, a number of conclusions seem justified. The congress established the primacy of the Mao-Lin leadership within the CCP. It defended the political utility—ignoring the dislocations and disruptions—of the GPCR, for the latter helped the congress to overcome its party opposition. It sought to heal some of the wounds of the cadres and the party by starting to rebuild the latter within the framework of military dominance in the Revolutionary Committees.[8] The CCP continued to identify its chief enemies as the USSR revisionist clique and the imperialist ruling circles of the United States. Above all, the congress reaffirmed a *hard-line policy* calling for revolutionary struggles everywhere, particularly in noncommunist Asia. The heightened emphasis on domestic unity and patriotism under the auspices of the People's Liberation Army, which has been strengthened and deployed to

[7]The full translated text is in the author's possession. Excerpts were published in the *New York Times,* April 29, 1969. Lin's exclusion of Cambodia, Ceylon and Pakistan is not accidental. Ceylon opened trade relations with Peking in the early 1950's; Cambodia received the first direct grant from Peking in the mid-1950's; and Pakistan sided with Peking against India. Peking still maintains more or less "revisionist"-type connections with nonrevolutionary governments.

[8]One theme from Mao's "extremely important" but unreported speech, mentioned in the first official communiqué (April 1), is quoted in the second official communiqué of April 14, and it, then, becomes the repeated theme of scores of subsequent reports and press comments. It reads: ". . . we hope that the present Congress will be a congress of unity and a congress of victory and that, after its conclusion, still greater victories will be won throughout the country."

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various border regions, complements and is in turn reinforced by China's militant foreign posture.[9]

II

The recent International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties was, from the Soviet point of view, long overdue. As early as 1962, Khrushchev had proposed such a meeting, in major part to reaffirm Soviet leadership in the latter's dispute with the People's Republic of China (CPR).[10] His successors, Brezhnev and Kosygin, initially ignored that political gambit while attempting some form of reconciliation with Mao Tsetung. Their failure in this respect led to the revival of the proposal and the convening of a preparatory meeting held in Budapest in 1968. However, resistance from several communist parties, the Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, and Moscow's justification of that act in terms of its new theory of "limited sovereignty" once again forced a postponement. Finally, on June 5, 1969, Moscow had its way. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was host at the Kremlin to seventy-four other parties from around the world.[11] For thirteen days this third post-Stalin conference of Moscow-led communist parties heard speeches generally in support of communist unity, "socialist" internationalism, and anti-imperialism. The controversial subjects of the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship and the communist invasion of Czechoslovakia, the pre-conference thorns that had prevented an earlier gathering, found their way into the discussions.

It is unnecessary to recount here the controversy which erupted over the Czechoslovakian question. In spite of its efforts to exclude

[9]The final communiqué, New China News Agency (NCNA) International Service in English, Peking, April 24, 1969, is a useful summary of the major themes of the congress. It includes the list of 279 Central Committee members and alternates. Various elements in this summary have been noted in the American press. See, for example, on the drive for unity, the *New York Times,* April 24 and May 25, 1969; on the "hard line," *ibid.*, April 28, 1969; on preparation for war, the *Wall Street Journal,* June 19, 1969 and the *New York Times,* July 6, 1969.

[10]Only as communist affairs in Europe impinge upon the Asian concern of this article will they be treated here.

[11]Of the seventy-five attending parties, two were unlisted for "security" reasons. They were the underground parties from Nepal and the Philippines. Five of the fifteen ruling parties were not present: Albania, People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. Cuba sent an observer. Other Asian parties not represented were those of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, South Viet Nam and New Zealand. Attending Asian parties included those of Australia, India, Mongolia, East Pakistan and Ceylon. For a comprehensive list of the conference roster, consult the "Communiqué on the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties," reprinted in Supplement to *New Times* (Moscow), June 30, 1969, p. 24.

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a discussion of the issue, Moscow found itself openly and sharply criticized by several delegations for its role in the August invasion.[12] These attacks were met by defenders of the Warsaw Pact, and more specifically by the reaffirmation in the Final Document of the Brezhnev thesis on "limited sovereignty,"[13] i.e., the right to intervene militarily across boundaries on behalf of "socialism."

While the most controversial issue, Soviet-Chinese relations, was carefully omitted from direct mention in the Final Document, it was not omitted from the speeches and discussions. On June 7, Brezhnev, in his second and most important formal speech to the delegates, delivered a wide-ranging attack on the CCP and Mao Tsetung.

"Frankly," he said, "we had no intention at all of touching on this question at the Meeting."[14] However, "the nature of the decisions taken by the Ninth Congress of the CCP have forced us to deal with it." This he did at length. He charged that Mao Tsetung and his supporters had attacked "the principles of scientific Communism"; started "a political offensive against the Communist movement"; engaged in "hostile acts" and "armed conflict" against "the socialist countries"; and, sin of sins, proclaimed

[12]See the *New York Times,* June 9 and 15, 1969.

[13]This widely current phrase is not that of official Soviet spokesmen, who prefer to term the Brezhnev thesis "principles of proletarian [or socialist] internationalism." The Final Document, "Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle Against Imperialism and United Action of the Communist and Workers' Parties and All Anti-Imperialist Forces," was adopted by the conference on June 17, 1969. (Reprinted in Supplement to *New Times* [Moscow], June 30, 1969, pp. 25-39.) It carefully omitted direct reference to the Chinese and Czechoslovakian issues. See also Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko's speech of July 10, 1969 to the Supreme Soviet, "Questions of the International Situation and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union." (Reprinted in Supplement to *Moscow News,* July 1969.) The Brezhnev thesis was expanded into an official statement, "Sovereignties and International Duties of Socialist Countries," published in *Pravda,* September 27, 1968; text in the *New York Times,* September 27, 1968.

In the above-mentioned speech, Gromyko reiterated in short form the Soviet's intention "to defend to the end the chosen road ["socialist" as perceived by Moscow] against any encroachment — concealed or overt — to divert people from this road and to take away the socialist gains from the people." At the conference Rumania's President Nicolae Ceausescu rebutted the Brezhnev doctrine by pointing out that the principles of proletarian internationalism, justifying Soviet "fraternal aid" [read military intervention] to Czechoslovakia do not invalidate "principles of equal validity" that recognize "independence and national sovereignty, equal rights and noninterference in the internal affairs" of fraternal states. (*New York Times,* June 10, 1969.) See also U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine,* 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1969).

[14]"For Greater Unity of Communists, For a Fresh Upsurge of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," reprinted in Supplement to *News From Ukraine* (Kiev), June 1969. All quotations in these several paragraphs are taken from Part II of the speech, titled "Some Problems of the Communist Movement and Unity of Action in the Struggle Against Imperialism."

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MTT as "the Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch," endeavoring to hoist its banner "over the globe."

Brezhnev, mindful perhaps that he should seek to avoid any appearance of interfering in the "internal" affairs of other fraternal parties and states, carefully indicated that he would not undertake an analysis of "the events in China over the last several years," but would at this conference "dwell primarily on the international aspects of the Chinese leadership's policy." Thereupon he warmed up to his task. The CCP was guilty of all the crimes that the Ninth Party Congress had leveled against the CPSU. It was "revisionist," "chauvinist" and "adventurist"; it organized "subversive splinter groups . . . in nearly 30 countries"; it is preparing and "calling . . . for war"; it has departed from proletarian internationalism and shed its socialist class content; it "directly or indirectly" helps imperialism "by everything it does." In summary, he said:

> . . . the attack on the Soviet Union all down the line, the specious propaganda, mud-slinging at the Soviet people, at our socialist state, our Communist party, fanning hatred against the USSR among the people of China and, last but not least, resort to arms; intimidation and blackmail in relation to other socialist states and the developing countries; flirting with the big capitalist powers, including the Federal Republic of Germany — those are the guidelines of China's present foreign policy!

Each accused the other of the same crimes — and with the same epithets.

At the close of the conference, the assembled delegations acted on and issued the above-cited Final Document. Not all parties present signed it.[15] Nevertheless, the Soviets had scored a significant victory. They had held their long-wanted conference with a majority of the world communist parties and groups. They had hurdled the Czechoslovakian question. They were able to present their case against the CCP. Above all, they were able to gain virtually unanimous support for their present, major strategic line: For Communist Unity, For Struggle Against Imperialism. To quote from the Final Document:

> The existing situation demands united action of Communists and all other anti-imperialist forces so that maximum use may be made of the mounting possibilities for a broader offensive against imperialism, against the forces of reaction and war.

[15]See note 11. For various reasons, five parties (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) did not sign; four (Australia, Italy, Reunion and San Marino) signed only the section on tasks of the anti-imperialist struggle; and six (Austria, Morocco, Rumania, Spain, Sudan and Switzerland) signed with reservations.

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With respect to Asia and other underdeveloped areas, the document presented a classic Leninist analysis of the revolutionary situation:

> Social differentiation is developing in the newly independent countries. There is a sharpening conflict between the working class, the peasantry, and other democratic forces, including patriotic-minded sections of the petty bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and, on the other, imperialism and the forces of domestic reaction, the elements of the national bourgeoisie which are increasingly accepting a deal with imperialism.

It is necessary to exploit this contradiction, thereby enhancing the anti-imperialist struggle, by strengthening "the alliance between the socialist system, the forces of the working-class movement and national liberation." In blunter terms:

> The present situation demands greater militant solidarity of the peoples of the socialist countries, of all contingents of the international working-class movement and national liberation in the struggle against imperialism.

As an earnest of this declaration, the conference "unanimously" adopted a special message of support for the "struggle for liberation" in Viet Nam.[16]

To implement the line laid down in the Final Document, Moscow secured agreement to appoint a thirteen-party commission to prepare for a world anti-imperialist congress. Thus, by word and by deed, Moscow, to quote Brezhnev, had provided "the fraternal parties of Asia, Africa, and Latin America a platform from which they can further step up the national liberation movement in a world-wide revolutionary process."[17]

A comparison of the above-quoted sections of the Moscow statement with the documents of the Ninth CCP Congress reveals an obvious convergence, both as to the estimate of the revolutionary situation and what should be done about it. As a matter of fact, Moscow has duplicated Peking's list of "imperialist" enemies around the globe, including social democratic party leadership and (in some countries) social democrats (i.e., socialist parties) who are in power.

It would not be excessive to remark that once again Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian, and Wang Min, the Chinese, who made their mark at the 1935 Seventh Comintern Congress, were, in the

[16] *Pravda* editorial, June 16, 1969. The Final Document also called for "coordinated measures" and "joint efforts" by all socialist countries in support of the Vietnamese struggle.

[17] Excerpt from a Brezhnev article, "Communist Movement is in the Period of a Further Uplift," *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, August 1969.

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Buddhist manner, reborn at the two communist meetings. Beyond the serious factional rivalry for hegemony in the movement, the external policy differences between Moscow and Peking with respect to the "other," noncommunist camp, were and are tactical. How to do it, not what is to be done, is the issue. Both sides clearly understand "it" to be the international advance of communism.

III

What relation do these two meetings have to the Asian scene? Are their speeches, resolutions and final documents mere words? Or do they constitute, in whole or part, a restatement of communist ideology and an operational code — a "line" of strategy and tactics — for the application and acquisition of power at any given place and time? Though the answers to these questions are to a certain extent predictions about the future, they are not wholly speculative. For they rest on previous and exploitable experience that circumstantially and inferentially supports probable conclusions. Nor does one need to enter the futile debate as to the primacy or potency of communist ideology, power and interests. For again, analysis of any given situation in Asia or elsewhere should reveal the relationship of all three.

If some argue that ideology is dead or, in Daniel Bell's phrase, "has come to a dead end," it is nonetheless true that the communists who participated in and supported the general outcomes of the Moscow and Peking meetings deliberated and acted *as if* communist ideology was alive and vitally important to them. Their ideological expression reaffirmed the now classic elements of Marxism-Leninism. The dialectical and historical process still divides the world into two classes and two camps. The eleventh thesis of Marx and Engels on Feuerbach, to wit, "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it," is still doctrine. Revolutionary change is brought about by revolutionary practice (the operational code). The instrumentality is the proletarian class led by what Lenin called "the vanguard of the revolutionary forces . . . an organization of revolutionists" whose members constitute a profession." They will guide the struggles, selecting strategy and tactics arising from their diagnosis of objective conditions; they will utilize the conflicts and contradictions between and among the antagonist class and imperialist countries to advance the goal of revolutionary change, the classless communist society of the future.

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If some argue that it is power and interest, not ideology, that motivate communist states and organizations, as power and interest also motivate noncommunist states and organizations, then it may be said that the calculus of communist power and interest is almost always rationalized in ideological and teleological terms. In both instances, theory and practice are to lead to the identical consequences.

One of the cutting edges of the communist movement wherever it is, and at every stage of development, is the Leninist *kto kogo,* who/whom question: Who controls whom? Who will destroy whom? Who will dissolve whom? Who will defeat whom? For Lenin, and all those, including Mao, who follow the Leninist path, "there is not, nor can there be, any third path, nor can there be any sentimentality."[18] Variations in strategy and tactics are always permissible and even necessary in the light of "objective conditions," as understood by communists. But there can be no ultimate compromise on who/whom when the communists represent one of the two parts of that proposition. No communist party or faction anywhere has disavowed Lenin, whose writing and teaching, on the impending 100th anniversary of his birth, still form the basic, rich curriculum of all communists. They, as did Lenin, understand the consequences of their thought and action. If they do not succeed in dominating, controlling, defeating and destroying whoever is their adversary, then in Lenin's phrase they can expect to be "smashed and strangled."

Whatever view of the foregoing is adopted, it is pertinent to look at the Asian data at least since the end of World War II. The communists have acquired Manchuria, North Korea, mainland China, North Viet Nam, Tibet, and slices of India, Laos and South Viet Nam. They are legally members of the Royal Laotian government, and at this writing govern in two states of India. They have violated the territorial integrity of Cambodia and blackmailed the sovereign powers of Macao and Hong Kong. They have launched episodic or continuous armed attacks (i.e., revolutions called "national liberation movements") against the governments of Burma, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Viet Nam. No state in the area,

[18]Lenin, Speech, at a Congress of Political Education Departments, October 17, 1921. See Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), Chapter XVIII, Sections 2-4. This remarkable book deserves constant study, for its analysis and research have not been blunted in any way by the passage of time. Leites and I completely disagree on the war in Viet Nam, but this fact in no way impairs my estimate of his book.

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including those that in one way or another secured freedom from previous Western imperialist power, has been free from communist harassment, subversion and insurrection. However others may analyze and explain communist successes and failures in the post-World War II Asian world, communist analysis and explanation are always and everywhere put forward in terms of the right or wrong diagnosis of "objective conditions," and, therefore, the right or wrong application of Marxist-Leninist ideology, strategy and tactics. Who/whom is always filled in both before and after the act.

One may characterize their record in a spectrum that ranges from "the communists have been cautious" or "they have not been very successful for all their effort" to "their gains have been most significant." It depends on how one counts and who is counting. The difficulty of the arithmetic is compounded by the fact that students of Asian affairs tend to "identify" with the countries or regions of study. Thus, China, Japan and India loom large while the Inner and Southeast Asian countries seem small. My assessment, perhaps in part because I am associated with Southeast Asian studies, ranges toward the latter end of the spectrum.

For more than two decades — during and after the successful struggle for independence — communist parties, whether regarded by others as "monolithic" or "polycentric" in orientation, have kept Asian countries in turmoil. At virtually every stage of their political conduct, these parties followed, accepted or adopted whatever strategy had been approved by the main communist center to which they were loyal and attached, i.e., Moscow and/or Peking. The thrust of the communist movement was conditioned by the two alternating or sometimes simultaneously employed classic communist strategies: the "hard," revolutionary, insurrectionary line loosely referred to as the "united front from below"; and the "soft," noninsurrectionary struggle loosely referred to as "the united front from above."

In some respects the role of the main Communist Party in Burma (BCP) furnishes an archetypal model of communist behavior. Toward the end of World War II, the BCP in consonance with Soviet communist policy entered into a "united front from above" alliance with nationalists and socialists. When it failed to achieve power in that alliance, it enthusiastically adopted Moscow's insurrectionary line proclaimed at the original 1947 Warsaw meeting of the Cominform. Moscow propaganda —

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if not more than that — vigorously supported the BCP and castigated the "social fascist" leadership of independent Burma between 1947 and 1954. In this effort, Moscow was ably seconded by the CCP after Mao Tsetung and Liu Shao-chi came to power in mainland China.

The post-Stalin change in the international communist line led to the active promulgation of the "soft" line heralded in Asia by Chou En-lai's "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" (with Prime Ministers Nehru and U Nu), the 1955 Bandung Conference, and the visits of Bulganin and Khrushchev to South and Southeast Asia. Certainly the so-called USSR-Burma "aid" program represents the highwater mark of this period. During the following years, it became clear that while Moscow and Peking seemed to be pursuing a government-to-government "soft" line— replicative of the Seventh Comintern Congress period — they were covertly encouraging and supporting the BCP's insurrectionary effort. Peking, rather than Moscow, especially in the 1960's, proved to be more valuable in this regard to the BCP, so the latter became pro-Peking. In the interim, Peking once again overtly approved the hard, insurrectionary line and openly supported, trained and supplied its BCP satellite.[19] Illustrative of the strategic outlook of pro-Peking communist elements throughout South and Southeast Asia is the following excerpt from a recent BCP statement:

> To win the war [i.e., against the Ne Win regime] and seize political power, it is necessary to use military force as the central means; it is necessary to establish the union of all nationalities with the peasantry as the basis and broaden the united front; and the work of party building is the key.[20]

Though the occasions, intensity and tactics of the communist assaults on the governments of Asia vary from the Burmese ex-

[19]I have elsewhere documented this development of communist policy vis-à-vis Burma. See F. N. Trager, *Burma from Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1966); "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Phaw Era," ORBIS, Winter 1968, pp. 1034-1054. For a regional analysis of the same phenomena, see *Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); and "The Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia" in William Henderson, editor, *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), Chapter 6. For an exposé of the USSR's covert subversive operations in Burma by a Russian diplomat who personally participated in them and subsequently defected, see Aleksandr I. Kaznacheev, *Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma*, edited, with an introduction, by Simon Wolin (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962).

[20]BCP Central Committee statement quoted in "Burma Communist Party Leads People's Struggle," NCNA International Service in English, April 27, 1969. Peking regarded this statement as an example of "integrating Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought with the concrete practice of the Burmese revolution."

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ample, these attacks have been pressed relentlessly throughout the postwar period of independence, guided by the strategy and tactics of the communist center to which the various communist parties remain attached.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the period. However, the following data on such communist assaults — political and military — are representative of the area.[21]

Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk's concern for the territorial integrity of his country has been motivated in the past by the fact that Cambodia is flanked by her two historical opponents, South Viet Nam and Thailand. However, this concern has more recently yielded first place to his "growing recognition that insurgency within Cambodia, rather than being a sporadic and geographically spotty problem, [is] beginning to represent a continuing malaise of widening geographical proportions."[22] He has identified three elements as composing and leading this insurgency: the Thai Patriotic Front, the Pathet Lao, and the Viet Minh (i.e., North Vietnamese communists). To paraphrase from Sihanouk's press conference of May 23, 1968, the Thai and Laotian insurgents are sponsored by and depend on, respectively, Peking and Hanoi. The latter, according to Sihanouk, is "now contemplating pushing the Pathet Lao ahead to devour Cambodia."[23]

Beset by these difficulties, Cambodia now appears to be facing a new diplomatic thrust on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviets have sent as their new ambassador to Phnom Penh, Sergei

[21]The interested reader may pursue this subject in a number of sources. In addition to the titles by Trager and Henderson, mentioned in note 19, see J. H. Brimmel, *Communism in South East Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); A. Doak Barnett, editor, *Communist Strategies in Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1963); Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, editors, *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); and Robert A. Scalapino, editor, *The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements* (2nd edition) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). The discussion which follows is based on data from "A Survey of Asia in 1968," *Asian Survey,* January and February 1969. (In January and February of each year, beginning in 1963, the *Asian Survey* has presented a series of country studies for the states of South, Southeast and East Asia by leading specialists in the field.)

[22]Bernard K. Gordon, "Cambodia: Shadow Over Angkor," *Asian Survey,* January 1969, p. 58.

[23]Excerpt of the press conference reprinted in *ibid.*, p. 64. Throughout the spring and summer of 1969, *Agence Khmer-Press,* the official Cambodian Information Service, published news accounts and Sihanouk's speeches detailing battlefield encounters between the Royal Cambodian Army and elements of the Khmer Rouge insurgents and North Vietnamese troops. See the *New York Times,* July 30, 1969, and South-East Asia Treaty Organization, *Trends and Highlights,* May 1, 1969, pp. 17-21, July 1, 1969, pp. 24-27, and October 1, 1969, pp. 16-18 (hereafter cited as *Trends and Highlights*).

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M. Kudryavtsev, one of the most senior of all Soviet diplomats with service in Berlin, London, Bonn, Paris, and the United Nations. During his tour in Ottawa, Kudryavtsev was cited by a Canadian Royal Commission as "the probable head of an espionage ring exposed years ago by Igor Gouzenko."[24] In view of his impressive background, Bernard K. Gordon raises the question:

> Why so senior a Soviet diplomat in Cambodia, with its six million persons and few objective resources of interest to the Soviet Union? Although no firm answer is possible, it is difficult to ignore the possibility that the Soviet Union may have chosen Phnom Penh as the base for its expected effort to become involved again in Southeast Asia.[25]

Laos. In 1963 I wrote that the signing of the Geneva Declaration of 1962 did not end the struggle for Laos. It represented at best a pause as Laos and the rest of mainland Southeast Asia entered a new — and perhaps decisive — phase. I pointed out then that serious fighting had already erupted between the Pathet Lao and neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's forces; that the former already were violating the cease-fire agreements; and that Souvanna Phouma had appealed to Great Britain and the Soviet Union (the Geneva co-chairmen) for help to preserve his government and restore peace.[26]

Since that time the situation has continued to deteriorate. In 1963 Prince Souphanouvong, titular leader of the Pathet Lao, resumed the military struggle to "liberate" Laos. There can be no doubt that responsibility for the resumption of hostilities lies in Hanoi. As Paul F. Langer recently noted: "Ever since World War II, the North Vietnamese Communists have sponsored and nurtured Laotian insurgency, furnishing guidance, training, material and weapons, and military manpower."[27]

As a result of the continuing warfare, Laos has become a *de fac-*

[24]Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[25]*Loc. cit.*

[26]Frank N. Trager, "Laos and the Defense of Southeast Asia," ORBIS, Fall 1963, pp. 578-579. In 1969 Laos continued its as yet unsuccessful effort to persuade the Soviet Union to agree to reconvene the Geneva Conference and help to restore peace. *New York Times*, July 31, 1969.

[27]"Laos: Preparing for a Vietnam Settlement," *Asian Survey*, January 1969, p. 69. For a case study of the North Vietnamese role in the Pathet Lao insurgency, see Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, *The North Vietnamese Military Adviser in Laos: A First Hand Account* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, July 1968). See also *The White Book on the Violations of the Geneva Accords of 1962 by the Government of North Vietnam* (Vientiane, 1968) which places total North Vietnamese military strength in Laos at approximately 40,000 and Pathet Lao strength at 30,000 men. For recent developments, see "The Military Situation in Laos," *Trends and Highlights,* December 1, 1969, pp. 10-13.

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to partitioned country. The Pathet Lao, its political "front," the *Neo Lao Hak Sat* Party, and its control group, the *Phak Pasason Lao* (People's Party of Laos[28]) dominate "the largely mountainous region along the Vietnamese border and the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) holds the more developed and more populous Mekong plain."[29] But it is questionable whether this rough demarcation will hold until a new cease-fire can be arranged. Militarily, the position of the RLG worsened considerably in 1969, especially during the rainy season that normally provides an opportunity to recoup losses.[30] The four-sided negotiations in Paris on the Viet Nam conflict, based on the Johnson-Nixon decisions for a declining U.S. military role in mainland Southeast Asia, have afforded the insurgents and North Vietnamese communists greater opportunities to pursue their objectives in Laos.

Thailand. "The uncertainty among Thai leaders," writes Frank C. Darling, "assumed heightened proportions [in 1968] as external and internal Communist threats continued to confront the kingdom."[31] Darling notes that the Peking-supported Thai United Patriotic Front was active in the northeast provinces where Thai guerrillas, trained by the Chinese communists at a base near Hanoi, have been captured by the Royal Thai Army. Additionally, communist insurgent activity in the tribal areas of the north and along the Thai-Malayan border[32] has occupied the Royal Thai Government (RTG).

There can be no doubt of Peking's heightened interest in and support for what it calls the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the "Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces." Mao's works have been translated into Thai and distributed to "party members and revolutionaries." Peking claims that since "the first

[28]That is, the Communist Party whose cadres have been trained in North Viet Nam, Communist China and the Soviet Union.

[29]Langer, "Laos: Preparing for a Vietnam Settlement," *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[30]*Trends and Highlights,* April 1, 1969, pp. 26-30, June 1, 1969, pp. 12-15, September 1, 1969, pp. 32-34, October 1, 1969, pp. 13-15; and the *New York Times,* July 28 and August 25, 1969. The Chinese communists, with a "road force" of 20,000, are reported to have extended roads from Yunnan into Laos for about ninety miles, reaching a point near Muong Houn "just sixty miles northeast of Luang Prabang." *New York Times,* October 16 and 29, 1969. See also three articles by Henry Kamm, *ibid.,* October 26-28, 1969.

[31]"Thailand: De-escalation and Uncertainty," *Asian Survey,* February 1969, p. 115.

[32]Located in this area is the headquarters of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), a group whose membership is predominantly Chinese. The MCP remnant forces now number approximately one thousand. During 1969, MCP elements clashed repeatedly with RTG authorities, necessitating an intensified police effort in the border region. *Trends and Highlights,* December 1, 1969, pp. 3-6.

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rifle shot of the people's armed struggle was fired in 1965 in the Pu Pan Mountain [of] northeast Thailand . . . armed struggle [has] spread to 33 of the 71 provinces of the country."[33] Characteristic inflation in Peking's propaganda need not detain us. Nor at this time is there reason to doubt Thailand's determination and ability to meet the threat. What is clear is that Thailand is a primary target for Peking and the Pathet Lao-Hanoi complex.

Korea and Viet Nam. The communist role in the divided states of Korea and Viet Nam is well known. In each case the communists acquired their portion of the once unified colonial state under World War II conditions. In that sense, one may say there is an aspect of legitimacy to their presence in North Korea and North Viet Nam since that presence emerged as a result of an actual or tacit agreement among the victorious allies following the defeat of the imperialist Japanese and Vichy French. But it became the communist aim to take over by any means, including war, that portion of these countries to which they did not have the same legitimate access. This aim continues to be the prime cause of their campaign against the noncommunist states of South Korea and South Viet Nam.[34]

Malaysia and Singapore. The communists have not been able to make much headway in Singapore. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party captured all fifty-eight seats in the 1968 elections for Parliament. The Prime Minister has been quoted as saying that if the communists had chosen to participate in the election (which they officially boycotted), he would not have been surprised if they had collected "over 15 per cent of the votes, which would have ensured them some six to seven seats in the House."[35]

Malaysia's difficulties since the declaration that ended the 1948-1960 "Emergency" caused by the communist insurrection are primarily "racial"; they inhere in the erupting strife between the roughly 50 per cent of the population that is Malay and 40 per

[33]NCNA International Service in English, Peking, April 26, 1969. See also "A survey of [Peking's] propaganda for the period 1 November 1968 to 1 February 1969," *Trends and Highlights,* March 1, 1969, pp. 4-7.

[34]I have treated the Vietnamese issue at length in *Why Viet Nam?* (New York: Praeger, 1966). For an analysis of Peking's role in the war, see Robert F. Bordonaro, "Communist China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: A Reconstruction of their Relations in the Post-Geneva Period, 1954-66" (unpublished Masters thesis, Department of Politics, New York University, 1968).

[35]Jerome R. Bass, "Malaysia and Singapore," *Asian Survey,* February 1969, p. 125.

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cent composed of Chinese who were born in Malaya.[36] Nevertheless, communist guerrilla activity continues on Malaysia's borders with Thailand and Indonesian Borneo. In June 1968 remnants of the forces of Chin Peng, head of the Malayan Communist Party, were strong enough to organize a successful ambush against Malaysian security troops in the Kroh-Betong border area. The action was characterized by a Government White Paper as a "dramatic gesture to signal the beginning of resurgent Communist militancy."[37] Since then, there have been occasional reports of communist terrorist action on both sides of the Thai-Malayan border and of close Thai-Malayan counterinsurgency cooperation in the area. Finally, the communist-infiltrated, if not dominated, Sarawak United People's Party remains active in the federal state of Sarawak.

While the insurgent activity is mainly Chinese and Peking-oriented in character, Malaysia has recently opened up a new chapter in her relations with the Soviet bloc. In 1968 the USSR was Malaysia's largest rubber customer; Rumania purchased $18 million worth of Malaysian goods while selling Kuala Lumpur commodities worth only $30,000. Both Rumania and Bulgaria have offered Malaysia long-term credits and deferred-payment plans for purchases or against deliveries in rubber, tin and other Malaysian products. Although Peking has complained against the "Soviet revisionist clique" attempting to make itself "an intimate pal of the Rahman puppet clique . . . the notorious neocolonialist product," it has nonetheless become the fourth largest buyer of Malayan rubber (after the USSR, the United States and Great Britain).[38]

The new Soviet trade initiative in Southeast Asia's most economically progressive country, enhanced by the fairly successful Trade Fair of September 23-October 12, 1969 (the first such event in ten years), is an "investment" with obvious political

[36]See Frank N. Trager, "The Federation of Malaysia: An Intermediate Failure?," in Thomas M. Franck, editor, *Why Federations Fail, An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1968), pp. 125-166.

[37]Bass, *op. cit.*, p. 128; *Trends and Highlights*, September 1, 1969, pp. 30-31. Mention should also be made of the insurgency in the states of former British North Borneo (i.e., Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah). A pro-Peking group known as the North Kalimantan People's Armed Forces has been active there since 1962. Last year Peking claimed the guerrillas had "developed revolutionary base areas" and were "carrying on a mobile guerrilla war in the hilly regions bordering upon Indonesia and in the jungles of Sarawak." NCNA International Service in English, December 28, 1968.

[38]*Trends and Highlights*, May 1, 1969, pp. 11-13.

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implications. Approximately 200 guests from Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were brought to the fair. These efforts are apparently related to Moscow's effort to establish a presence in the area by drawing a number of the countries of South and Southeast Asia into a so-called system of collective security.

The Philippines. Lawlessness and political violence have increased in the Philippines. In part this is attributable to what Jean Grossholtz calls "the Huk resurgence in Central Luzon." Hukbalahap (i.e., communist) "killer squads" are now operating in this area, which was known in the days of the insurgency as "Huklandia." In response, the government reportedly organized its own killer squads to assassinate Huk leaders and supporters, but lack of success prompted President Marcos to "switch tactics." He freed the well-known Luis Taruc, former Huk leader who had allegedly renounced communism while in jail (since 1954) and become a Roman Catholic, hoping thereby to use Taruc's influence over other Huks; stepped up his rural reform program especially in Pompanga and Tarlac provinces, long regarded as Huk strongholds; and ordered a demilitarized peace and order drive in Central Luzon.[39]

The new program did not work. By the end of 1968, the volume of Huk terrorist attacks, liquidations, and even assaults on the Philippines' armed forces significantly increased. The Huks had used the demilitarized period to regroup, recruit and prepare for more guerrilla activity. They were said to be assisted by a Communist Chinese army general who gained illegal entry in 1967. In early 1969, President Marcos restored military and police action against the Huks everywhere, except in the two above-mentioned provinces where he apparently still hoped to demonstrate the effectiveness of his reform and amnesty program.[40]

During the year there were additional reports of an upsurge in communist activities. The Huk "shadow government" increased its influence in the towns and villages of Central Luzon, especially Angeles City, reputed center of the movement. Citizens who refused to pay Huk "taxes" were systematically liquidated. From November 1968 to April 1969, 106 died violently in Tarlac

[39]Jean Grossholtz, "The Philippines: New Adventures with Old Problems," *Asian Survey*, January 1969, pp. 50, 54-55. One recent report indicated that Taruc has been "trying to reorganize the old Socialist Party and has been pressing for the legalization of the Communist Party." *Far Eastern Economic Review,* May 25-31, 1969, p. 484.

[40]*Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 1, 1969.

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and Pompanga provinces alone. The deterioration in security in these provinces brought on a renewed government drive against the Huks. But by mid-year they had begun to extend their activities to the sugar-rich province of Occidental Negros to the south, and there were reports of Huk recruitment drives in Mindanao and the Visayan islands. The increase in scope and intensity of Huk activities as well as the capture of "subversive documents" in raids in Tarlac and Capas led government leaders to speculate that the Huks might be carrying out a long-term plan for a full-scale rebellion.[41]

Indonesia. Indonesia, too, has had a "significant resurgence of Communist activity."[42] The summer of 1968 witnessed the most decisive encounter between the government and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) since the latter's attempted coup in September 1965 and the aftermath of that struggle. The PKI had regrouped in an area giving it the best advantages Java has to offer in the form of difficult terrain — the South Blitar region. With Peking's encouragement — frequent radio and news broadcasts calling for revolutionary armed struggle — it was apparently planning the first phase of a guerrilla war against Suharto's government. The latter had warned Peking twice, in April and again in August 1968, to stop meddling in the internal affairs of other nations. During this period, the Indonesian Army located the "strong redoubt" of the PKI and smashed it. More than "800 Communist members or suspects were captured, including eight of those believed to be the top 10 leaders of the PKI underground." Among them was Oloan Autopea, reputed to be the successor to Aidit. Interrogation and captured documents "led to the arrest of secret PKI agents elsewhere, including more than 20 field-grade officers of West Java's Siliwangi Command."[43]

One interesting aspect of the Indonesian situation has been the positions taken by Moscow and Peking.[44] The latter has consistently condemned the Suharto regime from October 1965 onward. Since 1967 it has openly supported the PKI's " 'victorious' application of Mao's strategy of struggle in the countryside." After the PKI defeat at Blitar, it castigated Moscow as

[41]*Ibid.*, May 4-10, 1969, p. 324, August 17-23, 1969, pp. 452-453, September 21-27, 1969, p. 814.

[42]John M. Allison, "Indonesia: Year of the Pragmatists," *Asian Survey*, February 1969, p. 132.

[43]*Ibid.*, pp. 132-133. See also Jay B. Sorenson, "Moscow's Djakarta Dilemma," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 8-14, 1969, pp. 613-617.

[44]This paragraph is based on Sorenson, *op. cit.*, p. 615.

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"the greatest danger to . . . the Indonesian Communist Party," and charged Moscow with collaborating with the United States in making available to Suharto's government military supplies which the latter presumably used in its attacks on the PKI. *Pravda* in a September 1968 statement "assigned Peking direct responsibility for July and August, for the 'thousands' killed in East Java." Mao and his clique were guilty, according to the Soviets, of "adventurism," of turning Indonesia "into a firing ground."

In the meantime, Moscow has had to reassess its Indonesian policy in light of the Suharto government's strong anti-communist attitude and the renewed militancy of the PKI. It has been forced to accept rescheduling of Indonesia's huge debt to the USSR incurred during Sukarno's regime, but has been able to halt shipments of spare parts for the MIG's, Ilyushins, and other military equipment previously allocated to Djakarta. And it has allowed civilian projects, such as the Asahan hydroelectric complex in North Sumatra, to stand unfinished. It is significant to note that Indonesia was omitted from the list of "friendly" countries designated by Foreign Minister Gromyko as possible members of an Asian collective security system. These developments, despite the recent renewal of low-level trade in nonstrategic goods, probably represent a pause until Moscow can reassess its position and decide how to continue in that sprawling, inviting island empire.

India. With respect to the execution of communist policy, the case of India resembles that of Burma. Between 1947 and 1959, Moscow and Peking (after 1949) treated existing governments in India to the same set of "hard" and "soft" strategies in the same sequence, though not with the same effects. Their divergence on policy emerged after the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. Moscow, already at odds with Peking, refused to alter its "soft" line, while Peking reverted to the "hard" line both had pursued before 1954. (Peking's line on Burma changed only in 1967.)

There are now three communist parties in India. The one under Chairman S. A. Dange, the original CPI, is loyal to Moscow. The second, under E. M. S. Namboodiripad, former Chief Minister of Kerala,[45] and Jyoti Basu, Deputy Chief Minister of West Bengal, began as the CPI (Marxist), critical of Moscow and friendly to Peking. When its section in West Bengal, represented

[45]In October 1969 Namboodiripad's United Front government, headed by the CPI (Marxist), collapsed due to interparty rivalry. It was replaced by a new coalition under the Chief Ministership of a Right Communist, Chelat Achuta Menon.

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in that state's coalition government, supported the suppression of a peasants' protest at Naxalbari and thereby was condemned by Peking as "revisionist," the third communist party emerged. Known as the Marxist-Leninist CPI and led by Charu Mazumdar, the latter, formed in May 1969, is staunchly loyal to Mao and MTT and is pledged to fight against all "revisionists."

There is no doubt that the "2000 years" of Indian-Chinese friendship, "Hindi, Chini, Bai, Bai" — the slogan of Nehru, Krishna Menon, Arthur Lall and others in the 1950's — was fractured in 1962 and remains so to the present. But the Moscow-Delhi relationship is more subtle. Moscow is friendly to the Congress Party government (especially to the Congress forces controlled by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi), as it has been since the post-Stalin era. But it also finds a way to support the CPI. As the Congress Party displays its increasing fissures and incapacity to govern, Soviet criticism becomes more intense. India recently felt called upon to lodge a protest against Radio Peace and Progress and gently remonstrated with the Soviet government for having proceeded to build in India a multi-million-dollar cultural center, despite India's regulations prohibiting such projects. Meanwhile, Moscow has taken steps to realign the CPI and the CPI Marxists, now scorned by Peking. It supports "parliamentary fights" and participation in coalition state governments where necessary. It urges support for the CPI's demands, designed to push the present Gandhi-led Congress government over the brink to economic disorder. Peking, on the other hand, supports the Nagas, the Naxalbari "revolt" of the peasants, and other revolutionary confrontations.

It is in this sense that the Soviet "soft" line, as always, is the more dangerous. It operates on two levels: correct or "friendly" government-to-government relations where it can use its power of aid and trade as a political weapon; and propaganda and other means of support for its indigenous communist followers who, by one means or another, expect to "take over." On the other hand, Peking's unsubtle, blunt name-calling and hostility are so clearly recognizable that the decision to be "for" or "against" its policy can be made by any literate political mind.

IV

Intense factional rivalry between the Maoists within and outside mainland China and the leadership of the CPSU has af-

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fected the Asian communist parties. On the whole, the ruling communist parties have either remained loyal to Moscow (Outer Mongolia) or have tried to steer a balanced course between the CPSU and the Maoists (North Viet Nam and North Korea). Where "splits" have occurred within a national party, e.g., India, Moscow has retained the support of at least one section. However, the majority on the Asian roster of communist parties or factions are generally pro-Peking. Whether the new *Analects,* MTT, will retain its political control over mainland China and its influence among the communist parties or factions of Central, South, Southeast and East Asia remains to be seen. There is reason to question the survivability and continuing Asian influence of the Maoist "dynasty" (not to be confused with the CCP), with Lin Piao as constitutional but unhealthy heir apparent and Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and Lin's wife, Ye Chun—both members of the top group in the new Central Committee — as two potential rival empresses. The extraordinary "cult of personality" represented in Mao and MTT, surpassing anything accorded to Stalin in his lifetime, is predictably nonsustainable once Mao departs the scene. On the other hand, the danger of irrational or adventurist Maoist behavior in the short run is heightened. Communist China has a significant number of medium-range ballistic missiles. Three new launching sites are reportedly being built at Shenyang, Nanchang and Nanning. These are in position to affect Japan, Taiwan, South Viet Nam and Thailand. Brezhnev reminded his comrades in his June 7 speech that

> possibly, many . . . here remember Mao Tsetung's speech in this hall [of the Kremlin] during the 1957 meeting. With appalling airiness and cynicism he spoke of the possible destruction of half of mankind in the event of an atomic war. The facts indicate that Maoism is not calling for a struggle against war, but on the contrary, for war which it regards as a positive phenomenon in historical development.

It will be recalled that during the period of the Sino-Indonesian axis, 1960-1965, Sukarno with the backing of Peking raised the banner of coalition, called the New Emerging Forces (NEFO), which, in the manner of the Leninist "two-camp" thesis, would oppose the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO). NEFO at that time included Indonesia, Communist China, North Viet Nam, North Korea and Cambodia. With funds supplied by Peking, Sukarno staged the 1963 GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces), a rival to the Olympic Games, and tried to organize a large international NEFO conference. At the height of the axis

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relationship, Foreign Ministers Subandrio and Chen Yi issued a joint statement in January 1965 reaffirming their mutual international obligations and agreeing "to strengthen their friendly contacts in the military field."[46]

There is no evidence yet that Indonesia and Communist China had formally agreed to a pact or treaty, but in 1965 the Peking-Djakarta axis was moving in that direction. NEFO, despite Sukarno's bombast, was an organizational step beyond that envisaged by the 1955 Bandung Conference. It foreshadowed an alliance system between communist and noncommunist, so-called Third World, governments. The effort collapsed in the aftermath of the September 30, 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia, but it has been revived in another quarter.

In the full text of L. I. Brezhnev's June 7 speech to the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties,[47] the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee devoted considerable attention to four types of Soviet-inspired international organizations: the Warsaw Treaty Organization; the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; the need for "a sound alliance of all progressive anti-imperialist forces," a new "world-wide anti-imperialist front" to combat the rival "system" of capitalism-imperialism, "above all U.S. imperialism, the main force of world reaction"; and "a system of collective security in Asia."

This last item, coming near the end of a long, three-part speech, had received a careful buildup in the preceding text. It rested on an analysis of "Communist assistance to and support of these young countries of Africa and Asia," their roles in the anti-imperialist, anti-neocolonialist struggle, their class composition (workers, peasants, intelligentsia, youth), and their national liberation struggles and movements. Brezhnev pointed out that the European communist parties had addressed themselves to "a concrete program of achieving the security of the European peoples, stability of frontiers and peaceful cooperation of European states." Now, he said, "the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia." He omitted, at this point, Africa.

There appears to have been no further public discussion or resolution on this issue at the June meeting. However, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Troyanovsky, on his return to Tokyo, in-

[46]Arnold C. Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 262-264.

[47]"For Greater Unity of Communists, For a Fresh Upsurge of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *op. cit.*, note 14.

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dicated that various Soviet ambassadors to Asian countries had been recalled for consultations during June, but that the Soviet Union had not yet decided which specific countries in Asia should be invited to join the proposed security system. He favored as many as possible.[48]

Though several comments appeared and questions were raised about the meaning of Brezhnev's proposal, it was left to Foreign Minister Gromyko to amplify in some respects the intent of the General Secretary. On July 10, in a far-ranging report on foreign policy, Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union, an Asian and a European power, seeks collective security systems "where the danger of unleashing armed conflicts is concentrated."[49] Such a system, he went on, is not "directed against a certain country or group of countries." It is "a question of the collective efforts of all Asian states of safeguarding security in that part of the world in their common interests." Then, in a series of disjointed paragraphs, he mentioned divers noncommunist Asian countries in the following order: Japan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Ceylon, Malaysia and Singapore. With all of them the USSR desired "friendly," "good-neighborly," cooperative or cordial relations. Apparently, these states could be considered for potential membership in the USSR's Asian collective security pact.

One must assume that Brezhnev and Gromyko are aware that most Asian governments for various reasons desire to avoid collective security systems, whether led by Moscow or Washington. The Soviets also know that some Asian leaders are cautiously moving toward regional associations which join "neutralist" states to others that are currently allied with Washington. Moscow optimally would like to have Asian regional associations join with it in its "system of collective security," but in proposing such a system, the Kremlin has more immediate strategic and tactical objectives in mind.

At least two hypotheses may be advanced for this Soviet move. It may be interpreted, to quote Peking, as "an anti-China military alliance"[50] designed primarily to serve Soviet strategic interests vis-

[48]Tokyo General Overseas Service in English, June 29, 1969.

[49]"Questions of the International Situation and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, note 13.

[50]NCNA Peking International Service in English, reporting a *Hsinhua* correspondent's text, June 28, 1969. There is ground for this Peking interpretation. On May 28, 1969, in an article by V. Matveyev, a leading political commentator, *Izvestia* called attention to the China issue and alluded to what Brezhnev later announced in his speech of June 7. Matveyev also pointed to the withdrawal of British and American forces from the area.

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à-vis the CPR. The second hypothesis derives from the foregoing analysis of the more subtle character of Soviet ideology and practice. The Soviets have invested heavily in Asia, both in such communist countries as Outer Mongolia, North Korea and North Viet Nam,[51] and in certain noncommunist countries. These investments now provide leverage to gain access to the Indian Ocean, hasten the decline of the West's influence in the area and prevent any new Asian regional grouping from acquiring significant defense capability.

In this connection, it is instructive to note the amount of economic and military aid the Soviet Union has invested in neutral Asia since the Bulganin and Khrushchev visits to Asia in 1955-1956. (See Table I.)

TABLE I

ESTIMATED SOVIET BLOC AID TO "THIRD WORLD" OR NEUTRAL ASIA, 1954-1968
(In $U.S. Millions)

	Military Aid	*Economic Aid*
Afghanistan	$ 250	$709
Burma		40
Cambodia	10	30
Ceylon		82
India	610	1948
Indonesia	1340	635
Laos	under 5*	
Nepal		20
Pakistan	10	234
	$2225	$3698

*now formally excluded

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1968*, Research Memorandum RSE-65, September 5, 1969, and Stephen P. Gibert and Wynfred Joshua, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).

As Americans know from experience, the use of aid as a political weapon is not a guarantee of increased diplomatic leverage in the target country. Sometimes it is even counterproductive. But it is still true that all bilateral aid-giving countries, big or small, believe in its utility. It seems plausible to assume that there exists a direct connection between Moscow's trade and aid program in

[51]Moscow's military and economic aid to North Viet Nam has been running at a rate of $1 billion annually since 1965, indicating that its support for "wars of national liberation" is more than mere rhetoric. See Bordonaro, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

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South and Southeast Asia; its desire to organize a system of collective security in the area—especially in light of the British withdrawal from Asia and the continuing reduction of U.S. combat forces on mainland Southeast Asia; and its strategic interests vis-à-vis Communist China. The convergence of these three factors provides a more adequate—and in our view a correct—explanation of Soviet behavior. The Soviets appear to be taking advantage of the Chinese threat to draw the above-mentioned Asian countries into their ideological orbit. For this purpose, their heavy investment in Asia over the past twelve years serves as an additional instrument in their diplomatic briefcase. If this hypothesis is correct, it represents still another example of the coalescence of ideological and strategic interests which has been central to Soviet foreign policy for over half a century.[52]

V

In a sense, there is no conclusion to an article of this kind. The two communist meetings defined their respective ideology, strategy and tactics within the recognizable pattern of previous communist gatherings. True, there is a serious factional fight between the respective leaders of the CCP and the CPSU. In earlier decades such factional fights were not uncommon within and between communist parties. They led to purges, splits, liquidations, assassinations, to formations of separate "internationals," and to armed invasions of one communist-controlled state by another. The differences between the factions have always been intensely felt and severely treated. As Lenin said, there is no "third road." The CPSU appears to have more ample means of all kinds at its disposal than its current rival, the CCP.

For the Asian countries, objects of both rival interests, one can easily predict futures that do not hold promise of peaceful development. They have been kept in turmoil and conflict for more than two decades of their independence. East Asia will probably suffer least and mainland Southeast Asia most from future communist strategies. The latter will continue to be guided by

[52]Dr. Bernard Gordon, who commented on this paper when it was presented at the annual American Political Science Association meeting in September 1969, pointed out that the USSR sought but did not receive a base on Java in 1963; that there exist at present informal refueling agreements between Moscow and New Delhi; and that Cambodia's new port at Sihanoukville (built in part with U.S. aid) may be the political target for Moscow's current moves in Cambodia. There is no doubt that Moscow is currently seeking a military-strategic beachhead in the Indian Ocean area.

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communist ideology, by a "two camp" analysis of the Asian world.

Some observers of the current communist scene believe that for Peking dominance and control over mainland Southeast Asia is vital. That is, Southeast Asia with respect to Peking is comparable to Eastern Europe with respect to Moscow, or Canada and Mexico to Washington. For Moscow Southeast Asia is of strategic importance, not a vital national interest. The distinction between the view from Moscow and that from Peking has at best a short-run significance. It will matter little to the victims whether the application of communist ideology, power and interest is made by Leonid Brezhnev or Mao Tsetung.

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FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE "NEW STATECRAFT" REASSESSED

by Norman D. Palmer

TODAY the foreign policies of nations, and international relations generally, are encompassing new forms and new dimensions. Interlinkages between domestic and foreign policies, a proliferation of programs and agencies for carrying on the world's work, and countervailing tendencies toward conflict and cooperation are salient features of contemporary international life. The world is sharply divided by many kinds of walls, curtains, barriers and gulfs, even as transnational contacts are increasing in scope and significance. Nations and peoples are still failing to respond adequately to the challenges, crises and opportunities of the twentieth century, while the greater challenges, crises and opportunities of the twenty-first century lie only a generation away.

For something less than a generation large-scale foreign aid has been one of the conspicuous features of the foreign policies of an increasing number of donor and recipient states, and of the operations of agencies for international cooperation and coordination. In the decade of the 1950's it assumed signal proportions on the part of certain states and international agencies, and in the 1960's it became an integral and, in spite of its *ad hoc* beginnings, apparently a continuing aspect of international relations. Although, as Hans Morgenthau stated, "The very assumption that foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy is a subject of controversy,"[1] the political behavior of nations and the interpretations of scholars and other analysts clearly indicate that this assumption is gaining widespread acceptance and is fast becoming doctrine. "For more and more countries," Robert E. Asher has noted, "foreign aid has become an integral feature of foreign policy — a device designed to extend political influence, cement relations with other countries, provide an alternative to the offerings of rival powers, open trade channels, pave the way for private investment, and respond to

[1]Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *The American Political Science Review,* June 1962, p. 301.

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myriads of other pressures."[2] It has assumed the status of "the new statecraft," to borrow George Liska's expressive terminology.[3]

The concept and practice of foreign aid, and the problems involved, are not new. They can be traced throughout recorded history, at least in embryonic form. Aristotle wrote, in poignantly timeless words, that "To give away money is an easy matter, but to decide to whom to give it, and how large a sum, and when, and for what purposes, and how, is neither in every man's power, nor an easy matter." And apparently giving away money — or goods or services — on an international scale is even more difficult than in personal relations. What is new is the scale of foreign aid, its integration into the foreign policies of many states, and its conspicuous role in international relations. In this sense, only in recent years has it really become "the new statecraft," of sufficient scope and importance to justify special consideration and analysis.

Large-scale foreign aid arose out of need and capability. It was extended by the United States to Britain, the Soviet Union and certain other countries during World War II, to many countries in the immediate postwar years for purposes of relief and rehabilitation, to the states of Western Europe under the Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Program), to nations associated with the United States in bilateral or multilateral security arrangements, to the countries of Latin America, especially under the Alliance for Progress, and to the new states of Asia and Africa to assist them in their uphill struggle for national and human survival, political integration and stability, and political, economic and social development. Many other capital-exporting countries of the Western world, and one non-Western state — Japan — have also been prominently and increasingly involved in the aid picture. Beginning in the mid-1950's the Soviet Union became a major contributor of external assistance, and the People's Republic of China and some of the communist states of Eastern Europe have provided foreign aid on a smaller and more selective scale. In short, over the past fifteen years or so foreign aid has been an important instrument of the foreign policy of both Western and communist states, as it has, in different ways, of the

[2]Robert E. Asher, "How to Succeed in Foreign Aid Without Really Trying," in John D. Montgomery and Arthur Smithies, editors, *Public Policy*, Volume 13 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 128.

[3]George Liska, *The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

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major recipient states. In addition, it has been a chief concern of the United Nations and many of its organs and agencies, of regional arrangements and associations, and of various other international organizations.[4]

The question of foreign aid is a delicate, controversial and sensitive one. It has already produced a vast literature, and a great deal of heated public and private debate. In recipient countries it ruffles sensitivities and stirs suspicions; in donor states it seems to have few friends and many critics. It has become, according to Felix Belair, "a catalytic agent that fuses all the occupational frustrations and resentments of average men into something approaching xenophobia."[5] Few subjects have been dealt with on such a high plane of unreality; few have been surrounded by more nonsense and more obfuscation. Supporters and critics alike have failed to document their case convincingly, or to win over those who are not already persuaded one way or the other.

Two of the many unfortunate consequences of "the new statecraft" deserve special emphasis. The first is that foreign aid distorts the entire relationship between major donors and major recipients, including private as well as official contacts and relations. The second is that it tends to create another and particularly undesirable division in the world, which affects thinking and approaches as well as national and international policies. John Kenneth Galbraith observed, "To divide the world as between the aiding and the aided is both wrong and psychologically damaging."[6] In a sense, this same kind of division is created by all references to the North-South problem, the "have" and "have-not" nations, and the developed and underdeveloped nations. Even UNCTAD, and the two main conferences it has held, in 1964 and 1968, can be criticized for sharpening and crystallizing the world's economic divisions, though it has served a useful purpose in providing an organization in which the interests and

[4]See John D. Montgomery, *Foreign Aid in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

[5]Felix Belair, "Opposition to Foreign Aid Mounts in Congress," *New York Times,* August 11, 1963.

[6]John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economic Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 52. "To see the countries of the world not as divided between the developed and the underdeveloped but as spread along a line representing various stages of development is essential if we are to have an accurate view of the problem of assistance. For when development is so regarded, we see that no group of countries is uniquely qualified to extend assistance and no other group is completely condemned to the role of recipient. . . . The provision of aid is seen, as it should be seen, as a cooperative endeavor in which all countries may participate." *Ibid.,* p. 51.

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needs of the developing countries can find special emphasis and, hopefully, be better accommodated.

The amorphous term "foreign aid," embracing many different concepts, programs and approaches,[7] eludes precise definition, except in particular contexts. It might be better if it were eliminated from the vocabulary of international relations. With respect to economic development, at least, the practice of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has much to commend it. OECD studies avoid the use of the word "aid" completely. "They compile from Government sources the total of funds of all kinds — not only grants and loans but export credits and private as well as public investment — everything except military expenditure, which contributes to the economic growth of the recipient countries."[8] But clearly, for a discussion of foreign aid this usage is at once too broad and too narrow. It covers funds not usually considered under the rubric of foreign aid and omits other sources of assistance usually regarded as its component parts. There is little rationale for including, for example, loans from the World Bank or from the U.S. Export-Import Bank under foreign aid, for these are "hard loans," on commercial terms; yet such loans are often listed in reports on foreign aid. Almost all donor countries are inclined to include items in their reports which should probably not be included, such as reparation payments in the case of Japan and private investments in the case of West Germany. Possibly the vast American food shipments are properly subsumed under foreign aid, but they constitute aid of a different type, contributing to human survival more than to economic development (although admittedly the two are not unrelated); they also represent a means of disposing of food surpluses, which is no longer such a problem for the United States.

II

The American foreign aid program is a hodgepodge. "It is a

[7]"Under 'aid' or 'assistance' several countries include strictly commercial loans, often on short terms, along with grants and loans of the 'soft' variety; also, the distinction between economic and military assistance is often a very tenuous one. The published data refer sometimes to actual disbursements and sometimes to new commitments, and both disbursements and commitments may be figured on a net (that is, with interest and principal repayments deducted) or gross basis. For the most part, these various categories are not kept clearly separated in the statistical presentations." Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), p. 634.

[8]Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, ID 1446-1, May 1963.

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misnomer," Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, once remarked,

> to speak of *the* foreign aid program. It is not *a* program; it is a conglomeration of programs—to support foreign armies; maintain American military bases in foreign lands; build roads, dams, steel mills; pay foreigners' import bills; grow more food; rent communication stations; train foreign tax collectors; provide emergency relief from natural disasters; and support multifarious United Nations activities which themselves range from feeding children, to killing malarial mosquitoes, to irrigating Pakistan. . . . It is no wonder that Congress, the public, and perhaps the Administration has difficulty in understanding [the assistance effort].[9]

The result is that other governments and peoples, including those in recipient countries, are even more confused regarding the nature and objectives of the vast American program and its implications for themselves. On the administrative side the program has often been a bureaucratic nightmare. During the period 1950-1963 there were seven major structural changes in it, and at least eight major studies by Presidentially-appointed commissions or groups. When David E. Bell became Administrator of the Agency for International Development in 1962, he was the eleventh person to head the AID economic assistance program, a post generally regarded as "the most thankless job in Washington."

In the postwar years the two principal types of American external assistance have been military aid and economic aid. In many respects military aid is even more closely and directly related to foreign policy than is economic aid: it has been used to support security objectives, to strengthen bilateral and multilateral alliance systems, and perhaps also to influence the foreign policy orientation of various states. It is a large and complex subject, which deserves careful examination, especially at a time when the undesirable results of some large-scale programs are more apparent than they have been in the past, and when many observers judge that military aid as a weapon of foreign policy is becoming increasingly unproductive, in some cases even counterproductive. A strong argument can still be made for military aid, under special circumstances and hopefully on a temporary basis. In any event it is a phase of foreign aid in which many countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, India, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, North and South Viet Nam, are deeply involved in various ways and for

[9]Quoted in "Foreign Aid Is a Many-Splintered Thing," *Dialogue,* August 1968, p. 2.

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various reasons. This article will concentrate on economic assistance, but the importance of military aid, its special relevance for foreign policy, and the difficulty of distinguishing between military and economic aid in many instances, are both freely acknowledged and strongly underscored.

Foreign economic assistance assumes many forms. It may be examined in such broad categories as bilateral and multilateral assistance, or as grants and loans. Current U.S. AID reports analyze the American program under the broad headings of AID economic assistance and non-AID economic assistance.[10] The former is in turn subdivided into two main categories, namely grants and loans, with the largest appropriations now going for development loans, the Alliance for Progress, supporting assistance-Viet Nam, and technical assistance. The latter consists mainly of the Food-for-Peace Program, under Public Law 480, but "other non-AID programs" include or have included substantial sums for several countries, among them the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy in the days of the Marshall Plan, Japan during the period of occupation, and Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and India.

Some foreign aid specialists have suggested that the best breakdown for current American economic aid programs would be Food-for-Peace, program assistance and project assistance. Others prefer more sophisticated categorizations. In this the economists have taken the lead, as they have in almost every other aspect of the foreign aid picture, and full credit must be given for their contributions. Nevertheless, to cite from Hans Morgenthau's now-famous article in *The American Political Science Review*, "As military policy is too important a matter to be left to the generals, so is foreign aid too important a matter to be left to the economists."[11] Morgenthau called attention to "the diversity of policies that go by the name, 'foreign aid,'" and pointed out that at least six different kinds of aid could, and should, be identified: humanitarian, subsistence, military, prestige, bribery, and economic development.[12] This might be described as a motivation rather than a typology classification. It would be inappropriate for an economic analysis, but does provide a useful framework for analyzing the political aspects of foreign aid and for considering

[10]See Agency for International Development, *Proposed Foreign Aid Program, FY 1968: Summary Presentation to the Congress* (Washington: GPO, 1967).

[11]Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 301.

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the place of aid in the broad context of foreign policy, especially from the viewpoint of the donor nations. It has less relevancy from the viewpoint of recipient countries or multilateral aid-giving agencies.

III

The objectives and motives of foreign aid are even more varied and nebulous than its types and forms. Obviously the basic approach of multilateral agencies is different from that of nations, of donors from that of recipients, of major aid-giving and aid-receiving states from that of states less directly involved in or affected by the aid-giving process, of communist states from that of non-communist states, and so on.

> National boundaries are hard to leap and programs look different according to whether one views them from inside or outside the donor country. Add to the irrepressible suspicion of the motives of foreigners, the fact that no nation is monolithic. The objectives of one group of citizens or bureaucrats may be anathema to some other group. The public and ostensible aims of a country are not necessarily its real ones, and both sets of objectives are likely to change over time.[13]

Presumably for all states the objective of giving or receiving aid is to promote the national interest; but this too is a nebulous term, and may be interpreted in ways which will either hamper or further the basic interests of the nation or international cooperation. One well-known American student of the subject, writing in the Kennedy era, argued that U.S. aid and trade policies should be employed mainly as "strategic weapons in the Cold War" and that the United States should distribute aid "primarily on the basis of the recipient nations' attitudes toward our foreign policy objectives." He expressed regret that the Kennedy Administration had, in his judgment, not been conducting its programs in accordance with these objectives, and tried to console himself with this reflection: "Even if the primary goal of the assistance program is to promote economic development and social change in the assisted nations, it should be implicit in the program that we can look upon our own interest with a little tenderness, and that aid or trade may be curtailed if actions are taken which are provoking as well as provocative."[14]

A content analysis of authoritative statements of the objectives

[13]Asher, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

[14]James R. Schlesinger, "Strategic Leverage for Aid and Trade," in David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen, editors, *National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 688, 689, 693. See also Schlesinger's *The Political Economy of National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 227-232.

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of the American foreign aid program would confirm the multiplicity of goals, but it might also clarify certain underlying themes. An example of this approach is contained in Karl von Vorys' *The Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid,* which relied mainly on what the author called "political marginal analysis," using experimental mathematical models. He found no fewer than twenty-three declared goals in the Statement of Policy prefacing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, "a legislative cornerstone of subsequent years' aid bills." The first five were: (1) peace; (2) wider recognition of the dignity and interdependence of men; (3) survival of free institutions in the United States; (4) worldwide atmosphere of freedom; (5) strengthening the forces of freedom.

A similar analysis of fifty-seven speeches by forty-five members of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1963 and 1964 foreign aid debates, both in support of and opposing the program, revealed that the most frequently stated goals were: (1) promoting the United States' national security; (2) countering the communist threat; (3) stimulating economic development; (4) developing friendship for the United States; (5) advancing the security and welfare of the Free World; (6) implementing U.S. foreign policy. An analysis of fourteen major statements during the same period by five leading spokesmen of the U.S. government (Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and AID Administrator Bell) revealed that three objectives were most frequently advanced: (1) the independence of underdeveloped countries; (2) the security and welfare of the Free World community; (3) a secure and stable world community of independent states.

On the basis of his investigations von Vorys concluded:

> As a matter of fact, it is possible with some persistence to identify the underlying official rationale of American foreign aid. It starts with the proposition that American national interest is best served by a stable international environment where changes occur in a peaceful, orderly manner. It proceeds with the observation that in our time two major threats to international order are especially critical. The first is the systemic disruption created by communist aggression (direct or indirect) throughout the globe. The other threat, less dramatic but potentially no less perilous, is the internal disruption generally characterizing "emerging" states of the world.[15]

[15]Karl von Vorys, *The Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid,* Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Research Monograph Series No. 11 (August 1967), pp. 3-4.

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IV

Soviet foreign aid outside the communist world, which began to assume significant proportions in the mid-1950's, has been concentrated on certain countries, notably India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Cuba, and on impact and showpiece projects, of which the Bhilai steel mill in India and the Aswan Dam in the UAR have been the most spectacular. Most of the aid has been in the form of low-interest loans, payable after a relatively short period, often either by barter or in local currencies.[16] From the beginning the political objectives and propaganda aspects of the Soviet program have been obvious. In recent months, however, the Soviet Union, like the United States, has been cutting back its aid commitments. One striking fact is that as of mid-1968 there was "a back-up in the Soviet aid pipeline of $3.9 billion in unused credits."[17]

Communist China has extended modest assistance to some twenty-five countries, mostly in Asia and Africa, and has sent many hundreds of technicians and laborers abroad. It has used aid efforts as part of its overall campaign to mobilize a common front against the United States and the Soviet Union. It has also rewarded Albania, its only real champion in Eastern Europe, with economic aid, and its various ties with Pakistan, stemming largely from a common desire to keep India on the defensive, have led to both economic and military aid.

While they differ greatly in size, emphasis and style, the foreign aid programs of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are similar in that they are channeled mainly to countries with which political ties have been long and close — meaning, for the most part, their former colonies. Portugal's program is directed almost exclusively to its overseas territories, chiefly Angola and Mozambique. Of the major donor states, only West Germany and Japan have been increasing rather than decreasing their aid programs. Both countries have tended to lag behind in the aid field; both have used aid to promote exports and to improve their international image, influence and status. They have charged rather high interest rates, but they are now easing the terms of their aid and are broadening its scope and increasing its size.

[16]See Marshall I. Goldman, "A Balance Sheet of Soviet Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1965.

[17]Seymour Topping, "Aid to Developing Countries Shifting to Private Sector," *New York Times,* August 5, 1968.

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Nationalist China and Israel have been both recipients and donors of aid. For understandable political reasons these two states, at opposite ends of Asia, faced with special problems of survival, have been carrying on limited aid activities, mostly in the form of technical assistance, in a surprisingly large number of Asian and African countries. The bulk of Canada's aid has gone to other Commonwealth members, and to a few countries in Latin America and French-speaking Africa — the latter an interesting concession to the French-Canadians and one of many illustrations of the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy.[18]

Among the major institutional sources of capital assistance to developing nations are the World Bank and its two affiliates, the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. Of the various arrangements for coordinating aid programs the Colombo Plan and the international consortia organized for India, Pakistan and Indonesia by the World Bank, and for Greece and Turkey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, have been particularly effective and particularly acceptable to both donors and recipients.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, now an established agency associated with the UN, represents the interests and needs of the developing countries, and also serves as a reminder that the developed nations can render far greater assistance to new states by following more liberal and better conceived trade policies than they can by any amounts of aid. Aid programs often seem to be used by developed states as an admittedly unsatisfactory substitute for more liberal trade policies. As Mrs. Gandhi observed in an address to the UN General Assembly on October 14, 1968, "Aid is only partial recompense for what the superior economic power of the advanced countries denies us through trade." This point was stressed again and again by representatives of the developing countries at the two major conferences of UNCTAD, in 1964 and 1968; but still the terms and conditions of international trade are weighted heavily against the less developed states.

[18]See Seymour J. Rubin, *The Conscience of the Rich Nations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 44-50. Rubin discusses the various aid programs of noncommunist nations and international agencies under the following heads: United States aid, programs stemming from colonial association, programs with no colonial association, programs of the European Economic Community, other programs, and multilateral programs.

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Multilateral aid seems to be preferred by most recipient countries, since it reduces the dangers of political "strings" and excessive dependence, whereas most donors, whatever their spokesmen may say about multilateralism, are reluctant to channel the greater part of their aid through multilateral agencies. The relative merits of the two approaches have been debated *ad nauseam*. Although there has been some shift in the direction of multilateralism, the bulk of aid is still bilateral in nature, and any further shift in emphasis would probably reduce rather than increase the levels of aid-giving. "Whatever the instrumentality . . . multilateralization on any appreciable scale raises questions about the integration of foreign aid with total foreign policy and with considerations of national security."[19]

V

The problem of evaluating the impact of foreign aid programs is a particularly difficult one. Certainly there has been widespread criticism of almost all aid programs, and disappointment with their results, in both donor and recipient countries. There has also been widespread support for such programs. Even such an unlikely source as *Time* magazine has expressed the view that "for all its shortcomings, foreign aid has been a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy since World War II and, on the whole, spectacularly successful."[20] *Time* did not indicate what its criteria of success were. Criticisms range all the way from aversion to the very idea of foreign aid to failures in specific programs. Defense also ranges from humanitarian motives to those of the narrowest self-interest, from support of the overall aims and objectives to enthusiasm for specific aid efforts.

Foreign aid is in essence a long-range endeavor, which can be properly evaluated, if ever, only after many more years of massive effort. This point is lost sight of, however, because it is often regarded as a short-range and experimental program to deal with immediate crises of transition and development, and the funds to support it are made available reluctantly and mostly on a year-by-year basis.

In evaluating foreign aid programs provisionally, as policy-makers must do, special attention should be given to their impact on donor countries, recipient countries, relations among

[19] "The Trouble with Foreign Aid," *The Morgan Guaranty Survey*, January 1964, p. 10.
[20] *Time*, February 16, 1968.

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donor countries, relations among recipient countries, relations between donor and recipient countries, international and regional organizations and agencies, and international relations generally. Each type of impact merits careful study. Foreign aid affects the balance of forces within as well as between nations, especially in recipient countries. In order to realize modernization goals most developing countries require substantial social change and substantial outside assistance. In both of these respects the modernization effort is lagging, as Gunnar Myrdal has demonstrated in his weighty three-volume *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*. This work may be criticized as an inquiry into "the poverty of notions," rather than "nations," as Romesh Thapar has insisted,[21] but no serious investigation of the situation in contemporary South and Southeast Asia can disregard the findings of Myrdal and his associates, based on a cooperative research effort lasting for some ten years.

In each recipient Asian country the foreign aid story has its own special features, its own priorities, successes and failures. The overall picture is not encouraging. In spite of massive military and economic assistance, none of the countries in noncommunist Asia, with the possible exception of developed Japan, and apparently none of the communist states, are in a healthy economic, political or social condition. It is impossible to say what the consequences would have been if outside assistance, of many types and from many sources, had not been forthcoming. While this assistance has shown no spectacular results, except perhaps in Japan and Taiwan, it is likely that without it the economic and security situation in noncommunist Asia would be far worse than it is today. Generalizations regarding the value and impact of aid should in any event be tested by a country-by-country analysis of the aid programs in their various dimensions, in actual operation.

Certainly disillusion about foreign aid is widespread. In the United States, the major contributor, increasing dissatisfaction with the results of aid programs, impatience with the reactions and policies of recipient nations, and preoccupation with problems that are bidding for higher priority, such as the balance of payments, the Viet Nam war, and urbanization and race relations inside the country, have led to a slackening of aid appropriations, perhaps on a long-term basis. Rebuffs from recipients — e.g., Nasser's invitation to "take a leap in the lake," and Sukarno's

[21]Romesh Thapar, "Poverty of Nations or Notions?," *Indian & Foreign Review*, August 1, 1968.

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taunt, "To hell with your aid"— have not helped. Other capital-exporting countries have seemed all too content to let the United States bear the burden of appropriations and take the criticisms, although several contribute a higher percentage of their gross national product to foreign aid than the United States does. Robert Asher described the situation in this tongue-in-cheek aside: ". . . the heavy involvement of the United States in aid to beleaguered nations has enabled other high-income countries to avoid some of the brickbats cast at the United States program and, in this sense, to succeed in foreign aid without really trying."[22] Like the United States, the Soviet Union seems to be curtailing its foreign aid efforts. "Today American and Soviet aid programs are regarded in some countries as complementary rather than competitive. Moscow and Washington have learned, sometimes painfully, that aid is not always an effective lever of influence."[23]

Given their sensitivities and weaknesses, their traditions and relative lack of external contacts and experience, it is only natural that the peoples and governments of many developing countries look upon foreign aid, especially from major powers, as a massive, unwelcome and dangerous involvement in their internal affairs. They recognize their need for aid, but are understandably apprehensive of some of the consequences. Since the motives of donors are by no means clear, even to their own people, it is little wonder that confusion about foreign aid is prevalent in the recipient states. As a Burmese scholar observed,

> Given the continued befogging of the issues, we cannot blame the people of the developing countries if they sometimes find it hard to distinguish the "crypto-philanthropists" who hide altruism behind the mask of national self-interest from the "neo-colonialists" whom they suspect of hiding national self-interest under the mask of altruism.[24]

The charge of "neo-colonialism" is frequently heard and widely accepted.

> In this charge is reflected much of the bitterness of the developing countries about the fact that the speed of their development depends upon economic aid, that they still feel themselves the victims of a subtle imperialism, that they are important onlookers in the struggle for world power among the larger nations, and that they may become the victims of wars which they did nothing to provoke and much to prevent.[25]

[22]Asher, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
[23]Topping, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[24]H. Myint, *The Economies of the Developing Countries* (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1964), p. 183.
[25]Bert F. Hoselitz, *Economic Aid for Development* (New York: The Institute for International Order, 1960), p. 15.

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In both donor and recipient countries attitudes toward foreign aid are unrealistic and paranoiac. Donors sometimes think of aid as a kind of undesirable but inescapable international charity, to be extended grudgingly and sparingly to unworthy and ungrateful mendicants. Recipients seem at times to look on it as an obligation of the rich toward the poor, or as an inadequate atonement for past exploitation. Even distinguished national leaders, who should know better, indulge in strange flights on the foreign aid theme. Two examples, out of many, may be cited. In December 1967 the late Senator Everett M. Dirksen wrote in a widely-syndicated newspaper column:

> India is 10,000 miles away. What has she ever done for us? Exactly nothing, although we have provided India with about $5 billion in economic aid, exclusive of military assistance. Don't you wonder, then, why we bleed the taxpayers of the United States to give aid to India? Just what can India do to us, just what can she do for us, to justify the sacrifices that Americans have been making for India? On a purely cold, material basis, a rather good case can be made against any aid whatsoever for India.[26]

Regardless of the merits of his argument, Senator Dirksen was giving way to irresponsible hyperbole by suggesting that American aid to India, which at that time amounted to little more than one-twentieth of one per cent of the gross national product, was bleeding the American taxpayers.

A few weeks later, the distinguished Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of India, Morarji Desai, made this immortal contribution to the foreign aid debate: "For some time to come, I think it will be wise to take it if it comes. If it does not come we need not worry about it. . . . In fact, it might be a blessing in disguise if that happens. But if help comes we should not discard it saying we will go alone no matter how long we will take in our economic development."[27] To the extent that this statement reflected the commendable objective of gradual removal of the foreign aid crutch, and moving toward self-sustaining growth by greater national efforts, it makes a great deal of sense; but at a crucial stage of India's development effort, when the need for continued external assistance is indicated in almost every study by Indian and foreign experts and in every draft of a one-year or a five-

[26]Everett M. Dirksen, "Why U.S. Taxpayers Are Bled for India," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin,* December 31, 1967.

[27]Address at a meeting of the Subjects Committee of the Indian National Congress in Lal Bahadur Nagar (Hyderabad), January 9, 1968; quoted in *India News,* January 19, 1968, p. 4.

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year plan, such double-talk seems almost ludicrous from a man who made periodic trips to Western countries and international aid-giving agencies to solicit continuing aid for his country. The absurdity of this trend of thought was expressed in a cartoon by Laxman in *The Times of India* for October 10, 1968, showing a Congress official looking at a large chart labeled "Project Progress" and remarking: "We can't give up at this stage! We will carry on without depending on external aid . . . or internal resources."

The need for continuing, and increasing, the levels of economic assistance to developing countries has been spelled out many times by key officials of national and international aid-giving or aid-coordinating agencies, such as Eugene Black, George Woods and Robert McNamara of the World Bank, by spokesmen of the developing countries at the two UNCTAD conferences, and by almost all serious students of the needs of development now and in years to come. It was underscored recently in the report of the Commission on International Development (the Pearson Commission), submitted to the World Bank on October 1, 1969. Unfortunately, considerations based on expert advice and national and international self-interest seem to be outweighed by the growing disillusionment with foreign aid generally, revelations of occasional administrative failures, bungling or even scandals in foreign aid programs, and apathy and indifference to the widening gap between the "have" and "have-not" nations.

VI

In 1961 the United Nations proclaimed the decade of the 1960's the Decade of Development, and called on all nations, developed and underdeveloped alike, to embark on a vast international effort to make the fruits of human progress and skills available on a more equitable basis to peoples everywhere. Foreign aid was envisioned as one of the major components of this effort — but by no means the most important one — and billions of dollars and vast human and material resources have been made available under foreign aid programs. But the net result of all these efforts has been disappointing. As the Decade of Development passed into history, a sense of frustration and pessimism hung over the world. The stark fact is that, as UN Secretary-General U Thant said in 1968, "We are not winning the war on want. The opportunity gap for many, if not most, of the nations and individuals of the world

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is growing wider, and inequality is increasing."[28] "The widening gap between the developed and developing countries," declared the Pearson Commission in the first sentence of its 230-page report, "has become a central issue of our time."

Obviously, efforts during the Development Decade, vast as they have been, have been inadequate to meet the growing needs, and any realistic look into the future indicates that even greater coordinated efforts will be required in the years ahead. Yet instead of gearing for this, many nations — developed and developing, communist and noncommunist — are growing weary of the struggle and are slowing down the pace. This is noticeably true of foreign assistance programs. In August 1968, Seymour Topping, an astute reporter for the *New York Times,* wrote:

> Most of the major donor nations are leveling off or reducing their governmental economic and technical-assistance programs. In Western and Communist countries, popular support for foreign aid is diminishing because of competing domestic needs, international payment problems and doubts about the effectiveness of governmental programs. The developing countries are being advised by the United States and other Western countries to rely more on private business as a source of foreign credits and investments. Thus their planning must be revised at a time when expanding populations are widening the gap between what capital is needed and what is available.[29]

To use U Thant's phrase, a "climate of fatigue and disenchantment" has gradually been slowing down the support for and dimensions of foreign aid programs.

In a penetrating editorial on "International Finance," prompted by the joint annual meeting of the Governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in October 1968, *Dawn,* the leading newspaper of Pakistan, summed up many important aspects of the current dilemma of economic development:

> With a declining share of world trade, with poorer prospects for flows of official aid and with an increasing burden of interest and debt repayment, the newly developing countries have been finding it increasingly difficult to maintain the momentum of economic growth.
>
> N. M. Uqali [the Finance Minister of Pakistan] drew attention to the irony of the situation when he told the Governors' meeting that the international aid climate was becoming indifferent at a time when the developing countries . . . were just getting ready to enter upon a more ambitious phase of development.
>
> As the Commonwealth Finance Ministers noted recently, it is possible that, considering the heavy burden of interest and debt repayment, the

[28]Quoted in Topping, *op. cit.,* p. 3.
[29]*Ibid.,* p. 1.

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net flow of external assistance may remain static or may even decline. The present aid climate in the industrially advanced countries coupled with the limitation through quota and tariff restrictions of trade opportunities available to the developing countries is bound to impinge adversely upon the economic growth of the latter.[30]

The implications of these trends should be clearly understood. After hardly two decades of large-scale experimentation, during which foreign aid became an important instrument of the foreign policies of many nations without developing an accepted body of theory or an adequate rationale or sustained public support, the "new statecraft" embodying it seems to be under increasing challenge. As Topping reported, "The world pattern of economic aid to the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is undergoing a fundamental change,"[31] which will inevitably reduce its dimensions and its significance unless present trends can be reversed. If the decline of foreign aid leads to more realistic policies and greater efforts on the part of the developing countries and to more helpful policies in trade, investment and international cooperation on the part of the economically advanced states, this apparently premature drying up of aid funds may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. But if compensatory programs of equal or greater effectiveness do not replace those which are declining, the consequences for the developing countries could be well-nigh disastrous. In that case the developed countries might discover the painful wisdom of the warning of William S. Gaud, former Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, that "To thwart the desire of the new nations for progress is to invite unrest and violence, to encourage hostility toward the developed half of the world and to jeopardize the possibilities for peace."[32]

All nations and peoples should consider the implications of the fact that the Decade of Development, so bravely proclaimed in the early 1960's, is likely to be judged one of frustration and disappointment, and that the situation in the 1970's will be even more grim unless heroic efforts are made by developed and developing countries alike. In his address to the UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi, on February 10, 1968, George Woods, retiring President of the World Bank, said that the most important change needed to correct the trend toward economic stagnation was a

[30]October 9, 1968.
[31]Topping, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
[32]Address at 34th American Assembly, Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., November 2, 1968.

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"realization on the part of the advanced nations that the development process demanded a more effective and constructive participation by them, and on a high-priority basis." Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in inaugurating that conference, observed: "We must all plead guilty to being tempted by the illusion that small efforts can yield big results. This is why we became disenchanted and international economic cooperation is the first casualty. Thus domestic pressures mount. Our affluent friends seek to curtail their contribution to development. In turn, recipients of aid retreat inward." And all the while, "the gap keeps growing." In her own country, Woods noted, "many millions of people have yet to experience more than the feeblest manifestations of progress," and India "is by no means the only country where hope has dwindled toward despondency."

It is past time to reverse these trends. It is time for all of us, wherever we may live or whatever may be our personal situation, to get out of "the slough of despond" in which we seem to be mired, to elevate our sights and enlarge our horizons, and to accept in fact, as well as in profession, the truth that the world has become too small to wall ourselves in behind political frontiers and refuse to face international needs and realities. It is time to realize, as John F. Kennedy, then a United States Senator, declared over a decade ago, that international economic development calls for "a vast international effort, an enterprise of positive association."[33]

Foreign aid is only one of the instruments that have come into existence to attempt to deal with the immense problems of development, and it has never been a very satisfactory instrument, even on an *ad hoc* and emergency basis; but until the conditions of the developing countries and of the international economy have substantially changed and improved, it is hard to see how the curtailment of foreign aid, at a time of growing needs, can be anything but harmful to all concerned. Admittedly there is a great deal of confusion and disagreement on this point, but the burden of proof rests clearly on those who would throw new burdens on developing countries and impoverished peoples.

For better or worse, foreign aid of substantial dimensions will be a necessary feature of this "vast international effort" for some time to come. It will therefore continue to be a significant aspect of international endeavors and of the foreign policies of nations.

[33]Address in the U.S. Senate, February 19, 1959.

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We can agree with Seymour Rubin that there are limits to the effectiveness of aid in achieving economic development and in promoting social change," or, for that matter, in advancing any of the goals which aid is supposed to promote. There are also, to continue Rubin's analysis, "limits to the cooperation which can be expected between donors, between the developing countries themselves, and between the developed and the developing."[34] Certainly, however, there is need for greater cooperation on all of these fronts.

In particular, there is need for more candid and more cooperative relations between aid-giving and aid-receiving countries. In spite of an obvious mutuality of interests, the attitudes of both groups of countries toward foreign aid vary greatly, and aid has far different aspects and implications from different vantage points. The relationship between donors and recipients, as Rubin noted, "is fragile, subject to many strains. Resentment, on both sides, lies close beneath the surface."[35] This is a condition that should be recognized and faced, but it should not be allowed to obscure the more positive aspects of the relationship and the mutuality of interests involved, even when viewed from the point of narrowest self-interest. "Foreign aid is not politically neutral. Its effects are powerfully manifested in international relations and in the domestic politics of both the giver and the receiver. It represents a new international ethic, at least in that it compels nations to take a more sympathetic view of each other."[36]

VII

By and large, foreign aid, especially in its political aspects, remains more of an art than a science. It should be the subject of more extensive and more objective research. *Ad hoc*, temporary programs, varying greatly in size and objectives, have developed into major, and apparently long-term, instruments of international cooperation and national policy. Even aid-giving and aid-receiving agencies have given far too little attention to it as a subject for research and evaluation. In spite of extensive studies there is still much uncertainty about the whole foreign aid experience, including its essential rationale, its objectives, its relationship to economic growth, social change and political develop-

[34]Rubin, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
[35]*Ibid.*, p. 152.
[36]John D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 278.

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ment, and its impact on national policies and international relations. Yet, to quote David Bell,

> the process of foreign assistance is inherently dependent on research. . . . If we understood our business better, it might well be that the whole process of foreign aid would be seen as a research process, aimed at learning how to move a particular society, with its special and unique characteristics of history and culture and physical geography, toward specified objectives. . . . there can be no doubt of the importance of incorporating far stronger programs of research and evaluation into our aid administration.[37]

Nor, as Bell added, can there be any doubt of the need to develop greater research facilities and competence in the developing countries themselves.

Research, and probably evaluation as well, should not be confined to agencies involved in the administration of aid or other official agencies; by far the greater part should be carried out by private scholars, at universities, research institutes and other centers for relatively disinterested investigation. It should be interdisciplinary in nature and approach, and it should utilize all of the major techniques, theories and findings of modern social science research.[38]

[37]David E. Bell, "The Quality of Aid," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966, p. 606.

[38]The subject of foreign aid and foreign policy, for example, can be profitably analyzed by using such concepts and approaches as formal and informal penetration and access, interlinkages between domestic politics and foreign policies, the spillover effect, the multiplier effect, the international demonstration effect, and political marginal analysis.

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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST CAULDRON

by Stefan T. Possony

HALF a century ago, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay said: "The world's peace rests with China, and whoever understands China socially, politically, economically, religiously, holds the key to world politics during the next five centuries." Statements of this kind are subject to the criticism that they can be made with equal justification about several major countries, including the United States. Yet fundamental misunderstandings among the major powers frequently have been prominent causes of war. Of all its pressing strategic problems, the United States neglects the Chinese question most and therefore understands it least.

Events in China, the most populous country in the world, have repeatedly influenced international relations. The current global protracted conflict has been intimately related to Chinese affairs, and Communist China has been the instigator of numerous crises. The impact of China on the rest of the world, whether for good or evil, is bound to grow rather than decline.

Several China specialists in the United States and Western Europe have been arguing that Washington recovered from its mistaken policy of the late 1940's and through its "masterly inaction" of the 1950's and 1960's has contributed a large share to the turmoil now convulsing the Maoist empire. I agree that activist policies are not always advisable or feasible, and I tend to support the thesis that with respect to a gigantic country like China a great deal of patience, a predilection for slow motion, and an avoidance of dramatic gestures may be necessary. Yet, leaving aside the question whether U.S. policy was "masterful" or unimaginative, I am not so sure it was characterized by "inaction."

The incessant debate in the United States about recognition and Red China's admission to the United Nations has certainly affected Peking, especially since some of our allies did recognize the Mao regime and a gradual buildup of a Maoist communist movement was tolerated within parts of the Free World. In addition, U.S. policy was characterized by three major types of actions: (1) support of the Republic of China on Taiwan and promotion of a highly successful and modern Chinese state across the narrow

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stretch of water from Fukien; (2) denial of large credits, and thereby of the main prerequisite of economic growth, to the Mao regime; and (3) opposition to aggression executed, instigated or supported by Red China in Korea, the offshore islands, Southeast Asia, India and Africa.

The USSR has pursued a course of action toward China which, surprisingly, has paralleled much of American policy. Moscow gave limited support to the Kuomintang before 1949 and its relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was marred by twists, turns and disagreements. During the early 1950's, when the United States refused recognition and branded China an aggressor, the USSR remained on friendly terms with Peking and gave Red China limited credits, arms, and nuclear information and assistance. But Moscow did not provide enough economic aid to start the mainland economy on the road toward rapid growth. This failure to offer more than token help was one of the causes of the abortive "great leap forward." When the disastrous economic and psycho-political consequences of Mao's entirely non-Marxian leap policy became visible, Moscow cut its nuclear support, withdrew technical assistance, greatly reduced economic cooperation and trade, and, albeit unsuccessfully, tried to maneuver Mao out of power. Diplomatic relations between the two major communist capitals became increasingly strained, and at various times practically nonexistent.

In 1962 and again in 1965 Moscow supported India against Chinese aggression, and in 1966 interfered with ambitious plans by Lin Piao to carry "people's wars" to foreign lands. Throughout the so-called Cultural Revolution, Moscow has clearly supported Mao's opponents, repeatedly intervened in the tangled affairs of Sinkiang, and fought a large number of military engagements along the Mongolian borders and the Sino-Soviet frontier. In March 1969 the Chinese attacked a Soviet island in the Ussuri River; two weeks later the Soviets launched a reprisal action, and within two months demonstratively conducted maneuvers in Eastern Siberia.

In April 1969 Lin Piao told the Ninth National Congress of the CCP that China's frontiers with the USSR (and India) are unsettled. One implication of his remarks is that Peking wants to acquire Vladivostok and evict the USSR from the shores of the Pacific. However, in May the reactivated Foreign Ministry in Peking informed Moscow that it was willing to negotiate on the basis

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of the "unequal treaties" through which current borders had been delineated: river navigation on the Ussuri and Amur must be regulated for stringent economic reasons.

The Kremlin has been waging open psychological warfare against Mao Tse-tung personally at least since 1966, and has supported Mao's opponents since 1958.[1] Much of this effort has centered around Wang Ming, the permanent Chinese delegate to the Comintern and CCP boss before Mao.[2] Wang Ming's main thrust is that Maoism is betraying communism, opposing Marxism-Leninism, organizing a pseudo-communist party, and attempting to establish a Mao Tse-tung international. Mao is accused of basing his dictatorship on military terror, disbanding the workers union, liquidating intellectuals, massacring minority nationalities, and protecting the capitalist class. Abroad, he is accused of splitting national liberation movements, trying to provoke a war between the United States and the USSR, and attempting to re-enter the capitalist camp in order to reap economic advantages.[3]

Soviet policy toward China may be summarized as (1) recognition with minimal diplomatic relations; (2) little trade and no economic or technological aid; (3) opposition to some Chinese attempts at aggression; and (4) psycho-political warfare which up to now has involved at least one effort to unseat Mao.

The parallels between Washington's and Moscow's China policies are, of course, only approximate; considerable common ground remains between the CPSU and the CCP, and even between the CPSU and the orthodox Maoists. Still, Moscow's hostility toward Mao is far more *active* than that of the United States. The Free World points to Taiwan as a far better alternative to Maoism, while the USSR has been supporting the alternative heretofore represented by Mao's arch rival, Liu Shao-chi. Mao accuses Liu of wanting to restore "capitalism." In this

[1]The Maoists reciprocate by playing up an alleged "Stalin group" which Peking says is planning to overthrow the "revisionists" in the Kremlin.

[2]Wang Ming, whose real name is Chen Shao-yu, was First Party Secretary between 1931 and 1935. Although Wang was Moscow's main protagonist within the CCP, Stalin helped Mao take control of the party. Wang left China in 1956. In 1958 his family, aided by Liu Shao-chi, followed him to the USSR. In retrospect, the beginning of the Mao-Kremlin split can be dated back to 1956 and probably was connected with the initial round of "de-Stalinization."

[3]*Chinese Communist Affairs, Facts and Features,* Volume II, No. 14, April 30, 1969, published by the Institute of International Relations, Taipei.

A Moscow-inspired underground Chinese magazine entitled *Red Tide* purports to be the organ of China's "Marxist-Leninist Alliance." A large portion of its documentation appears to be factual, and Mao is regularly attacked as a lackey of American imperialism.

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dispute, then, each communist faction accuses its opponents of plotting capitalist restoration, and no one is criticized for being too orthodox or too radical a socialist. The ideological dispute is further complicated by a dispute about territorial holdings.

The CCP's Ninth National Congress declared both American imperialism and Soviet revisionism to be its primary enemies which must and will be defeated. Yet the Congress carefully assigned a higher degree of significance to its hostility against the United States, and it also announced aggressive designs against many of America's allies and protégés. These strategic intentions of the Maoist leadership, whether they are serious or mere bluff, affect virtually all political activities on the mainland and make it clear that the policies of the superpowers have exerted intense influence on Chinese affairs.

The first open break in the CCP occurred when Mao, realizing the "contradictions" between his policy and Chinese power, attempted the "leap forward," tried to pressure Moscow into premature military adventures, lost Moscow's favor, and also lost the majority within the party (1957-1960). The second break came after the American intervention in Viet Nam to prevent a communist victory planned for late 1965 or early 1966, and the related communist fiasco in Indonesia. It was signaled by Mao's launching of the Cultural Revolution, either because he wanted to forestall an effort by Liu Shao-chi to force his retirement, or because Lin Piao maneuvered Mao into facilitating his own power seizure. The unstable situation within the CCP and the American presence in Southeast Asia, plus setbacks in the "people's war" strategy, propelled Mao into action, but his policies have destabilized the mainland situation to the point where it is unlikely that the Mao regime has the capability or even the inclination to restore order.

A new look at U.S. China policy is necessitated by the persistent unrest throughout Southeast Asia, instigated and supported largely by Peking and Hanoi. A viable U.S. peace arrangement with North Viet Nam would provoke strong opposition in Peking. The paradoxical result of a Vietnamese peace might be that North Viet Nam, like Yugoslavia, could call for U.S. (or USSR) strategic cover, partly because such a peace presupposes that the Maoists are removed from power in Hanoi. Conversely, if there is no peace, U.S. policy must still be revamped, and this requires a strategic reexamination not only of Laos, Thailand, possibly Burma, and

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North Viet Nam itself, but also of Kwangsi, Yunnan and possibly Tibet.

Another factor requiring a new look is the inevitable disappearance of Mao some day and the subsequent succession crisis. The USSR, conscious of the succession problem, will seek to restore its influence in China. In connection with this crisis or under different circumstances, the anti-Mao majority in the CCP may regain power and try to mend its fences with Moscow. Such a contingency would have worldwide strategic consequences for which the United States must be prepared.

Above all, there is the nuclear threat. Although China was unable to reach her objective of readying 100 MRBM's by June 1968, they will soon be available. Three launch complexes are being built at Shenyang, Nanchang and Nanning, aimed against Japan (and possibly Okinawa), Taiwan, and South Viet Nam and Thailand, respectively. There is no hard evidence regarding a current nuclear missile deployment against the USSR.[4] If none exists, this fact would suggest which country Peking regards as the chief enemy at this time. On the other hand, China is only in the preliminary phase of medium-range missile strategy. Her ICBM or even IRBM is a long way off; deployment against the USSR probably will have to wait until the long-range weapons are built. There are indications that the Chinese communists are developing mobile all-directional missiles, in which case there would be no fixed missile bases visibly targeted against the USSR. In any event, the USSR may want to "solve the Chinese problem" before the Maoists have IRBM's and ICBM's at their disposal.

II

Many American politicians who, with good reason, worry about the China problem, assume implicitly that the Mao regime is deeply entrenched and that Mao and Lin speak for the whole, or for most, of China. Accordingly, they argue that, in order to remain in contact with the Chinese people, the Mao regime must be recognized and normal diplomatic relations established with "China,"[5] even if this means the concealed abandonment of Taiwan. This thesis makes sense only if Mao really represents the

[4]The Shenyang missile base may include pads that could allow launches against the Maritime Provinces. Sinkiang would be the logical site for a MRBM or IRBM base against the USSR. As soon as such a base is built, the political war over Sinkiang could become dangerous.

[5]This is the logic on which Canada has based her current attempt to cooperate with Mao.

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majority. If he is not the legitimate spokesman of China, the goal of re-establishing contact with the Chinese people cannot be achieved through Mao. On the contrary, dealing with him would be counterproductive.

In the absence of democratic elections, it is difficult to determine whether a particular dictatorship is "legitimate" in the sense that it is genuinely supported by the majority.[6] This problem must be faced squarely, not evaded. The U.S. government should not operate on the assumption that power bestows legitimacy. Efforts must be made to collect evidence which would measure the degree of a regime's popularity.

To anyone who has followed the events in Communist China since 1965, the suggestion that Mao can be regarded today as the legitimate, or even a representative, spokesman of China is preposterous. To assume that the situation inside Red China is stable is like expecting ten starving dogs to "coexist" peacefully with one another before a meaty bone.

The more the Mao regime stabilizes internally, the more assuredly we may anticipate an external adventure, in the same way as the stability of the Nazi regime preceded Hitler's aggressiveness. It is true that Mao may be too old to start a major war and that numerous additional factors would continue to impose caution even on the most extreme Maoists. But the Mao regime is inherently just as aggressive as the Nazi regime was; Lin Piao is both a skillful and a daring military leader; and Chinese aggression by proxy was in full swing even in periods of internal turmoil, although Chinese armies were not goose-stepping across major frontiers.[7] Hence, the stabilization of Maoism might well produce considerable international trouble.

Nevertheless, the hypothesis that in the near future Communist

[6]One intellectual experiment that can always be performed is to ask to what extent human rights as defined in UN documents are being implemented, especially the right to emigrate. As far as Communist China is concerned, this experiment could be initiated through an analysis of escapes from China and the flow of people into the mainland. Another test is freedom to travel within a country, and the freedom of foreign travelers to talk with the local population.

[7]There are "nine struggles" which, in addition to Taiwan, Lin proposed to the Ninth Congress and which on April 14, 1969 the Congress vowed to support: (1) The Albanian struggle against imperialism and revisionism; (2) North Viet Nam's war of resistance against the United States; (3) the people's "revolutionary struggle" in Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, and in African and Latin American countries; (4) the "justice struggle" of the proletariat, youths, students and Negroes in the United States; (5) the anti-revisionist struggle within the USSR; (6) the people's "revolutionary struggle" in Japan and in West European and Oceanic countries; (7) the anti-Soviet revisionist struggle in Czechoslovakia and other countries; (8) the "revolutionary struggles" in various countries in the world; (9) the "justice struggle" of all those who oppose the invasion and oppression of the "U.S. imperialists" and the "Soviet revisionists." Nothing seems to be left out.

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China could become aggressive from *internal strength* is untenable. Despite attempts during the Ninth Congress to reconcile the warring factions and dampen the Cultural Revolution, at least temporarily, the internal turmoil will certainly continue and will give rise to various international complications.

The Cultural Revolution was designed to restore Mao's power within the party, force it to carry out his policies, including "forward leaps," and rally the various "social forces" and the people as a whole. Revolutionary slogans are expected to create the enthusiasm necessary for the painful implementation of Mao's projects. The term "cultural revolution" was chosen to emphasize that the new society could be constructed only by destroying the traditional cultural institutions and patterns and replacing the correlated mentality of the old society with a new revolutionary consciousness.

The fundamental Marxian concept that revolution is, above all, a social revolution based upon advances of the productive forces (technology) and requiring new "property relations" was discarded by Mao in favor of the thesis that revolution in the superstructure, i.e., in consciousness, will entail revolution in the infrastructure. Mao probably realizes that he lacks the capability to change the infrastructure. Thus, he has substituted propaganda for technological progress, and hopes that his incessant agitational campaigns will create a new type of society. But he appears to regard consciousness as the prime mover of history and believes slogans, demonstrations, public confessions, corrections at hard labor and purges are effective means of changing consciousness, and hence of changing society *in toto*. Mao could have adopted Lenin's concept of cultural revolution which centered on education and strictly cultural work as a primary method of remolding the population and preparing it for socialism, but he preferred to do it his way.

The absurd assumptions underlying the Cultural Revolution were divined by the top Maoists, not just Mao himself. The "little red book" was put together at Lin's instigation for the purpose of indoctrinating the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The technique of constantly reciting Mao's thoughts probably was invented by Chiang Ching, Mao's wife. There is reason to believe that many of Mao's thoughts were authored by Lin and Chen Po-ta. A former student in Russian universities, Chen reportedly has been the ghost-writer of Mao's more theoretical works. The entire Maoist leadership is responsible for the notion that in future "Mao's

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thought" can assume the role the Confucian *Analects* played in the past. Moreover, the Cultural Revolution is in many respects a replica of the mass movements, including the Boxer Rebellion, which were organized at the turn of the century by the decaying Ch'ing Dynasty. Mao lived through those times as a young man and knows more about Ch'ing Dynasty tactics than about Marx or even Lenin.[8]

The connection between Maoism and "Marxism-Leninism" has always baffled Western observers. Chinese communism has been considerably more confusing than Soviet communism, and it is time that those who initially took a somewhat sympathetic attitude as well as those who have steadfastly opposed Chinese communism confess their sins and start all over again. Analytical mistakes were inevitable because of inadequate documentation, but there has been much slipshod research and a widespread uncritical inclination to compare Chinese and Soviet communism. Whether Mao *ever* was a Marxist is debatable: before becoming a prominent party leader, he had never read more than the *Communist Manifesto,* for no other works by Marx had been translated at that time and Mao does not speak any foreign languages. There is not much evidence that he studied Marx carefully after translations became available. Most of those Chinese communists who were able to claim, with reasonable justification, that they were genuine Marxists and Leninists were in due time eliminated by Mao.

On the other hand, the subservience of the CCP and of Mao to Moscow, despite many squabbles, is fully documented. Stalin helped Mao to assume party leadership and to seize power over China. Mao played the Moscow line because he needed Soviet support. He turned against Moscow as soon as this support was denied. Yet he lost support in large part because Moscow decided it could no longer sanction Mao's extreme heresies. The "leap" and the agrarian commune policies, as well as Mao's line that the annihilation of one-third or two-thirds of mankind in a nuclear war would not be too high a price to pay if imperialism could be expunged from the earth, seem to have caused the open break.[9]

[8]It is important to remember that for the last half-century of its existence Imperial China was run by a highly gifted, energetic and ignorant woman, the Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi. The similarities between her and the "team" of Mao and Chiang Ching are startling.

[9]In a speech of June 7, 1969, to the international communist meeting at Moscow, Leonid I. Brezhnev reminded his listeners that many of them were present in 1957 when Mao "with astonishing frivolity and cynicism talked about a possible annihilation of half of mankind in case of a nuclear war."

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No one foresaw that Mao would turn so far to the left of orthodox communism, even Stalinism, that he may now be described as an "anarcho-communist" or "totalitarian anarchist." Mao's thoughts are being accorded precedence over those of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, who have been relegated to the status of mere precursors. This ideological gambit, promoted energetically by Lin, seems to be an imitation of Stalin's 1923-1925 operation when he "invented" Leninism, but it also constitutes a modern version of traditional Chinese imperial ancestor worship.

The umbilical cord has not been fully severed. Moscow obviously hopes to regain the allegiance of the CCP after Mao is gone, and the Maoists still proclaim their loyalty to "Marxism-Leninism." But the Maoists are *not* "national communists" or Asian "Titoists": Tito, Dubcek and Gomulka stand to the *right* of Moscow, whereas Mao and Ho's successors stand to the *left*. It is obviously wrong to assert that, now as before, the CCP follows Moscow's orders (the CCP as such is not at this time a functioning organism), or, in the extreme and silly version of this argument, that the fight between the Kremlin and Mao is a colossal deception.

The Maoists continued to follow the mutually-agreed-upon "general line" until 1965-1966, and to some extent were still following it in early 1969. But after the Moscow international communist meeting, Peking probably will not recognize a binding "general line." In any event, the Maoists have embarked on their own course of action which, among other objectives, aims at the fomenting of revolution within the USSR.

Mao's ideology is derived, probably unconsciously, from Bakunin, whom Marx evicted from the First International. The Chinese Bakunin *modus operandi* is a mixture of Blanqui, Lenin and Stalin, the late Ch'ing Dynasty, the howling dervishes, terrorism mixed with hypnotism, and Pavlovism applied through word magic.

III

Mao and Lin believe that the Cultural Revolution must last fifty to 100 years and in the end will put all "imperialists," "revisionists" and "reactionaries" out of business. While the stated purpose of the revolution is to "change consciousness," the operation does not seek to convince by logic, but to coerce by violence.

In the first three years of its operation in China, the Cultural

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Revolution did have the (entirely intended) effect of a bulldozer in a formal garden. The revolution, designed to correct false thinking, began with a critique of dramas and operas. But it soon developed into a purge, the extent of which cannot yet be determined. Since the purge is still going on, casualty figures continue to rise. In a recent book, Robert Conquest has shown that Stalin's purges in the 1930's took the lives of twenty million Soviet citizens, perhaps thirty million, of whom about 10 per cent were party members. In their broadcasts beamed to Red China the Soviets have reported a Cultural Revolution death toll of ten million. Demographic analysis indicates that by the end of 1964 the population of mainland China should have been larger by 50 to 80 million people,[10] but this deficit occurred before the Cultural Revolution and is largely attributable to the famine caused by the "great leap forward."

On a comparative basis, Mao's purge so far has been less bloody than Stalin's. Since the Maoist techniques are different and the purge is not completed, this is not surprising. Whatever the exact number of victims, many have been killed, some in public executions transmitted by radio and television, and others have been driven to suicide, e.g., Li Li-san. Most victims were sent to labor camps,[11] exiled from the main cities, tormented by the Red Guards, and tortured in jail, and some were even rehabilitated after they had "confessed" their mistakes. Millions of people have been pulled into the maelstrom.

But the Cultural Revolution has been more than propaganda combined with mass purges. It also was, and still is, a civil war in which "red flags" fought against the "red flag." Mao considers "struggle" to be healthy for society, even if it is done with rifles and machine guns, and he has indicated that he is not at all wor-

[10]Lin Chen, "A Study of the Chinese Mainland Population," *Issues and Studies* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations), November 1968, p. 24.

In an April 8, 1969 broadcast to France, Radio Moscow gave the following breakdown of Mao's "bestial killings":

1949-1952	2.8 million
1953-1957	3.6 million
1958-1960	6.7 million
1961-1965	13.3 million
Total	26.4 million

To illustrate the magnitude of this bloodletting, Radio Moscow pointed out that in 1960 alone the purge toll exceeded Chinese casualties during the entire war against Japan (1937-1945).

[11]There is "voluntary" and "corrective" labor. Both are compulsory, but "voluntary labor" is without compensation.

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ried about the civil war within the Cultural Revolution. This attitude clearly demonstrates his recklessness.

There is a voluminous, though by no means complete, record of dozens of civil war battles in China. Most of the provinces have been affected by open hostilities. CCP leaders have referred openly to a number of incidents of major proportions, notably a series of clashes in the city of Wuhan during July 1967. (Wuhan is a major industrial three-city complex on the Yangtze River and the point of origin of the revolution of 1911.)

A prolonged civil war in Kwangsi during 1968 halted the flow of military supplies to North Viet Nam: the Mao regime did not deliberately halt those supplies in order to make Moscow angry, as the American press suggested. It was an anti-Mao rebellion that helped the U.S. war effort.

Fukien has been another area of recurring violence. For years, several active guerrilla groups have been holding out in the mountains.[12] Not surprisingly, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet also have been theaters of serious warfare. The ethnic minorities are particularly restless. They account for only 6 per cent of the population,[13] but populate about half of Chinese territory. Outbreaks of fighting have occurred throughout the entire country, but the main centers of gravity are located in central and southern China. The north, including Manchuria, has been relatively quiet.

In the course of the last two years, mainland media have identified close to 250 anti-Mao and anti-communist organizations struggling against the regime. Some of these may have functioned for only a few hours, others may have been invented by Maoist zealots in the course of interrogations, but others clearly did and do exist, and a few appear to be solid underground organizations. The Maoists appear to have been particularly nervous about a Wuhan group called "One Million Brave Soldiers." The greatest number of underground groups, according to the Maoists, are found in Peking and Shanghai — a surprising fact — and in Szechwan.[14] Significant numbers of such organizations are located in Hupeh, Kangsi, Kwangtung, Sinkiang, Fukien, Hunan and Tibet (listed in descending order).

[12]It will be recalled that during World War II Nazi forced labor practices were the main instrument through which the *maquis* came into being.

[13]This figure is based on the census population in the autonomous regions and therefore is far too low.

[14]The population of Shanghai is now over ten million.

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There are ten military regions covering the twenty-three provincial districts, and three military districts in the autonomous areas. In two of those regions, the PLA has been engaged in major fighting: Wuhan (Hupeh and Honan) and Chengtu (Szechwan). In Fuchow (Fukien and Kiangsi), Kwangchow (Kwangtung and Hunan), Kunming (Yunnan and Kweichow), and Lanchow (Shensi and Kansu plus minority areas Tsinghai and Ninghsia), the PLA was also involved in action.[15] Warfare in Inner Mongolia was significant but seems to be at an end, at least temporarily, while skirmishes continue in Sinkiang and Tibet. Early in 1969, the internal military situation still was unsettled in Shantung, Kiangsu, Fukien and Kwangtung.

In many of the engagements involving the PLA, army units have split to support mutually hostile civilian groups and occasionally have fought against each other. There are few provincial military districts which escaped fighting altogether, and in virtually all provincial command headquarters reassignments and purges of high-ranking officers have been nearly continuous.[16] This disorder has resulted from Mao's command of August 1966 to the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Congress: "Attack the headquarters."

According to Maoist accounting, five major party purges have been executed, not including the original army purge of 1959 which propelled Lin Piao into power. In these purges the military leadership has been purged twice again, the party leadership twice, the state bureaucracy (especially the Ministry of Agriculture) once, and the cultural revolution group once.[17] It should be observed that most of the major purge victims were handpicked by Mao and Lin and their closest followers. However those events are evaluated, surely they do not testify to the contention that the Mao regime is "stable" and "here to stay."

[15]By the end of 1968 about one-third of the PLA had been taken off regular national defense duties and ordered to "support the left," i.e., the Maoist cultural revolution groups.

[16]Considerable documentation available on engagements of PLA units and military reassignments and purges is published regularly in *Chinese Communist Affairs, Facts and Features,* which lists exact places, times and names.

[17]Nine purges were conducted by Mao before the five purges connected with the Cultural Revolution: A purge of party intellectuals in 1942; three general purges in 1944, 1945 and especially in 1952; the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shoushih in 1954; the Hu Feng purge of intellectuals in 1955; the rectification of intellectuals in 1957; a purge of regionalists affecting thirteen provinces and two autonomous areas; and a major military purge between June 1957 and September 1959. The party split broke into the open in December 1958.

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IV

Applying acceptable Marxian techniques, we will discover a number of social "contradictions" under the Mao regime:

(1) The cultural revolution group is supposed to strengthen party discipline, and presumably there is a plan, ultimately, to reconstitute a new "Mao party" around the CRG (cultural revolution group). This political "transplant" was necessitated by the fact that, according to Foreign Minister Chen Yi's[18] public confession, 80 per cent of the CCP members, or 13.6 million out of 17 million, are opposed to Mao.[19]

The initial plan was to establish all over the country revolutionary committees that would consist of Red Guards, revolutionary activists (i.e., ultra-leftists heavily influenced by Chiang Ching, Mao's wife), and PLA leaders. The Red Guards were gradually downgraded and the activists made too much trouble; ultimately, most of the committees now operating in all provincial capitals (but not yet in the rural areas) fell under PLA control. In effect, the army controls the party in the provinces. Since Lin is *de facto* party leader at the center, the party for all practical purposes is in military hands. Thus, there is a triple parallelism between the CCP (number one party), the CRG (number two party), and the PLA partially reconstituted as a political organization. The upshot is a political monstrosity that pits the political and military cadres against one another.

(2) Inside the CCP structure, there is a major contradiction between the Mao-Lin group and the officeholders who are followers of purge victims Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, former First Party Secretary, as well as those who follow Wang Ming. Furthermore, the Mao-Lin group has set itself up as a special "proletarian headquarters" consisting of the fourteen primary leaders, and there are important differences in rank between the fourteen and the ten next most prominent members of the politbureau. Within the group of fourteen, the "standing committee" of five men exercises the major executive functions. It consists of Mao, Lin, Chou En-lai (who is partially oppositional), Chen Po-ta, Mao's ghost-writer, and Kang Sheng, the party's terror

[18]Chen Yi is close to Chou En-lai. If Chou comes to power some day, Chen will be an important public figure.

[19]By setting up the bolshevik group in 1903 and holding a purely Bolshevik Party Congress in 1912, Lenin split the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. This parallel between Lenin's and Mao's tactics is, however, superficial: Lenin was not the top party leader in 1903 and his party was not in power.

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specialist. In effect, there are three classes of top leaders. The wives of Mao and Lin, and Mao's son-in-law, belong to the "fourteen" and thus are in the second echelon.

There is friction between the central revolution group and the military among the fourteen, and between those two factions and Premier Chou En-lai, who represents the bureaucracy. The military in the third echelon are generally opposed to the military in the first and second classes. It would be tedious to enumerate all of the currently reported "splits" within these small groups, if only because the lineup frequently changes. Suffice it to say that the "summit" is by no means immune against purge; the historical CCP structure no longer has a spokesman at the top; and the headquarters group (the fourteen) has been constituted as a sort of family clan, or an "imperial palace," together with its retainers and its military and police guardians.

(3) There is an acute contradiction between the cultural revolution group and the state bureaucracy. Though barely visible, since the bureaucracy resists not through open struggle but through patient and silent methods, this contradiction is nonetheless significant. The CRG, constantly interfering with government administration, has become a root cause of governmental ineffectuality. This conflict so far has lacked drama, but the question remains whether the administrative apparatus can be restored to health.[20]

(4) The cultural revolution group fathered the Red Guards and still uses them as an instrument of pressure and purge. However, Red Guard members are dissatisfied and frequently take things into their own hands. They use various labels to proclaim their Maoist orthodoxy and opposing groups customarily fight as "Maoists," including some conscious anti-Maoists who pose as the Chairman's most loyal followers.[21] The contradiction between the CRG and the Red Guard may grow; it is also possible that the latter will be quietly put in limbo. The trouble with these political organizations is not so much that they disagree ideologically but that no one can possibly assume the other person says what he thinks.

(5) Within the PLA there is a contradiction between Lin and

[20]At least one-third of the Chinese economy, as measured in value, is bureaucratically administered. The equivalent figure in the USSR is about two-thirds.

[21]During the Boxer Rebellion, the Imperial Court believed the rebels were loyal to the dynasty. In actuality, many rebel leaders pursued revolutionary objectives and aimed at entangling the crown in a hopeless war. Others used the rebellion and the imperial sanction as a cover for large-scale and authorized looting.

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his followers and the adherents of top commanders who were purged. The importance of the old army cliques which had arisen during the war and which, in terms of loyalty, split the PLA into four parts, has receded, but the PLA cannot be compared with the unified national army of a Western state. It is essential to remember that the Cultural Revolution emerged from the party split of 1958-1959, which had been caused by the opposition of the PLA leadership to Mao's economic and military policies.

Mao and Lin are constantly worried about a phenomenon they call "mountain-topism," an expression describing the inclination of ambitious commanders to reach out for more power, to determine their own policies, and possibly to aspire to primary leadership. The attitudes of key commanders toward the Cultural Revolution movement, toward the power struggles within the CCP, and toward Mao and Lin personally have been major factors during the past four years and explain the frequent purges among the military. Whenever political power is weak and behaves destructively, "mountain-topism" emerges among military leaders. Hence, this phenomenon can hardly be purged out of existence.

The splits within the PLA, however, go beyond personal and political differences and extend to competing strategic concepts. In turn, those concepts are related to attitudes about friendship with, or hostility to, the USSR. The main cleavage appears to be between those officers who support Lin's "people's war" concept and those who want a modern army and hence regard close collaboration with the USSR as indispensable.

(6) The cleavages within the PLA have led to temporary alliances between various military and party factions and explain why, in many civil war situations, military units have fought each other. The proponents of military modernization undoubtedly have *de facto* alliances with economic planners eager for economic modernization and increases in productivity. Little is known about these ties, but "economism" is one of Mao's pet hatreds. The capable planners who performed the yeoman service of repairing the damage caused by the great leap forward have been purged.

(7) On the whole, the PLA stands in opposition to ultra-radical party factions, including cultural revolution groups, but the army and the party have infiltrated one another. Lin may be regarded as the highest ranking radical infiltrator into the PLA and at the same time as the leading military infiltrator into the party. The

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party appears to be more effectively infiltrated than the army, especially within the second and third layers of the politbureau and in the provincial revolutionary committees. The policy of the military chiefs within the "proletarian headquarters" is partly determined by military requirements. These men may help Mao to purge the army again, but they may also insist on purging the party, and they may be preparing to use forces loyal to themselves to back up their demands. If the PLA succeeds in consolidating the positions it has acquired during the Cultural Revolution, it should, given a suitable opportunity, be capable of seizing supreme power. Such an operation, however, also requires the military "mountain-topists" to cooperate with one another, not under but *against* Lin Piao.

(8) Two major security (or terror) organizations, one for the benefit of the party, the other to keep the rest of the country under control, cap this set of interrelated contradictions. The leaders of both organizations are represented within the "proletarian headquarters": Kang Sheng, ranked fifth in the hierarchy, handles the party; Hsieh Fu-chih, in ninth position, handles the rest and is also a member of the military affairs committee. In a pinch, the two probably would side with Mao or Chiang Ching against the PLA — yet crisis behavior is unpredictable and would be dictated by interest constellations at the moment of challenge.

There is no particular point in continuing this survey of "contradictions," though it is far from complete. The situation remains confused, no one can trust anybody, and therefore no one can perform efficiently or act responsibly. It is difficult to get staff work done, make rational decisions, and obtain loyal implementation. The safest course for the bureaucracy is to adopt the tactic of utter passivity and feigned orthodoxy, "pass the buck," and handle only routine tasks. Government *sensu proprio* is practically impossible.

Presumably, the individual party or military leader finds it hard to know exactly where he stands or how he would or should behave under various contingencies. The rulers and the contenders are spending much of their time in mass meetings and political maneuvering all over the mainland, and they rely on declamatory statements instead of pragmatic policies. They need to restore effective government, but were they to succeed in this task the political situation would be stabilized and hence "de-

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revolutionized." This would not accord with Mao's purposes, and it is predictable that he would promptly initiate new "rectification campaigns." Even if Mao grew tired of the turbulence, other participants in the power struggle would try to keep the pot boiling. To "normalize" the situation would require a concerted decision by the top leadership acting as a single and unified body to terminate the Cultural Revolution. No such decision will be made so long as Mao keeps his influence.

The Congress of April 1969 brought together the post-purge upper party echelons and indulged in reconciliatory overtones. The plan may be to observe a pause in the Cultural Revolution. But a halt is not contemplated, for Lin specifically stated that "the revolution is not yet over." As approved by the Congress, the "proletariat" was instructed by Lin to "carry the socialist revolution in the realm of superstructure through to the end."

Even if the Maoists wanted to impose internal peace, they could not do so: mainland broadcasting stations, in the spring of 1969, continued to report on major unrest in Shensi and on more of the troubles that seem endemic to Kwangtung.

Stagnation and even regression mark the Chinese economy, while the population rises. Meanwhile, the Mao regime tries to perpetuate its power through propaganda and aggressive posturing. The Maoists seem to have no practical alternative to their fanatic policies.

V

These multiple struggles between various communist groups or between communism and anarchism are taking place within the framework of widespread social dissatisfaction and activation of social forces. Enough data are available on the income, work and living conditions of peasants and industrial workers to assert that these people live under intolerable conditions, that they are more thoroughly exploited than were the *kolkhozniks* even during the darkest days of Stalin's regime, that the mainland workday is far longer than anywhere else in the world, and that the whole system inside and outside the labor camps is one of forced labor.

The Maoists are planning a new attack on the private plots of the farmers which, like those in the USSR, are far more productive than the state or commune farms. If this escape valve is closed, more serious famines will occur. The Maoists also seem to be planning a new "leap forward": the consequences of a second

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fantastic "leaping" experiment are easy to predict, yet "Mao's thoughts" accord no hospitality to trend curves.

There has been considerable expansion of medium-grade schooling for the purpose of creating a vast reservoir of highly skilled labor. Yet there is not enough capital to establish the industrial jobs for an enlarged skilled labor pool, so the regime, which wants no urban unemployment and has trouble anyway feeding the farms, was compelled to restrict the size of the urban population. It has gone to the length of forcing millions of persons qualified for industrial and white-collar jobs to move into rural areas where they cannot find suitable work. In the meantime, employment in urban industries was frozen following the "great leap" debacle, according to purged planner Po I-po in 1963. Such forced internal mass migrations tend to produce revolutionary situations, as was proved in Russia during 1917.

There have been, to be sure, increases in heavy industry production since 1952, notably in steel and oil. But in agriculture, which is China's life blood, plans called for an increase from 180 to 450 million tons in annual grain production between 1956 and 1967. In 1968 grain output still stood at approximately 180 million tons, and China was still spending much of her scarce currency on grain imports. Industrial wages appear to be one-fifth of those of USSR laborers, and the Chinese peasant has almost no legitimate monetary income.

"Average" Chinese statistics need to be treated with caution. The Lienching documents seized in March 1964 through a commando raid in Fukien indicated that within one agricultural "production team" food rations may vary in a ratio of 2.5:1, that agricultural "cadres" supposedly get twice the food the peasants receive, and that rations vary from year to year and generally are trending downward. There also are regional and local differences, differences between adjoining communes, and differences in the agricultural tax-in-kind which, according to the law, should be between 30 and 40 per cent but often "voluntarily" exceeds the norm by up to two-thirds of the harvest. Food is in short supply for nearly everyone, but the underprivileged groups are especially affected. During 1961, the "average" food intake was about one-third what it had been in 1953 and caloric intake was estimated to be about one-third below the level recommended by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization.

The effects of the agrarian debacle will not be overcome for a

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long time, since the neglect of the land in the 1950's resulted in a twelvefold increase of natural calamities — floods, droughts, locusts and erosion. By 1960, about 55 per cent of the cultivated land had been harmed by these calamities; one-sixth of the arable land area was afflicted by erosion. The continuing misuse of China's agricultural resources assures that Mao will rank as the architect of the greatest economic failure of modern history.

It would be imprudent to assume that China will make no economic progress in the near future. Yet a basic change, let alone a growth "take-off," is impossible under the present management. Progress would be contingent on an entirely different utilization of available resources, notably a reduction of expenditures for huge and useless bureaucratic and party machines, a contraction of the military budget, a massive and *real* agrarian reform, an influx of massive capital from abroad, and the reintroduction of free markets and personal initiative. Such a revision of economic policy cannot be instituted by the Mao regime, for it has discovered the bitter truth that "capitalism" tends to re-establish itself spontaneously.[22]

Since China still is 80 per cent rural and the virtually unchanging rural life-style is still dominated by barter and the near self-sufficiency of the farm, minor improvements will make little difference. Yet the population is rapidly increasing, and there is a stronger awareness of unfulfilled needs, thanks to advances in education and communications. Even if the Mao regime could manage sustained agricultural growth at the maximum rate allowed by available resources (say, 1-2 per cent annually), it could not possibly close the gap between accomplishment and need. The regime has missed its chance, and it probably will not have a second one. In point of fact, the Maoists may have written off the peasants as a force on which they could rely. The peasants do not want communes and collectives; instead, as the Peking propagandists admit, they want "to go it alone."

At the beginning of the Maoist regime, the intellectuals were among Mao's main supporters. They knew little about communism, believed it could hasten modernization, and expected an enlightened reformist regime. Many intellectuals assumed that the

[22]Socialism, once decreed, does not develop naturally of its own momentum but depends on totalitarian controls. Once these controls are relaxed, spontaneous capitalism takes over. The inescapable conclusion is that socialism is an inferior economic system which can last only as long as the dictatorship is maintained. Socialism does not lead to the "withering away" of the state but, on the contrary, presupposes permanent totalitarianism.

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communists were "agrarian reformers"— and some American diplomats bought this line from Chinese intellectuals who were *not* communists. Today Chinese intellectuals know better: their disenchantment has grown out of actions taken by the regime, which has become increasingly suspicious of intellectuals and takes great delight in sending them to the farm to get their hands dirty. This operation was debated at length by the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee. Referring to Mao's instruction, the Plenum proclaimed that "cadres" must go down "to do manual labor" and intellectuals "must be re-educated by the workers, peasants and soldiers so that they can integrate themselves with the workers and peasants."[23] To be exact, this integration with the workers and peasants applies to the young cadres; the old cadres are being "reformed" in special institutions, i.e., labor camps. This policy is to be continued. One can expect that it will alienate the majority of mainland intellectuals, whose number the regime estimates at five million.

The expulsion of several millions of young students from the cities to the rural areas, the search of young peasants for better opportunities, and the mass movements of Red Guards across the country have resulted in a new social phenomenon that is called "wandering youth." The young wanderers are spreading a great deal of unrest and dissatisfaction across the land.[24] But older people also are on the road, especially those liberated in the midst of civil warfare from forced labor camps and prisons. Many of these migrants are bitter, and the relatives of purge victims and former prisoners are revengeful. All are uprooted and without regular income; they have nothing to lose.[25] These migrations have been going on since 1957 — urbanites banished into the fields to stop the agricultural disaster and peasants fleeing to the town to find a new livelihood, back and forth in all directions.

Migrations pose frightening problems to both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary strategists. The vast mass of the Chinese

[23]Some Western observers find it hard to believe that intellectuals in China are persecuted because they assume that the regime needs the intellectuals, uses them efficiently, and cannot afford such waste. This, despite Mao's infamous "letting all flowers bloom" speech of 1957, which was the prelude to a persecution campaign against intellectuals—by no means the first attack on the *noblesse du mot*. The so-called *hsia-fang* ("mass rustification") movement is frequently discussed in the mainland press.

[24]In the time of the young Marx, the European revolutionary movement was recruited largely from exiled intellectuals and wandering artisans, mostly Germans, who were roaming through Europe on the search for jobs and political adventure.

[25]Returnees from Siberian exile contributed greatly to the upsurge of the revolutionary movement against the Tsarist regime.

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peasantry is potentially more rebellious than ever before, but it is in need of leadership. Historically, such leadership usually has been supplied by ex-peasant "intellectuals," soldiers and brigands. The terms "peasant rebellion" and "peasant revolution" often are misinterpreted. Peasants may join guerrilla forces, but if they become mobile they cease to be peasants. Peasants who stay on the farm can raise havoc locally, but they have little if any impact on the centers of power, and they rebel only if they are organized by nonpeasant leaders who tend to be few in numbers. Hence peasant uprisings rarely merge into a regional or national rebellion but remain isolated, though symptomatic, events. A so-called peasant revolution must be staged by ex-peasants and other elements but it is dependent upon the sympathy of the sedentary peasantry.

The large number of wandering youths and their wandering elders, most of whom have been politically sensitized and have had political experience, can recruit and provide leadership to potentially rebellious peasants. Since there is every reason to expect that the exiled urbanites will be successful in organizing peasant rebels, the policies that created the migratory movements loom as a grave mistake. Yet the Mao regime probably prefers to have those wanderers in the countryside rather than in the cities where they could make still more trouble.

These strange developments must be evaluated in conjunction with the PLA recruitment program. Up to 1967, the army required that 60 per cent of the draftees be junior high school graduates; since then, this requirement has been 35 per cent. The army and navy want 19 per cent of their recruits to be peasants and 30 per cent students, while the air force wants only 1 per cent of its men to be peasants and has a 60 per cent quota for students. Most recruits now spend their military service in places far from their homes, but this policy may not be of much significance, since of the thirty-six PLA armies twenty-three have not been moved during the last eighteen years, and nine have not been moved for ten years. Only four armies have been transferred since 1965.[26] The forces, therefore, remain subject to the pressures of local dissatisfaction and unrest, and it appears infeasible to revamp the PLA into a mobile force.

The social conflicts on the mainland cannot be described as a class struggle in the traditional Marxian sense, but as a struggle of

[26]Lu Yung-shu, "Peiping's Conscription and Retirement Program," *Issues and Studies,* November 1968, pp. 1-7.

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nearly all social classes against a tyrannical regime which is trying to sit on its bayonets. The opposition of the social classes is paired with several ethnic rebellions.

In these interrelated struggles, all customary conflict techniques are being used, including propaganda, corruption, infiltration, defection, desertion, mutiny, sabotage, demolition, freeing of prisoners, assassinations, rioting, sedition and guerrilla warfare. The army and the security services have been protecting the regime with only limited effectiveness and cannot be regarded as trustworthy.

On the ideological level, the regime is opposed by those who want to restore "capitalism" and democratic government, as well as by revisionists, economic reformers, orthodox Marxists, and extreme anarchists. So far, the opponents of the regime have been split into many different camps. But the "mobilization of consciousness," through which Mao attempted to strengthen his own grip, has actually forged closer links among the opposition groups. The anti-Maoists have started to cooperate with the anti-communists.

That there has been a turning point was recognized as early as October 9 and December 24, 1967 by Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, when they suddenly rediscovered the Kuomintang. On March 25, 1968, Chen Po-ta stated flatly that the Cultural Revolution is "a continuation of the prolonged struggle between the Chinese CP and the KMT." On April 10, *People's Daily* reported that Mao believes the Cultural Revolution to be "in essence" a continuation of that struggle. This assessment appears to be correct, despite the fact that many Americans are skeptical about the role of the KMT in shaping China's future.

It would be incorrect to say that the conflict has already crystallized as a contest between emerging democracy and decaying totalitarian dictatorship. Many opponents of the Mao regime are concerned chiefly with changing the dictator. The democratic elements are still weak and isolated, and as long as they are ignored by those who could and should support them, their morale will not be high. But they are confident that Maoism cannot last. As the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee pointed out: "A fierce struggle between the two classes, two roads, and two lines runs through the history of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution over the past two years and more." This, the CCP says, merely demonstrates "the profound and far-reaching

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significance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory on continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." But if Mao's revolution continues, it will eventually, in accordance with all historical precedents, devour its makers.

VI

We would have an incomplete picture of Communist China if we ignored the possibilities of a coup d'état within the regime's top echelon. The contingency of Chou En-lai taking over with the help of the state bureaucracy, the majority in the Central Committee, and the anti-Lin elements within the PLA can be disregarded here. Such a contingency could arise only in case of administrative chaos and otherwise unmanageable situations created by the recklessness or ineptitude of the Mao-Lin group. Chou has reportedly come to the rescue of the Maoists, who utilized his administrative abilities only because they do not expect him to reach out for supreme power. Although Chou is getting on in age, he could be a transient compromise candidate in an impasse situation. Lin also may try to keep him on his side as his administrative expert. The Soviets are reported to want Chou to succeed Mao, and they may install him in power if they decide to resort to force.

There are several methods by which the party majority may reassert itself against the Maoists and try to throw off the stranglehold of party number two. The organization of this Maoist party is loose and semi-anarchistic, yet party number one has no representation in the highest leadership echelon, except that, of course, all top-rankers made their career in the CCP. Mao set out systematically to destroy the old party and to supersede or reconstruct it through the cultural revolution group. The old CCP tried to weather the storm by the simple tactic of "just surviving," but the extent of its success is uncertain. The CCP cadres may have been so demoralized that the old party is no longer capable of taking action.

It is unlikely that the party can be put together again under the CRG (cultural revolution group) label. If the CCP becomes the CRG, the latter must transform itself into an "ossified" standard-type party or else it cannot function. On the other hand, if there is to be no organizational "transplant," CRG types will simply be promoted to key positions in the CCP. In this case, the old struc-

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ture would be rejuvenated, but it would remain intact and soon return to business as usual. It is against precisely this kind of development that Maoists of all hues are rebelling.

In this confused situation, the PLA has tended to emerge as the main political organization, with the CCP-CRG as its political action arm. If this constellation lasts, the military will mold the party according to its own principles.

Many disgruntled cadres work in the state bureaucracy and by mere passive resistance are able to produce the administrative chaos which may force the Mao-Lin group to turn to Chou En-lai or another administrator acceptable to the bureaucrats. The Soviets may be pinning their hopes on passive resistance by the administrative cadres.

The more likely contingency is an acute personal power struggle among the top leaders which could develop into a coup d'état. This matter is related closely to the explosive problem of succession. In appointing Lin as his successor and securing approval of this unusual appointment from the CCP's Ninth National Congress, Mao presumably sought to prevent an interregnum of power. He was also motivated by the desire to ensure the continuity of his policy and thus to entrust current executive functions to a person who has proved completely dependable and whose continued loyalty can be ensured by guaranteeing his future. By appointing Lin to be his successor, Mao authorized him to place his most trusted followers in key command and control positions.

For some forty years, Lin has been Mao's most loyal adherent: there is no record that he even once crossed Mao. A case could also be made that Mao has Lin to thank for his political survival since 1959. On his part, Lin needs the image and blessing of Mao, just as Stalin, for his ascent to the top post, was compelled to fabricate Lenin's blessing. In 1964 Lin originated the "little red book" to indoctrinate the PLA; by promoting this text as a replacement of the Confucian *Analects* and the *Communist Manifesto,* Lin accomplished the near-deification of his boss.[27] It is, therefore, most unlikely that he has any desire to engage in an open fight with Mao, for even if he were to win it he might jeopardize his own

[27]Liu Shao-chi was the first, in 1945, to use Mao's thoughts as a weapon in the intraparty struggle. In September 1959, Lin played up Mao's thought in an article written a few days after his appointment as Defense Minister. Shortly thereafter, the fourth volume of Mao's *Selected Works* was published, and the country was urged to study the book. This was a ridiculous expectation, so Lin tried the Madison Avenue approach of presenting a "digest."

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future. On the contrary, he obviously is trying to create ideological legitimacy for his own rule.

Nevertheless, history shows that the relationship between a ruler and his "heir apparent" can be quite unstable. Since Mao and Lin belong roughly to the same generation, a conflict like that between Peter the Great and his son remains improbable; there is every reason to believe that Lin is an even better Maoist than Mao himself. But Mao, whose physical condition seems to have improved in the last two or three years, may live a long time yet, and Lin has publicly admitted that he is not in good health. He may be laid up again for several months and be compelled to turn affairs over to a deputy. If Mao lives too long, Lin may feel that he has no time to lose and may grow impatient; or Mao may be dissatisfied with Lin's performance and look for a healthier successor. Mao may also come to dislike Lin's policy, especially if Lin turns toward "law and order." Conversely, Mao may insist on measures that Lin fears would further destabilize the regime and hence threaten his future. In the "standing committee"— the highest executive organ composed of Mao and Lin, Mao's closest personal collaborators Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, as well as Chou En-lai — Lin presumably cannot outvote Mao.

The longer Mao rules, the less stable the Mao-Lin relationship may become. Lin, despite his military backing, has less freedom of action, while Mao can be expected to be more reckless and treacherous. Nevertheless, a public falling-out between Mao and Lin is improbable if only because this rupture would pose a maximum threat to the survival of the regime and its two protagonists.

If the improbable were to happen and a conflict did develop, it could hardly be composed through demotion or purge; it might best be settled through clandestine means, i.e., one or the other would have to die a "quasi-natural" death. A precedent exists in the final struggle between Stalin and Lenin. Normally it is advisable to bet on the younger man. Stalin was more crafty than Lenin, and Lenin was badly incapacitated. Yet Mao is more clever than Lin, and he is supported by Chiang Ching, who wields considerable power and is far more skillful and ruthless than Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, whom Stalin silenced by a little profanity over the phone. Hence, the outcome of an improbable struggle between Mao and Lin would be uncertain. The longer Mao rules, the more the country will get out of joint. Small

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wonder, then, that staunch anti-Maoists now often yell with conviction: "Long live Chairman Mao!"

The Soviets claim Mao is trying to establish a personal dynasty.[28] This contention, though it sounds contrived, may be close to the mark. It is certainly a remarkable fact that the new CCP statute, in the words of a Moscow broadcast of April 4, 1969, "omits the right of party members to elect or be elected to leadership." "The party central committee and the central and local organs . . . shall not be elected but . . . appointed. . . . Mao's party statute prescribes his successor in the manner of an imperial edict appointing a royal heir."

If the Cultural Revolution is to last for fifty to 100 years, as Mao and Lin are planning, continuity must be established. A leadership in which the ruler necessarily changes every ten to twenty years, and in which each successive dictator pursues a different policy while regarding himself as wiser than all of his predecessors, cannot provide operational continuity for so long a time span. Accordingly, means must be found through which all successive dictators are morally bound to uphold Mao's principles. There is no reliable method to achieve this objective. Familial succession is about the only method that might serve the purpose, and dynasties have usually been created to assure continuity. Historical tradition makes the dynasty solution more applicable to China than to other countries. It is noteworthy that no other communist dictatorship has seen fit to create a *de jure* successor.

Concern with "dynastic succession" may explain why Mao and Lin have placed their wives in command positions within the proletarian headquarters: the two ladies hold sixth and twelfth rank, respectively. Mao's son was killed in Korea,[29] but he has two daughters. Both are politically active. One daughter, probably the younger one whose mother is Chiang Ching, reportedly is married to Yao Wen-yuan, who is ranked eighth in the hierarchy and is one of the instigators and leaders of the Cultural Revolution. Lin also lacks a male descendant, and his only daughter seems to be unmarried. Female rulers — empresses and dowager empresses — played a significant role in Chinese history up to the early twentieth century.[30]

[28]The Maoists reciprocate by calling the Soviet leaders the "new tsars" and accusing them of "social imperialism."

[29]According to recent information, Mao has a second son who is mentally ill.

[30]For twenty years (1861-1881), two dowager empresses were co-regents of China. Then a major quarrel occurred, and Tsu Hsi's ineffectual rival died promptly, probably of "unhealthy food."

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If, in line with the Soviet allegation, Mao were building a "dynasty," the succession could run from Mao to Lin and thence to Yao, and Yao's hypothetical future son, who would be Mao's grandson, could become the fourth Maoist ruler. For various practical and political reasons, Mao and Lin may have concluded a "family pact," not dissimilar to those common during the Middle Ages. Such a pact would make it possible to pick a successor from either of the two "dynastic" families, including female members.[31] Each successor would be morally bound to follow Mao's eternal commands.

Most Western observers instinctively will reject the notion of a Maoist dynasty. Yet within the proletarian headquarters or palace group of fourteen, five members, including Mao's presumed son-in-law, are members of the two "dynastic" families. Two additional persons can be regarded as members of Mao's personal household, and three are military technicians, who could be replaced easily. On May 1, 1969, Radio Moscow talked about a "three family junta of Mao, Lin and Chou" and added "these three families are united and resolved to pass on Mao's rule to Lin Piao." The Soviets referred to the fact that Chou's wife, too, serves on the Central Committee but failed to mention that this is also true of Kang Sheng's wife. Chou is needed by Mao and Lin as their dynastic chancellor, and he may lend himself to that role, largely because he has resigned himself to the realization that he can make it to the top only if the main contenders are eliminated or cannot prevent the domestic situation from collapsing around them. It is unlikely that the "three families" are united. It is still harder to believe that Mao and Lin have concluded a formal family pact and that any secondary member of the two families would regard such a pact as binding beyond a short transitional period. Hence the attempt to organize continuity will probably fail. In any event, either continuous Maoist rule or an intensive power struggle for the succession spells trouble.

During his stay at Yenan, Mao took Chiang Ching as his fourth wife over the opposition of the party. The party hierarchs sided with Ho Tse-chen, Mao's third wife, because she had been a most loyal and efficient comrade during the heroic days of the Long March. Chiang Ching promised she would rigorously abstain from all political activities. She kept the promise until about 1964,

[31]Tsu Hsi was a master in the making and unmaking of successors, and through this technique preserved her power for forty-six years.

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when she suddenly emerged as one of the promoters of the Cultural Revolution and directed much of her fury against those party leaders who had opposed her marriage. The party purge, especially the purge of Liu Shao-chi and his upper-class wife, therefore, displays many aspects of personal vengeance. Conversely, Kang Sheng, who had sided with Chiang Ching and Mao in the party conflict over their marriage, was allowed to make it to the summit.

Yeh Ch'un, Lin's wife, began her meteoric rise within the upper hierarchy only in 1967. While Chiang Ching is a leading figure in the cultural revolution group, Yeh Ch'un is a prominent member of the Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee, where she is backstopping Lin. Little is known of her past. It is not even clear whether she is the mother of Lin's daughter or, more likely, his second wife. In any case, her will-to-power seems to be just as strongly developed as that of Mao's wife. Chiang Ching's health troubles have been commented upon publicly, yet Yeh Ch'un seems to enjoy good health.

Suppose Mao departs while Chiang Ching is still in fair health. It would be natural for Lin to promote his wife and demote Mao's widow, and then for Chiang Ching to oppose Lin. There have been rivalries in the past, in particular when Lin conducted the so-called fourth purge against a group of Chiang Ching's followers. Well-informed observers assume that after Mao's death a conflict between Lin and Chiang Ching is almost inevitable, the implication being that Chiang Ching would reach for supreme power immediately or following Lin's first setback. The likelihood of such a struggle depends in part on Lin's health during the period of power transition.

Chiang Ching probably would be supported by Chen Po-ta and Chang Chun-chiao, respectively chief and deputy chief of the cultural revolutionary group; by Yao, as well as by Kang Sheng, chief of party security who wears a second hat as a CRG leader; by Hsieh Fu-chih, state security chief and chairman of the Peking municipal revolutionary committee; and possibly by Wang Tung-hsing, director of the Central Committee's staff office. (The party does not at present have a secretary general.) In this case, she would have seven of thirteen votes. Her power would be based on the twin security apparatus plus the CRG, and many believe she might be supported by the anti-Lin PLA brass.

But her power base is unstable. The Soviets, for example, seem

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to expect Kang Sheng to reach out for power on his own; in fact, his stature has recently grown. Yet with much of the PLA on his side, and with effective command over the armed forces, Lin holds a preponderance of power, especially if Chou En-lai supports him and if the military members of the local revolutionary committees can keep the party in line. Lin would have powers of appointment and thus could nullify Chiang Ching's voting strength. He may also be able to marshal more popular support than Chiang Ching, who seems to be widely hated. But Chiang Ching could try to frame Lin through the security apparatus. She also may count on unleashing the revolutionary fury of the committees and the Red Guards. In this case, the regime would break in two, and a real civil war would ensue in which each side would be led by a top party figure.

If from this vantage point we look back to Mao, it would appear that he has kept his options open, after all. Unless he is suddenly incapacitated, he will try to preserve his power until the last possible moment, and then place the scepter in Chiang Ching's or Lin's hands. Naturally, Chiang Ching's ability to manipulate Mao will be rising as he grows physically weaker. It is possible that Mao hopes for a harmonious duumvirate between his wife and Lin, but should trouble develop between them he may strive to make Chiang Ching his successor.

Despite these multiple friction areas, it is likely that the inner core among the fourteen members of Mao's palace will make heroic efforts to stand together, for otherwise they would be highly vulnerable to almost any combination of anti-Maoist and anti-communist elements. Yet the very concept by which Mao put the "summit" together — the "three-way alliance" among Lin Piao and the military, Chiang Ching and the cultural revolutionaries plus the secret police, and the lonely Chou En-lai with the state bureaucracy — almost ensures instability. The regular Communist Party is missing in the lineup; the main contenders are so old or sick that they may depart the scene abruptly; and no one in the supreme leadership group, with the exception of Chou En-lai, has the slightest technical qualifications for solving the country's ever more pressing problems.

It would be imprudent to predict a coup d'état, let alone to specify the exact alignment of the warring factions within the Maoist camp. But it is safe to conclude, on the basis of current evidence and events during the past ten years, that the Maoist

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leadership group is neither stable nor united. None of the major Maoist factions possesses a consolidated power base. If two main contending groups achieve a power balance, they will constantly maneuver against one another and the summit will be unable to function effectively. Such a balance between Lin and Chiang Ching could hardly last indefinitely. It would probably be upset by a surprise coup or another power-play designed to re-establish a clear-cut ruling hierarchy.

The diagnosis of severe illness is indisputable but no prognosis on the course and outcome of the malady should be attempted at this time. It is safe to say that recovery would be almost miraculous.

VII

The new phase of Chinese upheaval has been accompanied by some absurd and amusing international political warfare maneuvers. The Maoists report on the activities of a "Stalinist group" in the USSR and strongly hint that they are collaborating with it. Moscow indignantly denies the existence of such an organization, but is disturbed about surviving Stalinists and pro-Maoist activities within the CPSU. Soviet and Chinese communists are telling each other some unpalatable truths, a practice for which heretofore communists have always castigated their critics.

Moscow is still inclined to argue that Mao's left deviation is, "objectively," a deviation to the right, and it wants to create the expectation that a new "red tide" will follow the present disorder. Moscow's criticism of Mao is sharp and personal, but it does not deal with basic principles of communist theory or with the fundamental errors of Maoism. It may never do so because the Moscow propagandists are well aware of the ideological and logical vulnerabilities of the USSR. The Kremlin does not want to confess to its own revisionism, let alone expound its merits, even though this revisionism is the basis of the Kremlin's current (comparative) popularity at home. Nor is the Kremlin inclined to point out that it is now far less revisionist than it was a few years ago, and so far it has failed to mention that it moved against revisionist Czechoslovakia but took no action against left radical Albania. Moscow wants to prove to its Chinese listeners that it is pursuing a more promising strategy of revolution than Mao. This may be true or false, but it is of no earthly interest to comrades

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Peng, Teng and Feng, who prefer good solid revisionism with food to incessant and dangerous trouble with starvation.

Moscow strives to isolate the Chinese comrades within the international communist movement, but it is far from successful because, in addition to the special problems of Asian parties, the more revisionist parties are delighted that the Moscow-Peking conflict is providing them with more elbow-room. The European revisionists disagree with much of what Mao and Lin are saying, but in a communist rediscovery of free speech, they are happy that Peking is telling a few truths about the USSR. Thus, Lin in his political report to the Ninth Congress attacked the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" of the communist states and warned that this doctrine "means that your sovereignty is 'limited', while . . . that of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique . . . is unlimited." (Moscow promptly and mendaciously asserted that no such doctrine exists.) The "so-called socialist community," Lin asserted, in reality consists of "colonies of social-imperialism, just like the 'New Order of Europe' of Hitler, the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' of Japanese militarism, and the 'Free World Community' of the United States." Lin quoted Lenin against the "handful of capitalist roaders in power": "Socialism in words, imperialism in deeds, the growth of opportunism into imperialism." The socialist states possessing "limited sovereignty" like the noise Lin makes and therefore want to keep Maoist China within the fold.

The final split of the "world party" has been avoided, but it may come if and when Mao decides to establish his own international movement. He probably will proceed cautiously, since continuing participation in the present setup gives him more political influence and better capabilities of infiltration. Yet the common "general line" which so far has kept Moscow and Peking precariously together presumably will be terminated.

Moscow is nervous about Mao's policies. Maoist propaganda against the revisionists does not affect the Soviet population, which could not care less and probably reacts with hostility to Maoist political warfare. But Peking's propaganda is massive and outspoken. Internationally, it has sullied the Soviet image, especially among the "left"; the "new left" has been largely under Maoist influences.

The border skirmishes in Inner Asia may or may not have reached the magnitude of the "undeclared war" that was fought

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between the USSR and Japan between 1937 and 1939, but they have been spreading over a vast area and are creating costly and uncomfortable defense requirements. If the USSR were entangled elsewhere, the security of Vladivostok could be endangered and the borders of Kazakhstan might become unruly. There might also be crises over Mongolia, one of the world's divided nations. Furthermore, troubles in Sinkiang might activate the Turkic peoples, producing unrest in the Soviet colonies between the Altai, Pamir and Caucasus mountains. On the basis of military force-relationships and comparative logistics, the threat may not appear to be significant. Yet the Soviets are unavoidably nervous because of the low population density in their Far Eastern possessions and the numerous potentially explosive ethnic cleavages in Central Asia.

Although Peking affirms that the "handful of renegades" will be overthrown, it is unlikely that the Kremlin is worried about Mao's threat to mount an "anti-revisionist" revolution within the USSR. On the contrary, those Soviet leaders who want to concentrate on economic reforms probably find Mao's propaganda indirectly helpful to them. Yet the Kremlin has customarily regarded all potential and incipient enemies as real and full-fledged enemies. Since the Soviets are no more able than anybody else to predict what Mao will do next, they are concerned about this uncertainty and want to get rid of the great nuisance, the aging Mao. Lin has been warning about the danger of war, and there have been reports of food requisitions and extensive storage of grain and rice, which may relate to aggressive military preparations (or else signify a new campaign against the peasants).

Is Mao merely a nuisance? Moscow has alleged that Mao is trying to provoke conflicts that might engulf the USSR against its will, or in other ways expose the international communist movement to painful defeats. In fact, the emerging Maoist capability to mount *nuclear* provocations cannot but make Moscow apprehensive. On June 7, 1969, Brezhnev came close to accusing Mao of preparing war against the Soviet Union.

There is, indeed, a deeper dimension to Mao's threat to the USSR. Lin now calls the Soviet "revisionist renegade clique . . . a paper tiger, too," but added a Mao quote to the effect that "the masses of the Soviet people and of party members and cadres are good" because "they desire revolution." Hence "revisionist rule will not last long." Lin also warned of "the danger of U.S. im-

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perialism and Soviet revisionism launching a war of aggression," either conventional or nuclear, against which China "must be prepared." According to a time-tested rule, it is often possible to deduce the true intentions of a communist spokesman by turning around what he is saying. In this case, Lin would be saying that China must prepare to attack U.S. imperialism *and* Soviet revisionism. This does not sound plausible, but Lin instructed his followers to "bury U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and their lackeys." The Cultural Revolution cannot accomplish this gigantic job. However, if the Maoists provoke a nuclear war between the United States and the USSR, such a conflict might make China the victor, provided she can keep out of the fray.

This strategy may not work, and closer analysis uncovers basic flaws in the concept. Still, the Kremlin knows about Mao's attitude on nuclear war from first hand, and it is particularly suspicious because this strategy of provocation is derived from the tradition of Lenin, who formulated the basic idea in 1918, and Stalin, who reformulated it in 1925. It was precisely this type of strategy that was implemented by Stalin in his pacts with Hitler in 1939 and Japan in 1940. The CCP itself rose to power by exploiting the war between China and Japan. Whether a similar strategy would work again is one question. The more significant question is whether Mao or his successor might find an opportunity to try such a global provocation. Any attempt to execute this strategic concept might spell trouble, for the United States as well as for the USSR.

VIII

The United States plays a major role in the campaign the Soviets are slowly mounting against the Maoists. Stories are published all over the world (some are Soviet plants, others Western delusions) asserting that the USSR has replaced the United States as "China's enemy No. 1." This assertion has many obvious advantages for Moscow. Among other things, it provides cover for Soviet nuclear preparations and communist strategy in Viet Nam, and once again puts the onus of major aggression on someone other than Kremlin leaders. This has not happened since Hitler. This particular line has been quite effective because it is not a complete distortion, merely a blatant exaggeration.

Soviet propaganda also has taken a position against what is labeled the "new China lobby" in the United States. The old and

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defunct lobby was conservative and "McCarthyite," Moscow explains, but the new lobby is "liberal" and is at present agitating for better U.S.-China relations, possibly even for (belated) recognition of the Mao regime. In fact, this new lobby favors American coexistence or friendship with all communist states. According to Moscow, the lobby's spokesmen apparently missed the significance of events in China and therefore failed to realize what has been obvious for about three years, namely, that at *this* time U.S. endeavors for closer relations or modest collaboration with Peking would imply an anti-Soviet thrust. Consequently, Senators Edward Kennedy and Jacob Javits were accused by Soviet media of working for Mao Tse-tung against the USSR. This must have come as a great surprise, especially since the Soviets were comparatively friendly to William Rusher of *National Review,* who wisely ignored the idea of some Machiavellian conservatives that, for the purpose of putting pressure on Moscow, Washington should befriend Mao. In this contretemps, the Soviets can say with Edmund Burke, who is not usually one of their patron saints, that they changed front but did not change ground, whereas the lobbying Americans did not change front and therefore *did* change ground.

There also have been communist "writers" and "researchers" traveling through Asia, Europe and the United States trying to enlist the sympathy of the bourgeoisie on the side of the Soviet struggle against Mao. The Soviet diplomatic service went out of its way to inform "capitalist" governments about the Chinese aggression on the Ussuri. Even the favorite whipping boys at Bonn were so informed, despite the fact that according to Soviet logic the European "revanchists" should be seeking an alliance with the Chinese opponents of the unequal treaties in Asia. The Soviets also had their diplomats inquire about reactions in various countries to a Soviet pre-emptive attack on the Chinese nuclear capability.

Some communist "researchers" are now busy collecting "dirt" on Mao. It is only natural that they are studying the American documentation on how "Wall Street" helped Mao to come to power between 1944 and 1949. The Soviet interest in historical investigations must be as painful to the old U.S. "China hands," who persuaded President Truman, General Marshall and Secretary Acheson that the Chinese communists were just "agrarian reformers," as it is to their spiritual descendants who now worry

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that Moscow's current opposition to a Peking-Washington rapprochement is based on a misinterpretation of their efforts in the interests of international cooperation.

"Dirt" on Mao is not hard to find. It is a fact that during World War II the United States, through the OSS, supported the Chinese communists in order to help them fight the Japanese. This was a serious mistake which the authors of that policy have ever since tried to conceal and forget. To informed observers, the tale of U.S. China policy, e.g., General Marshall's ambassadorship and the sabotage of U.S. help to the National government, needs no recounting.

Both American and Soviet support were indispensable to Mao's success. The United States made a basic error because it misevaluated Mao, but the Kremlin made a far worse error, because it had known Mao for years and still misevaluated him. Moscow's timid attempts to unload the blame for Mao's ascendance on American shoulders are flattering. But the truth, to enlarge upon the old image by Marx, is that Moscow was the father of that baby and Washington merely acted as midwife. The outcome of so much folly should be a salutary lesson for Washington and Moscow.

If this form of "dirt" should suddenly become a criterion to distinguish good from bad communists, why not mention that Ho Chi Minh also was cooperating with the OSS? Why overlook the American help Castro received before he reached Havana? Why ignore the fact that Stalin had been an Okhrana agent in his youth and an assassin in his old age? Why gloss over the fact that for five hours on June 22, 1941, Stalin kept the Red Army from returning fire against the Nazi Wehrmacht and thus opened the Soviet frontier to the invader, a crime punishable by death according to the code of the RSFSR? Why forget the "deal" Stalin had with "Wall Street" and the London "City" which enabled him to push back the Nazis, his erstwhile allies? Why not remember American acquiescence in the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe? Finally, why does Moscow still keep classified Lenin's secret deals with Japanese, Austrian and German imperialists?

Marshal Yakubovsky, commander of the Warsaw Pact forces and currently an important Kremlin policymaker, stated that Maoism has become "the accomplice of world imperialism." In other words, Mao's domestic policies, his attacks along the Amur and Ussuri, and his preparations for an anti-revisionist revolution in

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the USSR, serve U.S. purposes. This line may be too silly to be taken seriously in the West, but it is designed to inflame both the Soviet and Chinese mainland citizenry against the United States. At the same time, this propaganda helps to exculpate the Moscow communists from their responsibility for the Peking Maoists.

Since serious suggestions have been made that the United States should help Mao against the USSR or, conversely, should support the USSR against Mao and even work toward an ultimate Soviet-American alliance against China, perhaps it would be valuable to enumerate Moscow's objectives with respect to Peking:

(1) Moscow wants to obtain various tactical advantages in order to weaken Mao and in the short run reduce the damage Mao can do to Soviet and communist interests. This first objective is comparatively unimportant.

(2) In the long run Moscow wants to re-establish its influence in Peking. This requires that the pro-Soviet faction of the CCP be restored to power, an undertaking that presumably depends upon direct action taken by pro-Soviet PLA generals acting as the main force of this strategy. This second objective is quite important, but except for psychological warfare there is no clear way of reaching it.

(3) Moscow wants to prevent the United States, wittingly or unwittingly, from profiting from the mainland turmoil: elements who seek to restore a democratic-republican environment or who realize that the economic reconstruction of China requires Free World support must not be permitted to seize power. This line came through clearly in a Moscow radio broadcast of April 29, 1969. After explaining that under a Maoist policy "the Chinese people will live forever in poverty," Moscow asserted: "In essence, the support and assistance given China by the imperialists can never compare with that given by socialist nations." Hence "China can expect rapid development only when the country and its people are closely allied with friendly socialist countries and communist parties." There was no explanation of why this theory did not work during the 1950's.

The third Soviet objective is of overriding importance. Regardless of the troubles Mao may produce, a democratic revolution in China would damage the strategic position of the USSR and could destroy the international communist movement. This objective is attainable, provided the United States plays into Soviet hands.

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To reach its goal, the USSR will seek to discredit the United States in the eyes of all those Chinese elements who in the years to come will play a major role in the succession struggle. Soviet leaders will build up positions of strength throughout Asia and try to secure American acquiescence in a growing political role for the USSR in the affairs of Viet Nam, India, the Persian Gulf, Singapore and Japan. Accordingly, the USSR probably will apply Lenin's tactic, explained graphically by Laszlo Rajk, Hungarian Minister of the Interior, who became a victim of one of Stalin's last purges: "If you have five enemies, you should ally yourself with them; arrange to incite four of them against the fifth, then three against the fourth, and so on, until you have only one enemy left in the alliance; you can then liquidate him yourself and kick him out of the alliance." These tactics, an American specialist added, cannot work unless they are supplemented "by the covert answer: penetration, intimidation, and subversion on an enormous scale."[32] Such covert techniques are to assure that American policy vis-à-vis China will be inactive or mistaken.

There is always the possibility of a Soviet-Chinese conflict breaking out along the borders of Sinkiang and the Maritime Provinces. During 1969 USSR ground and nuclear deployments in this area grew to such size and power that a Soviet resort to force seems increasingly probable. If the Soviets decide to attack, they can be expected (a) to destroy the Chinese nuclear forces and (b) to penetrate to Peking in order to install a government of their choosing. It is unlikely that they would occupy North China or operate south of the Yellow River. Since the Maoists will not wait in Peking for the MVD to arrest them, the continuation of a Maoist or otherwise anti-Soviet CCP government in the southern part of the country must be anticipated. In brief, a Soviet attack would result in the splitting of mainland China and presumably in full-fledged civil war.

IX

The confusion is so great and the changes are so swift that, as so often before, the United States will be tempted to pursue an opportunistic policy toward China along the line of least *immediate* resistance. In view of the enormous uncertainties, it would be unwise for the U.S. government to work out a prescriptive course

[32]Christopher Felix, *A Short Course in the Secret War* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963), p. 225.

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of action and rigidly apply an "agreed upon policy." But the following factors should be taken into consideration:

(1) The United States and the USSR are again in competition over the future of China.

(2) The United States and the USSR have the following common enemies on the Chinese mainland: Mao; Lin and his clique in the PLA; Chiang Ching and her followers; the cultural revolution factions or the "second party," and all anarcho-communist elements.

(3) The USSR has support in the "first party," the CCP; among some key elements of the PLA; in the state bureaucracy, possibly including Chou En-lai; conceivably among the arms-oriented scientists, and among persons who have remained communists. All those groups are anti-American.

(4) Party and state officials concerned with economic matters may not be pro-American or pro-Western, but many of them presumably tend toward a neutral position and might welcome normalization of China's economic and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. Some of these elements realize that the economic system must be changed and that the necessary massive economic support can come only from the United States. But no group is in a position, intellectually or politically, to advocate any pro-American policy at this time.

(5) Individual PLA officers may be veering toward a less pronounced anti-American posture, but it is too early to expect the development of a pro-American faction in the army. However, many older mainland officers have remained secretly friendly to the Kuomintang or are returning to their former sympathies. Younger and dissatisfied officers also may be turning toward this alternative. In short, there is no reason in this Soviet-American competition to cede the Chinese military establishment to the communists. If the mainland military, who occupy the crucial strategic position in the Chinese imbroglio, could be enlisted on the side of a free and noncommunist China, the world would be saved much trouble and blood.

(6) Those who are oppressed, exploited, disenfranchised and persecuted — whether they are intellectuals, purge victims, students, youths, workers, peasants, enlisted soldiers, or national minorities — are now potentially or actually anti-communist. Therefore, they are potentially or actually pro-American.

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(7) Those who are fully aware of China's future economic and political needs, who hold strong democratic and religious beliefs, who are the underground followers of the Kuomintang, and who desire good government and a growth economy, are consciously pro-American, albeit in varying degrees. They believe that China's future depends largely on U.S. policies. Some are convinced that an active U.S. strategy is needed to rescue China, while others believe that China's political problem must be solved by the Chinese themselves with conscious American encouragement to assure success.

There exist in China today the preconditions for the emergence of a mass movement that would fight for progressive and free government. This fact is not yet understood in the United States.

The United States at this juncture should go back to the fundamental principle that it is in our best interest to cooperate with true republican and democratic forces, including those who, in order to introduce democracy and a modern economy, may have to carry out a revolution against totalitarianism. Whatever may happen in mainland China, U.S. policy must support those elements which want to abolish repressive institutions, irresponsible dictatorship and slave labor, and replace "oriental despotism" by a modern, workable and representative system. The Maoists are perpetuating the oldest and worst traditions of Chinese tyranny. They are the chief enemies of China's modernization.

It is in our national interest to support efforts to eliminate a totalitarian system that is planning a 100-year assault against the entire globe and that may not recoil from instituting nuclear war to accomplish its goals. Once U.S. strategy is firmly anchored on the principle that we must help to establish democracy in China, we may allow ourselves all those tactical flexibilities, compromises and temporary arrangements that may be necessary to navigate the wild waters of China's protracted crisis.

It is fitting to conclude with a reminder from Confucius: "Do not seek quick results, nor look for small gains. Seek quick results, and you will not achieve success; look for small gains, and you will not accomplish big projects."

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THE MOSLEM-COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION IN EAST JAVA, 1964-1965

by Jacob Walkin

THE period from December 1963 to November 1965, when the writer was a Foreign Service Officer stationed at the American Consulate in Surabaya, was one of the most interesting and decisive in the history of Indonesia. Because a detailed knowledge of events in a single province may help to deepen insight into that period, this article will survey developments in East Java as they bore on the status and influence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Virtually every statement made can be documented by a study of the Surabaya press of that time; however, only occasionally will there be reference to a specific newspaper.

The writer went to East Java sharing the view of Indonesians and non-Indonesians alike that this area was a stronghold of the PKI. He left two years later convinced that PKI strength in East Java was vastly overrated. The myth of the party's overwhelming power was apparently based in part on the fact that it increased its share of the total vote in the province from 23 per cent in the national elections of 1955 to 27 per cent in the provincial elections of 1957 and was second to the *Nahdatul Ulama* (Moslem Teachers Party) in number of votes cast. Favored by the Palace and skilled in touting its own strength as national policy was shifted to the left in the late Sukarno years, the PKI gave an impression of invincibility. A more accurate appraisal was that it consisted of a small, well-organized and well-financed group of activists without a consistent mass following.[1]

The PKI had some advantage in Surabaya, where it won an absolute majority of the votes in the provincial elections of 1957, elected a communist mayor, and dominated the municipal (but not the provincial) administration from that time until the attempted coup in October 1965. Nevertheless, when one looked around the city and province in 1964-1965, it became immediately apparent that if raw power was being exercised, it was being exercised by the Moslems and not by the PKI or any of its front organizations. The awakening of the Moslems was a new develop-

[1]I know of no developments in East Java before or after the attempted PKI coup of October 1965 which contradict this view of the party.

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ment, the consequence of the leftward shift of PKI policy during that period. In addition to becoming the dominant element of the city and province, the Moslems, alone in the nation, defied Sukarno's dictum that criticism of the communists was only a phobia and would not be tolerated. While the rest of Indonesia conformed, the Moslems openly pointed to the communists as the cause of disunity and demanded the banning of the principal PKI press organs in East Java.

The PKI Turns to the Left: Unilateral Action

The shift to the left in the basic policies of the PKI during 1964-1965 was forecast by party leader D. N. Aidit in his political report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the PKI held in Djakarta between December 23 and 26, 1963.[2] This report merits more attention than it has so far received if only because it expounds the theory of revolution based on integration with the peasants in virtually the same terms Lin Piao used almost two years later. Aidit argued that with an impregnable base in the countryside the communists could successfully assault the capitalists and imperialists in their strongholds in the towns: "Asia, Africa and Latin America are the village of the world, while Europe and North America are the town of the world."

Presumably in anticipation of a revolutionary situation in Indonesia within a few years, Aidit demanded that the PKI solidify its control of the peasants by resorting to unilateral action (*aksi sepihak*). This was one of a number of provocative steps taken in East Java and elsewhere which abandoned the national united front policy of not giving offense to any major segment of Indonesian society. Others included an open attack on Moslem organizations, an aggressive but strictly word-of-mouth attack on religion, and an attempt to "retool" any official whom the communists deemed "reactionary." These measures, of which only unilateral action is specifically mentioned in Aidit's report, had a momentous impact on the Moslems and could be said to have contributed significantly to the decimation of the communists after the failure of the PKI coup on October 1, 1965.

[2] I have used an English-language version of the report published in leaflet form under the title "Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat!" by the Foreign Languages Press in Peking. For earlier, milder reports by Aidit, see his *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution* (Demos, 1963); no place of publication is given for this attractively bound book, but it was almost certainly Peking.

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Unilateral action was not put into effect immediately after Aidit proclaimed its importance as a weapon in winning the peasants' support for the party. Having obtained the Second Plenum's approval for its use, he claims to have devoted four months, February to May 1964, to leading a massive PKI research effort in West, Central and East Java concerned with the status and movement of the peasants. When he appeared in Surabaya on May 23, 1964 to participate in the celebration of the party's forty-fourth anniversary, he stated that he had spent the last five weeks in East Java studying the farmers and the city poor.[3] In June and July, the communists made an all-out effort to encourage unilateral action among the landless peasants of East Java. There was a lull during the celebration of the national holiday in August, but after President Sukarno virtually endorsed unilateral action in his holiday speech on August 17, the incitement of the farmers was resumed. At the beginning of 1965 the campaign gradually petered out, and by April it had ceased to be a major issue in East Java.

In the unilateral action campaign, the communists, generally acting through their peasant organization, the BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*) and youth organization, *Pemuda Rakjat,* sought to incite landless peasants to enforce the Crop-Sharing Law of 1959 and the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960. Under the crop-sharing law, tenants who cultivated the land of an absentee landlord were entitled to 50 per cent of the crop. The land reform law of 1960 limited the size of peasant family plots on Java to five or six hectares and provided that anything above this maximum must be distributed to landless peasants. Alleging that these laws were being sabotaged by "bloodsucking" landlords, the communists urged the landless peasants to "enforce" the two laws by their own efforts, overriding the landlords' opposition by force if necessary. In the summer and fall of 1964, the Surabaya newspapers were full of reports of communist-led peasants invading a given area, seizing the harvest, allegedly dividing it according to the law, and occupying the land which the communists charged should be distributed to landless peasants.

At the time the writer's view was that the communists were not achieving anything through unilateral action. When the campaign

[3]That Aidit had given time from about April 20 to May 22 to leading this effort in East Java appeared in the local press. He told a party conference on July 3 in Djakarta about his research throughout Java. See *Djadilah Komunis Jang Baik Dan Lebih Baik Lagi,* a pamphlet issued by Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta, in 1964, p. 7.

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was called off in the spring of 1965 and the slogan was dropped from the PKI line in East Java, this seemed to be confirmed. In retrospect unilateral action appears to have been a major blunder, one of a series of them culminating with the coup attempt in October—which raises serious doubt about the judgment of Aidit and company. First and foremost, despite the passage of an agrarian reform law in 1960, there was no land reform problem in Indonesia or on the island of Java susceptible to exploitation by the PKI. Indonesia was and is primarily a land of small holders. There are large estates, chiefly in tea, rubber and timber reserves, but these form only a relatively small part of the total arable land on Java, are already held for the most part by the state, and serve as important sources of exports for foreign exchange.

In his Second Plenum speech of December 1963, Aidit stated that, based on the limitations of landownership in the Basic Agrarian Law, there were a million hectares of land available for distribution. This was the frequently mentioned official figure for all of Indonesia; that for the island of Java alone was certain to be much smaller. Donald Hindley found references in *Harian Rakjat* indicating, according to official sources, that 200,000 hectares were available for redistribution in Java.[4] I have heard reliable sources cite for Java 100,000 and even 30,000 hectares. Whether the figure was 200,000 or 30,000 there is no dispute that there was not enough land above the legal norms to provide more than a tiny fraction of the landless peasants with their own small plot.[5]

A partial answer to the land problem in Java would be colonization of the outer islands. At the national transmigration conference in Djakarta late in 1964, then Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo pointed out that it would require the movement of two million people a year just to maintain the present density of population on Java. In 1963, only 3,000 families were moved from East Java, and in 1964 none at all. In April 1966, after the coup attempt, after the atmosphere in the nation had changed drastically, and after Sukarno had lost his executive power, even he felt compelled to give up the ideological mystique of land reform and "order" the cabinet to make plans to move two million people a year (calculated at 6,000 persons or 1,200 families a day) to other

[4]Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 177.

[5]In one case of unilateral action in the Djember area, probably not atypical, the pro-PKI daily, *Trompet Masjarakat*, on June 25, 1964, gave the size of the two plots at issue as 0.362 and 0.391 hectares.

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islands as the most effective way of solving the nation's food problem.[6]

The central concept of unilateral action was therefore defective to begin with. What the communists were doing in essence was robbing Peter to pay Paul, and since there are about as many Peters as there are Pauls, they were bound to make at least as many enemies as friends. (According to ex-Minister Sadjarwo, only 40 per cent of the peasants on Java, Madura and Bali own land, while 60 per cent do not, but the communists could not possibly have attracted all the landless peasants.) Also certain to limit communist gains from unilateral action was the absence of significant class stratification and class friction in the Javanese villages. As tends to be true in primitive, tradition-bound, subsistence societies, the obligation of the village to provide subsistence for all its members in mutual-help fashion was recognized and still practiced to the extent possible.[7]

Given these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand the fighting fury with which the small landowners, usually backed by the local authorities, greeted the artificial introduction into the villages of the concept of class struggle and the substitution of anarchy for a stable local order based on law. It was not unusual for blood to be shed on both sides. Toward the end of January 1965, the Chairman of the East Java BTI released some figures on communist losses that may be accurate. He announced publicly that since August 17 in East Java, four BTI cadres had been killed, forty-three farmers wounded, 409 cadres/farmers arrested, fifty hectares of farm land ruined, and thirteen houses of BTI cadres/farmers destroyed (probably by burning, a Javanese form of retaliation, of which British diplomats in Djakarta experienced a version on September 18, 1963).

There were of course casualties on the landowner side, but the impression I got from reading the Surabaya press, which reported numerous incidents of unilateral action, was that the communists had taken much more punishment than the opposition. The PKI constantly complained that the authorities had failed to take action against the perpetrators of this "terrorism." In his report to

[6]I have used the Foreign Broadcast Information Service *Daily Report, Asia & Pacific* for April 22, 1966 as the source for the above. Sukarno was making a formal address to the Cabinet on April 21.

[7]Hindley, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6. I have consulted this useful volume on many points concerning the situation in Indonesia and the tactics of the PKI up to the time I went to East Java. See also Hindley's article, "The PKI and the Peasants," *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1962, pp. 28-36.

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the Plenum of the PKI Central Committee in Djakarta in May 1965, Aidit acknowledged that the campaign had not been a success and severely criticized the way it had been conducted. However, even before he made his report, it was obvious from the PKI press in East Java that the party had for the time being quietly dropped unilateral action from its tactics, although Aidit himself did not acknowledge this and called for better execution.

The principal avowed PKI organ in East Java was *Djalan Rakjat*, which in 1964 was a weekly, then appeared three times a week, and some months before the demise of both the party and its press became a daily. It was a tri-weekly in the first week of April 1965, but for an unexplained reason appeared only once that week. In a series of articles called "The Leadership of the Party in the Mass Movement," which began March 20 and ended April 16, two pieces on peasant policy appeared in the issues of April 1 and April 8. These featured the conclusions of the party's National Peasant Conference of April 1959 that the two main enemies to be attacked were imperialism and feudalism, with the former the more important of the two. Only the land owned by the foreign imperialists and by native landlords who sided with them was to be seized and distributed to the peasants. The one demand made on other landlords was that there be a fairer distribution of the harvest as between landlord and sharecropper than the fifty-fifty division then in force. Nothing was said about unilateral action in these articles, or in subsequent articles up to the time the pro-PKI journals were closed shortly after the attempted coup.

It is important to note that in thus returning to the policy in force before Aidit raised the cry of unilateral action, the party had restored its neutrality toward the ordinary landlord, whose support it once more sought. During the period of unilateral action all landlords were *ipso facto* evil persons who were sabotaging the land reform and crop-sharing laws and whose actions must be overridden by force. The communists had thus departed from the previous national united front policy of not antagonizing any significant layer of the population, followed virtually since Aidit came to power in 1951, but had not formally abandoned it.[8] The

[8]Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit.*, pp. 54-59, 233-235. The landlord was earlier singled out as a barrier to progress, but in accordance with the party's policy of minimizing the number of enemies it made, its hostility was muted and appeals were made to the peasants without going too far in treading on the toes of the landlords. On the contrary the party sought, and apparently in part got, the support of the landlords themselves.

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PKI had presumably seen an opportunity to launch a revolutionary "offensive," moved markedly leftward, and narrowed the base of the population on which the policy of the national united front could rest.

PKI Attacks on Religion and Religious-Based Organizations

In this leftward shift, the communists converted into bitter enemies not only the landlords. As big a blunder as unilateral action was their simultaneous unleashing of a new and open attack on religion and religious-based organizations. This was not done openly in the sense that the PKI denied its adherence to Pantjasila, the Sukarno-inspired state philosophy which included as one of its five cardinal principles belief in God, or otherwise made any move in writing to affirm the traditional Marxist doctrine that religion is an "opiate of the people." It did none of these things, and every year when the Moslem fast ended it used the columns of one or another communist newspaper to wish all Moslems a *Selamat Hari Raja Idul Fitri* (and at Christmas time, all Christians a Merry Christmas).

Nevertheless it is clear from what the Moslems were saying that the PKI had begun a systematic campaign in East Java to introduce anti-Moslem doctrines in lectures and in popular art forms like the *ludruk* (a drama peculiar to East Java in which males impersonate females) and the *wayang kulit*, the Indonesian marionette show. Moslem cries of outrage appeared frequently in the moderate press at the same time that unilateral action became widespread in June of 1964. The Moslems sometimes broke up such affairs by violence. For example, on February 5, 1965 in the Menganti area of Surabaya, the PKI youth organization, *Pemuda Rakjat,* held a reception at which a speaker addressed those present inside and outside the building by means of a loudspeaker system. When the speaker made anti-religious remarks, the *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU) youth organization, *Gerakan Pemuda Ansor,* which apparently expected this, invaded the premises and inflicted damage to lamps, loudspeakers and musical instruments (gamelans) amounting to a million rupiahs.

In addition to this verbal attack on religion, which, as indicated, I learned about only from statements made by both sides in the press, the PKI was branding as counterrevolutionary any organiza-

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tion or person of which it disapproved. One of its principal targets was the Moslem university student association, HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*), formerly affiliated with the banned Masjumi Party, but never banned itself. The HMI was relatively strong in the East Java universities and getting it banned might have promoted the interests of the PKI's own student organization, CGMI (*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*). A shrill campaign against it was mounted daily in the pro-communist press, but the HMI nevertheless survived, except at the Law Faculty of the University of Brawidjaja at Djember, where the controversial Dean, E. Utrecht, unilaterally banned the organization in May 1964. In June the Moslems staged a major demonstration against Utrecht in Djember, during which he came close to suffering serious bodily harm. In any case he was removed from his position and may have been unable to teach again at any other state university.

Typical of PKI tactics at that time was the party's reaction when it became known in the spring of 1964 that a group of gangsters at Modjerkerto, about forty kilometers west of Surabaya, had murdered as many as seventy-three persons. The communists immediately linked these criminals with HSBI (*Himpunan Seni Budaja Islam*), then an independent Moslem cultural organization, now one of the constituent organizations of the new Moslem party, *Partai Muslimin Indonesia.* Subsequently, when this outrage became embarrassing even to the thick-skinned communists, they claimed that the murderers had connections with such nonexistent organizations as the Masjumi Party and its youth organization, GPII, which had been banned separately by Sukarno in 1962. For the most part, the PKI never acknowledged that it had any differences with a legal party, even the aroused NU. In answering attacks made by NU press organs or representatives, it always claimed that attacks on it could only come from the Masjumi and other banned "counterrevolutionary" elements.

Probably the worst blunder made by the communists, and the event which more than any other led to talk of a "holy war" among Moslems, was the Kanigoro affair of January 13, 1965. In the early hours of that day, a group of PKI cadres invaded an authorized training school operated by the PII (*Pemuda Islam Indonesia*), the Masjumi high school students' organization which like HMI, its college counterpart, was never banned. The school was located at Kanigoro, near Kediri. The communists seized the

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belongings of the students, bound their hands, and walked them six kilometers to a police station where they were turned in as subversives. The communists were subsequently accused of entering a mosque with dirty feet, manhandling its Kjai, and trampling on the Koran (by using their feet to pack the Koran and other student belongings into sacks).

The Kanigoro affair was a relatively rare example of the PKI's ability to exercise raw power. It was apparently made possible by the fact that a police commander of the subdistrict in which Kanigoro was located was sympathetic to them. There were far more incidents showing that the PKI was a relatively weak minority.

The Attempt to Retool the Communist Mayor of Surabaya

The demonstrations against the PKI Mayor of Surabaya, Murachman, are a good illustration of communist weakness in 1964, even before the aroused Moslems persistently showed in 1965 that they had organization and money, and were the dominant element in East Java. Murachman was appointed by Sukarno in November 1963 to replace Satryo, the PKI candidate first elected as mayor in the 1957 local elections, who had become Lieutenant Governor of East Java in the summer of 1963. Surabaya could live with Satryo for six years because his relationship to the PKI seemed nominal. However, Murachman came from the inner core of the party and appeared to be incapable of making any move as mayor which did not accord with party interests.

On June 30, 1964, as part of the PKI offensive to "retool" any public figure of whom it disapproved, left-wing groups staged a demonstration against a high city official, a Moslem named Supardi, who was head of the municipal economic department. The PKI made the customary charge against him that he was an ex-member of the banned Masjumi Party and a counterrevolutionary. Moslem reaction was swift. When, two days later, the first demonstration against Mayor Murachman was staged by twenty-two Moslem youth groups, so much animosity was displayed that it was considered unsafe for him to face the demonstrators on the steps of his official residence and he retreated to the interior. The communists were never again to bring up the name of Supardi, who continued his work in the city government without further public harassment.

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Three months later, on October 6, students organized a second demonstration against the Mayor after he made a remark about student hazing which enraged them. Long-time residents of Surabaya claimed that this was the most massive demonstration the city had seen for a long time. Toward the end of the year a student group went to Djakarta to seek the retooling of Mayor Murachman. Represented were student federations like PPMI (*Pusat Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia*) and MMI (*Madjelis Mahasiswa Indonesia*) which, though left-leaning at the national level, reflected the moderate opinion of the vast majority of students in supposedly red East Java. Finally, on December 30, 1964, the five principal noncommunist parties of East Java, organized as the "Cooperative Body for Safeguarding Pantja Sila in Surabaya," sent a delegation to Djakarta to demand of Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena and Interior Minister Soemarno the retooling of Murachman. The group chairman was from PNI, the nationalist party; represented also were the Moslem NU Party; the national communist Murba Party; Parkindo, the Protestant Christian Party; and the Catholic Party.[9]

The chances of persuading Sukarno to remove Murachman were slim. Since he had been in office only since December 12, 1963, his removal in early 1965 would have been a major blow to the PKI. At that time Sukarno was protecting the PKI at the national level, carrying out many of the policies it backed, and gradually silencing almost all of the voices opposed to it. The more remarkable, therefore, was this outspoken attempt of the moderate parties to oust a communist official incapable of putting the public interest above the interests of the PKI. Moreover, during 1965, as Sukarno moved the country further to the left, the moderate forces in East Java became increasingly bold in denouncing the PKI as the basic cause of disunity in the province. The Moslems were awakened to the communist danger as a result of the tactics initiated by the PKI the year before.

[9]One reason for this action by the five parties was their unsuccessful attempt earlier that month to persuade Murachman not to revive the RKKS (*Rukun Kampung Kota Surabaja*). They argued in vain that the purpose of the revival could only be political and that the National Front was the proper place for political activity. For the meaning and previous history of the RKKS, see Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit.*, pp. 158-159 and Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Publications Centre, 1965), pp. 216-217. Murachman's revival of the RKKS in December 1964 did not mean that the communists controlled Surabaya then; neither is the existence of the organization in itself sufficient evidence that they did so in the heyday of the RKKS before the East Java Military Commander banned it in 1958.

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The Moslems React to the Communist Danger

Although the awakening seemed to apply to all Moslems, it was natural that the center of activity lay in the largest party in East Java — and the most significant legal Moslem party — the *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU). The NU in East Java has as its base the poorly educated Madurese. It had no outstanding leaders, was devoted to its own narrow interests, and until 1964 was not averse to cooperating with the PKI or allowing the PKI to retain the initiative. Then came the challenge of unilateral action and the PKI attack on religion. Propelled more by spontaneous mass fervor than by brilliant leadership, the NU was transformed during the course of 1964 into a well-organized, well-financed and aggressive party which seized the initiative from the communists. Although it had never before had its own newspaper, it took over *Obor Revolusi* on December 14, 1964 and February 1, 1965 acquired two additional papers, both published in the evening.

The crude tactics of the PKI tended to polarize the population of the province and to bring out sharply all the potential advantages of the noncommunists and disadvantages of the communists. Particularly after the Kanigoro affair in January 1965, the political situation was deeply affected by the religious fervor of the Moslems. Leaflets were circulated in mosques warning of the great danger from the "atheists" and reminding believers of Madiun, where "thousands of Moslems were murdered by atheists." Moslems were urged to wage "holy war" against the atheists and to retaliate against all insults and attacks. As the issue between the PKI and the Moslems became joined, all were being asked: "Are you a Moslem or an atheist?" There were press reports, possibly exaggerated but probably true in substance, that PKI mass organizations were losing members to the NU and also to the nationalist PNI mass organizations. Specifically the NU Labor Federation, SARBUMUSI, was said to be gaining at the expense of the PKI's SOBSI; Pertanu, the NU's peasant organization and Petani, the PNI peasant organization, at the expense of the PKI's BTI; and *Gerakan Pemuda Ansor*, the NU youth organization, and *G. P. Marhaenis*, the PNI youth group, at the expense of the PKI's *Pemuda Rakjat*.

For this observer, the differences between the communists and the Moslems were well illustrated by the parades each side held at the end of May 1965. To understand their significance, it should first be mentioned that during that spring marching drum bands

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of *Ansor* and the NU girls' organization, *Fatajat*, were a common sight all over the roads of East Java. The *Ansor* men wore colorful naval cadet-type uniforms with peaked caps; the girls, uniform blouses (*kebajas*) and batik skirts, with white headdress. Perhaps in time the PKI might have matched the Moslem drum bands both in number and comparably expensive instruments and uniforms. In 1965, however, it came nowhere near doing this. This situation was reflected in the parades I witnessed. The PKI parade on May 29 was to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the party. The *Ansor* parade on May 31 celebrated the thirty-first anniversary of that organization's founding.

The PKI parade was held in the late afternoon and evening and included contingents from all mass organizations. There were only about half a dozen drum bands and only one wore the colorful naval cadet-type uniforms. Many of the marchers were middle-aged, seemed tired and dispirited, wore nondescript, sometimes ragged clothes, and gave the impression that the sooner the march was over the happier they would be. It was rumored in East Java that for affairs like this the PKI had to give the marchers, who were said to come from outside Surabaya, a fee and provide food, transportation and lodging. I saw nothing in the May 29 parade which would contradict that rumor.

The *Ansor* parade, while definitely smaller in size, was a striking contrast. The Moslems completely outshone the communists both in the number of drum bands and the colorful uniforms they wore. The marchers were almost all youthful, as is to be expected in a parade sponsored by a youth organization, but more than that, they marched with spirit and with obvious pride in their organization. The midday sun was hot but they did not seem to notice it.

A number of specific incidents readily illustrate the superiority of the Moslems over the communists in East Java and the startling way in which in effect they defied Sukarno by denouncing the communists as the disrupters of national unity.

The Moslems Become the Dominant Element in East Java

A major issue among all the parties in the summer and fall of 1964 was the appointment of a new Regional Secretary for the province to replace the two men in that position inherited from the Dutch, one called the Regional Secretary and responsible to

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the Governor, and one, called Secretary to the Governor, who was expected to protect the interests of the national government in East Java. Each of the major parties, the NU, the PKI and the PNI, had its own candidate (as did in this case the Partindo Party, the small left-wing party which took positions usually indistinguishable from those of the PKI), and none could get a majority in the East Java Legislative Assembly. On November 17, Governor Wijono legally broke the deadlock by appointing as Regional Secretary the NU candidate, Joewono Asparin. The appointment was bitterly opposed by both the PKI and the PNI (the latter at that time was commonly believed to be divided internally between a left and a right wing), and remained an issue until the PKI's coup attempt of October 1965.

The day of Joewono Asparin's installation as Regional Secretary, December 9, was a tense one in Surabaya for all residents, including the personnel of the American Consulate, and units of the armed forces were much in evidence to prevent the outbreak of violence. There is little doubt that the PKI intended to break up the installation by a demonstration, if it could. However, the divided Nationalist Party decided not to cooperate in any such demonstration. The communists obviously hoped to mass their adherents around the grounds of the Governor's official residence, but the Moslems, aware of this possibility, pre-empted them.

The Governor's residence was surrounded early in the morning, reportedly at 6:30 a.m., by members of twelve Moslem organizations and of the national communist Murba Party. The Governor addressed this group after the formal installation at 10:00 a.m., and its presence was mentioned in the press. What was not in the press but nevertheless became common knowledge in the city was that when the communist demonstrators found the moderates already assembled at the Governor's residence, the communist leadership decided not to challenge them. Had it done so and the troops been required to intervene, the installation would probably have been postponed. However, the communists, evidently deciding that the price they would have to pay was too high, left the scene. Later that afternoon, when the Moslems had dispersed, the PKI sent some demonstrators, mostly high school students, to the Governor's office, and ended the day by placing slogans on the grounds of the United States Information Service building farther down the street, which had been raided, damaged and closed on

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December 7, two days before. All in all, December 9, 1964 was a humiliating day for the East Java PKI.

Of numerous other such incidents, one meriting description is a case of the actual frustration of an installation of a PKI, not an NU, candidate. This was the postponement of the inauguration on January 2, 1965 of the new Regent of Banjuwangi, Soewarso Kanapi, the PKI candidate and the ex-prosecutor of Banjuwangi. Of the seven Level II appointments made in East Java during my residence there, Kanapi was the only successful PKI candidate.[10] His chief opponent was the PNI candidate, the Military Commander of Banjuwangi Regency, an Army major. Oddly enough, Kanapi had been supported in the Legislative Council of Banjuwangi by the NU delegation. Subsequently it was charged at a local NU plenum that Ali Mansur, head of the Banjuwangi NU executive committee, had been given a bribe of a million rupiahs by the PKI to support its candidate. Mansur was suspended for this "sin" and a new executive committee was formed.

On the day of the inauguration, the NU cooperated closely with the PNI, the right wing of which was in control of Banjuwangi at the time. The demonstrators arrived at 10:00 a.m. for an installation set for 8:00 p.m., stayed all day, and refused to allow anyone to enter or leave the courtyard of the Regent's office, where the ceremony was to have been held. At 10:00 p.m. the Governor of East Java and a local military commander were allowed to enter, but solely for the purpose of announcing that the installation of Kanapi as regent had been postponed.

A day or two later when the Governor returned from Djakarta, where he had made a report to Deputy Premier Subandrio and Interior Minister Soemarno, he announced that a new candidate for regent would be named. This was a commonsense approach to the problem, since it had been made clear that most of the people did not want a PKI candidate as regent. Evidently, however, Sukarno and the PKI decided that the party must not suffer the loss of prestige entailed by the withdrawal of its candidate, and the attempt to set a new date for Kanapi's installation continued. The installation was finally effected on August 26, almost nine months later, in the atmosphere of the national holiday (August 17) and almost certainly under heavy pressure from Sukarno. The hapless Kanapi served only a little over a month before he was removed following the attempted PKI coup on October 1.

[10]The appointment of Murachman as Mayor of Surabaya was made shortly before my arrival in December 1963.

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Another good illustration of the mood prevailing in East Java was the March 7, 1965 affair in Malang. The Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) was to conduct an anniversary celebration that Sunday morning, the left-wing national head of the association (Karim D. P.) was to speak, and the outlook was that the left-wingers would be massed for the occasion and in firm control of the city.[11] Actually it was the Moslems who were in control and the intransigence of the Moslem youth in East Java became known nationally that day. It was expected that the leftists would use the occasion to attack the BPS (*Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme,* Body for the Support of Sukarnoism), an organization of moderates banned by Sukarno the previous December for attempting to attack the PKI under the guise of promoting Sukarno's doctrines. When the leftists instead began to call for the dissolution of HMI, the Moslem university student organization, the Moslem youths were ready with a systematic and apparently premeditated plan of counterattack. The meeting site quickly became a shambles as the Moslems heaved rocks and chairs at the leftists, putting thirteen of them into the hospital. They also converged on the nearby office of a number of PKI front organizations, gutted that building, and partially damaged the PKI office more distant from the scene. The communists instantly demanded the dissolution of the HMI, but no action was taken, probably because no one really believed that the HMI was strong enough to have carried off the affair by itself. This was obviously a cooperative undertaking by several Moslem youth organizations, and it was likely that *Ansor* had a leading role in it. The possibility of effective punishment was forestalled the next day by the *Pantja Tunggal* of Malang, the five principal officers of that city, when they issued a statement saying that the incident was caused by individuals and not by any legal party or organization.

There are many other illustrations of the relative balance of forces in East Java during this period. No one, for example, disputed the fact that the most effective labor federation in Indonesia was the PKI-controlled SOBSI. On January 8, 1965, SOBSI's printers union, *Sarekat Buruh Pertjetakan Indonesia* (SBPI), announced its right to censor local newspapers, mentioning in particular *Manifesto* (probably still independent at that time but later that year affiliated with the Army), *Obor Revolusi,* the

[11]This forecast served as an excuse for the expulsion of a State University of New York team sponsored by the Ford Foundation at the Teacher Training Institute (IKIP) of Malang a few days before.

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outspoken NU newspaper, and *Mimbar Rakjat,* the PNI organ. This action was allegedly taken because of the party's irritation with the denunciations of Mayor Murachman appearing regularly following the attempt of the five principal noncommunist parties to get him retooled. Thereafter, the above three newspapers and other noncommunist organs from time to time displayed blank spots on one or more of their four pages, indicating that the SBPI was in fact carrying out its threat of censorship.

This situation continued for perhaps a month and a half, but during March it became noticeable that five newspapers printed by the same press occasionally did not appear at all. Among these were *Obor Revolusi* and *Mimbar Rakjat,* but they also included *Trompet Masjarakat,* the pro-PKI daily reputed to have the largest circulation of any single daily newspaper in East Java. The reason for this development was not stated in the papers, but it was known to a wide circle of knowledgeable Surabayans. The press was being visited by groups of Moslem youth, members of *Ansor,* who warned the union that if it attempted to impose censorship on *Obor Revolusi* they would prevent any of the five newspapers, including the pro-PKI *Trompet Masjarakat,* from appearing at all. By the end of March, the union's arbitrary censorship over the local press had disappeared.

It should be emphasized that the censorship was at best spotty and did not seriously interfere with the publication of news unfavorable to the communists. During February the three NU newspapers charged that the PKI was responsible for the turmoil in East Java and urged the authorities to take action against its "provocations, slanders, and instigations" before "it is too late." Also in that month *Ansor* first put forth its demand that the publication permits of all the pro-PKI newspapers in East Java be revoked on the ground that they "stir disunity, distort problems and spread slanders as a result of which the national struggle is weakened and the course of the unfinished Indonesian revolution is blocked." The Moslems were to continue to make this demand up to the time of the attempted coup, although Sukarno had so thoroughly cowed the remainder of the country that nowhere else was a manifestation of what he called "communist-phobia" permitted.

Moreover, the communists were unable to cripple the noncommunist press in Surabaya as they had done in Djakarta and Medan in February 1965 by persuading Sukarno to ban the so-

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called BPS papers. Four moderate papers, *Obor Revolusi* (before it was acquired by the Moslems), *Suara Rakjat, Manifesto* and *Dinamika,* had printed the anti-PKI Sajuti Melik series on Sukarnoism in whole or in part, and the PKI press had been insisting that they be banned. However, Sukarno did not dare comply because, as explained in detail below, he probably would have had difficulty containing the resulting commotion among the residents of the province.

The Moslem reaction to this PKI ploy reveals how well they had succeeded in intimidating the communists in East Java. On March 27, 1965 *Obor Revolusi* printed an editorial stating that it was an organ of the Moslems in East Java, that it would no longer tolerate slanderous attacks alleging that it was a BPS or Masjumi paper which should be banned, and that should such attacks henceforth be made, the matter would be communicated to the paper's "admirers" (*pentjinta*) who would then take whatever action they deemed wise and appropriate. The communists took this threat seriously. Thereafter when their press reported a resolution from one or another front organization demanding the banning of BPS papers in Surabaya, no mention was made of *Obor Revolusi,* even though the three other newspapers that had printed the Sajuti Melik series were specifically mentioned.[12]

On the eve of the coup, the chief local issue involved Joewono Asparin, the new Regional Secretary, and the appointment of new section chiefs for the merged units in the Governor's office, formerly divided as was the office of Regional Secretary. The East Java PNI, which had suspended its moderate members at the end of August, as the parent party had done throughout the country, was working with the PKI in opposing the appointments made by Governor Wijono, and Governor Wijono himself. On August 10, the Moslem Action Committee of Surabaya staged a massive demonstration in support of the Governor, pledging "blood and lives" to prevent his being undermined. The Committee also demanded the banning of five pro-PKI newspapers on the ground that they printed slander and false news. On August 14, the PKI-PNI attempted a counter demonstration against Governor Wijono and Joewono Asparin. The press imposed a blackout on what happened, but the story was no secret to a good many Surabayans. The Moslems had organized a kind of permanent guard whose members went to work armed with

[12]See, for example, *Djawa Timur,* April 6, 1965, and *Djalan Rakjat,* April 8, 1965.

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knives and sickles and were subject to call at any moment. As the PKI-PNI demonstration was about to get under way, the Moslem guard assembled rapidly, allegedly within half an hour, and blocked the path of the demonstrators to the Governor's office. The armed forces intervened to prevent violence, but the Moslems had achieved their purpose of frustrating the demonstration against the Governor.

East Java at the Time of the October 1 Coup

In the first part of September the city of Surabaya was preoccupied by the attempt of the leftists to close the American Consulate, but on Monday, September 27, four days before the coup, the tensions inside the country were quickened by a spectacular PKI demonstration against the Governor, during the course of which his official residence was severely damaged and he himself barely escaped injury.

No one was expecting a PKI demonstration; rather, on that day, there was to be a demonstration by GOWS (*Gabungan Organisasi Wanita Surabaja,* Association of Women's Organizations of Surabaya), a follow-up of a protest against the high price of rice last staged on August 5. GOWS had many moderate organizations in its membership, but like other organizations of this type in Sukarno's Indonesia, the left wing generally dominated it. The PNI women's organization had participated in the planning of the August 5 protest, but for the September 27 demonstration, PKI women, including the wife of Mayor Murachman, were in the forefront. The delegation of women went first to the Mayor's office, where he gave it a royal reception. What the noncommunists did not realize or had not paid sufficient attention to was the fact that the PKI had mobilized a great many men to accompany the women, with many of the participants brought in from outside Surabaya. On the way from the Mayor's office to the Governor's residence, a relatively short distance, it was easy for the men to get well ahead of the distaff delegation. They surprised the Governor, who, with other officials, was awaiting the women, almost mobbed him (he was apparently saved by the quick thinking of the East Java Police Chief, who pushed him into another room when the men became violent), and did extensive damage to the official residence before withdrawing.

For the next few days, all noncommunists, including the left-wing PNI, condemned the communists for this act of violence

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against constituted authority. Why did the communists risk antagonizing virtually the whole population of East Java? One possibility, advanced locally after the coup, was that the East Java PKI leadership knew that a coup was in preparation but was not sure of the exact day it would take place. It held the demonstration that morning in the belief that the action against the Army leadership would be undertaken at the same time in Djakarta. It deliberately sought to injure or kill the Governor so that the PKI Lieutenant Governor, Satryo, would be in charge of the province during the critical days ahead. Whether this explanation is the true one may never be proved or disproved.

There are other possible explanations. A totalitarian party like the PKI attracted membership in part and maintained the membership's morale in part because it seemed to represent the wave of the future; it was an organization respected for its power at home and connections abroad with other centers of power, particularly Communist China. The East Java PKI had been deeply humiliated on August 14, when it was prevented from conducting a demonstration against the Governor by the intervention of a hastily assembled guard of Moslem workers armed with knives and sickles. To the party's leaders, it must have seemed essential to find some other occasion to demonstrate that the PKI's reputation as a major power center was intact. The GOWS demonstration was perfect for their needs, since they were almost sure to achieve their purpose by hiding behind the skirts of the women and benefiting from the element of surprise. They appear to have been indifferent to its immediate impact on the noncommunists.

The same reasoning may have influenced the PKI leadership to stage the disastrous Kanigoro affair of January 13, 1965. Among other humiliations suffered at that time, the communists had been unable to prevent the installation of Joewono Asparin as Regional Secretary on December 9. Despite their selection of an ex-Masjumi group as the target, their insistence that they had acted only against subversive elements, and their elaborate attempt to dissociate the attack at Kanigoro from the NU Party, the incident thoroughly aroused most Moslems in East Java and alerted them to the threat from the "atheists."

Friday, October 1, 1965 was a relatively quiet day in Surabaya, outwardly not reflecting the upheaval going on in Djakarta. The announcements of Colonel Untung over Radio Djakarta were also heard over Radio Surabaya. In the course of the morning, a War-

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rant Officer of the Military Police named Sudono walked unhindered into the studios of Radio Surabaya and announced over the air that a revolutionary council supporting Untung would be organized in East Java. He then left the studios unmolested, but it was reported in the press in mid-November that he had been captured near Madiun. Sudono could have acted because he was a member of the conspiracy that staged the coup. On the other hand, there is some doubt that so low-ranking an officer stationed in the provinces was so pledged.

On Saturday and Monday, the PKI-dominated SOBSI unions attempted to take over twenty-five state enterprises in Surabaya by excluding the management and charging that it consisted of capitalist-bureaucrats whom both President Sukarno and First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio had recommended should be purged. Given the circumstances of the PKI's downfall, it did not take long in most cases for the management to be restored to its offices. It is impossible to say whether this was intended to be coordinated with the coup d'état in Djakarta or was simply another of the inexplicable moves made by the East Java PKI leadership. Apparently, the SOBSI unions did not attempt similar takeovers in other areas.

Neither of the two PKI dailies in Surabaya which appeared on October 2 and several days thereafter took a stand approaching the celebrated editorial of October 2 in the PKI's *Harian Rakjat* in Djakarta. Nevertheless, *Djalan Rakjat*, which was under the outright control of the East Java PKI, left no doubt where its sympathies lay. On the front page of the issue of October 2 was a partisan account of the Untung announcement taken from the radio under the caption: "Coup Plan of the Council of Generals Foiled." Mention was also made of the fact that Warrant Officer Sudono headed a movement in East Java in support of the September 30 Movement. *Djalan Rakjat* continued to appear daily through October 7. The news from Djakarta being unfavorable, it had little to say on what was going on there. It also avoided printing statements from any source regretting or condemning the killing of the six generals.

Trompet Masjarakat, generally a faithful PKI organ, was not run by the PKI. For whatever reason, its editor did not balk at publishing unfavorable comment about the attempted coup. The issue of October 2 contained a series of announcements emanating from Suharto or the Army Information Center stating, e.g., that

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the September 30 Movement was counterrevolutionary and that all armed services were acting together to crush it. *Trompet Masjarakat* was not published on October 7 and 8 "for technical reasons," and was banned after its appearance on Saturday morning, October 9. In that final issue it printed the statement Aidit had made on October 2 from the town of Solo and the PKI Politburo statement of October 5.

In East Java the PKI was unable to put up resistance of any importance to the anti-communist campaign that followed. There was a brief flurry in the middle of October when PKI members, massed in the woods south of Banjuwangi, ambushed a group of noncommunist demonstrators with forty reported killed on both sides. The graves of sixty-two Moslems were also found in that locality; the victims were said to have been invited to lunch by communists disguised as Moslems and poisoned. The area south of Banjuwangi was immediately entered by the Indonesian Army and the communists were put on the run. No other incidents in East Java involving significant resistance were thereafter reported. However, the atmosphere was not at all calm. Because East Java was widely thought to be a PKI stronghold, apprehension of a possible PKI military comeback persisted. The newspapers were full of stories of how the PKI had manufactured eye-gougers and other instruments of torture; the notion of communist strength was slow in dying.

Subsequently East Java proved to be an area where support for Sukarno was surprisingly strong. Although in the months before and after the coup Sukarno acted more like a communist than a nationalist leader, and his part in the coup may have been substantial, this upsurgence in his favor was not an indication that PKI sentiment remained a major force in the province. Support for Sukarno rose from many factors not necessarily connected with the PKI, among them the fact that he was born, brought up and schooled in East Java; resentment at the power of the Moslems; Moslem participation in the post-coup slaughter of communists; the continued devotion of even the right-oriented PNI to Sukarno; and Navy-Police jealousy over Army dominance.

Conclusions

That the coup attempt took place because the Army was a major obstacle to the communization of Indonesia sought by the PKI, and apparently by Sukarno as well, has been widely observed and

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commented upon. It appears to have escaped notice, however, that the Moslems of East Java were another major hindrance to the further leftward policies Sukarno clearly hoped to introduce. Even if their intransigence were widely known — which it is not — its importance could easily be overlooked because the coup was attempted, and if the communists had been successful, they could have disposed of the East Java Moslems as well as the resisting Army leadership. Had the conspirators gained control of the Army, it seems certain that the brutal treatment of the generals would have been extended to a widening circle, slowly and cautiously at first but on an increasing scale if it became apparent that resistance was declining. The Moslems were aware of the ruthless slaughter perpetrated by the PKI at Madiun in 1948, conscious of the close call they had on October 1, and determined this time to demonstrate to the communists that they could expect the same treatment in failure as they were ready to mete out to others in success.

A successful coup would have disposed of both obstacles to the communization of Indonesia, the Army and the aggressive Moslems in East Java. What would have been the likely outcome had there been no coup, and is it possible that the intransigence of the Moslems in East Java had something to do with triggering it? Whether Sukarno or the communists could have disposed of the Army leadership without the use of force is a debatable question. Only a limited number of men was involved, but opinion was widespread that he could. Perhaps he could even have extracted the same obedience from the East Java Moslems that he was getting from the rest of the country, but this is an even more debatable question.

Sukarno's power was based more on charisma than on the control mechanism familiar in communist countries. He was not accustomed to liquidating his enemies (executions were rare in Indonesia before the coup), although he did jail individual leaders he judged to be dangerous. Many other dissidents were not in jail, and there is no question that an underground of such banned parties as the Masjumi and the PSI was active. A wide range of legal and illegal activity was possible in Sukarno's Indonesia — to the extreme of the five or more attempts on his life. The seemingly unquestioning obedience he commanded was the result of his immense popularity, as well as his skillful political maneuvering to ensure that there was no viable alternative to his rule. By what measures he could have countered a mass movement not openly opposed to his personal rule but defying some of his key

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political axioms in support of the PKI, was not clear at the time and is no clearer in retrospect.

The activities of the East Java Moslems were effective, and must have been planned by a leadership amply supplied with funds, but it never became known who the leaders were, and the funds probably came from many well-to-do businessmen. No one person stood out as a key figure in the Moslem awakening, which appears to have been a spontaneous reaction to the crude tactics adopted by the PKI in early 1964.

It seems doubtful that Sukarno could have brought the Moslems under control by the harsh treatment of one or more of the local leaders or any leaders of the NU Party at the national level, who tended to obey him up to the time of the coup. There probably were no leaders capable of forcing the East Java Moslems to obey all of Sukarno's commands. They were a fanatical breed, and undoubtedly the easiest way to turn them away from the holy war they thought they were waging would have been to remove the PKI provocation for it. At the other extreme, the bloodbath and terror the PKI would probably have introduced if the coup had been successful would have subdued them, but before the attempted coup this was not a technique likely to be used by Sukarno. On May 31, 1965, just before the *Ansor* parade described above, "Hadji Subandrio" addressed a mass *Ansor* rally in Surabaya. Clearly speaking for Sukarno, from whom he brought greetings and good wishes to the Moslem youth, Subandrio stated that he saw no need for anxiety in the recent disturbances in East Java, since they were part of the process of revolution and meant that *Ansor* had become an instrument of the revolution. This was probably pure hypocrisy on Sukarno's and Subandrio's part, but playing up to the East Java Moslems was the only option they had at that time.

The possibility that the Moslems' intransigence might be a threat to Sukarno's power seemed fantastic to many in those days in view of the craven obedience he elicited from Indonesians in general, but we have enough perspective now to examine this possibility objectively, and in my opinion the threat was a real one, real enough even to have influenced the timing of the coup attempt. The turnabout in the predominant slogans after October 1, 1965, from something like "Expel the American Imperialists" to "Hang Aidit" and "Dissolve the PKI," was startling, but not too surprising for those in a position to follow closely the trends in

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Indonesian society. That the power of the PKI had been overestimated was clear, as was the unpopularity of Sukarno's increasing devotion to the Peking line. Well before the coup attempt, it had become apparent to most thinking Indonesians that Sukarno was selling the country down the river, and among themselves they were discussing this freely. Not long after October 1, contempt for Sukarno was expressed openly. Within six months he had lost most of his executive power and in less than eighteen months he had ceased being President.

Without the shock of the coup, the realization that Sukarno had known of it in advance, and the suspicion that he was deeply involved in planning it, the underlying disrespect for him would probably have taken longer to emerge. Nevertheless, in time it probably would have emerged. New moves intensifying the Peking-Djakarta axis, isolating Indonesia even more from other powers, and banning additional noncommunist forces, would have created increasing public anxiety. The same problems that agitated Indonesian society after the coup—that Sukarno was following the communist line, setting the pattern for widespread corruption, and running the economy to the ground — might well have agitated it to the point of rebellion. The example set by the East Java Moslems might have spread. Sukarno's power rested on charisma rather than effective organization and control; once defied by a mass movement, he had limited means of bringing the dissidents to heel, and his continued pursuit of unpopular policies entailed a risk that dissidence would grow before he could stamp it out.

While the PKI's assertion that it had three million members may or may not be accurate, there is a need to appraise its claim to power and influence in Indonesia. In the years before the party was crushed in late 1965, East Java, for example, was not a stronghold of the PKI, and I doubt that it ever was one. When, in the local elections of 1957, the PKI elected a mayor in Surabaya and garnered 27 per cent of the East Java vote, becoming second only to the NU in the province, this meant only that it had persuaded a lot of people (2.7 million, to be exact) to punch a hole in the ballot with the hammer and sickle, not that all had been converted to the cause of a communist revolution. The PKI was dangerous because of tight organization, ample funds and the support of the Palace, but, watching it closely over a period of two years from the vantage point of Surabaya, this observer never had

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the feeling that it commanded widespread popular support. Unilateral action, unnecessary for a party with a long-established hold in the village, appeared rather to be a policy undertaken with the hope of achieving a foothold in the village. The national chairman of the party did not spend five weeks at the village level in East Java in the spring of 1964 doing research because all was well with the party, but because all was not well. Aidit also did research among the city poor, and First Secretary of the Surabaya City Committee Mulanu, who worked with him, explained, in a series of three articles in *Djalan Rakjat* in August 1964, why the PKI had little influence among the poor of Surabaya and would find it hard to gain more. The general scene in Surabaya and East Java reflected that it was the Moslems and not the communists who were in control.

The PKI's strength may not have been overestimated on a national scale. Yet, with well over half of Indonesia's total population concentrated on Java and Madura, the party was thought to be stronger there than in the outer islands. If it was not as strong as it appeared to be in East Java, there is room for suspicion that it lacked the strength attributed to it in other parts of the main island, in particular Central Java, where it outpolled the other three principal parties competing in the local elections of 1957. In Central Java the communists did not have a fanatical brand of Islam to contend with and they mustered more popular support there in consequence. On the basis of developments since the coup, it would appear that popular support for the PKI was significantly greater in Central than in East Java, but not overwhelmingly so. The overrating was probably general.

There are other commonly held beliefs about communist parties which in my view have dubious validity if applied to the PKI. As pointed out earlier, the PKI did not gain influence or support because the land was unjustly concentrated in the hands of a few landowners. Indonesia is a country of small landowners. Although there are many landless peasants on the island of Java, they have no grievances that can be remedied effectively by land reform; they can be helped by transmigration to the outer islands, where the population density is so much less than on Java. Moreover, while the PKI appeared to be gaining as the Indonesian economy declined during Sukarno's last years, I could see no evidence in East Java that the communists were effectively capitalizing on the economic decline; I strongly doubt that they

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were doing any better in other areas. It would be more accurate to say that both the economic decline and the growing power of the PKI can be traced to a common cause, the policies of Sukarno. Without Sukarno's patronage and without his adoption of one policy after another favored by the PKI, the party would undoubtedly have appeared less formidable.

This observer was surprised at the degree of sophistication shown by the East Java Moslems in recognizing that the aims of the PKI sprang from its sharing of a foreign ideology with other communist parties and its admiration for the alleged achievements of communist countries, particularly China. This sophistication was out of tune with the Peking-Djakarta axis concept pursued by Sukarno abroad and his increasing support of PKI policies at home, but as it turned out, it was really Sukarno who was out of tune with his people. There were, after all, two occasions before 1965 when the PKI had revealed its true nature by staging a revolt, and almost everyone over thirty in East Java knew of or had actually seen the sickening brutality of the PKI at Madiun in 1948.[13]Once the party moved further to the left after 1963 it was not too difficult to arouse the Moslems to wage "holy war" against the "atheists."

The communists, now having attempted three times to betray the nation by a show of force essentially inspired from abroad, are not likely to be given an opportunity for a fourth try in the foreseeable future. I doubt that the feat of Aidit and company in restoring the PKI to respectability after the Madiun revolt of 1948 will be duplicated for a long time if ever. There is no indication that it will even be tried.

The communists may, of course, turn to the use of violence — the so-called people's armed struggle now favored as a plan for Indonesia by the Chinese Communist Party. The PKI tried it in the area south of Blitar in East Java, with the result that virtually all PKI leaders still at large were captured or killed when the Indonesian Army moved in, in the summer of 1968. The communists can always assemble their forces in a remote area as they did in South Blitar; if executed skillfully this tactic could be dangerous even if they are denied popular support. Apparently the effort in South Blitar was bungled. Having watched the party in action for two years at the provincial level, I believe that its skill, as well as its strength, was overrated.

[13]The first attempted revolt took place in 1926.

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MERGING THE COMMUNITIES: A MILESTONE IN WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION*

by Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett

THE European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the European Economic Community are scheduled to be merged into a single Community in 1970. As a necessary preliminary to this merger, the Brussels Treaty of April 1965, which came into force on July 1, 1967, established a single Council and a single Commission for the three Communities. When the treaty was signed, many convinced Europeans hoped that the fusion of the executives[1] would add impetus to the slackening momentum of the Communities. In the short run, however, the fusion brought chaos in its wake and still further lowered the morale of the Communities' employees. After the EEC decision-making crisis of 1965, their prevailing mood had been a mixture of quiet despair and a dogged determination to proceed with the tasks in hand. The departure of President de Gaulle from the Elysée has somewhat reduced their pessimism regarding the Communities' future.

Nevertheless, President Pompidou's appointment of men like Premier Chaban-Delmas and Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing, who are not doctrinally opposed to further West European integration, does not necessarily imply that either the new French government or France's five partners will readily forgo their own national interests for wider Community ones. During the next year or so, it is likely that the national and ideological tensions attendant on the creation of a single Community will provoke another major crisis both among the Six and within the Commission. Such tensions will be aggravated if the Communities are enlarged by the accession of the United Kingdom and other West European states.

This article is concerned primarily with examining the fusion of

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[1]Unless otherwise indicated, the term executives is employed herein as a synonym for the dominant institutions of the three Communities — the three Councils of Ministers, the EEC and Euratom Commissions, the High Authority of the ECSC — and, where appropriate, to the new single merged equivalents.

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the executives from two aspects: first, the conceptual and operational lessons arising from the experience of the three Communities; second, a more detailed identification of some of the dilemmas deriving from the institutional merger which will probably be pertinent to the planned complete unification of the Communities in 1970. The investigations will also provide some kind of perspective for appreciating the prospects for West European integration, but not unduly so, as the political power balance among the Six is likely to change drastically in the coming years. Whether or not the Communities' membership is enlarged, it is extremely unlikely that the Pompidou or any subsequent French government will be able to dominate EEC affairs to the same extent as did President de Gaulle. It is also highly improbable that the Federal Republic of Germany will continue to give way to France for the sake of Community harmony. To further Franco-German friendship during the era of de Gaulle, the West Germans somewhat underplayed the fact that the franc is weak, while the Deutsche mark is strong. The portents are that Chancellor Willy Brandt might not be so amenable to French pressure.

The Experience of the Three Communities

The integration process in which Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands and West Germany are participating began with the establishment of the ECSC in 1951. The Treaty of Paris was essentially a corpus of detailed rules for the creation and operation of a free trade area in coal, steel and their derivatives, within the economies of the Six. Its unique feature was that it represented an experiment in functional federalism: operation of the free trade area was to be under the auspices of a Council of Ministers drawn from the six member states, representing the separate national interests, and a High Authority, an international executive acting as the guardian of the Community interest.

The Council of Ministers was designed to be a liaison agent between the Community and the national authorities, participating in the decision-making process but not dominating it. The High Authority was conceived as an autonomous body, operating along similar lines to the French *Commissariat Générale du Plan*. Although endowed with an explicitly supranational character by Article 9 of the Paris Treaty, it was essentially a technical body charged with the proper application of the treaty.

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Its real powers resided in the ability to take action in instances of treaty infringement, such as the capacity to impose fines on non-cooperating enterprises. The overall scheme was based on Jean Monnet's original concept of a high-powered technocratic agency operating on the basis of a priori principles within a rigid treaty framework.

Even during Monnet's presidency and in a buoyant economic period, however, the Paris Treaty framework was ill-suited to the volatile nature of West European politics in the mid-1950's. The exigencies of national sovereignty prevented the High Authority from exercising much influence beyond the narrow sector of the coal and steel industries. Its experience demonstrated that it was not possible to isolate one section of a modern industrial economy from its general environment, to integrate that sector, and to leave the other areas to the national governments. The limitations of the sector approach were recognized by Monnet in his farewell presidential address to the Common Assembly of the ECSC:

> The indispensable contribution which the Coal and Steel Community has made and will continue to make towards European federation consists in its progress and success in the areas entrusted to it. However, the institutions of our Community exercise only those powers delegated to them. It is not for them to extend them. The decision to transfer new powers to the European institutions belongs entirely to the national parliaments and governments.[2]

In the aftermath of the failure to create a European Defense Community and with the experience of the ECSC in mind, the national governments were attracted by the notion of a general common market and the possibility of pooling national resources in the exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They believed such cooperation would further West European unity without a frontal attack on national sovereignty. After considerable intergovernmental consultation and debate, treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were signed at Rome in the spring of 1957. In marked contrast to the ECSC, the two new Communities were based on loose treaty frameworks setting out overall spheres of competence, general aims, and a timetable for their attainment. The precise means for achieving these goals, other than establishing general customs and atomic energy unions, were left to the central institutions to work out.

[2]Jean Monnet, *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe ont commencé* (Paris: Laffort, 1955), p. 102.

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In both the new Communities an institutional framework was created within which it was hoped that a dialogue would develop between the Commissions representing the common interests and the Councils of Ministers representing the six separate national interests. The former possessed the sole right of initiative and participated in the formulation of decisions, but the latter were invested with final authority. It was envisaged that the legislation necessary for realizing the aims of the Rome Treaties would result from the interaction of Commission and Council in each Community. To fulfill their assigned roles, the EEC and Euratom Commissions had to combine political expertise with technical efficiency to a greater extent than was required of the High Authority while working, like the High Authority, toward compromise and accommodation with the representatives of the national governments rather than attempting to replace them.

Community-style policy formation can succeed only when common interests, or at least the will to work toward them, prevail over particularist national demands. The overall experience of all three Communities, however, demonstates that the Six are unwilling to concede the primacy of common interests if these appear to threaten particularly vulnerable national interests. During the last ten years, within the context of rapidly changing political and economic conditions, the claims of separate national interests — especially Gaullist interpretations of French national interests — have reacted against and diminished the attainment of the supranational goals of the Communities. The phrase supranational goals is used here in the sense of an upgrading of common interests, a willingness to permit Council decisions to be taken by qualified majority voting, and the implementation of those decisions by the central autonomous Community institutions within the territories of the participating states.

The outcome of the confrontation of 1958 between the High Authority and the Six regarding the former's proposed closure of uneconomic Belgian coal mines conclusively demonstrated the Authority's inability to impose its will on a national government. It also demonstrated that the Authority could not extend its narrowly defined jurisdiction under the Paris Treaty to the numerous policy areas affected by the decision to rationalize coal mining. Control over such crucial areas of economic policy as customs duties on imported coal, major retraining schemes for redundant workers, diversification of regional economies almost totally

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dependent on coal mining, and industrial redeployment, rested with the national authorities, not the High Authority. The latter could cajole and persuade but was unable to dictate or decide. It had originated during a period of great coal and steel shortage, and was not equipped to deal with a situation of chronic surplus and overproduction.

The Euratom Commission was conceived as an instrument for coordination rather than as a supranational body, but it has failed to mobilize the support of public and private atomic energy agencies behind a common nuclear power program or to harmonize the activities of the Six. In particular, the French, Italian and West German governments "have not shown any interest in consolidating their nuclear power programmes in the Community context; indeed, the Community is now viewed as more and more superfluous."[3]

The development of the completely autonomous French atomic weapons program aggravated Euratom's difficulties, as did a combination of personality factors and the machinations of the Elysée under President de Gaulle. Paris took considerable pains to keep the Commission's successive French presidents subservient to the Gaullist interpretation of French national interests. When Etienne Hirsch attempted to take a Community line he was brutally deposed; the last President of Euratom, Pierre Chatenêt, seemed so amenable to Gaullist pressure that he came to be regarded as a stooge in Community circles. Yet France was not exclusively responsible for Euratom's retarded development, as neither Italy nor the Netherlands has adopted unduly favorable attitudes to its activities. A wholly new approach to technological development in the widest sense is needed for Euratom to survive. Unfortunately, there is no real consensus among the Six on the priorities in this crucial area.

The EEC's long-term objective of economic union implied that its operations would eventually touch on all aspects of the six national economies not already under the explicit auspices of the other two Communities. An essential prerequisite for the Common Market to become a successful reality was the development of confidence between its Commission and its Council of Ministers. Up to 1965 the dialogue between the two institutions appeared to denote a unique international phenomenon: the Six seemed

[3]See Lawrence Scheinman, "Euratom," *International Conciliation,* May 1967, p. 29. Euratom has become even more moribund since Dr. Scheinman wrote his definitive account of its activities.

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prepared to subjugate particular national demands to the Community interest, especially regarding integration in the spheres of customs tariffs and the construction of a common agricultural market.

However, EEC successes in this period primarily rested on a coincidence of Community and French interests. The Commission influenced the Common Market's progress only insofar as its actions and proposals were tolerated by France. The mid-1965 confrontation between the Commission and France shook the Community to its foundations. The crisis is well-documented;[4] it suffices to state that while common agricultural financing was the occasion, the real issues were the Commission's proposals for independent EEC financial resources linked with a marginal increase in the European Parliament's budgetary powers. Possibly the confrontation was precipitated by the Commission calculating that France would not jeopardize Community endeavors. The seven-month French boycott of Community activities delivered a severe blow to the carefully nurtured dialogue — the EEC is still advancing in low gear.

The Institutional Merger

Although political considerations were at the root of the failure of the three Communities to realize all the initial high hopes of their founders, progress was also hampered by the institutional dispersal of effort among the various executives responsible for promoting the Community interest. Clash of jurisdiction was an important factor in delaying the elaboration of a common energy policy. All three Communities have a vested interest in certain areas of energy production: the High Authority controlled coal, the Euratom Commission was responsible for nuclear power, while the EEC Commission was charged with formulating a common market for oil, natural gas and their derivatives. The executive fusion eradicated the institutional problem of separate jurisdiction and the "employees of the ECSC and Euratom no longer need dissipate energy in protecting their organisational interests *vis-à-vis* the EEC,"[5] but other problems remain, especially private and direct state opposition to the extension of supranational control in the energy field. Nevertheless, at least struc-

[4]For example, see Carol Ann Cosgrove, "Towards a Common Agricultural Policy in the European Economic Community," *International Relations,* April 1966.

[5]See the forthcoming book by Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett, *The New International Actors: The United Nations and the European Economic Community* (London: MacMillan & Company Ltd.), Part I.

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turally the new unified Commission is better placed for formulating a common energy policy in the areas covered by the Paris and Rome treaties.

The original creation of three separate Communities seems somewhat illogical from the perspective of the late 1960's. When the Rome Treaties were negotiated, however, the ECSC's merger into the wider EEC was not considered desirable. P.-H. J. M. Houben maintains that

> future historians will presumably find that the basic explanation for this fact was the fear then prevalent of a repetition of the events which occurred in the French Parliament in 1954 with regard to the European Defence Community Treaty. . . . it seems reasonable to assume that there were also no overriding objections to a separate treaty for specific provisions in the field of nuclear energy. Moreover, separation between EEC and Euratom created the advantage of permitting the Parliaments of the member States to consider either Treaty on its own merits, so that possible objections to one would not prejudice the other.[6]

Additional multiplicity of institutions with similar functions was avoided by a third Rome Treaty of March 1957, whereby all three Communities shared a single Parliamentary Assembly and a single Court of Justice. "In 1958 one Secretariat was set up for the three Councils; this actually reflected *the personal union* of these institutions. So in reality, only the . . . High Authority, EEC and Euratom Commissions, had been given fully separate lives under the Treaties."[7] The three Communities also shared the same statistical, legal and information services.

Nevertheless, duplication of resources and dispersal of effort were explicit in the very existence of three distinct Communities, all dedicated to achieving the same basic goals but pursuing their aims along different and often divergent paths. The disadvantages became apparent almost as soon as the EEC and Euratom commenced operations. The first notable scheme to redress this state of affairs was the suggestion of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Wigny, in October 1959 for a *de facto* merger of the High Authority and the two Commissions through another personal union, the same men holding posts in all three bodies. The Wigny plan was not considered feasible, ostensibly because of differing modes of appointment and length of service in the three executives. Another of its suggestions, the creation of interexecutive

[6] P.-H. J. M. Houben, "The Merger of the Executives of the European Communities," *Common Market Law Review*, Volume 3, 1965/66, pp. 37-38. This article is possibly the best examination of the legal aspects of the Merger Treaty.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

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working groups, was subsequently introduced for dealing with the vexed question of common energy policy.

The possibility of an institutional merger through revision of the Paris and Rome treaties was explored during 1960-1961. The Dutch government presented a draft convention to the EEC's Council of Ministers proposing a unified Council and a single Commission — the latter's members being appointed by the national governments, serving under the existing treaties, and the European Parliament possessing the right to force its resignation at any time on a two-thirds majority vote of no confidence. These proposals accorded with the Rome Treaties, the only substantial revisions concerning the Paris Treaty: namely, Article 10, which laid down that the Six should select eight of the High Authority's nine members, the ninth being co-opted by the other eight; and Article 24, under which the European Parliament could only pass censure motions when considering the High Authority's annual report.

After much consideration and as a deliberate move toward unifying the three Communities themselves, the Council of Ministers instructed its Committee of Permanent Representatives to prepare a draft treaty along the lines proposed by the Dutch. The Six signed the draft treaty creating a single Council and a single Commission at Brussels on April 8, 1965. It was intended that a unified Community would be created within three years of the Merger Treaty becoming operative. Meanwhile, although its provisions replaced those of the Paris and Rome treaties where they conflicted, the earlier basic treaty structures were unchanged and the unified executives would operate within each Community only according to already established rules and practices.

The fusion of the three Councils of Ministers was comparatively simple. The rationalization required by the Merger Treaty basically recognized a pre-existing situation. For a number of years the same national representatives had usually taken part in both EEC and Euratom Council meetings, a practice that to some measure had been extended to the ECSC. The new treaty eliminated discrepancies between the Paris and Rome treaties and more or less laid down EEC practices as the standard procedure. The most significant aspect of the fusion related to the standing of the Councils' auxiliary body, the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The Rome Treaties had given some prominence to the Committee but the Paris Treaty made no mention of any such body —

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although a coordinating committee was eventually established to prepare for ECSC Council meetings. Article 4 of the Merger Treaty confirmed the official status of the Permanent Representatives and provided for the unified Council to define their mandate.

Composition of the Unified Commission

While the Merger Treaty's provisions were clear, a major controversy developed during the early part of 1966 over the new Commission's composition. The executive reorganization and the reallocation of functions implicit in the fusion forced the Six to reconsider the whole nature of the Commission and its future role. The experience of the separate executives clearly demonstrated that the personalities and attitudes of top-level officials were frequently crucial factors in determining progressive development and the maintenance of *un esprit communautaire.* The Merger Treaty itself stated that for the first three years of its existence the new Commission was to consist of fourteen members whose primary task would be preparations for unifying the Communities. In the longer term the Commission would have only nine members, so at least five of the initial group would become surplus. Even with fourteen men to select, at least nine of the incumbents of the High Authority and the Euratom and EEC Commissions would have to be retired.

The Six therefore had to establish criteria for choosing the fourteen new Commissioners. Should they rely on men of proven worth at the top level of Community service, or should new blood be injected? Should the fourteen be selected for dedication and vision in initiating and developing common policies, or for administrative ability in organizing and overseeing the immediate problems involved in the necessary overhaul of the Community bureaucracy? National representation in the Commission also had to be considered. The Six provisionally allocated three places each to France, Italy and West Germany, two each to Belgium and Holland, and one to Luxembourg. Of the greatest significance was the selection of the President of the new Commission.

The opportunity for dissemination and intrigue was not to be missed by the Gaullist government at a time when the confrontation between the EEC Commission and Paris remained unsettled. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville stipulated that the Merger Treaty would not be ratified by France until the Six agreed on the appointments to the unified Commission. During

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an unsavory period of bitter wrangling among the Six, the existing executive incumbents retained their portfolios although their official mandates had expired. The Communities' day-to-day business was conducted in low key. On the global scene, however, throughout this period Monsieur Jean Rey represented the EEC in the Kennedy Round negotiations at Geneva.

The obvious candidate to head the unified Commission was the President of the EEC Commission, Professor Walter Hallstein. In principle all the member governments were prepared to accept his candidature, but the French insisted that the presidency should rotate among the vice-presidents at fairly short intervals. This would have brought the Commission's practice into line with that of the Council, an explicitly representative and *inter*national body, whose presidency is held by a representative of each state for a period of six months. The proposal was contrary to Article 14 of the Merger Treaty, which stated that the term of office should be for two years and renewable.

Although it is difficult to state categorically that Community progress depends on a dynamic president with a relatively long and secure tenure, the Five emphasized the coincidence whereby the High Authority and Euratom presidencies had changed somewhat frequently and both Communities had become progressively weaker, while the EEC had gone from strength to strength during Hallstein's nine-year tenure of office. In many quarters the French position was interpreted as another Gaullist broadside on Community progress and a spiteful thrust against the personal prestige of the EEC president. Even among those non-French Community employees who believed that nine years in office was long enough for any man, there was a general consensus that Professor Hallstein should have the honor of being the first president of the unified Commission. Their resentment at General de Gaulle's stand was shared by many of the Communities' French employees. Throughout 1966 and the early months of 1967 the stalemate continued amid a welter of uncertainty. In May 1967, however, Hallstein himself broke the deadlock by announcing his intention of withdrawing from Community service.

In a comparatively short time after his withdrawal, the Six nominated Jean Rey for a two-year term of office as president.[8]

[8]The unified Council of Ministers has prolonged for one year the mandates of Commission President Jean Rey and the four vice-presidents, Sicco Mansholt, Lionello Levi-Sandri, Fritz Hellwig and Raymond Barre.

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The new president had earned a considerable reputation during the Kennedy Round negotiations and was acceptable to the member states as a compromise candidate. There was comparatively little controversy over the remaining thirteen Commissioners. The original composition of the unified Commission is set out below:

Name	*Nationality*	*Responsibilities*
Jean Rey	Belgian	Secretariat and Legal Service
Sicco Mansholt	Dutch	Agriculture
Lionello Levi-Sandri	Italian	Social Affairs, Personnel and Administration
Fritz Hellwig	German	General Research, Nuclear Research and Nuclear Affairs
Raymond Barre	French	Economic and Financial Affairs, Statistical Office
Albert Coppé	Belgian	Joint Budget: Levies, Credit and Investment (Luxembourg), Information Service
Hans von der Groeben	German	Internal Market, Commercial and Fiscal Matters, Regional Policy
Emanuel Sassen	Dutch	Competition Policy
Henri Rochereau	French	Development Aid
Guido Colonna di Paliano	Italian	Industrial Affairs
Victor Bodson	Luxembourg	Transport
Edoardo Martino	Italian	External Relations
Wilhelm Haferkamp	German	Energy
Jean-Francois Deniau	French	External Trade

Six of the fourteen Commissioners were formerly members of the EEC Commission, two were from the High Authority, and one from the Euratom Commission. Of the five appointed from outside the Community service, Jean-Francois Deniau was a former EEC employee who had led the Community delegation

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during the 1961 negotiations over British entry. Lambert Schaus from Luxembourg, formerly EEC Transport Commissioner, was the only member of the EEC Commission desirous of remaining in Community service who was not selected for the unified Commission. The most outstanding absentee was the exceptionally able French vice-president of the EEC Commission, Robert Marjolin, who had voluntarily left for a university post in France.

Article 14 of the Merger Treaty made provision for only three vice-presidents, but as the president was a Belgian, France, Italy and West Germany decided that each of them should have a vice-president in addition to Sicco Mansholt retaining his title. Lionello Levi-Sandri, previously an EEC vice-president; Fritz Hellwig, previously a member of the High Authority; and the newcomer, Raymond Barre, were given vice-presidential status. This action by the Big Three to some extent represented a continuation of the pre-merger practice whereby they shared the three presidencies. Some Community circles do not rule out a future Italian president, but maintain that this office is unlikely to be held by a French or German national in the foreseeable future.

Administrative Problems

An important innovation was the formal creation of seven working groups relating to the general economy, industrial affairs, agricultural problems, external relations and development aid, social affairs, administration, and problems raised by membership and association applications. These groups are to coordinate the Directorate Generals' activities and to achieve a clearer overall perspective of the integration process. For example, Barre's responsibilities for medium-term economic policy cannot be properly defined without considering regional policy, which is von der Groeben's province. Similarly, industrial policy cannot be isolated from either competition policy or general research.

Before the fusion, in theory the collegiate nature of the respective decisions of the High Authority and the two Commissions assured coordination and coherence in Community endeavor, individual responsibility being limited to preparatory stages. But there were inherent practical disadvantages in this procedure, as demonstrated by the fact that under the EEC regime Marjolin was probably the only Commissioner apart from Mansholt aware of the intricacies of the common agricultural policy. The new work-

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ing groups can help to rectify such deficiencies by ensuring a wider understanding of the problems involved, even in the preparatory stages of policy formation.

The new Commission, like the previous EEC Commission, has important political functions. The individual and collegiate political expertise of the new Commissioners was thoroughly tested by the initial restructuring of the Communities' bureaucratic machine, a task entailing the redefining and reallocation of work roles of approximately seven thousand people. This was particularly difficult in that the top officials constitute a body of experts rather than a cohesive career civil service. Movement within the administrative structure is fairly limited, and each post is unique in terms of expertise required and the power and influence accruing to it. Salary differentials in the higher administrative grades are not unduly significant, but some posts carry prized fringe benefits and privileges such as reserved space in the overcrowded carparks or permits to obtain tax-free goods.

An additional complication is that there are two distinct statutes of service regulating the pay and working conditions of the new Commission's staff. Employees of the High Authority possessed more secure labor contracts than their Euratom and EEC counterparts. While all new recruits are employed under the terms of the EEC/Euratom statute, former High Authority employees retain their safeguards and prerogatives. Under the Merger Treaty, moreover, the High Authority's staff had to move from Luxembourg to Brussels, the location of the new Commission's headquarters. As compensation to Luxembourg for losing the High Authority, some agencies, among them the European Investment Bank, had to be moved to the Grand Duchy from Brussels.

Although primarily administrative in content, these problems had distinct political implications. They were exacerbated by the exigencies of national quotas in the Community recruitment system. It was more or less standard practice in the Communities to fill at least grade "A" posts from the nationals of the Six in proportion to the member states' contribution to the common budget: roughly a quarter each from France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux. Most recruits come from the national civil services of the Six, but an increasing proportion come from the universities, banking, and the business world generally. The new Commission thus had to share the cake, in the sense of the number of posts at all levels, proportionally among the Six — not an easy

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task when specifically required qualifications and nationality do not coincide.

The new Commission also had to contend "with the member governments' habit of *dosing* their own administrations according to political and religious factors":

> For example, all six countries have Christian Democrat or Catholic parties that did much in the early days to pioneer the European movement. These parties often display open interest in appointments to high Community posts, although, theoretically, no one inquires into a Eurocrat's politics or religion. There are also other kinds of dosage: Germany, for instance, tries to balance its intake from different Länder, as Belgium certainly balances the Dutch-speaking Flemings and the French-speaking Walloons.[9]

The member governments' insistence on the *fair* representation of subnational groups implied that if, say, a Dutch Protestant became a Director General, the next two most senior posts allocated to Dutch nationals would have to be filled by Roman Catholics. The New Europeans are confronted with subnational as well as national boundaries!

In fusing the staffs of the three Communities, now largely completed, the new Commission on the whole succeeded in rationalizing its bureaucracy and respecting seniority and personal qualifications. Nevertheless, while its avowed position was to avoid redundancies at all levels, the number of top administrative appointments has been significantly reduced. Few officials left voluntarily, but the large-scale Community-style juggling act resulted in frustration and disillusion among many able men. The general upheaval hampered their executive functions and subjected them to strain and uncertainty regarding their future positions. In the lightening of mood since de Gaulle's departure from the Elysée most officials now feel themselves to be not so much *stateless technocrats,* as de Gaulle labeled them, but rather charter members of the New Europe. Even among those most favorable to British membership in the Communities, however, the attendant new round of executive reshuffling appears somewhat abhorrent. The general consensus is yes, but not just yet.

Agenda for the Commission

The British and allied applications for Community membership form one of the three most urgent problems inherited by the new

[9]Margot Lyon, "Reshuffling the Eurocrats," *European Community,* May 1968, pp. 8-9.

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Commission — the other two being the eliciting of a working budget for Euratom (at present financed on a short-term basis), and a fundamental review of the Six's flagging coal industries (a major source of Community employment for which the member states are only too eager to divest themselves of responsibility). More general tasks are initiation and guidance of common policies in industrial and technological development (these now requiring the attention formerly demanded by the common agricultural policy), forging a common energy policy, giving new stimulus to regional policy, and more concentrated efforts to formulate a viable Community social policy.

Looming above these and threatening to destroy the delicate fabric of Community relationships, is the necessity to prepare for the revision of the Paris and Rome treaties. Only after accomplishing this will it be possible to weld the Communities into a single unit. However, during the latter part of 1969 the Commission's attention was diverted from these tasks by the pressing need to reform certain aspects of the common agricultural policy.

Prospects for a Unified Community

The most interesting aspect of the Merger Treaty relates to the unification of the Communities. Generally, EEC practices have been laid down as the standard norm and those of ECSC dispensed with whenever they conflicted. The only exceptions are instances where adoption of EEC practice would undermine Community operations, such as the levy providing the ECSC with a measure of financial autonomy and control over coal and steel enterprises. Overall the relative success of the EEC compared with the ECSC and Euratom undoubtedly implies that it will be the standard model once the wholesale revision of the Paris and Rome treaties begins. The EEC Treaty, however, is less precise than the other two. This offered its Commission more room for initiative, but also meant that there were more loopholes for intervention by the national governments. Although it contains fewer safeguards for the maintenance of *Community interest* beyond the integrity and personality of the Commission, it is important to remember that the final protector of Community autonomy is the Court of Justice. The Court's powers were not substantially affected by the Merger Treaty, but whether they will remain inviolate once the wholesale revision of the treaties commences is another question.

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The role of the Court, together with the part to be played by the European Parliament, the methods for financing the single Community, and the institutional balance within the Community framework, are crucial issues on which the member states must soon reach agreement. As is to be expected, however, there are grave differences among sectional interests, the member states, and within the Commission, regarding the best methods for completely unifying the three Communities. The whole issue is clouded with considerable secrecy, and an almost impenetrable wall of silence surrounds the deliberations of Monsieur Gaudet's official study group on the three treaties' revision. The atmosphere to some degree resembles a cloak and dagger melodrama rather than a sober exercise of sophisticated political and legal techniques.

Already those aspects of the economies of the Six governed by Community legislation, whether concerned with scrap iron, radioactive materials or the vast web of agricultural regulations, are the targets of vociferous sectional interests in the member states wishing to change the direction of, if not actually to reshape, Community activity. Their barrage of propaganda and pressure merely confuses an extremely complicated situation. Nevertheless, many of these interests have the ear of their national governments. For their part, the latter must examine their longer-term special interests regarding all areas of common policy endeavor likely to come within the orbit of the unified Community.

The German and Italian governments have so far adopted the moderate position of maintaining that only measures essential for harmonizing the Paris and Rome treaties need be worked out. In effect, they advocate the technique adopted for the Merger Treaty. Their reasonable and practical attitude should not be unduly emphasized, however, as both have policy interests likely to conflict with vital Community activities. For example, the recent West German transport bill has made the elaboration of a viable Community transport policy much more difficult, and it is almost certain that in the near future the Italian government will launch a full-scale attack on the ethos of the common agricultural policy. The Belgian and Luxembourg governments have tended to keep in the background, possibly because both have valuable real estate interests bound up in the status quo.[10]

Superficially, the Dutch have adopted the most conservative

[10]Luxembourg now bitterly regrets its 1957 decision not to permit the headquarters of the EEC and Euratom to be set up in its territory alongside that of the ECSC.

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position in advocating that the Paris and Rome treaties should not be tampered with unduly. But to take this line could result in the collapse of the whole precarious Community edifice, either accidentally or through French sabotage. Paradoxically, de Gaulle's government professed to have the Communities' best interests at heart by urging that the unification process be completed as speedily as possible, at the latest by the scheduled date of mid-1970. Departing from de Gaulle's policies, President Pompidou's government is unlikely to desire the utter castration of Community initiative, but it will also fight hard to retain France's Community-derived economic benefits and privileges. Whatever the French attitude, if the Five's commitment to Community-style integration is as firm as they have maintained, they have an overwhelming common interest in preserving some semblance of the Commission's supranational powers. A strong and determined Commission would obviously be an invaluable ally.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the trauma of the institutional merger will be overcome sufficiently for the new Commission and its staff to take much initiative in remodeling Community Europe. Prior to the merger the EEC Commission's image as a policy initiator had been severely tarnished by the 1965-1966 crisis, and for a number of years neither the High Authority nor the Euratom Commission had shown much innovating potential. The unified Commission is unlikely to be permitted undue initiative, for the further the integration process encroaches into vital areas of their national economies, the greater will be the Six's opposition to making concessions. It is within this general context that the actual merger of the Communities will take place. Yet if some aspects of Commission autonomy are not preserved, the essence of Community-style integration could be submerged in a welter of rival sectional and national interests. Tragically, the outlook for the unified Community is not overly promising, but the horizon is less clouded than when President de Gaulle dominated the New Europe.

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DULLES' THOUGHTS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: MYTH AND REALITY*

by Michael A. Guhin

JOHN Foster Dulles, the elder son of a Presbyterian minister, has been frequently categorized as a type of ideologue, a "legalist-moralist" in his approach to international affairs or, at minimum, a statesman with a distorting pair of moral spectacles. Thorough investigation of his background, development, positions and actions, however, disproves the notion that his interpretations of the national interest and his policy preferences were derived from or distorted by either legalistic-moralistic premises or strictly defined ideological considerations. The philosophical foundations of his views on human nature, on the inevitability of conflict and disharmony, on government and politics essentially coincide with what Hans Morgenthau has defined as the "principles of realism." Were one inclined to attach labels to particular personalities and approaches, Dulles would fall somewhere in the category of "realistic liberalism" or "Christian realism"[1]— as long as the "Christian" half is taken in a liberal, naturalistic theological sense.

Nevertheless, an inaccurate image of Dulles continues to be accepted and perpetuated by a sizable portion of the academic communities and the general publics both at home and abroad. The consistent critics have been ineffectively countered by a deluge of equally naive and superficial apologetics, many of which argue from the position that a so-called moral posture constitutes the

*The research and drafting of this article were carried out as part of the author's doctoral program at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Any views expressed are wholly personal and in no way represent the official views of the U.S. government.

[1]For a basic description of these categories, see respectively: John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism; A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 226-227; and Reinhold Niebuhr, "Faith and the Empirical Method in Modern Realism," Chapter I of *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), pp. 1-14. This is not to say that Dulles can be neatly placed in either category as delineated in these works. But as far as such descriptive phrases go, "realistic liberalism" and, perhaps to a lesser degree, "Christian realism" best indicate the tendencies in his approach.

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proper defense against communism. With few exceptions,[2] the majorities of the pro-Dulles and anti-Dulles camps operate under similar misapprehensions. Neither camp has perceived its subject as a thoroughly pragmatic craftsman whose approach to international politics was unimpaired by ideological or moral precepts. Both camps tend to assign insufficient attention to the political context within which Dulles weighed the diverse considerations and pressures that directly or indirectly affect foreign policy. More often than not, he has been misunderstood by both admirers and critics.

Widespread misinterpretations of Dulles stem from several sources. First, there has been a conspicuous dearth of perceptive research into his background, early experiences and the development of his thoughts. He has been generally remembered in the light of a single span in his career, the period of problematical balancing acts between international requirements and public acceptance, or between diplomacy and politics. During most of his career in international affairs, however, Dulles functioned as a technical adviser or competent negotiator and diplomat. His experiences and activities at the Versailles conferences, combined with his participation in efforts to solve the political-diplomatic-financial problems of the interwar years, form the background to his development and theory. These early experiences established the basis of his thoughts on international politics and resulted in an understanding which was not merely nonlegalistic, nonmoralistic and nonideological, but actually anti-legalistic, anti-moralistic and anti-ideological.

Second, there has been a general reluctance or inability to differentiate between the politician and the statesman, between political rhetoric and the actual content of policies, between "style" and "stuff." In the case of Dulles, the politician's indispensable references to moral principles and the common good, plus his tributes to the semi-official ideology, have been taken too much at face value. His earlier writings, for example, contained neither moralistic nor ideological references or overtones. Such overtones, with concomitant alterations in presentational style, became a part of the pattern only upon his emergence as a national political figure. They were natural products of perceived political

[2]The major exceptions are Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962); Louis L. Gerson, *John Foster Dulles* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967); and Richard Goold-Adams, *The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962).

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necessity and his role as a decision-maker in the domestic and international environments at mid-century.

Third, and perhaps most important, Dulles has been abstracted from the overall political context and foreign policy processes of his era. It is commonly assumed that, as Secretary of State, he had a relatively unlimited scope of action. The extreme of such an assumption is reflected in the contention that he could have pursued whichever course he chose without fear of serious domestic opposition.[3] Even when the basic limitations on the Secretary's maneuverability are mentioned, the actual impact of various political and even technical considerations on particular decisions has all too often been underestimated. Conversely, the room for individual maneuverability and ability to implement personal preferences have been grossly overestimated.

The proclivity to abstract policymakers and policies from their purely political surroundings has contributed to what Hans Morgenthau has described as the "popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter."[4] This manner of analysis has become fashionable in assessments of Dulles and of policy decisions during the Eisenhower years. There is more than a modicum of irony in the fact that Dulles was both aware of and counseled against this type of superficial, popular approach:

> The attitude of a great nation is not determined by the personalities of individual statesmen or politicians . . . individuals are merely brought into emergence by great fundamental forces of which they will be the mouthpiece . . . basic economic and political conditions . . . determine the broad lines of national policy. It is these we must study and with which we must deal.[5]

The elements of personality — preferences, prejudices, ego-involvement, style and especially operational code[6]—are not unimportant to the study of the day-to-day operations and the processes

[3]Hans J. Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles," in Norman A. Graebner, editor, *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 308.

[4]Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (third edition) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 7.

[5]Dulles' essay written in the 1920's, "The Relation of France to a Program of World Reconstruction," p. 4, in *The Collected Papers of John Foster Dulles* at Princeton University (hereafter referred to as *Dulles Papers*).

[6]See Alexander L. George, *The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-5427-PR, 1967).

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of decision-making; and, at times, a particular personality may even affect or modify the long-range course. However, the individual involved must be accurately evaluated, and his role must be considered in terms of the prevailing situation. A proper understanding of foreign policy issues demands that one delve behind appearances and political rhetoric into the climate, considerations and pressures of the day, which define the political game.

The subjects of international law and organization and of diplomatic recognition serve as excellent examples of Dulles' basic approach and understanding. (1) An examination of his early approach and reactions reveals that he was by no measure inclined toward a legalistic-moralistic position. (2) A review of his pronouncements in context shows that he did not acquire moralistically-tinted spectacles later in his career. (3) An investigation of his views in the context of the realities surrounding the issue of the recognition of the Chinese People's Republic and its admission to the United Nations reveals neither legalistic nor moralistic tendencies, but rather a series of moves and shifts determined by both the international situation and the domestic climate. The shifts in position-taking, from 1949 to 1952, illustrate how political factors beyond the control of actual and potential policymakers affect not only the extent of available alternatives but the presentation of policy. It becomes unmistakably clear that Dulles represented only one ingredient in the policy process, in spite of the fact that his personality colored almost every facet of the American posture during the 1950's.

One point should be established at the outset. A defense of Dulles against unwarranted and irrelevant criticism in no way immunizes him against all forms of adverse criticism. The conclusion that common assumptions regarding his theory and approach do not coincide with fact, and further that he was fundamentally realistic and pragmatic, does not mean that Dulles possessed an infallible view of situations and problems. It may serve as a healthy reminder, however, that the source of error in policy is not to be found strictly with the individual, no matter how powerful he may be within the system.

II

Before delving into the topics of international law and organization, a summary of Dulles' line of reasoning on international

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affairs would be useful. Taking the egotism of political man for granted, one cannot normally expect men or nations to deviate from perceived self-interest: "All nations are inherently selfish and we are no different from any other." Disharmony and conflict are part of the given situation: "We start out . . . with the proposition that whenever human beings are thrown together, there will be conflicts of interest." Likewise, it is "inevitable that nations interfere with each other and influence each other." In a never static world, transformation and transmutation are ineluctable: "There must be either a *peaceful* way of change or a *violent* way of change." The challenge is to arrive at ever temporary settlements, to adjust the constantly shifting balance between static and dynamic elements, to "discover the restraining envelope which creates the pressure" and to "provide outlets such that the dynamic forces become peacefully diffused."[7]

His entire theory revolved around the idea of the inevitability of change. "Change" was defined as "the ultimate fact to which we must accommodate ourselves."[8] Repression of dynamic elements only served "to postpone, but not prevent, change and to exaggerate its violence when it occurs."[9] As a rule, resort to violence represented either a last-ditch effort on the part of those fearing alterations in the division and structure of power, or a natural reaction to any rigid, unenlightened perpetuation of power by self-satisfied controlling groups. Accepting the implications of his interpretation, Dulles opposed Harding's "return to normalcy" and the ultra-conservatism of Calvin Coolidge in the 1920's. With respect to the deteriorating situation in the 1930's, he defined the U.S. part as one of contributory negligence and shared responsibility. His writings persistently offered trenchant criticism of American hypocrisy, isolationist impulses and interwar policies in general: "And to profess a love for peace is no great virtue in

[7]See respectively: "The Relation of France to a Program of World Reconstruction," p. 2, in *Dulles Papers;* "Law Needed in an International World Order," reprint from *Post War World,* April 15, 1944, p. 1, in *Dulles Papers;* "Criticisms of Mr. Hatch's Report on 'War,'" written for Presbyterian General Assembly's Committee on War (1924), p. 5, in *Dulles Papers;* Dulles, "Conceptions and Misconceptions regarding Intervention," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* July 1929, pp. 103-104; "The Church and World Affairs," reprint from *The Presbyterian Tribune,* October 1947, p. 9, in *Dulles Papers;* and "Peaceful Change within the Society of Nations," address at Princeton University, March 19, 1936, p. 7, in *Dulles Papers.*

[8]"Peaceful Change within the Society of Nations," March 19, 1936, p. 5.

[9]Dulles, "The Road to Peace," *The Atlantic Monthly,* October 1935, p. 496. See also Dulles, "The Aftermath of the World War," *International Conciliation,* April 1941, p. 265.

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those who control so disproportionate a share of the world's wealth that to retain it is their principal concern."[10]

Considering the constant tension between static and dynamic elements, Dulles viewed the active principle in both governmental and international relations as the balance of power, the sustentation of necessary stability by accommodation, bargaining and compromise. Contrary to the assumption that he sought absolutes, his approach precluded any "absolutization" of the finite and defined the essence of international politics as an endless process of adjustment-disequilibrium-adjustment. The capsheaf of his international theory was not some panacean solution, but a two-sided approach: (1) political procedures or diplomatic processes of settlement which would both decrease the occurrence and mitigate the scope and intensity of violence; and (2) the nurturing and growth of a functional substratum of international community interests.

Regarding the second aspect of the goal, he concluded that, since disharmony and conflicts of interest were part of the given situation, the intensity of conflict and the frequency of resort to forceful measures could be mitigated only by the existence and acceptance of other means of change and balance. In his most reflective work, *War, Peace and Change* (1939), he considered the roles of two interrelated principles of solution; the "ethical" and the "authoritarian-political." The former represented a slow process of enlightenment through education and exposure, emphasizing interrelatedness and interdependence, which would eventually erode the foundations of isolationism and extreme nationalism. The strategy of the "solution" involved three steps: (1) redefining the meaning of sovereignty; (2) diluting the concepts of one's own state as quasi-deity and sole benefactor; and (3) avoiding the other-nation-devil mentality or diabolical enemy images.

Dulles severely attacked what he considered to be an unhealthy and outdated concept of sovereignty, the "great affections" for the division "by artificial lines into compartments."[11] Accordingly, he

[10]Dulles, "The American Churches and the International Situation," statement adopted by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, December 1940, p. 2, in *Dulles Papers*.

[11]"The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World," reprint from *Religion in Life*, Spring 1937, p. 194, in *Dulles Papers*. His sharp attacks against the "sovereignty system" recurred in several speeches from 1936 to 1943. See, for example, in *Dulles Papers:* address of March 12, 1941, p. 17; "Christianity in this Hour," address before the Federation of Churches, April 21, 1941, pp. 13-17; and address at Union Theological Seminary, May 19, 1941, p. 7.

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decried "the exaggeration of nationalism" and was deeply concerned with the escape from freedom through deification of and total identification with a particular state, race or class.[12] From the early 1920's, however, perhaps the most consistent theme in his writings was the avoidance of diabolical enemy images. A noteworthy example appears in an early essay analyzing the attitudes and policies of the French government after Versailles:

> In approaching this international difference, I trust we can avoid two errors which commonly intrude themselves in such discussion. The first is the assumption that any difference between ourselves and a foreign nation is due to the inherent righteousness of our cause and the inherent perverseness of our neighbors. *Moral distinctions, though pleasing to those who draw them, are hard to sustain in fact, and I know of no historic reasons to justify our approaching these problems of international relations with the complacent assumption that we are party to a clashing of the forces of good and evil, and that solution is to be found in the moral regeneration of those who hold views contrary to our own.*[13]

On several other occasions, he candidly censored the "devil" theory of causation. In *War, Peace and Change,* the other-nation-devil approach was denounced as childish and superficial. Although responsive to primitive human desires, it was no longer necessary "as evidenced by its being discarded in the religious field."[14] In criticizing the "devil" theory approach, Dulles manifested a keen awareness of its psychological roots. During World War II, he described the matter thusly:

> The popular view is that, by some unlucky coincidence, four great nations of the world . . . happened . . . to fall under the domination of a few evil men.
>
> The "devil" theory of causation has always been popular. Thus we used to explain floods and other violent outbreaks of nature. We still thereby seek to explain the explosions of human energy. *This is simple; it saves us from mental exertion and relieves us of all causal responsibility.*[15]

The "authoritarian-political solution" dealt with the establishment of political devices and mechanisms that would facilitate change through contact and cooperation. The "solution" necessarily included both diplomatic processes and political mechanisms, though in *War, Peace and Change* his concentration

[12]Letter from Dulles to William R. Cotter, November 8, 1940, in *Dulles Papers.* His criticism of the "exaggeration of nationalism" and his concern for the escape from freedom were expressed in several of his writings from 1921 to 1945.

[13]"The Relation of France to a Program of World Reconstruction," pp. 2-3. (Emphasis added.)

[14]*War, Peace and Change* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), p. 112.

[15]Address of March 12, 1941, p. 10, in *Dulles Papers.* (Emphasis added.)

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was almost entirely upon the latter. Indeed, the book was prefaced with a note that it was not a study of day-to-day adjustments, principles of operation in negotiations, or diplomatic methods. His overall approach in this respect is to be found more in his activity with reference to international organization, political devices and international law.

III

During World War II, Dulles conducted an incessant campaign to bring the issues of American responsibilities and international realities before the public, to urge that the errors of League opinion be avoided, to counter isolationist tendencies and adjust Americans to the ideas of collaboration and international organization. It was characterized by a call to "idealism," in the sense of future possibilities, and a demand for "realism," in recognition of necessary gradualness and imperfections. Although specific proposals were offered, he was less concerned with immediate powers and initial jurisdiction than with the decisive step of developing an initial means of collaboration that would serve as the foundation for increasing cooperation.[16]

His campaign for international organization included the counsel that (1) the organization could not, would not and should not be an American formula; (2) some foundations had to be actualized before the allies drifted apart; (3) police force and weighted voting schemes were quagmires; and (4) emphasis should be placed on the functional agencies whose quiet results could bring about concrete products and increased cooperation. The predominant motif was the idea that the development of a functional world organization would be "a long, hard task."[17]

Dulles' approach to this subject tends to corroborate Inis Claude's conclusion that the founders of the United Nations Charter "exhibited a keen awareness of the problem of power and of the difficulties of dealing with it."[18] He both disbelieved in and

[16]See Dulles, "Peace without Platitudes," *Fortune,* January 1942, p. 90; and "Long Range Peace Objectives," statement submitted to the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, September 18, 1941, in *Dulles Papers.*

[17]See the following in *Dulles Papers:* "A Christian World Hope," reprint from *The Presbyterian Tribune,* November 1944; statement delivered at the *New York Times* Hall Symposium, September 24, 1943; address before the Federal Council of Churches, March 18, 1943; and address at Biennial Meeting of the Federal Council, November 28, 1944. For specific comments on sanctions and weighted voting, see Letter from Dulles to Professor Quincy Wright, December 19, 1939, and Letter from Dulles to Stuart C. Rand, January 30, 1945.

[18]Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The United Nations and the Use of Force," *International Conciliation,* March 1961, p. 333.

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warned against any utopian schemes or aspirations. In 1945, according to *The Forrestal Diaries,* he "indicated great misgivings as to whether the hopes of the nation for an international peace organization . . . might not be raised to too great heights. He said that these questions . . . have been perplexing the minds of statesmen for centuries and that it was unwise . . . to assume they would be settled now over night."[19] Throughout this period, he opposed the advocates of world government primarily on the grounds that energies spent in such a direction distracted attention from present realities. In 1951, he was even more critical of this diversion of human energy: "The World Federalists are, in the main, somewhat unrealistic idealists. . . . the error they fall into is to assume that the present prosecution of their ideal will help solve the very difficult and dangerous problems of the present."[20]

A similar nonidealistic, anti-legalistic strain pervaded his approach to international law and treaties. Before examining these views, however, a few general definitions should be noted. "Legalism" or the "legalistic approach" to international affairs involves the transplantation of legal principles, rules and procedures, which have proved effective in some national societies, to the international system. George Kennan has elucidated the weaknesses inherent in the approach. First, the idea of many individual states being subordinated to an international juridical regime implies a degree of contentedness that does not exist. Second, international relationships cannot be contained in a static legal framework or "legal strait-jacket." Third, the "legalist" ignores or is ignorant of the complexities of sanctions against violations.[21] In a real sense, "legalism" represents escape from the arduous tasks of diplomacy.

In a 1925 address, Dulles maintained that the judicial process was "well devised to meet the psychological attitude of hostile or unfriendly nations." Since the speech was advocating U.S. participation in the Permanent Court of International Justice, he could hardly have stated otherwise. But he also emphasized that law should never be viewed as a solution in itself and would

[19]Walter Millis, editor, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 41. See also "The Beginning of World Order," address at the San Francisco Conference, April 22, 1945, p. 3, in *Dulles Papers.*

[20]Letter from Dulles to Mrs. George D. Huntington, June 27, 1951, in *Dulles Papers.*

[21]George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952), pp. 97-100.

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always reflect existing ambiguities.[22] Orderly legal processes depended upon laws being mostly self-enforcing, which meant reflecting "what most of the community thinks is right, or at least acceptable." Consequently, international law could only be constructed upon a "general consensus of world opinion."[23] In none of his writings did he assert that consensus had attained a level whereby law could function as an effective mold for international relationships.

From the premise that law depended on public acceptance or acquiescence, he logically concluded that it must develop along with the community to keep astride of changing conditions. Therefore, any establishment of a functional system of international law required "that such laws should be changeable to meet changing circumstances, for basic moral principles may require certain conduct at one time and different conduct at another time."[24] The necessity of a flexible, adjustable and nonstatic system of laws also elicited his counsel that the international law of the distant future should not deal exclusively with states, but with states and individuals. Otherwise, it was "almost sure to be an effort to preserve the *status quo*."[25] Law, as a negative or static force, would inevitably encourage rupture and revolution — exactly what Dulles sought to prevent. A "strait-jacket" approach was foreign to his entire theory. Although international law could serve a useful function in regulating aspects of international intercourse, any framework, legal or political, had to be flexible.

Again in contrast to the legalistic syndrome, Dulles was fully aware of the complexities involved in the application of sanctions against offenses and violations. In a 1932 analysis of the nature of economic sanctions, his approach was characterized by selectivity and flexibility. He viewed economic sanctions as a series of intricate compromises between self-interest and "justice." He concluded that the precise form of sanctions to be effectuated was one "of the most difficult and complex problems" in the field of international relations.[26]

[22]"World Court," address before the Illinois Bar Association, May 29, 1925, in *Dulles Papers.*

[23]See "Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes," address at United Nations Forum, March 26, 1945, p. 7, in *Dulles Papers;* and Dulles, *War or Peace* (London: George G. Harrap & Company, 1950), p. 187.

[24]Dulles, "The Future of the United Nations," *International Conciliation,* November 1948, p. 588.

[25]*War or Peace,* p. 199.

[26]Dulles, "Should Economic Sanctions be Applied in International Disputes?," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* July 1932, p. 104.

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As stated earlier, Dulles' approach was not merely nonlegalistic, but actually anti-legalistic. In the early 1940's, when Philip Jessup proposed the idea of "freedom under law" as a guideline for foreign policy, Dulles' reaction was "I think we are following a vain illusion if we assume that the slogan 'freedom under law' has sufficient substance to be 'the living principle of U.S. foreign policy.'" In reply to Jessup's suggestion that the United States generally represented an exception to the widespread inclination to twist international law to suit national interests, he responded: "But that is not accurate. I can cite many treaties we have violated."[27]

The anti-legalism extended to his views on pacts and treaties. When asked in 1950 if he favored a Pacific Pact, he replied in part: "Sometimes . . . a mutual pact may be necessary . . . . but if there is not a long association among nations, it is better that they not place their relationships on a legalistic basis."[28] In similar vein, and contrary to the assumption that he unequivocally supported the so-called Northern Tier plan, he concluded, after his Middle East tour of 1953, that no basis existed for an overall defensive arrangement in the region:

> We must . . . avoid becoming fascinated with concepts that have no reality. We should rather, through measures such as the above [Point IV and economic assistance], seek to improve the general situation without demand for specific *quid pro quo* on our part. Where we do require certain guarantees on the part of local States, these should be simple, direct and devoid of legalisms.[29]

Furthermore, treaties should be viewed not as ends in themselves, but as means for action, as reflections of common interests with their ambiguities and qualifications. Because of constantly changing conditions, Dulles thought all treaties should be subject to reconsideration and renegotiation at least once in every generation. In fact, he maintained that most pacts should be reviewed even more frequently. During a meeting with Secretary Marshall, Under Secretary Lovett and Senator Vandenberg in 1948, he expressed some reservations about a long-term regional arrangement primarily on the basis that, if it were to encourage a sense of permanency regarding existing conditions, it would prove counterproductive in terms of interest in increased cooperation

[27]Letter from Dulles to Henry R. Luce, September 29, 1943, on the subject of Philip Jessup's article in *Life*, in *Dulles Papers*.
[28]Dulles address, quoted in June 23, 1950 Foreign Service Memorandum from E. F. Drumwright, Counselor of Embassy, Seoul, in *Dulles Papers*.
[29]See Dulles Memorandum on Near East Trip, May 1953, p. 4, in *Dulles Papers*.

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within Europe. The question was how would it "be possible to draft a convention which would promote growth and development rather than guaranty an existing status."[30]

Dulles' views on negotiations and treaties reflected the impressions and lessons of the Versailles settlement, its aftermath, the days of "the spirit of Locarno" and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. These impressions had an important bearing on negotiations and agreements with the Soviet Union. He was, by nature, a cautious and careful negotiator. A preference for traditional diplomatic methods contributed to his distaste, as illustrated by his reluctance in 1955, for "summitry"— which was shared, for similar reasons, by both George Kennan and Dean Acheson. As Secretary, he frequently expressed a willingness to utilize the less glorified machinery of traditional diplomatic channels and processes.

IV

It has been contended that the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the Chinese People's Republic constitutes "a classic example of the 'moralistic approach' to international politics,"[31] and that the continuation of the policies of nonrecognition and nonadmission to the United Nations derived from a moralistic attitude on the part of the Eisenhower Administration, as personified by the Secretary of State. Contrary to such conclusions, an abundance of material from Dulles' background, along with the analysis of his position-taking from 1949 to 1959, reveals an essentially antimoralistic approach to the subject of recognition.

In 1917, after successfully completing an unofficial mission to prompt Panama and Cuba to follow the lead of the United States in declaring war on the German Empire, Dulles proceeded to Costa Rica, where the regime of General Tinoco had gained control by revolution in January. The United States had withheld recognition. Dulles' assignment was to consult with the leaders, survey the situation and recommend a course of action. In his Confidential Memorandum to the Secretary of State, he strongly advocated recognition of the revolutionary regime. The recommendation was adopted by the State Department, but was not acceded to by the President.[32]

[30]See Dulles Memorandum of Blair House Meeting, April 27, 1948, pp. 2-5, in *Dulles Papers.*

[31]Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, op. cit.*, p. 13.

[32]See "Political and Economic Conditions in Costa Rica, as Bearing on the Question of Recognizing the Government of General Tinoco," Confidential Report of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, May 21, 1917, in *Dulles Papers;* and "Conceptions and Misconceptions regarding Intervention," *op. cit.*, p. 103.

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This relatively obscure incident illustrates three important points. First, it is an example of the many differences that existed between Wilson and Dulles, differences which cannot be bridged by any amount of intellectual construction. Dulles unequivocally disapproved of the policy of nonrecognition and nonintercourse vis-à-vis Costa Rica.[33] Second, he concluded that good motives and sound theoretical principles of morality were not guarantees of morally virtuous or politically successful policies.[34] Third, and most germane to this study, his proposals indicate a disinclination to adopt a moralistic or ideological stance against a government that happened to acquire power by force or revolution. Whenever a government exercises undisputed control, nonrecognition "is . . . a measure rarely to be availed of . . . . the United States cannot . . . lay down as a general principle, applicable even to the Caribbean states alone, the non-recognition of every government which comes into power through a revolution." He maintained that the condemnation of revolutionary action frequently amounted to the unwarranted transplantation of values to other systems.[35] Although granting that "Non-recognition may be a useful aid in carrying out a specific program. . . . I have heard no one suggest any such concrete program for Costa Rica."[36]

Thus, nonrecognition without supplementary sanctions or action programs was considered a feeble instrument of national policy. It was a measure to be applied only under rare circumstances. Dulles did not belong to the school of international lawyers which maintains that, in the absence of other machinery, nonrecognition "must be regarded as a supplementary weapon of considerable legal and moral potency."[37] His 1917 memorandum constitutes the earliest example of his distaste for anything bordering on the injection of unwarranted moral judgments and inapplicable legal standards into international affairs or relations with other systems.

The issue of recognition pertains not only to changes of regimes by force without affecting boundaries, but also to boundary changes effected by force. For example, it is normally conceded that Wilson followed a moralistic policy with respect to revolu-

[33]Conceptions and Misconceptions regarding Intervention," *loc. cit.*

[34]*Ibid.* See also "Criticisms of Mr. Hatch's Report on 'War'" (1924), p. 3, in *Dulles Papers.*

[35]Confidential Report to the Secretary of State, May 21, 1917, pp. 9-10.

[36]*Ibid.*, p. 10.

[37]Hersch Lauterpacht, editor, *International Law*, I (eighth edition) (New York: Longmans, Green, 1955-), quoted in Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy in the Great Depression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 166.

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tionary regimes in Latin America. Subsequently Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson discarded this Wilsonian practice of nonrecognition as it applied to the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, the Stimson Doctrine of 1932, relating to alterations brought about by force across boundaries (Japan in Manchuria), to some extent derived from the belief that the withholding of *de jure* recognition could serve as a consequential weapon of foreign policy. The doctrine cannot be explained away simply in terms of legalistic-moralistic tendencies on Stimson's part, for numerous considerations and complications, plus the dearth of viable alternatives at the moment, combined in its formulation. Nevertheless, as Stimson later stated, the declaration of a legal principle undeniably failed as an instrument of U.S. policy.[38]

To Dulles again, as well as to the Japanese, the instrument appeared as an impuissant reply to the situation. He did not know whether the changes in the Far East were warranted by the facts, but he found it at least conceivable that Japan in Manchuria represented "a logical and inevitable tendency." From this position, he criticized the American approach to nonrecognition: "Nor is the cause of peace advanced by closing one's eyes to actual changes merely because they result from the only mechanism for change which is available."[39] He neither maintained that all fruits of aggression should be automatically recognized as "logical and inevitable," nor entertained accepting Japanese tutelage over China.[40] He concluded, as before, that a policy of nonrecognition without the backing of supplementary actions was ineffective, and that recognition offered a better chance of influence over the direction of future relationships.

There were other important instances of opposition to a policy of nonrecognition. As early as 1924, he claimed that it was absurd to sustain the fiction that the Kerensky group represented the government of Russia. While he was not necessarily proposing immediate and complete recognition of the revolutionary regime in Moscow, he commended that the fiction be destroyed so that the United States could decide on the terms of dealing with the Soviets and renew diplomatic relations.[41] Once again in opposition

[38]Ferrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-169, especially pp. 153-158.

[39]"The Road to Peace," *op. cit.*, pp. 494-495.

[40]See Record of Trip to Hankow and Meeting with Ambassador Johnson, March 6-9, 1936, in *Dulles Papers.*

[41]See Memorandum from Dulles to The Honorable John W. Davis, for use in the 1924 campaign against President Coolidge, July 1924, pp. 8-9, in *Dulles Papers.*

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to the perpetuation of this legal fiction, in 1933, he supported recognition of the Soviet Union without conditions or reservations.[42]

His most forceful and extensive censure of the American inclination toward moralism in foreign relations appears in *War, Peace and Change*:

> Thus it appeals to our moral sense to have our government refrain from "recognizing" changes effected through the aggression of others.
>
> Such an approach, however, involves . . . carrying over into the international field judgments which derive from social units in which the authoritarian solution is operative. We can condemn the use of violence in a society which provides for peaceful evolution and change. . . . But we cannot . . . indiscriminately carry forward moral judgments of aggression into a society within which neither the political nor ethical solutions are operative.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Non-recognition by one state of a *de facto* situation created by another . . . involves certain political inconveniences to both. . . . Consular and diplomatic relations are interrupted or continued only through ingenious and complicated subterfuge.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> For a nation to base its relations with the outside world on the assumption that change brought about by force is in fact non-existent, is a policy of absurdity.[43]

Ten years later, as the anti-communist movements gained momentum in the United States, he saw no reason to recall diplomatic representatives from Soviet satellite countries. The presence of the missions "did not involve any moral approval" of the regimes in those countries, and could "perhaps help to promote the interests" of the United States.[44] Up to this point, Dulles unquestionably opposed, and frequently counseled against, legalistic-moralistic inclinations on the subject of recognition.

However, also in 1949, he hesitated to recognize the communist regime in China. He offered two legitimate reasons for hesitation. First, preferring a noncommunist government on the mainland — a preference founded on considerations of national interest — he hoped that the Chinese communists would encounter insurmountable obstacles in their attempt to gain and retain control. Second, in light of the many decades of chaos in China, he

[42]Letter from Dulles to Miss E. E. Lape of the American Foundation, March 16, 1933, in *Dulles Papers*.

[43]pp. 86-88.

[44]Statement given to Mr. Angelopoulos, December 30, 1949, in *Dulles Papers*.

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supported this hope with the requirement that every government should be tested over a period of time in order to establish the fact of control.

Shortly before the outbreak of war in Korea, at the same time that he was proposing a reasonable delay in recognition, Dulles twice stated that if the Peking regime proved its ability to govern without serious domestic difficulties, the CPR should be admitted to the UN. Along with this argument, he expressed discontentment with the Democratic Administration's "total neglect of an effective cold war offensive for this area."[45]

There are no substantial contradictions, in terms of overall national interest, between proposing to admit the CPR to the UN and simultaneously withholding official U.S. recognition. (As will be noted below, two distinct advantages inhered in this course.) As it turned out, however, the United States could support neither admission nor recognition because of a combination of factors including (1) developments within China and the policies of the CPR, (2) the opposition of the American public and Congress, and (3) inheritances from past administrations. (With reference to admission, for example, the issue was made even more difficult, if not actually unmanageable, by the inheritance of "China's" permanent seat on the Security Council.)[46] Nevertheless, an interesting twist is reflected in Dulles' position-taking. The qualified proposal to admit the CPR to the UN supports the thesis that he was non- or anti-moralistic in approaching the problem. But the proposal to delay official recognition by no means indicates a tendency in the opposite direction toward moralism. The twist requires elucidation.

Before the outbreak of the Korean War, Dulles consistently argued for, and accepted, the logical implications of a universal base for the United Nations. In *War or Peace* (1950), he declared that the organization "will best serve the cause of peace if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts which we like." A government in control "should be represented in any organization" purporting to mirror world reality. If the Chinese communist regime proved

[45]See respectively: Dulles, "Korean Attack opens New Chapter in History," in *Department of State Bulletin,* XXIII (1950), p. 210 (hereafter referred to as *DSB*); and Letter from Dulles to Henry R. Luce, April 24, 1950, in *Dulles Papers.*

[46]For purposes of analysis in this section, the issues of recognition and admission are frequently linked together. This is not to imply that these two closely related, but separate, matters are identical for all purposes. There are important differences between them.

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its ability to retain control, "then it . . . should be admitted to the United Nations."[47] This position led him to recommend amendment of the UN Charter to provide for universality. Article 4 (1) "makes a vote for the admission of a new member in effect a vote of confidence in the moral quality of the nation. . . . *As between nations, diplomatic recognition involves no element of moral approval. It should be the same with admission to the United Nations.*"[48]

After the opening of hostilities by North Korea, a gradual shift in emphasis began to emerge in some of his utterances. He still maintained that the UN should be constructed upon a universal base, but "universality should not turn the United Nations into an impotent organization."[49] Since the Soviet Union had often exercised its veto power in the Security Council, there was naturally some concern that the granting of a permanent seat to the CPR would increasingly hinder Security Council operations.

While Dulles hoped the Chinese communist experiment would fail, he was careful to allow for any future adjustments which would be necessitated in the event of communist success. The suggestion of UN membership for the CPR had two advantages. First, it would have established a form of contact with the revolutionary regime. Second, this would have been accomplished *hopefully* without the Administration risking political crisis or suicide by further infuriating the American Congress and public.

In a very real sense, the CPR itself and later the U.S. Congress slammed the door the Truman Administration and Dulles were willing to keep ajar. Neither the Administration nor Dulles hastened to adopt hard and fast lines for policy in the area. The United States neither bolted the door on the subject of recognition nor demanded that the admission issue be considered an "important question" which would require a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. During a span of approximately eight months, the official U.S. position was pragmatically ambivalent. The positions were solidified when hostilities began in Korea.

The superficial question — why the proposal to delay recognition? — deserves only scant attention. There were many sides to the issue, and the answer to this aspect did not lie chiefly within the American sphere: "The Communists themselves . . . by their

[47]pp. 190-191. See also Dulles, "How to Take the Offensive for Peace," *Life*, April 24, 1950, p. 128.

[48]*War or Peace*, p. 209. (Emphasis added.)

[49]"Korean Attack opens New Chapter in History," *loc. cit.*

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action in the Angus Ward and similar cases, had effectually shelved the question of U.S. diplomatic recognition for the foreseeable future."[50] Even after the ill-treatment of U.S. officials by communist authorities – Angus Ward in Mukden and other incidents in Dairen, Nanking and Shanghai – the Truman Administration and the State Department, while entertaining no illusions about the possibility of a reversal of events, were careful not to adopt an inflexible and irreversible position. There were other reasons supporting a delay in recognition. The decision to hold off appeared reasonable in itself given China's internal problems, Washington's welcome for difficulties that contributed to hindering communist control, and the preference for a ruling faction more in line with American interests. But the matter was already slipping out of the hands of the Executive. To favor immediate recognition publicly would have been the equivalent of playing political Russian roulette with, at best, a single empty chamber. A U.S. Gallup poll, on June 2, 1950, found 40 per cent of the public opposed to recognition, 44 per cent undecided or without opinion, and only 16 per cent in favor.

If, at this stage, there had been the slightest hope for adjustments, such anticipations vanished with the Chinese attitude toward and participation in the Korean War. This fact was reiterated several times during the meetings, in December 1950, between Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman. Both Truman and Secretary of State Acheson were well aware that recognition was not in the realm of the possible.[51] A few weeks later, James Reston wrote that Acheson's policy on China had reversed itself within a year. According to this report, the CPR's participation in the Korean War "started a chain of events in American national and international politics that is now extremely hard to control."[52] Acheson's letter of September 26, 1951 reflected the hardening of the political scene and the U.S. attitude. Countering Senate suspicions and charges, he wrote that the United States had consistently opposed and continued to oppose, both for itself and for friendly governments, the following: (1) recognizing the CPR; (2) seating representatives from Peking at the UN or any other international agency; and (3) turning over Formosa to the Chinese communists. The letter also stated

[50]Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1949* (New York: Harper & Brothers, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1950), p. 436.
[51]See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope,* II (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 396-413.
[52]*New York Times,* January 31, 1951.

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opposition to linking an armistice in Korea to the last two points. The Secretary maintained that he had informed British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, in late 1949, that the United States was not considering recognition. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, went a step further with the assertion that no important official of the State Department had recommended recognition.[53]

From the outbreak of the Korean War, if not from October 1, 1949, until Dulles' first hints toward rapprochement and recognition in 1958, the door was firmly closed on the recognition question. Strictly in terms of the balance between international and national interests, it cannot be assumed that extending recognition would have been either possible or prudent. Since the unification and control process in China depended largely on the existence of a concrete enemy —"Uncle Sam" and "U.S. imperialism"— what reason was there to suppose that the communist regime would desire adjustments or entertain early recognition? If the safety of diplomatic officials could not be guaranteed, why should the United States risk exacerbating an already inauspicious situation? Considering the vast differences between the situations of China and Yugoslavia, was there any validity in the British idea of "Titoism"? Even if a comparison were plausible, would a type of "Titoism" in China serve U.S. interests? In the early stages, was it not a better bargain to have the Chinese communists identified as tools of Soviet masters? Would not this identification tend both to hinder the effectiveness of Peking's propaganda to overseas Chinese and to lessen possible Chinese influence in the Far East, especially Japan and Southeast Asia? With respect to the issue of UN membership, did not both the Nationalists and communists reject any form of a "two China" solution?

Given the combination of international and domestic factors in the early 1950's, the above questions become practically academic. The Truman Administration had been made painfully aware of the absence of alternatives within the domestic political environment; and, as will be noted, similar political realities severely restricted the freedom of action of succeeding administrations in this area. The communist authorities showed no desire for a move toward rapprochement. December of 1950 was not yet the heyday of "McCarthyism." Public and Congressional opinion, which did not begin to mellow on the issue until over a decade later, became

[53] *Ibid.*, October 6, 1951.

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more resolute in its opposition. The following months produced a unanimously passed (91-0) Senate resolution demanding that the CPR not be admitted to the United Nations. Unanimity became the standard thereafter for expression of Congressional opposition to any change in the China policy of the U.S. government.[54] A Gallup poll release, on July 25, 1954, found that 78 per cent of the respondents opposed admitting the CPR to the UN.

This background explains the questions relating to Dulles and his Secretaryship. Why did he find it necessary gradually to shift emphasis? Why did his advocacy of admission for the CPR silently fade until, finally, it was supplanted by opposition? Why did he not propose recognition after a reasonable period of time had elapsed? Why were there no substantial changes throughout the 1950's? The answers to such questions reside in several considerations: (1) the CPR's intense anti-Americanism and prognostications for the future of Asia, and their effects on public opinion and American thinking; (2) the impact of the Korean War and the CPR's participation upon official thinking and public attitudes in the United States; (3) the U.S. support for and commitment to the Nationalist regime; and (4) the restraints imposed by domestic reactions on governmental processes and maneuverability.

The Truman Administration's decision to "let the dust settle in China," whether rational or not in relation to the international situation, had its measure of tragic repercussions. If the administration had genuinely decided to accept either victor in China's internal struggle, it failed to cultivate Congressional acquiescence and prepare the American public for this eventuality. The matter, after the Korean War began, no longer rested mainly with the Executive and the State Department. Morgenthau described the failure of U.S. policy in China as "one of the most resounding defeats our foreign policy" had "ever sustained."[55] The magnitude of the Congressional and domestic reaction to that

[54]"Language objecting to the recognition and/or seating of Communist China in the UN was incorporated each year, from 1953 through 1964, in State Department or foreign aid appropriations acts or both. Separate resolutions to the same effect were adopted by one or both chambers in 1954, 1956, 1959 and 1961. Support for the *status quo* was recorded by roll-call on eight occasions: by the House, July 15, 1954, 381-0; July 18, 1956, 391-0; August 17, 1959, 368-2; and August 31, 1961, 395-0; and by the Senate, June 3, 1953, 76-0; July 29, 1954, 91-0; July 23, 1956, 86-0; and July 28, 1961, 76-0." *Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 104.

[55]Hans J. Morgenthau, *American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination* (London: Methuen & Company, 1952), p. 208.

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policy meant that, for years to come, the two groups most directly concerned with foreign policy would have no room for maneuver, and could only incur unnecessary political difficulties by raising the issue of possible recognition.

Realistically speaking, therefore, Dulles had no alternative but to oppose admission of the CPR to the United Nations and remain silent on the subject of recognition. From 1950-1951 on, the analyst encounters a continuous stream of "if's" and "but's," the inevitable products of a delicate balance between domestic demands, the exactions of leadership, and international requirements. As far as his position as Secretary is concerned, the policy of nonrecognition was irrefragably determined before he set foot in office, and no practicable alternative emerged during his term. There was little, if any, change on the domestic scene; and, throughout the 1950's, Peking showed no signs of adopting a more conciliatory approach while continuing to threaten an invasion of Formosa. It is debatable whether a time for education and preparation had existed during the Roosevelt and early Truman Administrations. But there remains no doubt that, by the time Dulles took office, a cram course was beyond reason. Happenings and events, as Richard Neustadt points out in *Presidential Power,*[56] determine the educational projects and subjects of the President and his advisers. Even after a definite relaxation in the Cold War and on the domestic front, the Kennedy Administration found it imprudent either to suggest positively or to pursue actively a path toward eventual recognition. The change in U.S. tactics at the United Nations, in 1961, can only be considered as a shift in tactics, not in policy.[57]

If part of the American practice has been "using recognition to express moral or political approval of new regimes,"[58] Dulles eludes rigid classification as an exponent. In 1950, he left the future open for possible adjustments in U.S. relations with China until those became politically impossible. In 1958, he appeared to be searching for an eventual way toward increased intercourse and conciliation. On January 16, he asserted: "Any time it will serve the interests of the United States to recognize the Communist

[56](New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960).

[57]The Kennedy Administration agreed to debate the Chinese issue but argued that it was an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority. The General Assembly agreed with this interpretation (61-34 with 7 abstentions) on December 15, 1961.

[58]F. S. Northedge, *British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment, 1945-1961* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962), p. 193.

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Chinese regime, we will do it."[59] Twice in June, and again in December, he maintained that, although official recognition would not serve the interests of the United States at the time, the Eisenhower Administration did and would continue to deal with the Chinese People's Republic whenever and wherever it appeared expedient.[60] The Secretary had earlier, in March, recommended the renegotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty in a manner that would recognize the need for an extension of trade between Japan and mainland China.[61] In October, he counseled the Nationalist regime to abandon the "civil war complex," concentrate on economic and social development, and begin thinking in terms of an armistice along the present lines of division.[62] The Chinese invasion of Tibet in March 1959, the frontier disputes with India, and continuation of the hostile attitude toward the United States prevented any further action in that direction.

Yet clearly the U.S. government had to take account of the fact that the CPR did exist: "And where there are cases where we can deal with it on a *de facto* basis with relation to a particular matter, if we fail to do that through a policy of non-recognition, that would be equally stupid."[63] Dulles' support for establishing the Geneva and Warsaw talks corroborates the conclusion that he realized the importance of having contact with Peking. Respecting the types of contact, however, the maneuverability of the Secretary was restricted, as exemplified in his approach to the Geneva Conference of 1954. Political concerns were evident in the wording of his announcement that the United States would not refuse to meet indirectly with the CPR. He found it necessary to justify, to an American public with vivid memories of Yalta, the decision to go to the conference table: "We need not, out of fright, lay down the tools of diplomacy and the possibilities which they provide. Our cause is not so poor, and our capacity not so low, that our nation must seek security by sulking in its tent."[64] Nevertheless, warnings

[59]Dulles Press Conference, January 16, 1958, quoted in Eleanor Lansing Dulles, *John Foster Dulles: The Last Year* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), p. 45.

[60]See respectively in *Dulles Papers:* interview with Congressman Kenneth B. Keating on "Let's Look at Congress," June 15, 1958; interview with Edgar McInnis of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, June 23, 1958; and address before the California Chamber of Commerce, December 4, 1958.

[61]See transcript of remarks at Opening Session of the Far East Chiefs of Mission Conference, March 14, 1958, in *Dulles Papers.*

[62]Notes for talks with Chiang Kai-shek, October 21, 1958, in *Dulles Papers.*

[63]Interview with Congressman Keating, June 15, 1958, p. 2.

[64]Address concerning Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference at Berlin, February 24, 1954, in *Dulles Papers.*

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persisted against a "Far East Munich," from Senator Knowland and others. There was no decrease in pressures against any type of "implicit recognition."

In short, political studies of this period and this particular issue must acknowledge the severe restrictions placed on the Secretary's freedom of action. International considerations definitely buttressed the nonrecognition decision. Advocates of recognition often place the cart before the horse, as though the issue constituted the cause, rather than a reflection, of instability in the area and of Sino-American conflict. For the rest, there remained the overriding domestic difficulties. An understanding of the nonrecognition policy and of Dulles demands discarding all superficial explanations. The reasons for nonrecognition, nonadmission, and for certain actions in 1954 lie deep in both the national interest as perceived by American leadership and the relationship between domestic political situations and international postures. The Secretary of State must always be, to varying degrees, a prisoner of Washington politics, national moods, past policies and, not least, international circumstances.

V

The argument that Dulles was legalistic is untenable on at least two counts. First, it has been illustrated that he did not possess the so-called lawyer's trust in written agreements. He was keenly aware that paper agreements and conditions, whether with allies or others, would be ineffective unless they reflected a substantial concurrence of interests. Second, his conception of the role of international law was basically positivistic. Although he occasionally referred to the potential supremacy of international law when addressing meetings of the American Bar Association or similar gatherings, he always recognized the limited scope of law in the international arena. He eschewed all absolutes and absolute solutions, and manifested a healthy skepticism regarding glittering slogans.

The argument that Dulles was moralistic appears reasonably plausible if one limits analysis to particular public pronouncements and explanations of policy designed to gain needed public or Congressional support. It is rendered invalid, however, by a balanced examination of his statements and, more important, by a study of his actions and reactions as a technician both before and after he assumed office. In 1957 he wrote: "Sound policy can-

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not be derived from *a priori* concepts, whether moralistic, materialistic or legalistic. It must always have a wholesome infusion of the pragmatic. . . . This means that we must understand both the realities we confront, and the limitations on our power."[65] Throughout the interwar period, he had incessantly criticized moralistic propensities in the American approach.

There remains the popular argument that, in spite of his earlier training and pragmatic approach, Dulles acquired an ideological outlook sometime after 1945. The scope of this essay precludes a punctilious account of his interpretations of communism, the USSR and the Cold War. However, studies of the period must take into consideration the following facts regarding Dulles' position. (1) He viewed the rise of Soviet power as a natural, long-range and stimulating challenge to the West. (2) He perceived the Cold War as a result of conflicts between interests and objectives based more on national than on ideological considerations. (3) He was fully aware that this classical power struggle also included an ideological twist. (4) Concerned with the problems of isolationism, withdrawal, self-deception and miscalculation, he was unwilling to loosen the tension lines beyond a certain point. To Dulles, an appearance of inflexibility was a better bargain than either miscalculation or self-deception. (5) In approaching a dispute with the Soviet Union over the Berlin blockade of 1948, Dulles stressed the points that the United States must understand the difficulties of the Soviet regime and take care not to blow up any incident.[66] (6) During this period, he continued to oppose the American tendency toward self-righteousness, and picturesquely condemned the habit of acting and talking *"as though God had appointed us to be the Committee of Admissions to the Free World and as though the qualifications for membership were to be found by our looking into a mirror."*[67] (7) He continued to stress that patience was a quality Americans needed to develop, and countered illusions of omnipotence: "We are not omnipotent. . . . Our power and policy are but one significant factor in the world. . . . In combination with other factors we are able to influence importantly the course of events. *But we cannot deal in absolutes.* This, to many

[65]Draft (August 9, 1957) of "Challenge and Response in United States Policy" for *Foreign Affairs,* p. 3, in *Dulles Papers.*

[66]Memorandum on Washington Conference, July 1948, in *Dulles Papers.*

[67]"The Strength of Adversity," May 18, 1950, p. 2, in *Dulles Papers.* (Emphasis added.)

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Americans, is a source of worriment."[68] In light of such considerations, the contention that ideological commitment or a morally-rooted aversion distorted his perception of reality and the national interest, sometime after 1945, rests upon tenuous foundations.

In the final analysis, the issue of legalism-moralism boils down to the subject of idealism or escapism versus realism. Three characteristics of idealism or escapism appear to be a belief in solutions rather than settlements; a tendency to simplify problems — not to be confused with the proclivity to simplify for public consumption; and unwarranted self-assuredness regarding the proper or "right" course. With reference to the first characteristic, in 1939 Dulles urged that "we should seek to abolish any sense of finality" in international and domestic affairs. " 'Never' and 'forever' are words which should be eliminated from the vocabulary of statesmen."[69] As for the second and third characteristics, he deplored the "tendency to underestimate the complexities and difficulties of the problem" of coexistence in the Cold War. He sometimes chose "to present the problem in terms of what, to the American temperament, is its most baffling aspect, namely, indecisiveness."[70] However, indecisiveness is not a quality readily accepted in public or political officials. The statesman, regardless of personal reservations and hesitations, must radiate conviction in the correctness of a chosen course if only to help secure the implementation of a program. For obvious reasons, the subtleties and sophistication of a personal approach are not always apparent in the political arena.

Thus, a pragmatic approach to foreign policy studies rests, not simply on accurate evaluation of the actors involved, but on a sound appraisal of political considerations and possibilities, a genuine appreciation of political necessity, and an ability to understand actions in the light of a particular setting and time. Perhaps a slight trend in the direction of "Dullesian fatalism" is in order: "It is basic economic and political conditions which determine the broad lines of national policy. It is these we must study and with which we must deal."

[68]Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1957, p. 26. (Emphasis added.)

[69]*War, Peace and Change,* p. 156.

[70]See respectively: Dulles, "The Great Powers' Role in Settling Disputes," statement before Committee I of United Nations Organization, October 20, 1950, in *DSB,* XXIII (1950), p. 749; and "The Challenge of Today," address at the University of Arizona, May 30, 1951, in *DSB,* XXIV (1951), p. 935.

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SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL LINE-DRAWING IN THE BRITISH TRADITION

by Henry J. Abraham

ONE of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s most felicitous phrases was his oft-repeated exhortation to his countrymen that a basic, constant and continuing requirement of our living Constitution is that it reflect the "felt necessities of the times." The great skeptic's belief in, and dedication to, the enduring constitutional health of his beloved land mandated that recognition and practice not only as an article of faith and an essential aspect of survival, but as simple adherence to "common sense"—the common sense that underlies, or ought to underlie, enlightened government in Western democratic society.

In the mid-twentieth century an evolving syndrome has made our fundamental civil rights and liberties one of the most acute "felt necessities of our times." Yet the inconsistent, often contradictory, posture of perhaps a majority of Americans on these issues prompted me to turn for a comparative attitudinal examination to Britain — the cradle, as it were, of our Anglo-Saxon cultural freedoms.

During a few winter weeks in 1969 it thus became my privilege to obtain a renewed on-the-spot glimpse into the renowned British approach to the issues of civil rights and liberties.[1] Procedurally, the survey was based on a host of interviews with individuals in both the private and public sectors of life, on levels of influence ranging from high to low, comprising the man in the street and in his trade or profession as well as sundry members of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the British government. The analysis that follows may be little more than "impressions"; yet, fleshed out against the backdrop of serious evaluation and considerable reflection drawn from actual experience, the impressions were sufficiently keen, enduring and persuasive to engender strong conviction.

I

In commenting on the debacles that attended the pathetic

[1]I am deeply grateful to the American Council of Learned Societies and to the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania for their material assistance in this endeavor.

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"shakedown" voyage of the Cunard liner *Queen Elizabeth II,* one bright and influential American news organ said that while "it would be misleading to hold up the new *Queen* as a reflection of all that ails Britain's economy . . . it exposed anew the casual management and slapdash workmanship that has become all too common in a nation anxious to regain the grandeur of the past."[2] This may well be a valid observation on British production, but the converse holds true in the case of the British maintenance of, and regard for, civil rights and liberties. The British attitude differs remarkably from our own. With the qualified exception of the vexatious and burgeoning issue of racial discrimination — for even in that contentious realm the contrast is marked — it differs not merely in degree but, more significantly, in fundamental philosophy. The underlying attribute is what, for want of a more appropriate term, I should like to style common sense, in which are rooted basic apperceptions of line-drawing between individual and societal rights in the Western democratic social order.

Much that is distinctive in the British and American conceptualizations of civil rights and liberties, of course, stems from such dominant factors as age and tradition, size and homogeneity, factors that have caused these two lands with a basic common origin and tradition of the common law to be so diverse in the law's application and execution. Depending upon one's count, Britain has existed as a nation some seven centuries longer than we have, with all the implications of experience and growth, tradition and wisdom that fact entails. (Notwithstanding the intolerant attitudes and excesses of many of the campus rebels today, there *is* something to be said for the argument that in experience based on longevity there resides at least a modicum of greater wisdom and knowledge!) In terms of size, both geographic and demographic, the 55,000,000 people in the British Isles inhabit a total of 153,000 square miles, while the 210,000,000 Americans live in an area covering 3,615,200 square miles. And although the United Kingdom is more diversified than the Scandinavian lands, it is nonetheless characterized by a marked degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. This fact of life renders the political process infinitely less complicated, if perhaps less exciting, than ours in the United States.

The present British preoccupation with, and general antipathy toward, continued large-scale nonwhite immigration, while

[2]*Time* (Atlantic Edition), January 10, 1969.

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primarily due to fear arising from economic factors, is unquestionably also linked with concern over potentially diminishing homogeneity. The patently racist views voiced by Conservative Member of Parliament Enoch Powell — who was publicly censured by his party's leadership and removed from his post in the Opposition's "shadow cabinet"— would probably command majority support in the country if put to the test. But this is true only insofar as these views concern cessation, diminution or restriction of nonwhite *immigration* to the British Isles, certainly not with regard to any double standard vis-à-vis political rights or equality before the law. Not even Powell advocates that kind of discrimination. It is a matter of record that in Britain's homogeneity has lain much of her libertarian strength. On our part, many of our difficulties in America have been caused by what, in other aspects, has been our dream as well as our strength: our heterogeneity, our proverbial "melting pot," so full of promise and problems.

II

What is distinctive *in form* about the British arrangements concerning civil rights and liberties is that the citizen will not find his freedom set out in any written constitution. British law merely defines the *limits* of the citizen's freedom — he may do as he likes unless and until he oversteps these limits. Lines are drawn broadly and generously within the spirit of Anglo-Saxon traditions and the common law. The average Briton would simply not visualize, let alone permit, such threats to individual liberties as have been posed in the States by the activities of certain Congressional investigating committees in the sector of freedom of political expression. In Britain's attitude toward personal freedom, this would not be considered "cricket" — a term much derided by the uninitiated, but one that represents the attitudinal *sine qua non* of the British citizenry.

On the other hand, the very absence of the precise delimitation found in our own Bill of Rights has periodically raised the intriguing question whether the Britisher pays too high a price for uncertainty about the limits of freedom. Successive British governments have maintained that it is useless to have constitutional documents that are merely idealistic catalogues of freedoms phrased in vague language. These, they say, may well provide more confusion than certainty, especially since they lack

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the American institution of judicial review — an unthinkable practice in view of the British tradition of Parliamentary supremacy. (Actually, however, the latter has necessarily given way to what amounts to cabinet supremacy based upon party majorities.) And while this writer, for one, regards our judicial branch with its power of judicial review as the ultimate guardian of our fundamental freedoms, any British enthusiasm for a move toward adopting the American judiciary's power of the veto, even in the civil libertarian spectrum, must be tempered by the vista of 5:4 U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the meaning of, for example, freedom of expression in the realms of assembly[3] and publication.[4] By and large, as Professor Harry Street, one of Britain's foremost students of civil rights and liberties, has pointed out so cogently,[5] in Britain the legal concept of liberty is that, in areas of great importance, man is free to act as he likes without restrictions by law: whatever is not forbidden is permitted. Parliamentary sovereignty simply insures that Parliament can make any law and change any law, however basic — but it shall not infringe the fundamental libertarian spirit and ethos.

Nonetheless, influential voices are heard from time to time in behalf of the adoption of a formal Bill of Rights. Thus Louis Heren, the distinguished Washington correspondent of the London *Times*, who, late in 1968, returned to Britain to "investigate the British system of government" for his paper, stated that "to my mind a Bill of Rights would be the best possible import from the United States."[6] Evidently vexed by the snowballing administrative complex of rules and regulations governing the lives of Britain's economically harassed citizenry, Heren suggested that a Bill of Rights would "reassert the rights and liberties of the citizen in relation to parliament, the executive, and the bureaucracy [and] not only would the rights of citizens take precedence over administrative convenience, but Acts of Parliament violating those guarantees would be null and void."[7] Yet while exhorting his countrymen to adopt a formal, written Bill of Rights, he admitted to some disquietude, as he was bound to do in his capacity as an on-the-spot, perceptive, experienced observer of American attitudes toward the Bill of Rights in our own Con-

[3]E.g., *Adderley v. Florida*, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
[4]E.g., *Ginzburg v. United States*, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
[5]*Freedom, the Individual and the Law* (second edition) (London: Macgibbon & Kee, Ltd., 1967).
[6]"The Case for a Second Bill of Rights," December 21, 1968, p. 7.
[7]*Ibid.*

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stitution. These attitudes caused Chief Justice Warren to comment with heavy heart not so long ago that he did not believe the Bill of Rights' key provisions, including the First Amendment, could today pass Congress — a fear that had been alarmingly confirmed by the famous Stouffer study of the mid-1950's.[8]

Taking note of what he correctly viewed as a "period of reaction," Heren suggested that in the process of adopting a Bill of Rights Britain could well make "another notable contribution to the Anglo-American tradition in reminding Americans of their duty to uphold our common unalienable rights no matter the inconvenience and complications." He expressed profound shock that "even a public man such as Mr. Thomas Dewey" would, in response to the wave of reaction against libertarian activist judicial postures vis-à-vis criminal procedures, say that the country "could get along just as well if we repealed the Fifth Amendment." Verbally — and, in this commentator's opinion, justifiably — spanking the Republican nominee for the Presidency in 1940 and 1948, Heren concluded that "outside the United States, only Britain could remind such Americans of why our rights such as due process of law are unalienable."[9]

In the real sense, then, Heren's argument for the adoption of a Bill of Rights becomes academic. What matters, in the final analysis, is the attitude of society and its organized political forces, rather than its legal machinery or formalized documentary tools. That attitude, in the words of the late Justice Robert H. Jackson, "is the controlling force in the character of free institutions."[10] Although there has been considerable amelioration (between 1954 and 1957 and, again, since 1962), it is still lamentably true that, as Jackson put it in 1955, "the American public lacks both sophistication and enlightenment in [matters of civil liberties] and is thus unsuited for a role of protector of civil liberties."[11] Broadly speaking, and again citing Justice Jackson's conclusions, while to observe civil liberties in Britain is "good politics," and to transgress the rights of the individual or the minority is "bad politics," in the United States there is still the attitude of "let the

[8]"The number of people who said that they worried . . . about civil liberties, even by the most generous interpretation of occasionally ambiguous responses, was less than 1%." Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 30.

[9]Heren, *loc. cit.*

[10]Robert H. Jackson, *The Supreme Court in the American System of Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 80-83.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 83.

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judges do it."[12] All too often, alas, when they indeed "do it," the fat of adverse public reaction adds to the fire. Witness Dewey's comment — from an influential, distinguished and sophisticated member of the bar as well as a figure of public renown and esteem.

III

A timely and hopefully pertinent case study of contrasting British and American attitudes and practices in a highly visible sector of the civil rights and liberties spectrum is that of the police. It may provide some lessons for us to master. The position of the American police in society, in both absolute and relative facets, has become at once more acute and more exposed to the eye of the general public in the past half-dozen years or so, exacerbated by its role in the "confrontation" syndrome involving the Negro and the student communities. Where, how and when to draw the lines between the freedoms of the individual and those of society — of which I have written in considerable detail elsewhere[13]— are questions that have been difficult to answer and, where answerable, difficult to resolve. A congenital lack of public knowledge about the overall problem, not to mention its finer nuances, has clouded the way to a viable solution — any solution. All too often this has expressed itself in catchy popular slogans about "law and order," as the 1968 Presidential campaign demonstrated so well, slogans for the most part as unhelpful and empty as they have been semantically simplistic and dangerous.

The lot of the average American policeman is not a bed of roses. It can stand considerable amelioration in a host of ways and on a host of issues. Yet he who becomes a policeman can hardly expect to find a bed of roses. He can expect a decent wage — an area in which there has fortunately been commendable and continuous movement in most, if not all, American jurisdictions. He can expect decent working conditions, by which is generally meant equipment, schedules, sundry tangible and intangible fringe benefits. But he does not have, and should not have, the right to strike to achieve these goals.

The profession of a policeman (or a policewoman) is not tantamount in public responsibility to that of a clerk in a store or a cloth-cutter. He can expect the respect of the public for, and its

[12]*Ibid.*

[13]*Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

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adherence to, the commands of the law he is charged to enforce, but he has no license to break that law! He cannot realistically expect adulation by the public, which does not mean that he does not, in fact, obtain it now and then, and increasingly so of late. He cannot allow personal abuse, such as name-calling, no matter how disagreeable, to rattle him into a loss of self-control to the point of overreacting. He must, above all, himself obey the law of the land, behaving in unswerving commitment to the discipline his profession demands and commands. Whatever else may be said about the role of the police forces of the city of Chicago during the late August 1968 days of the Democratic National Convention, it was hardly an edifying illustration of disciplined, measured, self-controlled — yes, even lawful — work by professional police in a Western democratic state, regardless of how great the provocations by the demonstrators cum rioters.

By way of striking contrast, the serious mass demonstrations that occurred outside the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square in October 1967 and March 1968, while producing a good many complaints against the police, were handled so professionally that the twenty-five observers stationed there by the British National Council for Civil Liberties expressed the formal opinion that "the police had endured an intolerable amount of provocation."[14] Training, tradition, the "cricket" concept, acting according to deeply ingrained official as well as unofficial rules — notwithstanding the occasional aberration noticed on the part of "a small number of policemen," at once "restrained and pacified by their colleagues"[15]— all combined to perpetuate the kind of relationship the concept "law and order" ought to signify, given the basic goal of justice in democratic society.

In many ways the American policeman and the American public could learn much from the British "bobby" and the setting in which he functions. Generally displaying enormous tact and politeness in his daily tasks, the British policeman has commanded universal respect among the populace — respect, not fear. Carefully recruited and well trained in a milieu of readily perceivable *esprit de corps,* he has access to such morale-nourishing appurtenances as advanced training schools, officers' luncheon clubs and recreation facilities. He is modestly but

[14]National Council for Civil Liberties, *Civil Liberties 1968* (London: Goodwin Press, 1968), p. 9.

[15]National Council for Civil Liberties, "Report on the Demonstrations in Grosvenor Square . . . ," April 1968, p. 1.

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equitably paid, receiving approximately one-third more than a bus driver, about the same as a trained artisan, primary school teacher or junior engineer. Yet regardless of the pertinency of these "comparisons" it would simply not occur to the bobby — for it would not seem proper or appropriate, not "cricket"— to engage in the sort of strike-threats and actual "slowdowns" (however short-lived) that recently characterized the actions of the much more highly paid New York police force in turning down their most lucrative contract in history. This was in excess of $10,500 in base pay plus a host of fringe benefits. The rejection occurred not, it was alleged, because this was insufficient compensation, but because other New York City employees, such as firemen, whom the police regard as somehow less "prestigious," less "worthy" and engaged in less dangerous pursuits, were evidently to receive similarly lucrative contracts. Not only would any such action by the British bobbies be inconceivable today, it would destroy their position in and relationship to society that has existed for a long time and violate a universally acceptable unwritten "no strike" understanding that has existed ever since the abortive strike of 1919 was decisively crushed.

The unquestionably happy relationship between the public and the bobby is nurtured by certain well-established customs and practices that our police and their administrators might consider. That the leaders of America's police forces are well aware of the problem they face was evident in a tersely frank press conference announcement by Richard G. MacEachern, Chairman of the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, who headed a committee meeting in Cleveland to form a nationwide National Patrolmen's Association: "We feel the police image has to be improved in the country."[16] To begin with, the British police relies on visibility, on "showing its colors" to an infinitely greater extent than does our own police force. There is a deliberate de-emphasis of the "I-Am-In-The-Red-Car" representation of authority; the bobby believes, almost without exception, that for maximum effectiveness he must be in full view *on foot* at all times. The patrol car is eschewed as much as possible, and if any are nearby the observer is certainly not aware of them, whereas he *is* conscious of the "bobby on the beat," usually *à deux*. The on-foot rather than in-the-car approach to patrol policy also militates against the shocking practice of "cooping," i.e., sleeping in patrol cars while on du-

[16]As quoted in the *New York Times*, January 29, 1969.

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ty, recently dramatized in New York City.[17] It goes without saying that such a practice is unheard of in the United Kingdom.

The visibility of the bobby supports his desire to foster the continuing "dialogue" between himself and the constituency he serves, which is maintained scrupulously in all save the most extreme crisis situations. It is a manifestation furthered by a collateral British police practice: to assign the bobby, insofar as administratively feasible, to his social habitat. This involves risks, of course, for the "scienter"-based temptations of local rackets such as prostitution and gambling might well outweigh home-ground advantages. Nevertheless, the "social habitat assignment" should be worth a more sustained trial than we have generally given it in the States. For example, an experiment, similar to one in force outside London since 1968, might be to select a few diverse communities and *require* the policemen serving there to be residents.

However, the most fundamental divergence between British and American police practices, one that inevitably amazes those who are not students of the field, is that the bobby carries no firearms. Many do carry a nightstick, but not all go even that far; in any case, a club may only be drawn on the order of a senior officer, and, in the event extreme provocation demands its instant use, the officer must file an immediate report to justify his action. The "no firearms" phenomenon represents such a striking contrast to our own approach that the average American reaction is one of disbelief, yet it is absolutely essential to the societal position of the British policeman and the trust and regard the public has for him. While it would be absurd to report that *no* bobby would like to carry arms, those who do comprise but a tiny percentage: no more than two or three per cent, according to two of the senior Scotland Yard officers interviewed; "maybe five or six but no more," according to policemen on duty at the Great Marlboro Street Magistrates' Courts. One of the latter added, "It just wouldn't sit right, sir; the crooks and we just don't operate that way in England, sir."[18] True, in specific situations the Chief Constable (an officer who exists at the rough ratio of one per 1,000,000 inhabitants) has the authority and power to order the use of firearms and other arms, but the practice is rarely resorted to.

It is significant to note that all three parties involved in police action — the police itself, the incipient offender, and the public at

[17]See the account by David Burnham, and accompanying photographs, in the *New York Times,* December 16, 1968, and in *Time,* December 26, 1968.
[18]Interviews conducted on January 9, 1969, in London.

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large — are content with the "no arms" tradition. Interview upon interview, without the slightest attempt at "card-stacking," confirmed that conclusion. And this despite an occasional departure from the rules-of-the-game by criminal elements. The tragic killing of two Westminster bobbies in a shoot-out trap in 1964 evoked acute outrage and deep sorrow throughout London and the land at large, but little, if any, call for a change in the firmly established tradition. The reason is probably obvious: there is less violence because both hunter and hunted know that the policeman has no arms on his person. The rule has stood Britain well. Whether American society would ever be willing to embark upon a similar practice is clearly an academic question. The violent events in our recent history, which have accelerated so tragically, mandate against even a trial experiment. Yet it might help the blighted image of America's policemen, of which Chairman MacEachern spoke with such deep concern, if some of the trappings of arms were de-emphasized wherever prudently feasible. Is it really necessary, for example, for policemen to be armed to the teeth when appearing at the site of criminal trials? Does the flaunting of authority really serve the goal of image-building?

IV

It is easy to be critical from the vantage point of the observer's platform. Perhaps it has been unfair to assay a comparison between British and American attitudes toward civil rights and liberties, given the crucial distinctions between the two countries in age, size, tradition, elites, and, above all, homogeneity. But the comparison nevertheless has some pertinence. While we can neither "transfer" nor "adapt" those enviable traits that make up the British national and historical approach to civil rights, we can observe and learn from them and from their fruits. It would serve us well to keep in mind Britain's magnificent spirit of fundamental fairness; the reasonableness of the body politic; the dedication to the rules-of-the-game from which comes that graphic concept of "cricketness." Above all, we should take a lesson from the commonsense give-and-take which never forgets that there are, and must be, lines and limits in a democratic society — in both the public and private sector — that cannot be violated without grave risk to the very lifeblood of a free people.

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SWITZERLAND'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

by George Schwab

SOVIET military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and further fears in the West of possible moves against Rumania and Yugoslavia, arrested the relaxation of political tensions that Europe had enjoyed for several years. This political calm had become discernible in 1963, coinciding with the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Whether the Soviet intervention will also end the hope of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons still remains to be seen. Temporarily, at least, the Non-proliferation Treaty was in jeopardy as the nations of the West expressed concern about the adequacy of an effective military deterrent against the Soviet Union. In this regard, traditionally neutral Switzerland was no exception.

Despite Switzerland's size and population, national defense questions constitute one of the most important concerns of her government. This can be ascribed not only to her strategic location in Europe, but also to the implications of her policy of armed neutrality. Furthermore, unique democratic features in the Swiss constitution permit the electorate to have a decisive voice in the federal decision-making process — and this extends to matters related to national defense. Due to these various factors it is necessary to outline briefly the implications of Switzerland's policy of neutrality and the rights of the electorate as it has played a decisive role in determining the government's nuclear weapons policy, before we discuss the nuclear debate, Switzerland's present capacity to produce tactical nuclear weapons, and the government's current defense policies.

I

Although Switzerland's neutrality, as recognized at the Congress of Vienna and reaffirmed in Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, prohibits her from entering into political and military alliances, it also implies, according to Kurt Brotbeck, a Swiss authority on international relations, her ability to defend her ter-

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ritory when attacked.[1] Thus Switzerland's traditional policy of neutrality is closely linked with her capacity to defend herself should the need ever arise. Of particular importance to the Swiss in this context are the weapons she can employ if her political sovereignty is challenged.

Article 10 of the Hague Convention of 1907 (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land merely states that "a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality can not be regarded as a hostile act." In interpreting this point, R. L. Bindschedler, another Swiss authority versed in international relations and law, summarized the prevalent opinion by pointing out that the neutrality concept says nothing at all on the nature of the weapons to be employed in self-defense. Of significance only is that the weapons be effective. Were a convention to be agreed upon which would, for example, prohibit the use of atomic weapons — as was the case with poison gases or poisoned weapons — this still would not mean that Switzerland could not acquire them. After all, although countries were legally prohibited from employing poison gases or poisoned weapons, no law in existence so far prohibits the *production* of such gases and weapons, and their presence in the military arsenal of a country could perhaps serve as a deterrent against aggression on the one hand, and, on the other, forestall an aggressor from utilizing like weapons for fear of reprisal. International law, maintained Bindschedler, is based on the principle of self-help, and therefore it recognizes the notion of reprisal.[2] As applied to nuclear weapons, there are so far no legal barriers prohibiting Switzerland from acquiring and utilizing such arms in the event of a conventional or nuclear attack upon her.

II

That Switzerland's policy of traditional neutrality and national defense are closely linked is logical. It is also logical to expect that in liberal-democratic countries decisions regarding national defense are made primarily by the government with the aid of parliament. This is not exactly the case in Switzerland. In periods of order, peace and stability, the Swiss electorate can participate in

[1]Kurt Brotbeck, *Die schweizerische Neutralitaet als Beitrag zu einem freien Europa* (Bern: Benteli-Verlag, 1963), p. 38.

[2]R. L. Bindschedler, "Die Schweiz und die Ferngeschosse-voelkerrechtliche und aussenpolitische Probleme," *Allgemeine schweizerische Militaerzeitschrift,* June 1958, pp. 410-411.

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the decision-making process by means of specific constitutional devices of direct democracy.[3] With regard to the Swiss government's nuclear policy the electorate was called twice to the polls to express its decision, which is then legally binding upon the government.

Since our interest centers on the question of nuclear arms, mention must be made of the democratic device of the constitutional initiative. It was in this form that the electorate expressed its decision in 1962 and 1963. Both constitutions, the documents of 1848 and 1874, provided for the constitutional initiative, but not until a law was passed on January 27, 1892, was this procedure more carefully circumscribed. According to this law, a proposal to amend the constitution, if requested by at least 50,000 qualified voters, must be submitted by the federal authorities to the electorate for approval or rejection.[4] The rights of the electorate are such that it can even legally dissolve the government's responsibility in the domain of national defense — but no action has ever been taken toward this end.

III

The Swiss nuclear debate can be divided into a number of phases: (1) the period between 1954 and 1958 when the topic was mainly of concern to military strategists; (2) from the summer of 1958, when the government and then the political parties began to participate, until 1963, when the electorate was called upon to vote on the second atomic initiative; and (3) the government's policy since 1963.

Between 1945 and 1954 there was little incentive for Swiss military strategists to engage in an atomic debate, because it seemed to them a futile exercise. The military arsenals of the atomic powers at that time consisted mainly of strategic weapons, and such weapons were not only beyond Switzerland's capacity to acquire but also irrelevant for a country intent merely on following a strict policy of armed neutrality. With the gradual development and introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the arsenals of the "have" countries, some Swiss army officers began

[3]Electorate participation is excluded in an emergency situation, when emergency clauses, decree power and emergency power, among other legal devices, prohibit the functioning of a popular democracy. See Kurt Eichenberger, *Die oberste Gewalt im Bunde* (Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1949), p. 341.

[4]For a detailed discussion of the various constitutional devices of direct democracy in Switzerland see Christopher Hughes, *The Federal Constitution of Switzerland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p.132 ff.

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raising the question whether Switzerland's conventional weapons were still adequate to safeguard her neutrality. By the end of 1954, a number of strategists were urging Switzerland to acquire tactical nuclear weapons as a means of strengthening her defense capabilities in an age of rapidly changing war technology.[5]

To the public this debate among the military, which appeared at first to be abstract, abruptly became a national issue once the government entered into it. Under the pressure of Soviet military moves in Hungary, the strength of Soviet military forces in Europe, and menacing threats against the West, the Swiss government, in a press release on July 11, 1958, felt compelled to state that in order to safeguard Swiss neutrality effectively the army would have to be equipped one day with tactical nuclear weapons.[6] This announcement occasioned such an uproar among large segments of the population that the government hastened to explain, on August 9, that it had not so far committed Switzerland to an atomic course. Pointing out that the first release had been misunderstood, it made clear that it favored equipping the army with tactical nuclear weapons, but that no definite decision had yet been reached as to when this would happen, and noted that for the time being it had instructed the proper military department to prepare a study on the feasibility of introducing such weapons.[7]

The second press release did nothing to reassure the people, and consequently the political parties, press, radio and television now joined the debate. The upshot was the launching of two constitutional initiatives which the people were asked to endorse or reject. The first initiative, promoted largely by left-wing members of the Social Democratic Party, aimed at forbidding Switzerland to produce, import, or permit the transit, storage or utilization of nuclear weapons or any parts of such weapons.[8] It was submitted to the electorate by the federal authorities on April 1, 1962, and was overwhelmingly rejected.[9] The text of the counter initiative,

[5]See the following editorials in the *Allgemeine schweizerische Militaerzeitschrift*, the leading military journal: "Krieg mit Atomwaffen," October 1954, p. 731 ff.; "Die Zielsetzung unserer Landesverteidigung," April 1955, p. 235; "Welcher Weg ist richtig?," December 1955, p. 886; "Welcher Weg ist richtig?," January 1956, p. 1 ff. See also, in the same journal, Captain Otto Messner, "Eigene Atomwaffen," August 1955, pp. 555-557.

[6]*Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber das Volksbegehren fuer ein Verbot von Atomwaffen* (Bern, July 1961), No. 8273, p. 2.

[7]*Ibid.*

[8]*Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber das Volksbegehren fuer ein Verbot der Atomwaffen* (Bern, May 1959), No. 7854, p. 1.

[9]*Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz* (Basel: Birkhauser Verlag, 1962), p. 546.

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launched by the majority wing of the party, merely stipulated that the government consult the electorate before it decided to introduce nuclear weapons into the military arsenal.[10] This too was overwhelmingly rejected on May 26, 1963.[11] Thus the government received from the electorate carte blanche to embark upon a nuclear course whenever it deemed this to be necessary.

Several years earlier, the federal authorities, cognizant that Switzerland was in no position yet to acquire atomic weapons from abroad or produce them at home, sought expert opinion on how meanwhile to forge the Swiss Army into an effective combat force with the resources at its disposal. A study on this topic prepared by a special commission of Swiss officers and made available in May 1957 contained majority and minority viewpoints. Both factions agreed on the necessity of augmenting the firepower of the army, and that the easiest way of accomplishing this would be by acquiring tactical nuclear weapons, which at that time was not possible.[12] But here the general unanimity ended.

The majority doubted that a Soviet attack against the entire West would necessarily lead to a defeat of the Free World. In the event of such an attack the aim of the Swiss Army should be, they argued, to destroy as many units of the aggressor as succeeded in penetrating Swiss territory. The purpose was to gain time and the initiative in specific battle areas until outside aid arrived.[13] To accomplish this it would be necessary to abandon in large measure the long-followed principle of "static defense" and to reorganize the armed forces along lines of greater mobility.[14]

Among the reorganization proposals suggested, the majority stressed the need of creating three combat divisions with 100 to 160 medium-sized tanks each, and five to six motorized infantry divisions.[15] Also, besides strengthening the three major Swiss fortifications at Sargans, Gotthard and St. Maurice, they insisted on the need for modernizing and expanding the air force from 400 to 600 of the latest model fighter planes, reconnaissance planes, and aircraft capable of delivering tactical atomic bombs.[16]

[10] *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber das Volksbegehren fuer das Entscheidungsrecht des Volkes ueber die Ausruestung der schweizerischen Armee mit Atomwaffen* (Bern, June 1962), No. 8509, p. 1.

[11] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz* (1963), p. 544.

[12] *Bericht des Zentralvorstandes der Schweizerischen Offiziersgesellschaft auf Grund der Studie einer Sonderkommission ueber die Reorganisation der Armee* (Schweizerische Offiziersgesellschaft, May 1957), pp. 10, 23.

[13] Lorenz Stucki, *Davids Chancen gegen Goliath* (Bern: Alfred Scherz Verlag, 1959), pp. 27-28.

[14] *Bericht des Zentralvorstandes. . . , op. cit.*, p. 17.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 23, 28.

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The minority believed the West would have little chance of survival against a Soviet onslaught.[17] They worked on the assumption that a Soviet attack would not be of a frontal nature but that NATO would be outmaneuvered by way of Scandinavia in the direction of England, and through the Middle East and Egypt in the direction of North Africa and Spain. Then Soviet submarines would establish a blockade of Europe.[18] Consequently they argued that the Swiss should abandon the hope of playing a significant role in the defense of Europe as the majority envisioned it, and, instead, concentrate on establishing an effective defense system on the Swiss terrain, which might prevent the Soviet Union from attacking Switzerland in the first place.[19]

Based on their evaluation of the situation, the minority advised against extensively motorizing the Swiss Army. They emphasized that a largely motorized force would encounter many handicaps in parts of Switzerland where the terrain is difficult.[20] Instead, they stressed the necessity of strengthening the existing fortifications,[21] and proposed that tanks be employed mainly in support of the infantry. Their view was that the number of tanks should be limited and kept in a tank "pool" upon which the infantry could call at a moment's notice in the event of need.[22]

The minority also took issue with the majority on the need for acquiring additional fighter planes. They did not believe the air force, in the event of an attack, could at any time assert itself effectively over its own territory. Therefore, they concluded, the air force should be employed only in an emergency situation to aid the ground forces, and not attempt to defend the entire Swiss air space, or try to deliver tactical atomic bombs on targets outside Switzerland.[23]

In the chain of events, the next significant step came in June 1960. The government then submitted to parliament a general outline on how it intended to adjust the army to modern methods of warfare. It recognized that the principle of "static defense" had shortcomings and now stressed the need of improving the army's mobility, the modernization of the air defense system, and the necessity of augmenting firepower.[24]

[17]Stucki, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[18]*Ibid.*, p. 12.
[19]*Ibid.*, p. 22 ff.
[20]*Bericht des Zentralvorstandes. . . , op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.
[21]*Ibid.*, p. 24.
[22]*Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
[23]*Ibid.*, p. 20.
[24]*Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Organisation des Heeres* (*Truppenordnung*) (Bern, June 1960), No. 7987, p. 15 ff.

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Since "static defense" would be an inadequate strategy in the flatland of central Switzerland, one of the major points of the reorganization plan called for the creation of three mechanized divisions.[25] Central Switzerland was now to be divided into three army corps areas, each consisting of one field division, one border division, one mechanized division, and some corps troops making up one infantry and one bicycle regiment. To safeguard the southern borders and the Alps a fourth corps was envisioned, to comprise three mountain divisions and army corps troops.[26] The plan called for no changes in the border or fortress brigades because they still served specific functions adequately.[27] Insofar as this general part of the reorganization proposal is concerned, the government reported in 1966 that it had been largely accomplished.[28]

According to the same plan, the primary task of the air force must be to support the armed forces. But, contrary to the old strategy, this would no longer be the sole task: now it must also be prepared to attack and destroy enemy bases and installations outside Swiss territory which directly threaten Swiss ground forces — particularly platforms from which missiles can be launched.[29] Thus, besides the funds necessary for introducing various kinds of defense missiles and improved radar-equipped anti-aircraft guns,[30] the government, in 1961, requested from parliament 871 million Swiss francs to acquire 100 Mirage III S planes, spare parts, hardware and appropriate ammunition.[31]

Whereas the reorganization of the army proceeded largely according to schedule, the improvement of the air force has been only partially accomplished. The funds originally requested for the 100 Mirage III S planes proved insufficient because the government grossly misjudged the cost as well as the adequacy of the

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 47-48, 66.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 23.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 48.
[28] "Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber die Konzeption der militaerischen Landesverteidigung," *Bundesblatt* (1966), I, No. 24, p. 854. For additional reports on improvements in the army's effectiveness, see: "Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber die Beschaffung von Panzerhaubitzen M 109 und Schweizerpanzern 68 sowie von weiterem Material fuer die mechanisierten Verbaende (Ruestungsprogramm 1968 I)," *Bundesblatt* (1968), I, No. 12, p. 462 ff.; "Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber die Beschaffung von Kriegsmaterial (Ruestungsprogramm 1968 II)," *ibid.*, No. 17, p. 921 ff.
[29] *Botschaft . . . (Truppenordnung)* 1960, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 21-22.
[31] "Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber die Beschaffung von Kampfflugzeugen (Mirage III S) und von weiterem Material fuer die Fliegertruppen," *Bundesblatt* (1961), I, No. 18, p. 822.

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planes as all-purpose aircraft.[32] By 1966 it had reconciled itself to the fact that financial barriers would not permit acquisition of more than fifty-seven Mirage planes, and of these only thirty-six will be fighters.[33] The last of these planes was scheduled to be delivered by the summer of 1969.[34]

On the crucial question of significantly augmenting the army's firepower the government shared the opinion that this could best be accomplished by means of tactical nuclear weapons. But realistically, in 1960, it recognized that (1) due to the nuclear monopoly then in existence these weapons were not obtainable from abroad, and (2) Switzerland was not yet capable of producing nuclear weapons herself because of her inability to secure uranium for military purposes, the lack of a sufficient cadre of experts and technicians, and the immense cost of such an undertaking. The government noted, however, that the nuclear monopoly would one day be broken, and that Switzerland must carefully follow developments in the nuclear field so that sometime in the future the question of introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the Swiss military arsenal could again be reviewed.[35]

IV

Various developments in the early 1960's made it clear that Switzerland could eventually produce her own nuclear weapons; yet there have been no official Swiss estimates on how quickly this could be accomplished.[36] Switzerland is by no means a newcomer to the atomic energy field, but her efforts so far have been devoted exclusively to research and experimentation for peaceful purposes. The government pointed out in 1956 that in the interwar period Switzerland had belonged to those countries which were in the forefront of nuclear research, but that the subsequent efforts of

[32]*Bericht der vom Nationalrat und Staenderat eigesetzten Kommissionen an die Eidgenoessischen Raete ueber die Abklaerung der Mirage-Angelegenheit,* September 1, 1964, pp. 1 ff., 56; "Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber die Gewaehrung eines Zusatzkredites fuer die Beschaffung von Kampfflugzeugen Mirage-III," *Bundesblatt* (1964), I, No. 18, pp. 915-916; "VIII. Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber den Stand der Beschaffung von Kampfflugzeugen Mirage-III," *Bundesblatt* (1968), II, No. 30, p. 142 ff.

[33]"Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber die Konzeption der militaerischen Landesverteidigung" (1966), *op. cit.*, p. 855.

[34]"VII. Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber den Stand der Beschaffung von Kampfflugzeugen Mirage-III," *Bundesblatt* (1968), I, No. 6, p. 202.

[35]*Botschaft . . . (Truppenordnung)* 1960, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

[36]Gustav Daeniker, *Strategie des Kleinstaats* (Frauenfeld und Stuttgart: Verlag Huber, 1966), p. 161.

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the leading powers in the period after World War II had, for obvious reasons, left her far behind.[37]

Nevertheless, even with her limited resources, atomic research for peaceful purposes constitutes at present a significant part of Switzerland's overall endeavors. The Swiss program is of more than passing interest because there is always the possibility that the experiences thus gained can at any time be converted for military purposes.

In 1956, in reviewing atomic energy research in Switzerland since World War II, the government acknowledged its profound debt to the American Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which permitted the United States to make available for peaceful purposes to foreign countries small amounts of uranium, some atomic equipment and certain pertinent information. On the strength of this, Swiss scientists were accelerating the pace of research considerably.[38] Subsequently Switzerland signed atomic treaties with France, Canada, Brazil and Sweden, and not only exchanges pertinent information, students and professionals, but also receives from France, Canada and Sweden small quantities of uranium for peaceful research projects.[39]

Valuable theoretical and practical knowledge, leading to a greater understanding of the nature of the atom, the possibilities of finding means of protection against radiation and the economic utilization of atomic energy, is also being gained by virtue of Switzerland's membership in CERN, OECE, IAEA, ENEA and OECD.[40] Insofar as nuclear reactor technology is concerned, Swiss scientists participate in the operation of the OECD Halden Boiling Heavy Reactor Project in Norway, and in the OECD High Temperature Reactor Project DRAGON at Dorset, England.[41]

Within national borders, too, atomic physics and reactor technology are subjects of vital interest to Swiss scientists. In spite of this, Switzerland, according to Dr. E. Choisy, President of the

[37]"Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Genehmigung des Abkommens ueber die Zusammenarbeit der Schweizerischen Regierung und der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika auf dem Gebiete der friedlichen Verwendung der Atomenergie," *Bundesblatt* (1956), II, No. 34, p. 122.

[38]*Ibid.*, p. 126.

[39]"Bundesbeschluss betreffend die Genehmigung von Abkommen ueber die Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiete der friedlichen Verwendung der Atomenergie mit Frankreich und Kanada," *Sammlung der eidgenoessischen Gesetze* (1958), p. 692 ff.; *Atom Pressedienst* (Bern, April 1967), No. 4, p. 1; *Schweizerische Vereinigung fuer Atomenergie — Bulletin* (Bern, March 1968), No. 5, p. 4.

[40]*Atomenergie und Strahlenschutz in der Schweiz (Handbuch)* (Zurich: Fabag, 1963 and supplements), F2. 1, p. 1 ff.

[41]*Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

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Swiss Association of Atomic Energy, "cannot show at the present time [1963] unusual accomplishments."[42] Institutions of higher learning that are particularly strong in theoretical studies of the atom are the universities of Basel, Bern, Freiburg, Geneva and Zurich. The most extensive atomic research and experimentation programs being conducted are at the Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich and the University of Lausanne's Institute of Technology. Important research and experimentation centers are also located at the universities of Basel, Geneva, Lausanne, Neuchatel and Zurich.[43] Furthermore, individuals engaged in atomic research have access to the Swimming Pool Reactor SAPHIR at Wuerenlingen (Aargau), the DIORIT reactor, which is a tank cooled by a conducting tube, also at Wuerenlingen, and the pressure-tube reactor at Lucens in the canton of Vaud.[44]

Due to the general technological advances made and the knowledge gained by Swiss scientists, the production of tactical nuclear weapons is no longer considered impossible. Back in 1962 one of the leading Swiss authorities on atomic energy, R. Sontheim, stated that the easiest and least expensive method of producing some atomic weapons in Switzerland would be by way of utilizing plutonium (PU-239).[45] To produce three or four atomic bombs annually with an explosive equivalent of between ten and twenty kilotons (kt) of TNT would require anywhere from forty to fifty kilograms of PU-239. Of course, the construction of an appropriate reactor must constitute the first step. For autarchical reasons the reactor would have to be moderated by heavy water (D_2O), and the quantity of heavy water needed to produce three or four bombs is at least thirty tons annually.[46]

Sontheim estimated that it would take approximately four years to design and construct an appropriate reactor; one year for it to be tested; two years for the reactor to work at full capacity; one year for the production of plutonium; and two years for the

[42]*Ibid.*, p. III.

[43]*Ibid.*, G2. 1, p. 1 ff. See the Handbook also for the research equipment available.

[44]*Ibid.*, A, p. 10 ff. For problems encountered in the development of a heavy water reactor of Swiss design at Lucens, see *Schweizerische Vereinigung fuer Atomenergie: Jahresbericht 1967*, p. 4, and *Nuclear Newsletter from Switzerland*, Summer 1968, pp. 1-2.

[45]The production of plutonium is simpler and far less expensive than the production of U-235. See the valuable discussion of this point by Leonard Beaton, *Must the Bomb Spread?* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 25-27, 32-37, 87 ff.

[46]R. Sontheim, "Die Moeglichkeiten der Herstellung von Nuklearwaffen in der Schweiz," *Schweizer Journal*, No. 1, 1962, pp. 29-30.

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development of a few weapons. Consequently Switzerland could not be in possession of atomic weapons for at least ten years; in twenty years she could have in her military arsenal between thirty and forty atomic warheads.[47]

However, to be in a position to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, large quantities of natural uranium must be available. The Swiss government noted in 1960 its inability to secure uranium for military purposes. Since then thirty-five uranium deposits have been discovered in Switzerland.[48] But Sontheim has pointed out that so far technical and financial resources have been insufficient to ascertain the economic value of the discoveries.[49] He estimated that the cost of securing sixty tons of uranium annually for military needs from Swiss sources would range anywhere from thirty to 120 million Swiss francs.[50]

Yet the overall cost factor in producing nuclear weapons would not be as forbidding as the government considered it to be in the late 1950's. In calculating the cost for the first ten-year period, Sontheim concluded that the average would amount to approximately 140 million Swiss francs annually. He argued that in the long run the production of atomic weapons would prove more economical than the acquisition of conventional ones, and supported his evidence by comparing the firepower of conventional with atomic artillery. Conventional artillery requires 7,200 cannons to produce explosive power equivalent to 15 kt TNT; the delivery time would be three minutes; 800 five-ton trucks must be employed to deliver shells; and the process would require a crew of 300,000. An atomic artillery shell with the explosive equivalent of 15 kt TNT, on the other hand, can be delivered to the target in one second, and the need is for only one five-ton truck and a total crew of 800.[51]

In lieu of official Swiss estimates, the Sontheim calculation can serve as a guideline, and it is widely accepted in Switzerland. In general, there is little doubt that Switzerland is now capable of producing nuclear weapons. Although the Swiss government considered the difficulties still insurmountable in 1960, Sontheim was

[47]*Ibid.*, p. 29.
[48]Th. Huegi, "Uranvorkommen in der Schweiz unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung des alpinen Raumes," *Schweizerische Vereinigung fuer Atomenergie*, No. 2 (1964), p. 1 ff.
[49]Sontheim, *op. cit.*, p. 29; Huegi, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Lack of financial resources has continued to hinder a thorough evaluation of the uranium deposits in Switzerland. *Atom Pressedienst* (Bern, December 1967), No. 12, pp. 1-3.
[50]Sontheim, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
[51]*Ibid.*, p. 30.

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able to measure technological progress and arrive at a timetable in 1962 — the same year in which Leonard Beaton and John Maddox reached their independent conclusions. Like Sontheim, they observed that it would take Switzerland no less than a decade to be in possession of nuclear weapons.[52]

Although we have no further Swiss discussions since 1962 regarding a timetable, Beaton, who in 1963 became Director of Studies of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, appears to have revised his estimate in 1966. According to him the Swiss reactor DIORIT already yields a sufficient quantity of plutonium for Switzerland to produce perhaps one atomic bomb annually.[53] The reactor at Lucens has the capacity to produce enough plutonium for perhaps an additional two bombs annually.[54] Furthermore, although for many nations acquisition of the required uranium is still problematic, Beaton points out that "the spread of peaceful atomic facilities is also the spread of plutonium production capacity."[55] In other words, in their utilization of natural uranium certain types of reactors acquired for peaceful purposes have the capacity to produce plutonium.

Because of Beaton's revised estimate, substantiating the general consensus that Switzerland is capable of producing tactical nuclear weapons — something the Swiss government has never denied since 1960 — the question is: When could she possess such weapons? In 1962 Beaton and Maddox, on the one hand, and Sontheim, on the other, agreed independently that such weapons could be in the Swiss military arsenal approximately ten years after the government committed the country to a nuclear weapons course. Since Switzerland already has reactors that produce enough plutonium for several atomic bombs per year, Sontheim's timetable — four years to design and construct an appropriate reactor, one year to test the reactor, two years for the reactor to

[52]Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 166-167. As early as 1957 Klaus Knorr concluded that it would take Switzerland considerably less than ten years to produce such weapons once the government decided to embark upon a nuclear course. ("Nuclear Weapons: 'Haves' and 'Have-Nots,'" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1957, p. 168.) From the evidence gathered for the present article, Knorr's estimate was too optimistic. Despite its more general conclusion, the same observation holds true for the study by William C. Davidson, Marvin Kalkstein and Christopher Hohenemser, *The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control* (Washington: National Planning Association, 1960), Pamphlet No. 108, pp. 27-28.

[53]Beaton, *Must the Bomb Spread?*, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

[54]*Ibid.* The Lucens reactor attained criticality for the first time on December 29, 1966. See *Nuclear Newsletter from Switzerland*, Autumn 1967, p. 1.

[55]Beaton, *Must the Bomb Spread?*, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

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work at full capacity, and one year for the production of plutonium — is outdated.[56] What remains of his original estimate, and something Beaton does not deny, is that it would still take two years for the development of a few weapons after all the above factors have been met, were the government to decide on a nuclear course.

V

As was pointed out earlier, the second phase of the Swiss atomic debate, between 1958 and 1963, can be characterized as one in which the government was actually interested in equipping the army with tactical nuclear weapons but realized at the time the difficulties involved. During this period parliament approved a proposal for the reorganization of the army which has in the meantime been largely implemented. Although the reorganization was conceived only as an intermediate step before the armed forces could be equipped with nuclear weapons, it become basic government policy during the third phase of the debate.

The government's *volte-face* coincided with a relaxation of political tensions in Europe, marked by the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Thus, though the federal executive had instructed the proper military department in 1958 to prepare a blueprint dealing with the introduction of nuclear weapons into the military arsenal, and this has not been submitted so far, it has not seemed to be much concerned with this problem until recently. Some military critics have implied that the government is discouraging the submission of such a report because this may again result in controversial debates regarding the adequacy of the Swiss defense system.[57] In a 1966 policy statement succinctly summarizing the new attitude which has been discernible since 1963, the government articulated its sincere hope that an effective nuclear nonproliferation treaty would be signed so that the threat of nuclear war would vanish from the horizon.[58]

But hopes were diminished and fears reawakened when, shortly after the Soviet Union and the United States had finally agreed

[56]When Sontheim made his calculations in 1962 the DIORIT reactor had been operational for about two years.

[57]Lieutenant Hans Glarner, "Wo sind die Entscheidungsgrundlagen fuer unsere Landesverteidigung im Atomzeitalter?," *Allgemeine schweizerische Militaerzeitschrift,* August 1965, pp. 454-455. For a discussion of the necessity to acquire tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent against aggression, see Major Gustav Daeniker's "Strategie des Kleinstaats," *Die Weltwoche,* August 26, 1966 and September 2, 1966.

[58]"Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber die Konzeption der militaerischen Landesverteidigung" (1966), *op. cit.*, pp. 871-872.

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upon the text of such a treaty, the Soviet Union with some of its allies invaded Czechoslovakia. This military intervention, and the threat of further military moves on the part of the USSR, had at least temporarily arrested the progress made in relaxing tensions between East and West. The recent events in Czechoslovakia will almost certainly open a new phase in the Swiss nuclear debate.

Since the Swiss electorate overwhelmingly rejected the two atomic initiatives of 1962 and 1963, thus giving the government carte blanche in this domain of policy, it is doubtful that this question will again be submitted to the electorate. But aside from popular participation in the debate, the government, even before the invasion, in an *aide-mémoire* on November 17, 1967, and again in May 1968, expressed strong reservations against acceding to the provisions of the nonproliferation treaty then being drafted. It pointed out that Switzerland could not sign such a treaty unless it provided satisfactorily for: (1) a clear definition of the control system to be established; (2) Switzerland's right to reject certain inspectors and accompany on their inspection tours those she accepts; (3) the right of Swiss industry not to be hindered from the peaceful utilization of atomic energy; (4) the duty of nuclear powers to furnish information they secure from the development of atomic weapons when it can be utilized for peaceful purposes; (5) the right to undertake nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; (6) the establishment of effective arbitration procedures to settle differences arising on the interpretation and application of the treaty's provisions; (7) the necessity for most potential nuclear powers to sign and ratify such a treaty; and (8) the renunciation of the use of atomic weapons against countries not in possession of these arms.[59]

By the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia more than fifty countries had signed the treaty, but not Switzerland. Despite the fact that the final version met to an extent some of the demands made by nonnuclear powers, including those of Switzerland, the attitude of France and particularly of Communist China constitutes a major threat to the treaty's effectiveness and many potential nuclear powers still have strong reservations regarding its provisions. A crucial point is that the nuclear "have" countries have so far not given any meaningful assurances that they would refrain from using nuclear weapons against countries not in possession of such arms. In view of these loopholes the Swiss were particularly interested in seeing whether the United States

[59] *Neue Zuercher Zeitung,* November 17 and December 19, 1967; May 16, 1968.

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would ratify the treaty and, if so, how the Senate would interpret its provisions.[60]

VI

Since Switzerland's policy of neutrality explicitly prohibits her from entering into political and military alliances, yet implies her ability to defend her territory when attacked — in which case she cannot, in theory, rely upon anyone to come to her aid — a natural objective of the Swiss is to acquire nuclear weapons. In this vein, Beaton observes: that politically "friendly countries possess almost unlimited armouries of nuclear weapons cannot be an important consideration with a true neutral, for to recognize that another power is friendly in this sense is to abandon neutrality to dependence."[61] Because of this danger he believes that "doctrines of neutrality and neutralism will inevitably play an important part in stimulating the spread of nuclear weapons."[62]

By forgoing nuclear acquisition so far, Switzerland, from the viewpoint of world politics, has opted for a conventional response to an unconventional challenge. Although far from constituting a heroic stand, her position on this question has helped to stem the tide of proliferation. Among the government's reasons for not committing her to a nuclear course is that she is surrounded by friendly powers which have no territorial ambitions against her. Should a major nuclear confrontation develop between East and West in Europe, Switzerland, if seriously threatened or actually attacked, would come under the NATO umbrella. In that event circumstances would force her to abandon her long-cherished principle of armed neutrality and take part in the defense of the West — and her dependence on the West in such a conflict would not necessarily be lessened by the possession of tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently it may be concluded that the government will continue to follow a neutral course in politics — with or without nuclear weapons — and hope to escape such a conflict. But if she is unsuccessful in her endeavor to remain neutral, Switzerland's safety valve for the foreseeable future remains NATO.

[60]*Ibid.*, July 3, 1968. The Nonproliferation Treaty has in the meantime passed the U.S. Senate, been signed by ninety-three countries, and ratified by twenty-four, including Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. Although Switzerland has recently signed the treaty she has not ratified it. Forty-three nations have to ratify the treaty before it becomes effective.

[61]Beaton, *Must the Bomb Spread?, op. cit.*, p. 62.

[62]*Ibid.*, p. 63.

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THE USSR AND UN PEACEKEEPING

by Robert Weiner

THE peacekeeping crisis that erupted in the Middle East on May 16, 1967[1] occurred, ironically, at a time when the United Nations was convening in Fifth Special Session in an attempt, among other things, to resolve its continuing financial predicament with regard to peacekeeping operations. The organization had been plagued by difficulties in meeting expenses for its international police efforts ever since the Soviet Union and certain other states had objected to paying assessments levied upon the general membership for the upkeep of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC). Since the termination of UNEF's mission in the Middle East, as brought about by Egypt in May 1967, was supported by the USSR, an examination of the Soviet position toward UNEF and ONUC may be useful. From it we may gain insight into the factors hindering agreement, and those that might promote understanding, between the superpowers on the issue of the UN's peacekeeping role.

The Creation of UNEF and ONUC

A Canadian draft resolution presented at the First Emergency Special Session in 1956, requesting the Secretary-General to set up an emergency international force, provided for the creation of UNEF. When the Soviets elected to abstain rather than vote against the resolution, they attempted to justify their action by expressing the hope that the force would prevent any further extension of aggression in the Middle East.[2] Nonetheless, they also guarded themselves against future developments. Even though their abstention can be interpreted as a form of tacit approval, they made the point that the establishment of the Middle East force was illegal because the General Assembly action bypassed the Security Council, which was contrary to the Charter of the United

[1]On that day General Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the UAR armed forces, requested the withdrawal of all United Nations Emergency Forces from positions in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip in which they had served for ten years as a buffer between the Arabs and Israel.

[2]U.N. Doc. A/PV.567, November 7, 1956, p. 128.

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Nations. Regarding the emergency situation, although the USSR believed that the transfer of control over the Suez Canal to an international force was an undisguised attempt to settle the Suez Canal question in favor of the United Kingdom and France,[3] she realized that the United Arab Republic, as the victim of aggression, was compelled to agree to the introduction of UNEF on its territory. Not only had the permission of Egypt as host state been secured (in 1967 the question of Egypt's permission for the UNEF to remain on her soil was to be extremely important), but UNEF, at the time, appeared to be the best possible solution in a highly charged situation.[4]

Turning to the Congo crisis, we also find that Moscow did not originally oppose the creation of the United Nations force for the Congo, the largest peacekeeping operation ever mounted by the UN.[5] For example, in July 1960 the Soviet Union voted in favor of a Tunisian resolution presented to the Security Council, which authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Congo government with whatever military assistance necessary to deal with the turmoil following the mutiny of the Congolese army.

The initial Soviet attitude toward the creation of these international forces must be viewed against the USSR's overall analyses of both crises. In the Middle East case, the Soviets felt that the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Great Britain and France, in the fall of 1956, was the result of a plan which had been worked out meticulously in advance.[6] The reason given for the Anglo-French interposition between Egyptian and Israeli forces — to protect the Suez Canal — was a myth as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. In further explaining their view of events leading to the Suez crisis, the Soviets presented the theory of collective colonialism, i.e., the idea of several imperialist powers collaborating with one another in order to reimpose a system of colonialism on a former subject area. They seemed convinced that Egypt was the victim of

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[4] Later on, in pleading before the International Court of Justice over the applicability of Article 17 (2) to the financing of peacekeeping operations, the Soviet Union further tried to rationalize her tacit acceptance of UNEF by pointing out that she had only wished the emergency special session in 1956 to make appropriate recommendations to deal with the situation, and not to go so far as the use of force. See D. W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1964), p. 295.

[5] At its height, the Congo operation consisted of almost 20,000 men. See H. G. Nicholas, "The Peace-Keeping Experience of the League and the United Nations," *NATO Letter,* May 1966, p. 10.

[6] See Walter Z. Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 238.

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a colonialist plot which involved not only Great Britain, France and Israel, but also "financial" and "military" circles in the United States.

Similarly, although in United Nations debates the USSR time and again placed major blame for the situation on the Belgians, "colonial collusion" was scored as the root of the trouble in the Congo. Belgium, whose paratroopers were originally sent to the Congo in 1960 to protect Belgians, was not the sole aggressor, but was in collusion with the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany and NATO.

The Soviet Union further stressed that colonialism threatened not only the countries directly concerned in 1956 and 1960 (Egypt and the Congo), but all of the Middle East and all of Africa. For example, Mr. Sobolev, a Soviet delegate to the First Emergency Special Session, linked the "aggression" against Egypt to the USSR's view of the larger picture by contending that the "aggressors" had hurled a challenge at all the Arab "peoples," and all the "peoples" of the East who were fighting colonialism.[7] And when the Security Council met to consider the request of the Congolese government that the UN render it aid, the USSR maintained that the Belgian re-entry into the Congo was really part of a wider "capitalistic" plot directed at gaining control of all of Africa.

Thus from the outset the Soviet approach to UN operations in the Middle East and the Congo was developed within a Marxist-Leninist framework of analysis, tinctured by a strong mixture of pragmatic self-interest. The Soviets viewed both peacekeeping initiatives within a framework of conflict, which involved a clash between the international forces of nationalism and colonialism. As a result, they conveyed the impression that they were under no false illusions about the environmental factors conditioning the success or failure of the operations.

Article 43

Besides objecting to UNEF and ONUC on the charge that they were Western "fronts," the Soviets were critical of the forces on constitutional grounds. In this respect, the USSR hewed to a strict construction of the UN Charter. Her spokesmen placed a great deal of emphasis on their interpretation of Chapter VII of the Charter, entitled "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace,

[7]U.N. Doc. A/PV.562, November 1, 1956, p. 17.

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Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Much of their argument revolves around the meaning attached to Article 43, which describes the procedure to be followed in setting up the international police force envisaged by the Founding Fathers at San Francisco in 1945. However, because a number of differences between the Soviet Union, the United States and the other permanent members of the Security Council over the nature of the future peacekeeping force prevented a consensus, the agreements called for in Article 43 were never drawn up.[8] The Soviets used this later as a justification for not paying the assessments for UNEF and ONUC.

The USSR argued that the financial impositions for UNEF and ONUC could only be decided on the basis of the special agreements called for by Article 43, and since no such agreements had ever been concluded, member states like the Soviet Union were under no obligation to pay assessments for the two peacekeeping operations. While Article 43 nowhere mentions the word "expenses" with any specific meaning attached to it, the Soviets consistently maintained that agreements concluded under the article would certainly cover the cost of financing any peacekeeping efforts. They also contended that reference to the terms "assistance" and "facilities" in paragraph 1 could be interpreted as covering the necessary financial arrangements. On the other hand, one could argue that "assistance" and "facilities" referred only to logistical matters, with no connection to the financial aspect of peacekeeping.

The USSR further used Article 43 to justify her denial of the principle of collective financial responsibility by arguing that the "expenses" mentioned in Article 17 of the Charter, upon which the principle was based, were of an entirely different nature than the "expenses" that would be incurred if Article 43 were implemented. One might conclude at this point, from an analysis of the Soviet position, that if the agreements according to Article 43 were actually drawn up, the financial crisis over peacekeeping might be solved.[9] When pleading her case at the International Court of Justice, the USSR also pointed out that while Article 17 lays down a "general" rule for financing, Article 43 contains a "particular" rule which relates to expenditure for peacekeeping.

[8]See Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 679.

[9]Czechoslovakia made this point. See U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.466, November 25, 1965, p. 4.

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Thus the Soviets tried to persuade the Court not to confuse the general with the particular.

Moscow contended that a study of the documents at the San Francisco Conference of 1945 supported its position, because an Australian amendment to Article 19, for the purpose of extending that article's provisions to expenses connected with the practical implementation of peace, was rejected.[10] (Article 19 punishes members in arrears on financial obligations supporting the regular budget as formulated in Article 17.) However, the International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion delivered in 1962, found that if agreements had actually been set up according to Article 43, some of the expenses for a peacekeeping force might have been apportioned within the meaning of Article 17.[11]

With the passage of time, the USSR placed renewed emphasis on negotiation of the agreements called for in Article 43. In a memorandum of July 10, 1964, to which the Soviets have attached great importance, she established some guidelines which she felt would be acceptable in carrying out the provisions of the article so that national contingents could promptly be made available to the Security Council for inclusion in a United Nations Force.[12] The memorandum is rather explicit about the mechanical procedures to be followed in drawing up the necessary agreements for a UN force. The USSR, with modifications later, proposed that a draft agreement, containing the main provisions contemplated under Article 43, could be prepared by the Military Staff Committee, and then submitted to the Security Council for consideration.[13] If the Security Council approved this model, the agreements necessary between the Security Council and the states or groups of states interested in supplying national contingents would commence. These would define the conditions and terms under which the contingents would be provided.[14] In some quarters such a pro-

[10]The Secretary-General, appearing before the Fifth Committee of the UN, refuted this argument, which in effect had also been presented by Mexico. See U.N. Doc. A/C5/SR.839, April 17, 1961, p. 59.

[11]See Leo Gross, "Expenses of the United Nations for Peacekeeping Operations: the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice," *International Organization,* Winter 1963, p. 19.

[12]See U.N. Doc. S/5811, July 10, 1964, p. 6.

[13]See U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.23, March 14, 1967, p. 9. The Military Staff Committee, according to Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter, had the responsibility of assisting the Security Council on the use of UN armed force.

[14]The USSR also felt that the agreements could include undertakings by the states concerned in accordance with Article 45 of the Charter, to keep certain units of their armed forces in an immediate state of readiness so that they could be placed at the Council's disposal. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.23, *loc. cit.*

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posal was seen as an attempt to take advantage of the increased Afro-Asian membership[15] and its demand for greater participation in UN decision-making, since the Soviet Union had also suggested that a number of African and Asian countries be invited to participate in the work of a revived and expanded Military Staff Committee.[16]

A further twist to the Soviet proposal was the suggestion that the international force be based on the well-known troika principle, which meant a political and military, as well as geographical, division of forces. The international force itself, the command of the force, and even the Military Staff Committee,[17] would be equally divided among the East, West and neutralist states. A single commander, for each specific operation, would be picked by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with the governments directly or immediately concerned, including states providing troops and supplies.[18]

Moreover, the USSR suggested that in the future socialist countries be allowed to participate at all levels of a peacekeeping force, exclusive, that is, of the permanent members of the Security Council, which would nonetheless be allowed to participate in the Military Staff Committee and the overall strategic direction of the force. When the Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly met in 1964, both Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, as socialist states, volunteered to supply contingents of their armed forces to the Security Council, in accordance with the terms called for in Article 43 of the Charter.[19]

The desire by the Soviet Union to revive the defunct Military Staff Committee for the planning and coordination of peacekeeping operations can be seen as an attempt not only to assert the "exclusive" responsibility of the Security Council, but also to minimize the power of the Secretary-General in overseeing such operations. Earlier, in criticizing the ONUC operation, the Soviets contended that Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold had violated

[15]For an interesting study of the African bloc in the UN, see Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Africa in the United Nations* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

[16]U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.465, November 24, 1965, p. 7.

[17]They noted that states providing troops for a UN force, as well as the permanent members of the Security Council, should be invited to participate in the work of the Military Staff Committee.

[18]U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.465, November 24, 1965, p. 8; U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.23, March 14, 1967, p. 9.

[19]At a meeting of the Special Political Committee during the Twentieth Session of the UN, Czechoslovakia reiterated her offer of contingents. See U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.466, November 25, 1965, p. 4.

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Article 43 of the Charter by determining alone which states would participate.[20] As part of the general plan the USSR suggested establishing regional organs of the Military Staff Committee in various parts of the world, such as Africa. These steps were to take place in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter,[21] and in consultation with the appropriate regional agencies.

The Soviet proposal for the negotiation of new agreements under Article 43 met with an initially favorable reaction among some states.[22] Eventually, in March 1968, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations set up a Working Group to furnish reports on the logistical problems connected with UN peacekeeping operations.[23] The Soviet Union stressed that the Working Group should aid the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee in implementing Article 43.[24]

Soviet emphasis on the necessity for concluding the agreements, however, was open to criticism, because Chapter VII of the Charter encompasses only "enforcement action," and not other types of peacekeeping operations, which possibly could be instituted differently. The USSR argued that it was not possible to draw a distinction between "enforcement action" as referred to in Chapter VII and other operations set up for peacekeeping purposes.[25] She held the opinion that any use of armed force in the name of the United Nations would represent one of the enforcement measures provided for.[26] Moreover, she maintained that only the Security Council had the right to undertake such "enforcement action," citing, among other things, Articles 5 and 50 of the Charter to justify this position.

As we can see, her adherence to a strict construction of the Charter as a treaty which could not be informally amended by *ad*

[20]The Soviet Union also expressed the opinion that Hammarskjold had violated paragraph 1 of Article 48 when he alone seemed to determine those states which would participate in the ONUC operation. Paragraph 1 of Article 48 reads: "The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine."

[21]U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.465, November 24, 1965, p. 7. Article 47, paragraph 4, provides for the establishment of regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee.

[22]Canada, for example, which has traditionally played a crucial role in the peacekeeping function of the United Nations, felt that the Soviet plan had merit, especially since it would strengthen staff arrangements at UN Headquarters. See U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.461, November 19, 1965, p. 1.

[23]*U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, May 1968, p. 52.

[24]*Ibid.*, April 1968, pp. 67-68.

[25]U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.486, December 10, 1965, p. 2.

[26]The Soviet interpretation of enforcement action as covering all manner of peacekeeping has not been accepted by the United States. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.8, June 25, 1965, p. 15.

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hoc peacekeeping practices such as UNEF and ONUC led her to argue for the primary control of the Security Council over all phases of peacekeeping operations — the establishment of a United Nations Force, its task, composition and size, direction and command, and the mode of financing it.[27] However, the Soviet position suffered somewhat because the term peacekeeping was nowhere mentioned or defined in the relevant portions of the Charter. When several delegations suggested the insertion of a new chapter into the Charter, between Chapters VI and VII, to deal explicitly with the topic of peacekeeping, the Soviet Union did not seem entirely opposed, although her spokesmen took pains to point out that defining peacekeeping was an artificial problem.

The USSR's contention that the Security Council exercised primary jurisdiction over all aspects of peacekeeping operations assumed more sophistication when the Soviets stressed the necessity of using all the means available in Chapter VI of the Charter, entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," to resolve cases of international conflict. Their brief for utilizing the procedures of Chapter VI, prior to those of Chapter VII, was based on the argument that experience had shown that foreign troops of any kind, including those of the United Nations, often had the effect of complicating a crisis, through interference in a state's domestic affairs. They held that resort to all of the methods mentioned in Chapter VI could serve as a check against the hasty utilization of UN forces under Chapter VII in the interests of the West.

The USSR also felt that it might be useful to rely upon Article 41 of the Charter when there is a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression. Under this article, she pointed out, the Security Council could adopt enforcement measures of a nonmilitary character, such as the interruption of economic relations, the severance of diplomatic relations, and other related actions.

The Soviet Union did state that under exceptional circumstances it might be appropriate to send a UN armed force to the area concerned,[28] to be used only to prevent or halt acts of aggression against the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state. But the Soviets believed the states threatened in such a way would be the "newer" nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America, where "imperialists," utilizing UN machinery in a repressive fashion, would try to crush national liberation movements.

[27]U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.23, March 14, 1967, p. 7.
[28]*Ibid.*, p. 6.

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The Financial Question

What had started out as and remained basically a political and constitutional problem, assumed financial overtones.[29] For example, the evolution of the UN Emergency Force from a temporary into a lasting arrangement until it was sent packing by Egypt in 1967, was an unforeseen development and a financial burden for the organization. The Soviet Union refused to pay the assessments levied for the upkeep of UNEF, pointing out that "the only correct approach would be to decide that all UNEF expenses should be borne by the countries responsible for the aggression against Egypt, namely, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel."[30] Similarly, she refused to recognize the principle of collective financial responsibility for the operations in the Congo,[31] again asserting that since the expenses did not fall within the meaning of Article 17 they should be borne by the "aggressors" responsible for the situation. In the Soviet view Article 17 of the Charter applied only to "regular" or "administrative" expenses of the budget, while UNEF and ONUC constituted extraordinary expenses. Paragraph 2 only referred to normal expenses, and this had "clearly" been the intention of the participating states at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. As a matter of fact, it was illegal to use the term "arrears" in reference to payments for UNEF and ONUC, since "arrears" could only designate something legitimately owed, and this the Soviets felt did not apply in the case of UNEF and ONUC.[32]

The financial crisis over peacekeeping had reached such dimensions by the middle of December 1961 that it was decided to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether or not UNEF and ONUC expenses were governed by Article 17 (2) of the Charter. The Soviet Union objected to making the request because she felt that the financial problem of peacekeeping was basically political rather than legal,

[29]For some insight into the financial problems of UN peacekeeping, see King Gordon, *The United Nations in the Congo* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), pp. 148-155; John G. Stoessinger, *The United Nations and the Superpowers* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 90-113; Rosalyn Higgins, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Political and Financial Problems," *The World Today*, August 1965, pp. 324-337; H. G. Nicholas, "The United Nations in Crisis," *International Affairs*, July 1965, pp. 441-450.

[30]U.N. Doc. A/C5/SR.697, December 2, 1958, p. 258.

[31]Originally, however, the Soviet Union waived reimbursement for transporting UN troops to the Congo. See H. G. Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 65.

[32]U.N. Doc. A/AC.113/SR.15, March 26, 1963, p. 7.

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and therefore could be covered by Article 43 of the Charter. Her protest was unavailing. The Court found, by a vote of 9 to 5, that the expenditures authorized for UNEF and ONUC constituted expenses of the organization within the meaning of Article 17 (2). When the General Assembly, at the Seventeenth Session, adopted a resolution accepting the advisory opinion of the Court, the USSR announced that she would not be bound by it.

By the spring of 1963 it was necessary to convene a Special Session of the United Nations in light of the fact that a number of members, besides the Soviet Union and her allies, were in arrears on payments for UNEF and ONUC, to a total of $105,000,000.[33] This Fourth Special Session followed the unsuccessful attempts of the Working Group of Fifteen and the Working Group of Twenty-one to resolve the crisis. At the meeting the USSR not only adhered to her previous position but even "hardened" it. Moscow expanded its "financial veto" over peacekeeping operations it opposed by announcing that from 1963 onward it would not contribute to the financing of activities which it felt had been "unlawfully" included within the budget. These activities encompassed the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East, and the United Nations Field Service.

In face of the Court's decision that peacekeeping expenses fell within the meaning of Article 17 (2), Soviet unwillingness to recognize the principle of collective financial responsibility raised the question of the applicability of Article 19 of the Charter, through which states in arrears could stand to lose their votes in the General Assembly. To avoid a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, it was decided that no votes were to be taken during the Nineteenth Session, thus circumventing the question of depriving the Soviet Union of her vote.

Moscow later expressed its acceptance of a compromise solution proposed by an Afro-Asian negotiating group, in which the question of Article 19 would not be raised, and the financial crisis of the organization would be solved by means of voluntary contributions without "prejudice" to positions of "principle."

[33]The author remembers the atmosphere of tension when the Secretary-General, appearing before the Fifth Committee, the body entrusted to deal with the crisis, pointed out that "despite the various measures that had been taken, the unhappy fact was that the organization continued in a state of serious financial difficulty. . . ." See U.N. Doc. A/C5/SR.984, May 20, 1963, p. 2.

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However, the "no-vote" consensus of the Nineteenth Session was torpedoed by the pro-Peking Albanian delegation, which demanded that the Assembly return to "normal" business and take a roll-call vote on the election of officers and the establishment of an agenda. Although the Albanian suggestion was defeated, the United States contended that the U.S. position on Article 19 had not been compromised, because the vote that took place on the Albanian suggestion was "procedural" in nature. But the Soviet Union seemed to feel that the distinction between a "procedural" and a "substantive" vote in this instance was a fine one, and that her position on Article 19 had been upheld since the USSR voted in the Assembly without penalty.[34]

Upon the termination of the Nineteenth Session, the responsibility for finding a way out of the peacekeeping impasse fell to a special peacekeeping committee of thirty-three nations (successor to the Working Groups of Fifteen and Twenty-one), which also failed to reach an acceptable solution. Consequently, as the Twentieth Session approached, there was speculation about whether the United States would still call for the application of Article 19 to states in arrears on peacekeeping assessments. Then, in view of a Soviet promise to make an unspecified voluntary contribution at some future unspecified date, the United States reluctantly announced on August 16, 1965 that it would not call for the application of Article 19.

However, an inkling that it might be difficult to persuade the Soviet Union to come forth with her voluntary payment was provided when the Soviets stressed in the Committee of 33 that a contribution must not be expected in the absence of a firm guarantee that the question of the application of Article 19 would not be raised again. At the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly, the USSR still had not made her payment. A French suggestion was accepted that an expert financial committee be set up,[35] ostensibly to study the overall budgetary problems facing the United Nations, but informally it was hoped that the expert committee would persuade France to make a voluntary contribution,[36]

[34]For an interesting analysis of Article 19 and the Nineteenth Session, see Meg Greenfield, "The Lost Session at the U.N.," *The Reporter,* May 6, 1965, pp. 14-20.

[35]Later known as the Committee of Fourteen, this consisted of the following countries chosen on the basis of regional and ideological representation: United States, Argentina, Brazil, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Senegal, USSR and UAR.

[36]No French contribution was forthcoming, despite rumors. See the *New York Times,* September 20, 1966.

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and thereby increase the pressure on the USSR to pay up. The Soviet Union supported the creation of this committee of experts, possibly hoping to use it as a device to hold off on payments. When the Committee of Fourteen issued its report to the Twenty-first Session, it shied away from the politically delicate question of financing peacekeeping operations, recommending that the General Assembly consider the problem. The committee stuck to purely technical financial matters, such as proposing that the UN cut down on the number of its meetings, conferences and publications.[37]

A Soviet voluntary payment was not forthcoming at the Twenty-first Session, since the Soviet Union had injected a new element into the controversy by tying its payment to a similar voluntary payment by the United States. The Soviets now argued that their payment was contingent upon an American payment, while the United States denied this. Nor, despite repeated speculation, was there any Soviet contribution at the Fifth Special Session,[38] or the Twenty-second Session of the General Assembly. However, an echo of the Article 19 controversy that had paralyzed the Nineteenth Session was heard when Haiti and the Dominican Republic were not called upon to vote during several meetings of the resumed Twenty-second Session, due to being in arrears in their contributions to the regular budget. The USSR took the opportunity to object to what she viewed as an attempt to deprive Haiti and the Dominican Republic of the right to vote under the terms of Article 19, which could establish a precedent to be used against Moscow.[39] She argued that Article 18 (2), which categorizes "important" questions calling for a two-thirds decision by the General Assembly, must be followed before a state's right to vote in the Assembly is suspended.[40] The Soviets tried to buttress their position by stressing that Articles 18 and 19 were linked together in Chapter IV of the Charter, under the heading "Voting." They also contended that the General Assembly must decide upon the application of Article 19, because the article provided that the Assembly should allow a state in arrears to vote if its inability to

[37]For further information on the work of the expert committee, see an article by the Canadian member, J. Douglas Gibson, "The Financial Problem of the United Nations," *International Journal*, Spring 1967, pp. 182-194.

[38]The only decision reached at the Fifth Special Session, meeting from April 21 to June 13, 1967, was the adoption of Resolution 2249 (s-v), which among other things appealed especially to the highly developed countries to make voluntary contributions.

[39]U.N. Doc. A/7111, June 19, 1968.

[40]*Ibid.*, p. 3.

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pay stemmed from conditions beyond its control. Finally, Moscow cited Rule 161 of the rules of the General Assembly, which stipulated that the UN's Committee on Contributions was to advise the Assembly on any action to be taken under Article 19 of the Charter if a state could not pay due to conditions beyond its control.[41]

The Secretary-General responded to Soviet criticism by pointing out that the first sentence of Article 19, which deprived a state of the right to vote, did not require action by the General Assembly before a state lost this right,[42] and, in the opinion of the Secretariat's legal counsel, was entirely separate from Article 18 (2).[43] The Secretariat's legal counsel did note that the second sentence of Article 19 allowed the General Assembly to permit a state to vote if its arrears were due to conditions beyond its control. But then the Committee on Contributions, after investigating some of the factors that may have affected Haiti's ability to pay, concluded that Article 19 could be applied, and urged Haiti to meet her financial responsibilities prior to the Twenty-fourth Session of the General Assembly. The Soviets suffered a setback due to these decisions of the Secretariat and the Committee on Contributions vis-à-vis their interpretation of the procedures to be followed in applying Article 19 to debtor states.

In sum, in the many UN deliberations on the financial crisis, the Soviet Union stressed that it was undesirable to lay down what she called rigid formulas for financing peacekeeping operations. Time and again, she suggested that future peacekeeping efforts could be subsidized by a variety of techniques: charging aggressors, distributing expenses among all member countries, payment of expenses by the countries directly concerned, voluntary contributions or a combination of such methods. For the past several years she has noted that if her suggestions on financing, which she feels are in accordance with the Charter, were followed, she would be willing to pay the expenses involved in the maintenance of international forces.

The unresolved financial crisis in effect enabled the Soviets to achieve their objective of forcing the UN to rely increasingly on the voluntary financing of peacekeeping operations. For example, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), set up in 1964,

[41] *Ibid.*
[42] U.N. Doc. A/7146, July 26, 1968.
[43] *Ibid.*, Annex I, p. 1.

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subsists on voluntary contributions.[44] In the introduction to his Annual Report on the work of the organization, presented to the Twenty-third Session of the General Assembly, U Thant complained about how unsatisfactory this method was, and in periodically requesting the Security Council to extend UNFICYP's life, he has consistently drawn attention to the difficulty of relying on voluntary contributions as a means of financing it. Moreover, a new facet of the Soviet position toward UNFICYP arose when the Security Council met on December 10, 1968 to extend the force's mandate for another six months. Then, the USSR asserted that she would have to reassess her attitude if any attempt were made to connect the necessity for keeping the UN Force on Cyprus to heightened Soviet activity in the Mediterranean.[45] At the same time, the Soviets expressed hope for an early end to UNFICYP's mission.

Termination of UNEF and the Aftermath

The UNEF operation was terminated after a prolonged period of tension in the Middle East in 1967, when the UAR requested that UNEF units be withdrawn from their positions. The Soviet Union, which had called for the termination of UNEF's mission for years, supported the Egyptian demand. The Six-Day Arab-Israeli War followed almost immediately. After the June war, however, the Security Council reached a "consensus" which allowed U Thant to send a group of observers to the Suez Canal area to be positioned along both sides of the cease-fire line, in order to establish some kind of a UN presence there. The method of "consensus"[46] rather than the adoption of a resolution was followed by the Security Council on July 10, 1967, because the Soviet Union, consistent with her position on peacekeeping matters, raised objections over the number of observers to be dispatched, wished to establish a time-limit governing the length of their mission, and did not relish giving U Thant too much blanket authority to act.[47] In December 1967 the Security Council expanded the UNMO (United Nations Military Observers) force

[44]For an exhaustive study of UNFICYP, see James A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968).

[45]U.N. Press Release SC/3054, December 10, 1968.

[46]See Ruth B. Russell, *The United Nations and United States Security Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 178.

[47]The Soviet Union had acquiesced in the dispatch of UN observers to patrol the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line, but later supported Jordan's refusal to accept UN observers along the Israeli-Jordan cease-fire line. *U.N. Monthly Chronicle,* April 1968, p. 8.

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in the Suez area again by the method of "consensus,"[48] although the Soviet Union attempted to have the authorization take the form of a draft resolution[49] — a gambit designed to reinforce the authority of the Security Council over peacekeeping operations.

Despite the termination of both UNEF and ONUC, however, the crisis over peacekeeping continued. During the Twenty-third Session of the General Assembly, Moscow not only voted against the bond issue for the payment of UNEF's and ONUC's debts,[50] but also failed to make the voluntary contribution to cancel out its peacekeeping arrears, even though the United States stressed that she had held up on the application of Article 19 on the understanding that "certain countries" in arrears (France as well as the USSR) would make substantial contributions.[51]

In the spring of 1968, in the Committee of 33, the Soviets had argued that the 1965 consensus on voluntary contributions had called for "industrialized and developed" countries to make contributions, which in Moscow's view applied to the United States as well as the USSR.[52] The special peacekeeping committee found itself reduced to discussing the Soviet contentions that (1) the Secretary-General lacked the right to furnish the committee with documentation relevant to the study of peacekeeping, and (2) only the members of a Working Group established by the Committee of 33 to prepare a first "model" of peacekeeping by UN Military Observers should see two volumes of documentation compiled by the Secretariat, dealing with past UNMO operations authorized by the Security Council. The Soviets, however, supported the decision reached at the Twenty-third Session of the General Assembly, to continue the committee's mandate. They felt that the committee in 1968 had accomplished something tangible in the study of peacekeeping operations, and hoped it could accomplish more on other "mutually acceptable models" of peacekeeping. Perhaps they envisaged that such studies would lay the groundwork for the agreements they called for under Article 43.[53]

The diplomatic discussion concerning all aspects of future

[48]Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 268.

[49]See U.N. Doc. S/8236, November 10, 1967.

[50]U.N. Doc. A/C5/SR.1273, December 5, 1968, p. 18.

[51]U.N. Doc. A/C5/SR.1255, November 13, 1968, p. 13.

[52]U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.29, May 28, 1968, p. 22.

[53]During the Twenty-third Session, U Thant's military adviser, Major General Indar Jit Rikhye, resigned, explaining that he was doing so because of a lessening of UN peacekeeping activities. (*New York Times,* December 19, 1968.) The USSR had been critical of any increase in the military staff of the Secretary-General.

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peacekeeping operations continues. The USSR sticks to negotiating agreements under Article 43 to govern peacekeeping ventures. The United States now maintains that such agreements may be acceptable, but that "stand-by" or "earmarked" units are what are needed for the immediate future.[54] In the U.S. view agreements under Article 43 and "stand-by units" are complementary.[55] According to the Soviets, units "earmarked" for employment in "consent-type" peacekeeping operations, as opposed to the enforcement actions called for under Chapter VII of the Charter, are unconstitutional.[56]

A number of ingenious plans for financing peacekeeping, ranging from a U.S. suggestion at the Twenty-third Session for a UN Peace Fund to UN exploitation of the resources of the oceans[57] to a UN worldwide mail system,[58] have not yet gained sufficient acceptance for implementation. It appears that future operations will continue to be mounted on an *ad hoc* piecemeal basis.[59] Until the two superpowers arrive at some agreement on this vital question, the United Nations will be severely hampered in solving major peacekeeping problems, such as the crisis in the Middle East. This is why it will be particularly interesting to see whether a recent Soviet proposal, suggesting that a UN force be positioned in the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, and at the mouth of the Gulf of Tirana,[60] will be acceptable to the United States, given the vagueness of several versions of the Soviet plan and the overall Soviet position on UN peacekeeping.

[54]For support of the concept of "earmarking" national contingents, see Richard N. Gardner, editor, *Blueprint for Peace* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 69; Andrew Boyd, "UN Peacekeepers," *Vista*, May-June 1966, p. 28; Lester Pearson, "What the U.N. Has Learned About Peace-Keeping," *Think*, July-August 1965, p. 6.

[55]U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.29, May 28, 1968, p. 24.

[56]*Ibid.*, p. 26.

[57]At the Twenty-second Session, Malta submitted a resolution which could have been applied with that end in mind.

[58]Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966, p. 680.

[59]For some interesting comments on future prospects, see Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 145; also see Norman J. Padelford, "Financing Peacekeeping: Politics and Crisis," *International Organization*, Summer 1965, pp. 444-462.

[60]Reportedly the USSR suggested that the Big Four — France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union — finance the projected force. (*Washington Post*, January 9, 1969.) Perhaps the four permanent members of the Security Council, excluding Nationalist China, might even participate in it. (*The Observer* [London], January 5, 1969.) UAR President Nasser stated in an interview that he would not agree to troops drawn from the four major powers, but he had no objection to soldiers drawn from smaller countries. (*New York Times*, February 3, 1969.)

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Reviews

VIET NAM: THE ROAD TO DISASTER*

by Harvey Sicherman

In November 1964, Lyndon Baines Johnson became President of the United States by the greatest political plurality in American history. In August 1968, he did not attend the nominating convention of his own party on his birthday. Much of the distance between these two points, the peak and the nadir, may be explained by a single issue: Viet Nam.

Why did Johnson enlarge the Viet Nam war? How did he come to pursue a policy so extremely costly to his country, his party and his career? What enabled him to do so and what explains his reversal of "escalation" at the end of his administration? What does all this mean in the context of American foreign policy?

These are questions of considerable moment and mystery. In *The Limits of Intervention* Townsend Hoopes, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1965-1967) and Under Secretary of the Air Force (1967-1968), attempts to answer them. Although his positions in the administration were "not at the center of policy, but in the near periphery," he has set his reader a large order: "How Vietnam came to represent the outer limits of feasible American intervention, how the working of the democratic process finally forced the President to abandon a policy of escalation, and why the particular events of March 1968 signaled the end of an era constitute the subject matter of this book." It records his personal odyssey as well.

According to Hoopes, Viet Nam was a natural product of American foreign policy rather than an aberration. The Cold War, which pitted two global powers in relentless confrontation, bred a view of communist conspiracies circling the earth. In this situation "containment," the frustration of communist encroachment where and when it should occur, became paramount American strategy. By definition, the smallest and largest challenges were of equal importance.

This interventionist policy, relying heavily on military tactics, had largely succeeded by 1960. Khrushchev's 1961 speech, in which he rejected nuclear or conventional war as legitimate (moral) means in favor of national liberation wars, implicitly admitted Soviet strategic inferiority. The Sino-Soviet split, another eminent event, indicated communism's loss of coherence. In the Kennedy White House, however, the Cold War still reigned. The President proclaimed in his 1961 State of the Union address: "We must never be lulled into be-

**The Limits of Intervention.* By Townsend Hoopes. New York: David McKay, 1969. 245 pp. $5.95.

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lieving that either power [the USSR or China] has yielded its ambitions for world domination. . . . our task is to convince them that aggression and subversion will not be profitable routes to pursue these ends."

To Kennedy and his advisers the Khrushchev speech meant that the challenge would be at a new level: the national liberation war. Roger Hilsman and Walt Rostow drew up a cogent "counterinsurgency" doctrine, featuring police force action and heavy emphasis on political coordination. Hoopes agreed with this occasionally "faddish" emphasis on new strategic concepts: "I too was a child of the Cold War." More important, however, was the cast it gave to a foreign policy already "interventionist" in nature: ". . . the implicit assumption that henceforth Washington would be predisposed to view an effort to overthrow the existing order *anywhere* as national liberation war fomented by and for the benefit of Russia and China." (p. 15.) Thus, no distinction could be made between *desirable* interventions and necessary ones, between the complete interventionist and the total isolationist.

By 1964, with Kennedy gone, both the plans and machinery for counterinsurgency had matured. Although there was considerable Army opposition to the new concepts, Secretary McNamara had finally imposed civilian control over the Defense Department. Unfortunately, the political organization for foreign policy coordination was seriously defective. A fluctuating series of private cliques arose over the ruin of the National Security Council. "President Johnson, a man of little background and much uncertainty in foreign affairs, had inherited an organization for their conduct that had been made deliberately loose and flexible by President Kennedy, a man of broad knowledge, intuitive grasp, and determined initiative in that field." (p. 2.)

The stage was set for Viet Nam. An inexperienced Chief Executive, "at bottom a combination of sentimental patriot and gambler," presided over a host of advisers burdened by Cold War assumptions in a loose administration without orderly channels of consultation. The protagonists in this relationship are described provocatively: McGeorge Bundy's "activist universalism"; McNamara, "machine-ready"; Walt Rostow, an inductive filter protecting the President from facts disagreeable to Rostow; General Maxwell Taylor, a certain trumpet for military solutions and regular formations over the unconventional strategy; Secretary Rusk, with a phobia about China and facile, fatuous historical analogies. Hoopes tells us that, alone among the President's closest advisers, Vice President Humphrey argued against the escalation; in his view, more men and much more time would be required than Johnson and his entourage thought. Humphrey was turned out of inner circles until he recanted.

We relive the dreary chronicle of deepening disaster. Armed with preconceptions and the Tonkin Resolution, and a conviction that Viet Nam was *the* test, the U.S.

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government had invested, by October 1967, 40 per cent of its tactical airpower, a third of its Navy and a $25 billion annual budget in South Viet Nam.

"The rather incredible disparity between the outpouring of national blood and treasure and the intrinsic U.S. interests at stake in Vietnam was by this time widely understood and deplored at levels just below the top of the government." McNamara was exhausted but "loyal." Although the Secretary seemed by far the most able man in the Cabinet, his attitude was "disturbingly ambiguous." Loyalty of his sort bore "the unspoken corollary . . . that, whether or not his counsel of moderation were followed, there could arise no issue or difference with President Johnson sufficient to require his resignation—whether to enlighten public opinion or avoid personal stultification." (p. 53.)

Hoopes himself, although on the periphery, decided not to resign because, like McNamara, it might be "worse" without him. At the top, LBJ, zealously guarded by Rostow, "a fanatic in sheep's clothing," with handy assists from Rusk and Bundy, pursued military victory. Their peculiar stubbornness had much to do with the credibility gap, i.e., "The general disorder and incongruity that characterized the interaction of ideas, policies, strategies and personalities in the Administration's conduct of the war. . . ." (p. 61.)

What went wrong? According to Hoopes, war strategy comprised three themes: the ground war, pacification, bombing. Each ran at cross purposes to the others and the conflict among them finally overwhelmed political objectives. For the political aim was to defeat a "proxy" national liberation war aided and abetted by the communist powers without "escalating" into confrontation with them. This required a "limited war" tactic. But General Westmoreland, forgetting about both counterinsurgency doctrine and the insistent advice of General Sir Robert Thompson of Malayan fame, quickly evolved a concept of conventional war whose "seek and destroy" had American troops rushing about the country looking for enemy "main-forces" — which by definition, at this stage, did not exist.

Hoopes provides a succinct exposition of what pacification should have been. By establishing a police-enforced curfew over each village, the guerrilla contacts can eventually be flushed out. At the same time, mobile regular army units prevent large-scale raids on the villages. The government also extends social benefits. But a South Vietnamese government run by the military was unwilling by nature to do this slow work, and its executive agencies were incapacitated by graft to govern anyone. Pacification fell an easy victim to assumptions about Asian democracy and an uncoordinated military strategy. In the end, the American-administered pacification "was another example of that troublesome American belief that the application of enough resources can solve any problem. . . ." (p. 70.)

The bombing campaign over

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North Viet Nam was by far the most controversial part of the strategy. Originally a "retaliatory" feature, it gradually became the "key" to breaking Hanoi's will (another peculiar assumption, that Hanoi's "will" and ours conformed), and then the right arm of American ground strategy in the South. Hoopes explains convincingly the "graduated" escalation of the bombing. Given assumptions about Hanoi's capacity to resist, bad weather eight months of the year, and the amazing vigor and variety of North Viet Nam's transport, there was no real way to assess the campaign's effectiveness. When Hanoi's will did not "respond" properly, a new purpose —ending infiltration—was devised. When, nonetheless, the North Vietnamese managed to supply even greater ground strength, Admiral Sharp (in Honolulu) convinced himself that Haiphong's destruction was the key. McNamara didn't think the port worth the cost of ruining it. Sharp and his allies complained about "civilian muzzling"; McNamara was haled before the Stennis Committee; and the truth came forth. Only 100 tons daily into the South were necessary to maintain the enemy; the North Vietnamese had a capacity of 14,000 tons; and rail routes and beach landings were largely impervious to accurate bombing eight months of the year. But McNamara's figures made little impression on the military commanders or Lyndon Johnson.

By the time McNamara departed for the World Bank, the American public had come to perceive the administration's dilemma: to win the war, the South Vietnamese government must be reformed; to reform the South Vietnamese government the war must be won. Escalation, which the North Vietnamese could meet, could not be met by Saigon, whose incapacities were merely magnified. Meanwhile, the United States was losing its chance to reform and fight simultaneously. Plainly, "military victory was the only way out." Military victory, in the Westmoreland-Sharp context, could only mean eventual escalation into invasion of the North. Would the Chinese or the Soviets permit this? Neither the generals nor their nominal civilian superiors would face such escalatory logic. The military strategy was sabotaging the limited political aim.

In January 1968, Hoopes observes, the TET offensive shocked the United States by revealing that South Viet Nam was not pacified, and that the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese were not on the defensive. All Washington's computer-calculated successes in these areas were brutally cast aside for those who would look. The critical press, some of whose members had been much longer in South Viet Nam than rapidly rotated American personnel, were vindicated.

General Wheeler went to Saigon for a personal assessment. He returned with a proclamation of "victory" and a request for 206,000 men.

The rest of Hoopes' story is largely in praise of Clark Clifford. A convinced "hawk" upon entering the government, Clifford dis-

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covered several inconvenient facts: the North Vietnamese and their Soviet - Chinese suppliers were stronger militarily in the South than ever before; the U.S. Command had no specific idea of how long or how much it would take to change this situation; the Saigon regime had neither the broad support nor ruthless efficiency necessary to make its soldiers fight like the enemy. The Senior Advisory Board (men like Acheson, Bradley and Dillon) now entered the lists. Based on official briefings, this prestigious group had approved LBJ's policy as recently as November 1967. Now Acheson requested authority to conduct his own investigation at lower levels (Hoopes' level) of the government. He then confronted the President with conclusions similar to Clifford's.

In addition, Johnson now faced a reeling Democratic Party, the New Hampshire primary, the opposition of Senator Robert Kennedy (after a quixotic request for a "National Commission" to reconsider the war), and a military request whose fulfillment required $10 billion and more annually and a mobilization. The disproportion of means to ends finally impressed the President. Perhaps Senator Karl Mundt expressed the disproportion best at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's March 12, 1968 hearings. After Secretary Rusk had painted a picture of a rampaging Communist China swallowing the Pacific, Mundt asked why, if this were true, the administration had employed such petty means to stop such a leviathan. And if Rusk's estimates of China were not true, was not the idea of "military victory" unsound for the carefully graduated policy the administration seemed to pursue?

Despite his change in his March 31 speech to a "peace policy" of de-escalation, President Johnson remained warlike to the end, torn between "Alamo" sentiment and a divided administration. Hoopes and his colleagues were saved their resignations by Clifford's actions, "one of the greatest individual performances in recent American history . . . a fresh perception of the national interest, unfettered by connection with the fateful decisions of 1965."

Hoopes' account of the great "half-turn around" at the end of the Johnson Administration is a convincing story. We should recall, however, that Lyndon Johnson was an extraordinarily secretive personality, adept at disguising both his convictions and his intentions. What is convincing is not necessarily accurate.

In summary, then, Viet Nam came to represent the outer limits of American intervention because of an uncoordinated application of military force and political objectives, distorted by inexperienced emotions, hardened prejudices, and an arrogant "interventionist" spirit born of previous success. Democratic processes turned aside the policy of escalation through the arousal of public concern by the press, a great national sagacity in a citizenry stung by the credibility gap, and critical personalities. Among the latter must rank Townsend Hoopes and his as-

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sociates; Clark Clifford is the chief hero. Viet Nam signifies the end of an era in U.S. foreign policy. A natural product of the "arrogance of power," whose sources were in a Cold War since passed, U.S. policy must now be more sober and more mature for having suffered this terrible defeat. We have come of age when we fail.

Hoopes argues that no policy shy of immediate withdrawal can succeed because that policy alone recognizes our defeat and cuts our commitment. Partial withdrawal, in the Nixon formula, merely bids Hanoi sit quietly at Paris, waiting to overwhelm us when we withdraw to a dangerous military level and thus put us again into 1965's dilemma: "to escalate or to liquidate . . . to forswear victory yet avoid defeat—is an inherent contradiction, it can't work." (p. 236.)

The Limits of Intervention is well written. Sparing neither friend nor foe, Hoopes carries his Gibbonesque tale with minimal rhetorical interference. Unfortunately, his own propositions do not emerge unscathed by his assembly of facts. First, one can argue rather plausibly that Viet Nam is an aberration, not a natural consequence of our foreign policy. Our attitude toward Southeast Asia has never been the same as our cool, calculating and consistent mood toward containment in Europe. (Dean Acheson recalls in his recent volume, *Present at the Creation,* the emotional cascade that nearly overwhelmed him in the "loss of China" and the Korean War.) We do not recognize nor have we come to any terms with Communist China. Furthermore, it is unclear whether catastrophe in Viet Nam was "inevitable" because of our strategic ends or because of our tactical means, both of which were suffering badly in Asia from "hangovers," of which Dean Rusk was merely one. Do we therefore conclude that all our foreign policy is faulty? Or do we learn something about the application of military means in Asia?

Second, in his account of characters, Hoopes leaves a sensational question unasked. He describes fully and well Robert McNamara's tortured squeeze between his intelligence and his loyalty. In the end, however, McNamara proved to be a glorified civil servant, not a politically responsible Cabinet officer. His "loyalty" avoided a virtual imperative for resignation; in view of subsequent events, he might have done much better had he left earlier in favor of Clifford.

If knowing how to resign is high political art, President Johnson's dissenting advisers were singularly defective. That their dissent did not make itself known forcibly prior to the Wheeler request for 206,000 additional troops cannot be laid entirely to Walt Rostow. They were a "silent majority" the government could ill afford.

Finally, Hoopes' analysis is shot through with the ambiguities inherent in the concept "national interest." The United States was well into the escalation before various people concluded that Viet Nam was not sufficiently in the "national interest" to justify our great effort. Clifford's "fresh perspectives" of the national interest seemed to

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turn on the consequences of the TET offensive. Hoopes never really tells us if this "interest" is an objective reality, or a function of what succeeds. He does tell us, however, that John F. Kennedy was too skeptical to be drawn into a Johnsonian quagmire. But Johnson received Kennedy's conception of national interest. Kennedy's advisers surrounded him. And in Viet Nam there were 35,000 "advisers" dispatched by the late President. Thus, Hoopes' assertion remains tenuous. According to Arthur Schlesinger, President Kennedy was "perplexed" by Southeast Asia. Faced by "liquidation" or "escalation" in 1965, would he have liquidated? Once escalation began, could he have grasped the crucial implications of Westmoreland's strategy? The idea of counterinsurgency as an alternative to escalation had been understood too late for Viet Nam. Johnson "inherited" this situation.

Hoopes is also critically vague on the withdrawal question. His idea of immediate withdrawal is "private" notice to South Viet Nam that we will be out entirely by a certain date. Although "such a U.S. policy would be extremely painful for several strata of South Vietnamese," it should not be abrupt if it is "deliberate" and "orderly." In Hoopes' opinion, we must do this if we are to save our coherence and renew our society.

It is easy to read into President Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war a more politic version of the same "orderly" liquidation of our "disproportionate" exercise in Southeast Asia. To be consistent with "total" withdrawal, Hoopes should declare an end to our national interest in Viet Nam. He does not. Instead, he asks us only to recognize that our national interest did not require intervention of such size in 1965. If this is the way to "bite the bullet," then Hoopes' convictions and current government policy are at last in accord.

New Approaches to the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy*

by Roger E. Kanet

In the past few years a fascinating new approach to the study of Soviet foreign policy has been developed by Jan F. Triska and his associates at Stanford University. The initial results of this program have appeared in various academic journals, especially in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* and in a monograph series entitled *Stanford Studies of the Communist System.* Now Professors Triska and David Finley have brought together much of this research in their book, *Soviet Foreign Policy,* the best analytic study of the subject to date. They have attempted to synthesize various methods of analysis, although, as they state in the introduction, they are "inclined to use quantitative indicators wherever we found them available and the relevant questions [were] amenable to quantitative analysis."

One of the major criticisms of area studies, and of Soviet and

**Soviet Foreign Policy.* By Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 518 pp. $9.95.

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communist studies in particular, has been that the practitioners are merely glorified commentators who are unaware of methodological developments in their own disciplines —for example, political science and international politics. Triska and Finley have proven that this blanket accusation can no longer be made without qualification. In fact, their volume is representative of a much larger trend toward a behavioral approach in studies of communist political systems.

Although the general topics covered in the book—the institutions of Soviet foreign policy, the personalities involved in the decision-making process, the role of ideology and events—are not new or unique, the way they are handled is quite different from the approaches used by most authors and, in the reviewer's opinion, represents a distinct improvement.

Following a brief survey of five decades of Soviet foreign policy, in which they trace the transition of the doctrine Socialism in One Country into Socialism in One Region, Triska and Finley turn to a somewhat extended discussion of the state institutions involved in the decision-making process and the implementation of policy. In addition to listing the institutions, along with their formal relationships to one another, they attempt to indicate what functions each level of the party and state bureaucracy performs. In this part of the analysis, they have drawn on concepts from both organization and decision-making theory.

They next deal with the personalities who make decisions in the Soviet Union and point out that, although a fusion of roles is apparent at the top of the hierarchy, there is increasing independence in the state organs at lower levels—where information is collected and decisions implemented. In combing the existing literature for hypotheses concerning the role of individuals in the formulation of Soviet policy, they found a number of significant propositions—many of them contradictory—which they have tested. One of these propositions—that the men who make foreign policy are all "party career" men and that the state and government apparatus is merely a shadow organization of the party—they conclude has not been completely borne out. Especially in state relationships with the "imperialist countries" and the "third world," the personnel of the Foreign Ministry perform a "usually decisive function in the policy process, and definitely do not constitute a shadow organization."

Perhaps the most important chapter is the one assessing the relative importance of ideology in Soviet decisions. Instead of rehashing all the old arguments about ideology, national history and national interest, Triska and Finley tested a number of hypotheses taken from the literature on ideology, in order to determine "the nature and extent of Marxist-Leninist precepts in the intellectual and emotional make-up of the effective Soviet decision elite." When public statements of the decision elite were content-analyzed the investigation produced both expected and unexpected results.

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For example, the importance of Marxist-Leninist precepts varies with the age of the individual; there is a negative correlation between emphasis on ideological precepts and the substantive competence of the individual; and there is no apparent distinction between doctrinal influence in short-range, routine decision-making situations and crisis situations. However, ideology and environmental factors (events) are closely intertwined. To examine their relative impact, Triska and Finley developed a rough typology of events that have been considered by Soviet decision-makers. They point out that perceptions of failure and threat are likely to induce abrupt changes in Soviet foreign policy output regardless of ideological precepts, and that doctrine has its greatest impact in long-range planning.

The authors then discuss Soviet policy toward the communist system, the developing countries and the West. In their analysis of the Soviet position in the world communist system, they employ a systems approach and emphasize Moscow's goal of maintaining predominance and the means used to achieve it. Since the mid-1950's, the main reliance has been on economic primacy. It is here, however, that the authors fall into the trap which snared most other analysts of the Kremlin's foreign policy before the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia—the conviction that the use of military coercion to maintain the system was largely a thing of the past.

The section on relations with developing countries relies on the work of David Beim, who has applied game theory to an analysis of Soviet and American aid programs. Although the game-theory approach is useful with respect to the USSR's entry into the aid competition in the late 1950's and early 1960's, the reviewer has reservations about its applicability in recent years, when both the United States and the Soviet Union have begun to question the underlying assumptions of their policy toward the uncommitted nations. The effectiveness of Soviet aid in gaining support from recipients, in competition with the United States, is assessed by correlating the voting behavior of developing countries in the United Nations with the amount of aid received from Moscow. Results show a strong positive connection between the two.

For their discussion of Soviet relations with the West, Triska and Finley have adapted a stimulus-response model to a systems approach. They argue that any action initiated by one of the major contestants will lead to a response by the other in order to keep the system in balance. In particular, any novel course of action that unbalances the conflict between antagonists must elicit a compensating response. However, the use of a novel response—such as the Soviet introduction of covert diplomacy after World War I or a major weapons breakthrough — may change the ground rules of the competition or may lead to its escalation.

In assessing overall Soviet behavior in international affairs, the

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authors examine the question of recklessness or caution. They have ranked international crises in which the Soviets were involved since 1945 according to their initial source and intensity. They conclude that, in general, the more risk Soviet decision-makers perceived, the more cautious was their response.

Soviet Foreign Policy represents a major shift in orientation in studies of the Soviet system. Its authors employ the methodological achievements of political science in order better to understand the behavior of the Soviet Union in international relations. One major criticism is that the book is not really unified. Because it is based, to a large degree, on separate articles dealing with different aspects of Soviet foreign policy, and because the authors employ various approaches in analyzing these aspects, each chapter, and at times parts of chapters, could be considered a separate study, and little attempt has been made to fit the various sections into a whole. However, the reader can readily forgive the lack of integration, for he is continually stimulated to rethink his views concerning both the approach to the study of Soviet policy and the actual substance of that policy. The fact that much in the book is incomplete—e.g., the application of systems analysis to the study of COMECON and the Warsaw Treaty Organization—only represents a challenge for future work in this field.

The authors have also laid some of the groundwork for developing the study of comparative foreign policy. Rather than looking at the Soviet Union as a unique political system, they have applied concepts and research techniques that can be used to compare Soviet international behavior with that of the United States and other political systems. For example, the student of supranational political unification can find much of value in this book, as can the scholar interested in great-power behavior toward allies, adversaries or neutrals.

So far I have emphasized the contribution of *Soviet Foreign Policy* to scholarship. It is just as valuable as a classroom text, for it introduces the student not only to the specifics of the Soviet system and Soviet foreign policy, but also to new research techniques for the analysis of foreign policy in general. Seldom, indeed, can a new book be recommended on both counts.

Change and Constancy in U.S. Cold War Policies*

by Sig Synnestvedt

Over the years of its existence as a nation, the United States has maintained a substantial degree of consistency in its relations with other countries. During the nineteenth century three considerations —avoidance of conflict, self-determination of peoples and guardianship of the democratic purity of the Western Hemisphere—permeated U.S. foreign policy. The administration of Theodore Roosevelt and the rise of America to

**The Faces of Power.* By Seyom Brown. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 397 pp. $8.95.

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world power introduced an imperialist-flavored modification of these traditions, but fundamental objectives remained the same. Franklin Roosevelt's adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy reinvigorated America's nineteenth-century ideals. U.S. policy during the Cold War has basically adhered to the same long-standing objectives.

Yet the challenge of Soviet communism, begun as a third dimension to World War II, has forced the United States to participate in a wide variety of complex activities in support of its ideals. In the process, the ideals have sometimes become obscured. The necessity for practical responses to a rash of ambiguous communist challenges has led to new involvements. Containment of communism has required American commitments to increase human freedom everywhere through support of more rapid and balanced economic growth in which all citizens benefit. Ultimately, these initiatives look to closing the gap between the rich and the poor nations without detriment to the standard of living in the affluent societies.

Seyom Brown, a member of the RAND Corporation staff, writing during a year of special assignment with the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research at Johns Hopkins University, has addressed himself to the matter of "constancy and change in United States foreign policy from Truman to Johnson." His efforts have resulted in a well reasoned, keenly written book which is judgmental without being passionate. It can be commended as a major work in its field.

The Faces of Power invites comparison to recent studies such as Ronald Steel's *Pax Americana,* J. William Fulbright's *The Arrogance of Power,* Eugene J. McCarthy's *The Limits of Power* and Walter LaFeber's *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966.* Steel, Fulbright and McCarthy criticize America for a generally heavy-handed involvement overseas; LaFeber, judging more harshly, concludes that the United States has been chiefly responsible for both creating and sustaining the Cold War. All four belong among the revisionist critics of the world role the United States has played since 1945. Brown's book supplies a more balanced perspective unburdened by automatic defense of either the United States or its foreign policy opponents.

He begins by viewing the Truman record in a generally favorable light. President Truman early accepted the fact of Soviet aggression and sought to contain it but without materially increasing defense costs. The Korean War forced major upward revisions in both the defense and foreign aid budgets and became a turning point in the continuing U.S. effort to limit the Soviet sphere of influence. The Truman-Acheson policy, while primarily concerned with the defense of Western Europe, also made a significant commitment to Asian stabilization. Korea brought about the "globalization of containment in terms of operational commitments as well as rhetoric." (p. 59.)

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Inner circles of the Eisenhower Administration disagreed with Truman's increased foreign commitments, chiefly because economic conservatives like George Humphrey, Charles Wilson, Sinclair Weeks, Arthur Burns and Gabriel Hauge sought to reduce federal costs. Senator Robert A. Taft's voice supported this conservative bloc in Congress. Conflict in policy direction developed because Secretary of State John Foster Dulles insisted that the United States engage in a wide range of objectives generally consistent with the pattern established by Truman and Acheson. The Dulles approach heightened official American concern for Asian priorities without significantly lessening European commitments.

In this policy dispute, President Eisenhower found himself pulled between two of his basic beliefs, fiscal responsibility and proper support of U.S. vital interests overseas. Brown perceives Eisenhower as a relatively creative leader who was able to maintain a good balance between budget conservatives and Dulles' rigidity. While the Secretary of State thought in terms of a "zero-sum" contest in which any type of gain for an opponent constituted a loss for the United States, Eisenhower sought ways to arrive at mutual gains through finding "non-zero-sum" relationships. The Open Skies proposal, the Atoms for Peace plan, and the welfare-not-warfare speech made to the Society of Newspaper Editors in 1953, illustrate his creative approach. In contrast to the President's peaceful initiatives, Dulles' commitment to the New Look defense posture involving journeys to the brink emerges not only as an inferior stance, but one which was counterproductive in that it reduced the options open to the American government.

Hungary, Suez and Sputnik I compelled the Eisenhower Administration to reassess its somewhat simplistic view of world affairs. New opportunities for peaceful initiatives as well as new dangers of war presented themselves. The administration encountered difficulty, however, in getting its fiscal conservatives to go along with fresh approaches. Although U.S. troop landings in Lebanon in 1958 gained a measure of success at less cost than might elsewise have been incurred, other opportunities to promote freedom were lost partly because of the administration's conservative bias. The continued sluggishness of the U.S. response to rising demands for change in Latin America, the failure of American actions to block Castro-communist subversion in Cuba, and the rather hesitant reaction to Soviet pressures on Berlin revealed a schizophrenic quality in Washington's conduct of foreign relations. In the end, the embarrassing collapse of the 1960 Summit Conference, followed by Nixon's defeat in the election, eased the Eisenhower Administration out of power with a blurred foreign policy image.

Brown views John Kennedy's Presidency as the most creative of the four postwar administrations. The New Frontier sought to fuse Acheson realism regarding the continued Soviet threat with a fresh

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approach to foreign affairs. The hopes and needs of the underdeveloped nations were to receive major attention. This fusion of shield and plow would create maximum opportunities for peaceful engagement with the Soviet Union in the Third World arena where so much needed to be done.

Kennedy was much impressed by Premier Khrushchev's January 1961 speech in which the Soviet leader rejected nuclear war although embracing "just wars of national liberation." Since such wars could only take place in the underdeveloped countries, the world stood at a turning place. Either wars of national liberation would embroil the great powers in increasingly dangerous confrontations, or aid to the needy nations could serve as the means for creative competition between the superpowers leading toward a more stable social order. This competition, added to the rivalries of the space race, could invigorate both the American and Russian peoples; mutual gain could result.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's efforts to increase the range of military options open to the President resulted in heightened defense costs. But they also strengthened the President's ability to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World and turn it to peaceful avenues. Once in possession of his broadened set of options, Kennedy did not hesitate to go to the new economists for fresh ideas on the process by which underdeveloped areas could be assisted to modernize themselves. Some of the Kennedy economists even took a direct ambassadorial role, such as John Galbraith in India and Lincoln Gordon in Brazil.

The most creative initiative of the New Frontier, according to Brown, was the "vast new ten year plan" to engage the nations of Latin America in an Alliance for Progress. He sees this program as a "coupling of the structural approach to economic development . . . with the revolutionary idealism of Thomas Jefferson and Simon Bolivar." (p. 205.) The administration hoped to portray the United States to the Third World as a non-status-quo power interested in genuine, revolutionary advance. As regards the Soviets, the Alliance for Progress concept did not have to be viewed as containment with a new face. Rather, the U.S. initiative could serve to bring the Soviets into the best sort of world competition—the upgrading of those whose need is greatest.

Three Cold War experiences challenged the New Frontier's approach to the support of America's traditional foreign policy objectives. Events surrounding the Bay of Pigs, the Congo and Laos demonstrated to the leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union that frustrating limitations bore upon the several facets of a nation's power. The United States could have forced its will upon the Castro regime in the spring of 1961, but not without a decisive commitment of U.S. arms, an action which Kennedy resisted. The struggle for control of the Congo showed that neither superpower could readily achieve its intention in some conflict situations,

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and also that the United Nations had a role to play in such crises. The extended negotiations over Laos brought the United States and the USSR into uneasy, armed truce in an area of the world difficult for both nations.

The most pointed tests of the governmental wills of the two superpowers came in West Berlin and the Caribbean. The continuing crisis over the German capital and Khrushchev's attempt to upset the balance of power by introducing long-range missiles into Cuba placed in the background the New Frontier's emphasis on Third World development. Although the Kennedy Administration met both challenges in high style, in each case the initiative belonged to the Soviets. Furthermore, Berlin tensions eased only after the Soviets successfully sealed off East Germany without having granted any increased recognition of the allies' rights to be in the West Berlin enclave. And when the Cuban crisis quieted down the Soviet presence in the island was more "legitimate" than before. Brown closes the Kennedy foreign policy record with highly favorable comment on Kennedy's June 1963 American University speech which further stressed peaceful competition, adding that "even Khrushchev was impressed." (p. 274.)

President Johnson's relative lack of experience in foreign affairs is seen to have been a serious obstacle to continuation of the Kennedy initiatives toward arms control and reduction of the more hostile aspects of the contest with the Soviets. The new President's skills in the areas of domestic politics failed to attain success in foreign matters. In the end, according to Brown, Johnson was brought down by two great blunders, deepening involvement in Viet Nam and intervention in the Dominican Republic, both implying a turn toward extensive use of military force to gain American objectives.

Analysis of the steps by which the Johnson Administration became bogged down in Viet Nam constitutes the most penetrating portion of *The Faces of Power*. Brown finds the helicopter the key to understanding how the President let military pressures come to dominate American policy in Southeast Asia. The Gulf of Tonkin incident in the late summer of 1964 was a somewhat isolated though important action. A far more important series of events stemmed from the communist attack on the Bien Hao air base in November 1964. The assault, which resulted in a number of casualties and large losses of war matériel, nearly induced a major retaliatory raid advocated at the time by leading policymakers including Ambassador Maxwell Taylor. However, not until February 1965 did the air forces respond to stepped-up communist attacks on U.S. air bases, by raiding North Vietnamese military barracks above the 17th Parallel. These counter raids attempted to underscore American willingness to take decisive military action to protect the air bases, particularly the one at Pleiku. The Pleiku retaliatory raid began a sequence of American actions and the escalation process received a

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major infusion of U.S. military strength.

American involvement through helicopters had begun well before 1965, however. Brown feels that, even before Kennedy's death, encouraging the South Vietnamese to make fuller use of helicopters for reconnaissance, troop support and transport led inevitably to increased U.S. participation in the war. The use of helicopters on a large scale required many American air bases. As the helicopters began to function as major deterrents to further Viet Cong success, the air bases became attractive targets. When the South Vietnamese army proved incapable of defending the bases adequately, U.S. troops were called upon to expand the defense perimeters around them. In Brown's words, "At this stage the United States became, willy-nilly, an active co-belligerent. . . ." Before many months went by, "The United States found itself the dominant combat force in the Viet Nam War." (p. 331.)

Brown believes Johnson allowed himself to be trapped into a limited option situation in which military considerations outweighed all others. He credits the President with sincere and imaginative attempts to break out of the military box. On three occasions Johnson tried to reduce the likelihood of further involvement. But the Johns Hopkins University address of April 1965, calling for unconditional negotiations followed by a U.S.-sponsored economic development program for all of Southeast Asia; the late-1965 "razzle-dazzle" Johnson peace offensive, which found numbers of American leaders visiting the capitals of the world to urge action toward peace; and the Declaration of Honolulu of February 1966, in which the President used men like Secretary Gardner of Health, Education and Welfare and Freeman of Agriculture to underscore the nonmilitary aspects of American participation in Viet Nam, all failed to bring peaceful competition to the fore. For all of his skill and energy, Johnson's weary pace toward his March 31, 1968 "abdication" speech continued.

The conclusion is that the policy of gradual military escalation in Viet Nam was doomed from the start. In retrospect, this judgment seems sound. But, in his steady opposition to the extensive use of force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives, Brown fails to consider the possible success of a different military formula. An early American decision to effect a quick victory through rapid deployment of perhaps a million men, air-raid destruction of the basic industry and commerce of North Viet Nam, and blockage of the port of Haiphong, might have brought the communists to the bargaining table far sooner with vastly reduced losses on all sides.

The author consistently questions the wisdom of relying on force to solve foreign policy problems. The Dominican intervention in April and May of 1965, while nearly bloodless and relatively low-cost, belongs, in Brown's view, alongside the Viet Nam war as an unfortunate piece of militaristic

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policymaking. "An administration," he says, "cannot escape the massive impressions created on domestic and foreign observers by its most dramatic actions. Regardless of intention, large doses of force in the international environment create a noise level that drowns out the sound of other signals." (p. 364.)

But his analysis of the Dominican crisis and the Johnson response to it glosses over the complexities and ambiguities of the situation as it actually evolved. No one can say for certain that U.S. inaction would not have resulted in the establishment of a second Soviet satellite in the Caribbean. Fidel Castro had only one-fifth as many followers as the Dominican radicals when he took to the hills of Oriente Province in 1956. While the national interest of the United States certainly could have survived a second Castro in the Caribbean, the basic interests of the Dominican people were also at issue. The intervention did end the bloodshed and the American occupation appears to have contributed significantly to the promising new start in the process of self-government made by the Dominicans since 1965. The free election of President Balaguer, and the establishment of political stability and economic growth in a climate of peace and freedom would seem to be good return for the American troop commitment. To identify the Caribbean intrusion as a Viet Nam-type error seems questionable in the light of events which have transpired since the President dispatched the Marines to the area.

The Faces of Power ends on a cautiously optimistic note. Despite setbacks, U.S. policy appears to be moving slowly toward peaceful solutions to world problems. Brown hopes for greater thought, sensitivity, flexibility, perseverance, sacrifice and maturity on the part of Americans and their leaders. Few readers will quarrel with his call. But he admits that these hopes are at best a "brief flame flickering in the wind" (p. 372), due to continued communist interest in solutions brought about by military force. The American Presidents since World War II have scarcely been free agents in matters of foreign policy. Although force solves no social problems, reliance upon it by a given national entity can block progress toward solutions and compel other countries, no matter how reluctantly, to take up arms in their own defense and in support of freedom.

Certain additional reservations regarding Brown's judgments can be noted. For example, the book could have benefited from a sharper delineation of the errors of the Truman Administration. The Truman-Acheson policy, while highly successful in Western Europe, for far too long slighted Asian problems. And although the Korean police action forced the administration to commit more national power to the Far East, the limited-war strategy inhibited the exercise of that power and ultimately denied Koreans, North and South, an opportunity to unify their nation and point it clearly toward a prosperous, democratic future. Recent events along the Korean frontier, including hundreds of communist intrusions be-

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sides the capture of the *Pueblo,* underscore the many unresolved conflicts present in that part of the world.

Also, praise of Eisenhower's creative contributions seems overdone as does condemnation, implied and explicit, of Dulles' rigidity. Dulles' initiatives, minus some of his more flamboyant rhetoric, fit the pattern of the foreign policy record of all the postwar Presidents. Truman's stand in Iran, Greece, Turkey and Korea, Eisenhower's in Lebanon, Guatemala and Taiwan, Kennedy's in Berlin and Cuba, Johnson's in South Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic, all seem quite similar in their intent—denial to the communists of geographic advances engineered through the use of force.

Finally, the Kennedy assessment somewhat neglects to balance praise for promising New Frontier peace initiatives with clear criticism of JFK's foreign policy blunders. The Bay of Pigs disaster has properly been termed by Theodore Draper the "perfect failure." Even the missile confrontation, while ably handled as far as it went, failed to make the Soviets give up a major military base in Latin America. For the first time since 1823, the United States has been forced to accept the continuing presence of a hostile governmental system intruded within the Western Hemisphere. All of the nations of Latin America, as well as the Cuban people themselves, have, as a result, been subject to subversive pressure supported by the Soviet Union, whose strength for manipulation they are unable to match. The very introduction of the missiles was an expression of Soviet contempt for Kennedy, stemming from demonstrated American weakness at the Bay of Pigs and repeated U.S. failure to assess with accuracy intelligence information on the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. On the other hand, Brown seems overly critical of Johnson, whose record may have been substantially the one Kennedy would have established had he lived.

But reservations should not detract from the importance of *The Faces of Power.* The book deserves close study. The process by which a major nation expresses its power in foreign affairs has rarely received more thoughtful analysis. Brown has supplied a perspective which should be of value to the policymakers who comprise the Nixon Administration.

The Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949*

by Warren I. Cohen

Contending that "once the Mandate of Heaven begins to slip away there is no turning back," John F. Melby has provided a depressing account of Chiang Kai-shek mirroring Canute, impotent against the ebbing tide in his attempt to retain power as support vanished and only his indomitable will remained. Equally depressing is the description of well-intentioned American efforts to determine China's future between 1945 and 1949, which prolonged the civil

**The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War, China 1945-49.* By John F. Melby. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. 313 pp. $10.00.

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war and left both sides with strong anti-American feelings. The author is not content to imply the obvious parallels with intervention in Viet Nam, and there is no mistaking his message.

The book is at core a "diary" constructed from notes and letters written while Melby, then an officer of the Foreign Service of the United States, was stationed in China, November 1945 to December 1948. Each section is prefaced by substantial introductory comments based on the famed "China White Paper" (*United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*), of which the *Mandate* jacket indicates Melby was the principal author. Diary entries are occasionally accompanied by marginal notes that identify less well-known figures, clarify points or allow the author additional opportunity for editorializing. Further reflections appear in a brief epilogue.

Of the various threads woven through Melby's narrative, two are of primary importance. First is a persistent sense of the hopelessness of the Kuomintang cause and the helplessness of the Americans who sought to bring peace and reforms to the Chinese people. The coalition government that Marshall sought to create appears as a desperate effort to bring peace before the Kuomintang embarked on a course American authorities believed would be disastrous for the Chinese people and suicidal for Chiang's legions. In retrospect, Marshall's efforts, misguided as would be any efforts to reconcile the irreconcilable, were nonetheless the only hope, not only for peace in China but for the Kuomintang, for a noncommunist China. The idea of an alternative to Chiang or Mao, of a third force of liberal democrats, is rendered absurd by Melby's portrait of the pathetic circumstances of liberal intellectuals in a land where all power came out of the barrel of a gun and all guns were controlled by Chiang and Mao.

In his afterthoughts, Melby also brushes aside Tang Tsou's (*America's Failure in China*) conclusion that the United States foundered in China because it was unwilling to use force commensurate with its objectives—a theory not likely to impress a generation witness to the Viet Nam case study on the limitations of power. Whatever the responsibilities of power may mean for the American people, they do not include responsibility for Chiang Kai-shek's failure in China.

A second important theme that emerges clearly is of Chinese hostility to the Russians, which infected the communist Chinese as well as those around Chiang. Shaken by Stalin's deal with Chiang in August 1945, the communists, too, were appalled by the Soviet rape of Manchuria. Melby constantly records evidence of the potential for discord between a communist China and the Soviet Union and of widespread assumptions that Mao's China would be at least as independent as Tito's Yugoslavia—though none dreamed that the Chinese would claim to be champions of the true faith.

New to many students of Amer-

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ican policy will be Melby's description of the strange role of Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, who ignored the Department of State and showed no interest in the decision-making process in Washington. Though Stuart did not trouble to keep his staff informed, his Chinese secretary, Philip Fugh, managed to keep the Chinese government well informed. As a result, the Embassy staff was forced to keep information from the Ambassador in order to prevent leaks and perhaps to protect the lives of their sources.

Some important questions remain unanswered. Melby was aware of the massive anti-American campaign the Chinese communists launched on July 1, 1946, but he offers no explanation for the timing. What, if anything, had the United States done to warrant these attacks? He warns against efforts to impose American-conceived ends on other peoples, but beyond these vague strictures, offers no analysis of American intervention in the Chinese civil war nor any statement of what would have been a more appropriate role for the United States.

To explain various actions of which he did not approve, he develops a devil theory of history in which the so-called China Lobby plays the central role. Melby was part of that generation of Foreign Service officers subjected to the McCarthyite inquisition and no one can question his right to be bitter. On the other hand, the historian, however much he sympathizes with Melby and the more grievously wronged John Paton Davies and John S. Service, requires far more evidence than Melby offers before he can accept the idea that the "China Lobby" was responsible for every unseemly action by Americans and their government. The suppression of Ross Koen's book (*The China Lobby in American Politics*) deprived students of American policy of an opportunity to evaluate Koen's evidence, and Melby's references are less than satisfactory. Indeed, on one occasion he cites Herbert Feis (*The China Tangle*) as evidence for the China Lobby's influence on Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley's resignation, but the reader will find that Feis wrote nothing of the sort.

For the professional, this book is to be treasured more for its color than for its content. Though there is little new information, Melby's earthy observations on life in China will delight every American who has ever lived there and will provide the uninitiated with an understanding that some of the smells of China cannot be blamed on the Kuomintang. For the layman, the book provides a lively record and a sense of what happened in China which is far more readable than any previous account.

A History of Psychological Warfare*

by Thomas T. Winant

Recognition of man's attempts to control his neighbors' opinions, if not their minds, is certainly not

**Shinri Sensō.* (English title: *Psychological Warfare: A Historical Review and Basic Principles.*) By Hisao Iwashima. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1968. 247 pp. n.p.

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lacking in this day of the mass audience and mass media. The sensitivity of the human animal to ideas, especially those someone wants him to have, seems to be proportionate to man's numbers and ever increasing physical proximity. In *Shinri Sensō* Professor Hisao Iwashima has attempted to explain to a Japanese audience the principles of persuasion as a technique of modern warfare. Rarely in the history of free societies has a people been so buffeted by the winds of psychological warfare as have the Japanese. Geographically close to three communist powers, the Soviet Union, North Korea and mainland China, as well as two anti-communist states, the Republics of Korea and China, yet committed in alliance with the United States, Japan has been a strategic focus of both the Cold War (1950's) and Hot Peace (1960's) eras.

Iwashima devotes the major part of his volume to a general history of psychological warfare, from the Bible to *Pravda*. The Western specialist with a prolonged fascination for what the author calls *Shinri-sen* (translated as psywar) will find little that is new in this exposition. Much of the information presented is from Western sources consulted by the author. To Japanese who have been less enraptured with "psywar" it may be a revelation to have Moses, Alexander the Great, Caesar and Napoleon paraded forth as masters of the modern-day art of mind-molding.

The manipulation of "truth" to suit the needs of the state becomes clearer as the modern period is discussed. The tremendous efforts of the Hitlerite regime toward the perfection of "psywar" techniques, the sophisticated and persuasive activities of the Soviet Union and China are all carefully explained. An interesting section is devoted to American "psywar," from the founding fathers through Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, Wilson's Fourteen Points, the O.S.S., the Zacharias broadcasts to Japan in World War II, and on into the postwar U.S.-Soviet conflict.

"Because of the sensitive nature of his position at the Japanese Defence College," Professor Iwashima has been prevented from commenting on "psywar" and its specific Japanese contemporary contexts. Considering the pivotal role of Japan in Asian politics, this is a disappointment. There is much to be told about psychological warfare and its relationship to Japan. An introductory work of this nature should be succeeded by a more detailed study on the Japanese experience.

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Books Received

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I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Cromwell. Edited by Maurice Ashley. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 177 pp. $4.95 ($1.95, paper). As part of the Great Lives Observed series, this volume portrays Cromwell through his own words on such topics as law reform and the execution of Charles I, the views of his contemporaries, and analyses in retrospect by historians Leopold Von Ranke, Hugh Trevor-Roper and C. V. Wedgwood.

Economic Nationalism in Old and New States. Edited by Harry G. Johnson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967. 141 pp. $5.00. The editor's opening essay presents a formal theory of nationalism that attempts to relate the phenomenon to rational governmental processes. Arcadius Kahan and Roger Weiss examine, respectively, nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe and the extent to which British economic policy was influenced by nationalism. Robert Dernberger contrasts nationalism with the internationalist philosophy of communism; Manning Nash examines nationalism in Mexico. Two other essays, by the editor and Aristide Zolberg, assess the impact of economic nationalism on Canada and Mali..

The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time. By John G. Stoessinger. New York: Random House, 1969. 455 pp. $7.95. This third edition of a basic text in world politics—whose first edition won the Bancroft Prize in International Relations in 1963—contains accounts of the 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovakian crisis and the changing nature of NATO, an analysis of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, a case study of the Vietnamese conflict, and an explanation of the subtle changes in the two major power struggles of our time: the Cold War or East-West confrontation and the developed vs. developing nations or North-South confrontation.

Natural Selection of Political Forces. By Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1968. 120 pp. $1.95 (paper). The four lectures in this small volume were originally delivered at the University of Kansas Law School in April 1948 and published in late 1950 with an epilogue. Mr. Berle has added another epilogue, dated July 1968, in which he stresses that his principle of natural selection of political forces has not changed but the forces now active have been altered in the past two decades. He argues that natural selection favors political forces which tend to approach universality within their field of application and which give to individuals a sense of harmony with the universal pattern; and that selection discards forces which are based on limitative conceptions such as exclusion, aggrandizement and hatred, and which tend to concentrate power without modifying that power by imposing, in some form, corresponding responsibility.

Politics and the International System. Edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1969. 514 pp. $4.95 (paper). An important new

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volume of readings on international relations for college courses. The editor, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, has organized the selections around the following topics: the nature and scope of international relations; theory-building efforts, from utopianism and realism to systems frameworks and theories of integration; conflict and military power; technology; economics; man-milieu relationships; national character and transnational images; propaganda and psychological warfare; and the management of power through diplomacy, balance of power, alliances, arms control and disarmament, and integration at the international level.

Science and Technology in Developing Countries. Edited by Claire Nader and A. B. Zahlan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. 588 pp. $16.00. This book contains the proceedings of a conference, held at the American University of Beirut in December 1967, at which nearly 100 specialists discussed the problems of planning the development and application of modern science and technology in emerging countries, with particular reference to the Arab world and Turkey. The three main topics examined were the nature of the link between science, technology and national goals; the problems facing institutions of higher education and government in the Arab world and Turkey; and the kinds of support required to promote scientific and technological expansion, and the cultural factors affecting this effort.

Totalitarianism in Perspective. By Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis and Benjamin R. Barber. New York: Praeger, 1969. 164 pp. $6.00 ($2.25, paper). A debate on the usefulness of the totalitarian construct as an analytical tool. In his opening essay, Dr. Barber surveys the major approaches to the concept and questions its integrity. He suggests that a critically nurtured language of comparative political analysis will leave little room for the totalitarian construct. Dr. Curtis analyzes actual political systems out of which the concept emerged, as well as those to which it is applied currently, and concludes that its usefulness as an analytical model is impaired because it does not illuminate the respective systems as a whole, but illustrates only facets of their behavior. Dr. Friedrich argues for retaining the concept, because the "totalitarian syndrome" encompasses unique defining characteristics that are meaningful in the comparative analysis of modern political systems.

The United Nations and How It Works. (Revised edition.) By David Cushman Coyle. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 256 pp. $7.50. An up-to-date reference work which surveys the structure of the UN and its responsibilities. The book also includes the complete Charter and a list of the principal organs, agencies and commissions of the UN.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council. By Walter R. Sharp. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 332 pp. $8.75. A detailed analysis of the Council since its inception in 1946, and of how its role has changed because of the entrance into the UN of many new African and Asian states during the 1960's. In assessing whether or not it might again assume importance as a coordinative and planning instrument for the wide range of economic and social development programs now sponsored by the UN and related specialized agencies, the author submits and discusses some recommendations.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

Arms Control in International Politics. By David V. Edwards. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. 200 pp. $7.50 ($4.50, paper). Using a study of the nature, objectives, successes and failures of arms control as a basis, the author analyzes the national and international political conditions that will encourage and permit nations to approach, attain, implement and maintain arms

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control arrangements. The difficulties of such arrangements are investigated with special emphasis on inspection and control.

Atomic Shield 1947/1952. By Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969. 718 pp. $11.95. This second volume of the series documenting the history of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission begins with the transference of the government's atomic energy program to the AEC in 1947. It covers the Oppenheimer Affair, recounts the U.S. effort to build up the atomic stockpile, views the effect of the Korean War on atomic matters, and describes the debate over whether the H-bomb should be built.

The Bomb and the Computer: A Crucial History of War Games. By Andrew Wilson. New York: Delacorte Press, 1969. 218 pp. $5.95. Originating with the Prussian General Staff as a series of tabletop maneuvers, the war game has evolved as a military planning device. Its uses, pitfalls, limitations and advantages are here critically appraised. The author discusses how war games are employed to gain "synthetic war experience," for research in international relations, to analyze new weapons systems and to generate scenarios, and points out some notable failures in battle of war game solutions. There are useful sections on the organizations engaged in war gaming and a glossary of the various types of games.

Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals. Edited by Edward Shils. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1968. 207 pp. $2.95. In discussing how money is spent, or should be spent, on the promotion of national goals in science and in society at large, scientists and other informed authors study the problem of scientific choice and the conflict it engenders among and between the state, schools, the economy and human beings.

Disarmament and Soviet Policy 1964-1968. By Thomas B. Larson. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 280 pp. $6.95. Analyzing Soviet internal and external trends since 1964, Larson shows how developments in Soviet leadership, ideology, economy, foreign policy and military potential relate to disarmament. While Moscow is interested in arms control, the agreements of 1967-1968, on space and nonproliferation, have involved no arms reductions, no slowdown in weapons development or procurement. He concludes that the United States and the USSR will be drawn back to negotiations repeatedly because neither has been able to purchase with free competition in weapons development the kind of influence and security each seeks.

Lawrence and Oppenheimer. By Nuel Pharr Davis. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968. 384 pp. $7.50. The fateful story of two of America's greatest physicists, Lawrence, the inventor of the cyclotron, and Oppenheimer, the wartime director of the Los Alamos Weapons Laboratory. Their association began in productive harmony and ended in rancor that split the nation's scientific community and swayed the entire course of U.S. nuclear and defense policy in the postwar period. Davis writes not of abstract science but of the ambitions, tensions, insights and clashing values of two brilliant men.

The Luftwaffe War Diaries. By Cajus Bekker. Translated and edited by Frank Ziegler. New York: Doubleday, 1968. 399 pp. $7.95. A history of the wartime German Air Force recounting the main events that took place in the major theaters of action: the West, Russia, the Mediterranean and Germany. Because of the complexity of the subject it has been impossible in a single volume to treat issues in comprehensive detail. Important developments in the air aspect of the war are condensed in the summary and conclusions at the end of each chapter. The chronicle of the Luftwaffe's last year has been summarized only; according

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to the author, it had little influence on the eventual outcome of the war. The first chapter makes abundantly clear that the seeds of the Luftwaffe's defeat were sown well before the war began.

The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power 1934-40. By Derek Wood with Derek Dempster. New York: Paperback Library, 1969. 505 pp. $1.25. A paperback reissue of a work originally published in 1961, revised and updated with new technological material, *The Narrow Margin* is a comprehensive analysis of the German and British scientific-technological, military, strategic and intelligence preparations for the Battle of Britain. The first part recounts the rise of air power in the prewar period. Part two begins with the invasion of the Low Countries and ends with the one month of grace afforded the British after the fall of France to prepare for the air onslaught. Part three describes the actual air battle, the technical operation of the British air defense system, and each side's strategic and military operations.

The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy. By Michael H. Armacost. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 304 pp. $10.00. Armacost presents an analysis of the ways in which interservice rivalry, as one facet of the political process, affected the development of the intermediate range ballistic missiles, Thor and Jupiter. He shows how weapons choices and policies are influenced by the character of the political-legislative process the military services engage in in order to achieve larger budgets, additional mission assignments, more extensive roles and additional weapons. He also describes how civilian officials may attempt to manage the terms of interservice competition with the aim of improving the rationality of weapons planning.

Survival and the Bomb: Methods of Civil Defense. Edited by Eugene P. Wigner. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969. 307 pp. $7.95. This book explores the political, economic, military and emotional attitudes regarding civil defense (CD) of which the current ABM debate is a part. Its authors consider the probable effect of CD preparations on the likelihood of war, their influence on morale in peacetime, and their effectiveness if put to the test. The conclusion is that an intelligently planned and thoughtfully executed civil defense program would enable the United States to negotiate during crisis, and, in the event of war, to save lives and begin the task of recovery and recuperation.

Tongues of Conscience: Weapons Research and the Scientists' Dilemma. By R. W. Reid. New York: Walker and Company, 1969. 352 pp. $7.50. An account of weapons research—from Nobel's explosives to present BW/CW research—and the deepening crisis of conscience as some of the greatest scientists engaged in it became increasingly uneasy about their role as weapons-makers. Recorded along with the story of the A-bomb and H-bomb projects are the more significant cases of nuclear espionage, in which the author reveals the agonizing dilemmas of clashing moralities among the key participants.

Weapons Systems Decisions: Political and Psychological Perspectives on Continental Defense. Edited by Davis B. Bobrow. New York: Praeger, 1969. 301 pp. $17.50. In a study resulting from a research project sponsored by the Oak Ridge National Laboratories, authors from several social and behavioral science disciplines discuss the place of behavioral science variables—principally political and psychological—in national security affairs relating to continental air defense, missile defense and civil defense. Using data from simulation, survey research and content analysis, they consider such topics as the development of a

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general methodology for responsive predictions; the debate about strategy between World Wars I and II; and the reactions of other powers to alternative U.S. defense postures.

III. United States and Canada

Curtains over Vietnam: Strategic Appraisal of Suppressed Aspects of U.S. Security Stake in Vietnam. By Charles A. Weil. Jericho, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1969. 155 pp. $6.00. A convinced "hawk" on Viet Nam, author Weil criticizes the Johnson and Nixon Administrations for not explaining to the American people why defense of Viet Nam is a vital national interest, and admits that were he of draft age he would probably be a "peacenik" because today's youth have not been told clearly why Americans have to fight in Southeast Asia. The purpose of his book is to set forth in straightforward language the strategic-military reasons which make Viet Nam essential to U.S. security.

Governing the States and Localities: Selected Readings. Edited by Duane Lockard. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 432 pp. $4.50 (paper). A useful collection of supplementary readings to accompany the author's text on state and local government. The essays focus on power—how it is amassed, used and abused in different contexts. Among the topics treated are governmental problems relating to the ghetto, suburban development and city planning.

High on Foggy Bottom: An Outsider's Inside View of the Government. By Charles Frankel. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 240 pp. $6.95. A former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Johnson Administration offers a personal statement, philosophical commentary, humorous anecdotes and cogent analysis on the workings and failings of U.S. bureaucracy, especially the State Department. He answers such questions as what does a government servant actually *do* in his job from day to day; why does a man who enters government full of new ideas become an apologist for why things can't be changed; what are the frustrations and satisfactions of official life; and what is it like to be inside "the power structure," yet to find "power" becoming more elusive the closer you get to it?

The Making of the President, 1968. By Theodore H. White. New York: Atheneum, 1969. 459 pp. $10.00. A fascinating and sweeping report on political America in 1968—the condition of the two major parties and the emergence of Wallace, the resurgence of Nixon and the withdrawal of Johnson, the campaigns of McCarthy and Kennedy, the Miami and Chicago conventions, the election campaign and its outcome, all against the background of Viet Nam, space shots, student demonstrations, street riots, and the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy.

The Politics of State and Local Government. By Duane Lockard. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 545 pp. $8.95. In this second edition of his text, the author emphasizes the political process at work at the state and local level, giving particular attention to the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on reapportionment in altering the characteristics of state politics. He also assesses the effect of increased party competition on state and local politics. A bibliography with state-by-state listings is included.

Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. By Dean Acheson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 798 pp. $15.00. President Truman's Secretary of State presents a penetrating account of the postwar era, covering the period from World War II, the reconstruction of Europe, the Korean War, the development of nuclear power, the formation of the UN and NATO, through the beginning of the Cold War. The cast of characters of which he writes includes

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Truman, Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, Attlee, Bevin, Eden, Adenauer, Yoshida, Vishinsky, Schuman and Molotov. Among the subjects he analyzes incisively, from a personal point of view, are the process of policymaking; bureaucratic power; the role of intelligence—its successes and failures; the necessity for decision; the role of power; and the need for initiative in matters of state.

The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars. By Selig Adler. London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1969. 340 pp. $2.95 (paper). Intended for the general reader rather than the specialist, this work, first published in hardcover in 1965, traces U.S. policy in the interwar years. Lack of consensus as to the appropriate role it should exercise in world affairs contributed, according to the author, to the United States' failure to seize leadership in averting the outbreak of World War II. A useful bibliography provides information on sources pertaining to this era of U.S. diplomacy.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1969. 216 pp. $2.45 (paper). The evolution of U.S.-European relations since the founding of NATO, the principal sources of tension among Atlantic countries, and the need for close collaboration between the United States and Western Europe are the major subjects covered in this volume, published in connection with the twentieth anniversary of NATO's establishment. The author's thesis is that a series of imbalances in military affairs, technology, politics and economics have contributed to the disarray of NATO and the reduction of Atlantic cohesiveness. He argues that a unified Western Europe would serve the basic interests of both the European states and the United States in the 1970's, and presents a series of policy proposals aimed at molding a new Atlantic consensus.

Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie: Bonns Beitrag zur Europaischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. By Arnulf Baring. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1969. 492 pp. n.p. A historical and structural-functional analysis of the foreign policymaking process in the Federal Republic of Germany, using Bonn's contribution to the abortive European Defense Community as a case study.

Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever. By Eleanor Lansing Dulles. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. 245 pp. $6.00. In addition to reviewing Berlin's history since World War II, the author, a well-known authority on German affairs, describes the circumstances under which the Berlin Wall was constructed in 1961 and assesses Berlin's strengths and weaknesses today, including the moods of its people. It is her conviction that Berliners will not indefinitely permit the issue of German reunification to remain unsettled.

The Breaking Wave: World War II in the Summer of 1940. By Telford Taylor. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967. 378 pp. $10.00. The third volume in the author's series on the Wehrmacht and the Nazis, this covers the strategic, political and military aspects of one of the most decisive campaigns of World War II, the Battle of Britain. While the most dramatic engagements of this battle were fought in the air over England, Taylor recounts the German preparations for a seaborne invasion and the English preparations to forestall and disrupt it.

Cyprus. By H. D. Purcell. New York: Praeger, 1969. 416 pp. $9.00. In this thorough study of Cyprus, the author explains the historical precedents that gave rise to the difficulties of the past decade, stressing that the whole of Cyprian history has been a story of ethnic conflict. He believes any solution to the present

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stalemate between Cypriot Greeks and Turks will entail large-scale separation of the peoples. The withdrawal of UN troops, now or in the future, will result in a repetition of the previous unstable situation.

France. By Douglas Johnson. New York: Walker and Company, 1969. 271 pp. $6.50. Following a survey of French history prior to World War II, the author concentrates on the Fifth Republic under Charles de Gaulle and the impact on the French political scene of such events as the 1968 strikes, the student riots and the financial crisis. In a brief postscript noting de Gaulle's resignation from office, he charges that the French President was unable to reconcile the various elements of France whose differences have long contributed to political instability. He wonders whether de Gaulle's successor will prove better able to unite the nation.

The Franco-Prussian War. By Michael Howard. New York: Collier Books, 1969. 512 pp. $3.95 (paper). Historian Howard, Professor of War Studies and Dean of the Faculty of Arts in the University of London, provides a comprehensive account of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, including a description of technological advances in weaponry, reforms of the French and German armies, military mobilization and war plans, economic and social pressures, the intrigues of Bismarck and Moltke, Gambetta and the French generals, the grim battles in the Saar and the Ardennes, and the siege of Paris.

The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918. By C. A. Macartney. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 886 pp. $14.95. An impressive scholarly narrative of the century-and-a-quarter power struggle between the ancient dynastic empire that ruled Central Europe and the rising national, political and social forces that eventually overthrew the *ancien régime* and splintered all of Europe.

A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945. By Hajo Holborn. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. 818 pp. $9.75. An important new history of Germany in the period of nationalism, imperialism and world war, from the abortive effort of popular forces to establish a liberal national state and Bismarck's unification of Germany, through the Prussian military monarchy, to the expansionist designs of William II and Hitler. This is the third and last volume in the series by Professor Holborn on the history of modern Germany from the Reformation to 1945.

Hitler's Last Gamble: The Battle of the Bulge. By Jacques Nobécourt. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 302 pp. $2.45. The paperback edition of a 1967 study of the difficulty of establishing the correct relationship between the political direction of a nation or coalition and its military instrument. The author's contention is that the Battle of the Bulge had political repercussions, for both the Germans and the Allies, far greater than any other single operation of the war.

Index to British Foreign Office Correspondence, 1920-1938. Public Record Office, Great Britain. Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus-Thomson Organization, Ltd., for Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1969. 77 volumes. $2,350.00. The British government, by recently reducing from fifty to thirty years the period during which its official papers and correspondence are closed to public inspection, has released a vast storehouse of source material for the study of the momentous years 1920-1938. These volumes contain the Foreign Office index to dispatches and correspondence, enabling scholars to identify documents relevant to their research. Once the existence of any paper has been established, a photocopy may be ordered directly from the Public Record Office. Kraus-Thomson will publish subsequent volumes on an annual basis as documents are

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declassified under the thirty-year rule. Kraus Reprint Corporation of New York is the American distributor.

Modern Belgium. By Frank E. Huggett. New York: Praeger, 1969. 296 pp. $7.50. An interesting account of the problems of twentieth-century Belgium, presenting an in-depth portrayal of the clash between Flemish nationalism and Walloon internationalism. The author attempts to answer the question whether Belgium will be able to survive as a unitary state in view of its ethnic divisions and the political discontent that results from them.

Policy-Making in Britain: A Reader in Government. Edited by Richard Rose. New York: The Free Press, 1969. 375 pp. $9.95. Dr. Rose is Professor of Politics at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland. His many books include *Politics in England, Studies in British Politics* and *Influencing Voters.* This volume is a collection of analytical rather than prescriptive articles on the policymaking process in Britain, arranged in four sections: Political Recruitment, Political Roles, Case Studies in Public Policy, and The Policy Process. The articles, selected for their quality, relevance, permanence and difficulty of access, were written by political scientists, sociologists, journalists, civil servants and cabinet officers.

Stalin, Hitler, and Europe 1933-1939: The Origins of World War II. By James E. McSherry. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1969. 308 pp. $10.00. A step-by-step account of the secret Soviet official maneuvers that led to World War II, paying particular attention to Stalin's cunning and Germany's rise to power as they culminated in the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact of 1939.

V. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy. By Richard F. Rosser. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 391 pp. $8.50 ($4.95, paper). Dr. Rosser, USAF Colonel and Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at the U.S. Air Force Academy, examines the motivational sources and chronological unfolding of Soviet foreign policy from 1917 to 1968.

Communist Party-States: Comparative and International Studies. Edited by Jan F. Triska. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. 392 pp. $9.00. In this collection of essays, written in the period 1963-1967 and updated for this volume, sixteen authors examine various aspects of the communist party-states as they interact within the world communist system. The papers treat such topics as the integrative tasks of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact; the peculiar identity problems of Cuba and the four divided nations—Germany, Korea, Viet Nam and China; interaction of the communist states with developing nations; the link between socio-economic development and comparative rates of liberalization; the effect of external conflict on the cohesion of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the basic themes of Soviet foreign policy, especially ideology and national interest. The authors employ new theoretical concepts, methodologies and research techniques.

The Cuban Crisis and the Chinese-Indian Border War. By Andrew Dapondes. New York: Vantage Press, 1969. 126 pp. $2.95. A former U.S. Army military intelligence analyst attempts to demonstrate that the Cuban crisis and the Chinese-Indian border war were really two military parts of a single communist strategy.

A History of Russia. By Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 748 pp. $13.50. In this new edition of his standard text on Russian history, Professor Riasanovsky adds sections on the erratic economic

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policies of the post-Stalin period; Khrushchev's rise to power and the political and administrative reorganizations he tried to effect; the post-Khrushchev economic "liberalization"; foreign policy issues such as the Cuban crisis, evolution in Eastern Europe, the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict, and the Soviet posture toward the war in Viet Nam; and social and intellectual developments.

Russia's Road from Peace to War: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-1941. By Louis Fischer. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 499 pp. $12.50. This new treatment of Soviet foreign policy focuses on domestic politics and the attitudes and behavior of the men who ruled from the Kremlin. Fischer's personal acquaintance with many Soviet leaders casts new light on many intriguing and little-known episodes, and he has had access to hitherto unpublished documents in the German, British and French archives.

The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy. By Uri Ra'anan. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. 256 pp. $10.00. An analysis of the relationship between Soviet donors of military aid and their Afro-Asian recipients. By means of two case studies, Egypt and Indonesia, Ra'anan focuses on the problems confronting Soviet foreign policymakers and the connection between the various communist parties and states. He makes use of new material that throws light on the motivations and operational processes of Soviet decision-makers.

Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis. Edited by Robin Alison Remington, with an introduction by William E. Griffith. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. 473 pp. $12.50. Mirroring the Dubcek era, January to August 1968, these Czechoslovakian and foreign documents are arranged in six parts: Prelude to January, Liberalization in Prague and Orthodox Response, Pressure and Negotiation. Invasion of Czechoslovakia and Split in World Communism, Normalization, and Epilogue. They reflect the factional struggle within the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and the involvement of Soviet, other East European and West European communist leaders in the 1968 crisis.

VI. Middle East and Africa

African Armies and Civil Order. By J. M. Lee. New York: Praeger, published for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. 198 pp. $6.00. An examination of why some new African states have been vulnerable to violent military takeover while others have been able to withstand the military. Analyzing a wide variety of contributing factors, such as the disparate colonial heritage, economic and financial stability, ethnic rivalries, a regime's popularity with its people, relations with the great powers, and the roles each state assigns to the military, Professor Lee provides an enlightening survey of the problems of civil order and military intervention in developing African countries. The book contains examples from thirty nations, including the ten English-speaking states, the eighteen French-speaking states associated with the European Common Market, Guinea and Ethiopia.

Icon and Minaret: Sources of Byzantine and Islamic Civilization. Edited by Charles M. Brand. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 180 pp. $4.95 ($2.45, paper). Professor Brand has selected a series of passages from historians, biographers, philosophers and travelers, the decrees of Church Councils, the lives of the Saints, the Koran, and contemporary codes of law and imperial statutes to provide insight into the passionate faith, turbulent politics, and momentous social conflicts that characterized the Byzantine and Islamic civilizations from the fourth to fifteenth centuries.

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The Modern History of Egypt. By P. J. Vatikiotis. New York: Praeger, 1969. 512 pp. $9.50. A comprehensive history of Egypt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with emphasis on political and cultural developments and relations with outside powers. Mr. Vatikiotis is Professor of Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

United Arab Republic: Egypt. Edited by Donald N. Wilber. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1969. 461 pp. $11.00. This fourteenth volume in the series entitled "Survey of World Cultures" treats of Egypt's culture, historical setting, geography, transportation, population and ethnic groups, languages, religion, social structure, education, art and literature, political dynamics, governmental structure, mass media, foreign relations, national economic goals, agriculture, industry, domestic and foreign trade, and other topics.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

Asia and Western Dominance. By K. M. Panikkar. New York: Collier Books, 1969. 364 pp. $2.95 (paper). An important contribution by the distinguished Indian statesman, scholar, diplomat and editor to an understanding of Europe's impact on Asia from 1498 to 1950. Originally published more than a decade ago, the book remains one of the most insightful accounts of European expansion, conquest, empire and retreat, with valuable sections on the Russian impact, Christian missions, and Oriental influences on European culture and thought.

Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965. Edited by Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper. Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. 503 pp. $8.75. Eleven distinguished Australian scholars review Australian foreign policy and relations in the period from 1961 through 1965. Topics covered include the Australian diplomatic service; economic and defense policies; the United Nations; relations with the United States, Japan, China, and the nations of South and Southeast Asia; Papua-New Guinea, and the South Pacific Commission.

The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy. By Stanley A. Kochanek. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 516 pp. $13.50. This valuable analysis of post-independence developments in the Congress Party of India is divided into three parts: (1) the relationship between the national party and the national government, using as its focus the relationship between the Prime Minister and the Congress President; (2) the evolving role of the Working Committee of the Congress, the changes in the composition of the party executive, its behavior and decision-making style, its relationship to the national government, the state governments, and the state parties, and its role in candidate selection; and (3) the source of Congress recruitment and the nature of the leadership elite in party and government.

General Giap: Politician and Strategist. By Robert J. O'Neill. New York: Praeger, 1969. 219 pp. $6.95. Major O'Neill, Senior Lecturer in History in the Faculty of Military Studies. Royal Military College of Australia, University of New South Wales, traces the intellectual, political and military development of this major North Vietnamese leader against the background of the growth of nationalism and communism in the 1920's and 1930's, the destruction of the colonial order during and after World War II, and the ensuing conflict between communist and noncommunist forces in Viet Nam.

Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan: Their Social Origins, Educational Backgrounds, and Career Patterns. By Akira Kubota. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 197 pp. $9.00. By collecting detailed information on 1,353 Japanese civil servants with the rank of section chief or above for the

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period from 1949 to 1959, Dr. Kubota has assembled the kind of systematic data that provides a solid base for understanding the major characteristics of the Japanese bureaucracy. The author found that these civil servants were recruited from nearly all parts of the country and all strata of society; that those who attended the Faculty of Law at Tokyo University tended to dominate the postwar bureaucracy; and that they were promoted largely on the basis of education and seniority, and tended to retire at about the age of fifty.

How the Conservatives Rule Japan. By Nathaniel B. Thayer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 349 pp. $10.00. A detailed analysis of the central feature of postwar Japanese politics: the workings of the Liberal Democratic (conservative) Party which has governed Japan since 1955 and was re-elected in late 1969 with an increased majority in parliament. Dr. Thayer, press attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo from 1962 to 1966 and currently director of programs at the Japan Society, Ltd., in New York, examines all aspects of the party's operations: the role of factions, relations with the economic community, the organization and financing of elections, the selection of a president, the making of the cabinet, and policymaking and decision-making.

Malaysia. By J. M. Gullick. New York: Praeger, 1969. 304 pp. $7.50. First published in 1963 under the title *Malaya,* this book has been revised and updated to take into account the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the withdrawal of Singapore in 1965, the positions of Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia, the Malaysian-Indonesian confrontation and new relationship, and developments in the tenuous society, "a mixture, but hardly a blending, of three major cultures, of two economic systems, of old and new." Mr. Gullick served in the Malayan civil service from 1946 to 1957 and is the author of two previous books on Malaysia.

Taxation and Economic Development in India. By James Cutt. New York: Praeger, 1969. 413 pp. $17.50. India's stated economic goals suggest three major objectives for tax policy: to increase the growth rate of national income by increasing the proportion of income saved and invested in both public and private sectors; to mitigate inequalities of income and wealth; and to control inflationary price increases. Dr. Cutt's analysis of India's tax system reviews the objectives of the present tax policy, investigates the extent to which Indian federal and state taxes meet these objectives, makes recommendations for the modification of the system, and suggests new taxes to help attain policy goals. The author, an Assistant Professor of Economics at York University in Canada, also explores the problems of tax administration in developing countries and offers proposals for administrative reform.

This is Communist China. Edited by Robert Trumbull. New York: David McKay, 1968. 274 pp. $5.95. In 1966 and 1967, one of Japan's largest newspapers, *Yomiuri Shimbun,* sent a staff of journalists and scholars to Communist China to write an in-depth study of her accomplishments and failures, continuing power struggles, record of the Cultural Revolution, outlook of youth, impact of Maoism, and strength of the Red Army. Robert Trumbull, chief of the Tokyo bureau of the *New York Times,* prepared these articles for publication and wrote the Foreword.

Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia. By Robert Shaplen. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 465 pp. $8.95. A country-by-country analysis of Southeast Asia by the Asian correspondent of *The New Yorker.* He probes the internal situation in each country, the successes and failures of U.S. policy, and the effects of Communist China's giant presence and the Vietnamese conflict on the area. Much of the material has appeared in *The New Yorker,*

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but there are two new chapters and the others have been extensively revised and reformulated.

VIII. Latin America

The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition. By Howard J. Wiarda. New York: Praeger, 1969. 249 pp. $7.00. A brief survey of recent Dominican history, with emphasis on the Trujillo era and the post-Trujillo period, is followed by chapters on geography, the people, social structure, education and culture, the economy, governmental structures, political processes, public policy and foreign affairs. The author is Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Massachusetts and has lived in the Dominican Republic for many years.

A Monetary Policy for Latin America. By Pierre Uri with Nicholas Kaldor, Richard Ruggles, Robert Triffin. New York: Praeger, for the Atlantic Institute, 1968. 147 pp. $15.00. An important study of inflation and general monetary instability as it affects the distribution of income in Latin America, as a basic obstacle to social progress and international cooperation, and as a prime factor influencing political stability and economic development. The authors examine such topics as Latin America and the monetary debate, the general theory of inflation, characteristics of monetary evolution in Latin America, internal financial policies, and foreign trade and exchange policy. In a concluding section, they present a strategy for growth and stability.

Papa Doc: The Truth About Haiti Today. By Bernard Diederich and Al Burt. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. 393 pp. $8.95. An indictment of Francois Duvalier's "megalomaniac misguidance" of Haiti by two journalists who were expelled from Haiti in 1963. Diederich, who lived nearly fourteen years in Haiti, is currently in charge of Time-Life International of Mexico, and Burt, who traveled frequently to Haiti for United Press, is now editor of state news operations and Latin American affairs for the *Miami Herald*. They examine Haitian developments since that day in 1957 when power passed into the hands of Papa Doc, a physician by profession who became a "witch doctor" in office.

Politics in the Altiplano: The Dynamics of Change in Rural Peru. By Edward Dew. Austin: The University of Texas Press, for the Institute of Latin American Studies, 1969. 216 pp. $6.00. An analysis of the sources of conflict and political change in the plural society of Puno in southern Peru as it underwent socio-economic development through a period of recurring natural disasters. Dr. Dew examines the mismanagement of American aid to the suffering peasants; the migration to Peru's coastal cities which reached such large-scale proportions that it launched several peasant movements in Puno; the creation of an autonomous development corporation for Puno by the Peruvian Congress, and the institution of local elections in 1963—all of which combined to provide ample opportunity for dissident mestizos, *cholos* and peasants to pursue their "revolutionary" goals.

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Monographs and Reports Received

American Foreign Aid: Strategy for the 1970's. By Max F. Millikan. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 196, August 1969. 64 pp. 85 cents.

Asian Dilemma: United States, Japan and China. Edited by Elaine H. Burnell. Santa Barbara: A Special Report from the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Vol. II, No. 5, October 1969. 236 pp. $2.25.

Assisting Development in Low-Income Countries: Priorities for U.S. Government Policy. CED Research and Policy Committee. New York: Committee for Economic Development, September 1969. 81 pp. $1.25.

Austria: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 1969. 42 pp. 80 cents.

Bibliography on Peace Research in History. By Blanche Weisen Cook. Santa Barbara: American Bibliographical Center, Bibliography and Reference Series, No. 11, September 1969. 72 pp. $6.95.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. By Zdenek Suda. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. 178 pp. $2.95.

Detente: Dilemma or Disaster? By Gerald L. Steibel. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1969. 37 pp. $1.00.

Eastern Europe After Czechoslovakia. By Alexander J. Groth. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 195, June 1969. 63 pp. 85 cents.

Finland: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, June 1969. 60 pp. 80 cents.

From Destruction of CCP to Birth of Mao-Lin Party: A Survey of the Party Congress in 1921-1969. By King Ta-kai. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, June 1969. 97 pp. $1.00.

Greece—A New Vietnam? By Elias P. Demetracopoulos. Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, August 1969. 29 pp. n.p.

Internal War and International Systems: Perspectives on Method. By George A. Kelly and Linda B. Miller. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 21, August 1969. 40 pp. $2.00.

Issues Before the 24th General Assembly. Special editor, Lynn H. Miller. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation,* No. 574, September 16, 1969. 199 pp. $1.25.

Italy: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, August 1969. 59 pp. 80 cents.

Japan: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969. 57 pp. 80 cents.

Latin American Development: A Selected Bibliography (1950-1967). By Jerry L. Weaver. Santa Barbara: American Bibliographical Center, Bibliography and Reference Series, No. 9, October 1969. 87 pp. $7.25.

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Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations. By Joan M. Nelson. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 22, September 1969. 81 pp. $2.25.

Natural Alliance for the West: Flexibility and Global Security. By Geoffrey Williams. London: The Atlantic Trade Study, Trade Policy Research Centre, June 1969. 109 pp. 7/-.

Nontariff Distortions of Trade. CED Research and Policy Committee. New York: Committee for Economic Development, September 1969. 39 pp. $1.00.

Norway: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 1969. 57 pp. 80 cents.

The Politics of Regional Integration: The Central American Case. By James D. Cochrane. New Orleans: Tulane University, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. XII, 1969. 225 pp. $4.00.

Turkey: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, August 1969. 63 pp. 80 cents.

The UN and World Order. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 197, October 1969. 62 pp. 85 cents.

The Voices of Tearful and Bloody Complaints by the Chinese on the Mainland. By Chiao Chin-tang. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, May 1969. 137 pp. $1.40.

Weltrevolution oder Koexistenz? By Alois Riklin. Zurich: Schweizerischen Aufklärungs-Dienst, 1969. 126 pp. S.Fr. 4.50.

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Contributors to this Issue

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George Schwab, Assistant Professor of History, City College, The City University of New York; author of *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921-1936.*

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Thomas T. Winant, graduate student and teaching fellow, Department of History, University of Pennsylvania.

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